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Abstract
Atoms Organised - On the Orientations of
Theory, and the Theorisations of 
Organisation in the philosophy of Karl Marx
The  contemporary crisis has lead to a renewed interest in Marx's critique of political 
economy. But today it is hard to read Marx as the prophet of a new and better world, his 
writings  on capitalism's  self-destructive  tendencies  seem without  hope:  where  Marx 
believed that capitalist organisation would concentrate, homogenise and organise labour 
and orientate it toward socialism, in today's globalised capitalism the tendency is the 
opposite,  towards  precariousness,  disorganisation  and  competition.  This  raises  the 
problematic  of this  thesis,  that  of  the relation between orientation and organisation. 
Where  capitalist  organisation  atomises  and  differentiates,  the  starting  point  for 
orientation cannot be capitalist organisation. The question emerges: is there a place and 
orientation of self-organisation in Marx – and what is its possible relation to the critique 
of the dynamics of capital? 
To  answer  this  question,  I  will  not  focus  on  Marx's  explicit  theory  of  workers' 
organisation  or  the  party,  which  is  in  crisis,  but  on  his  theorisation  of  the  epochal 
problem of organisation under capitalism. Through a reading of some of Marx's central 
writings,  which  is  sensitive  to  their  historical  context,  the  thesis  asks:  what  is  the  
orientating role of the concepts of organisation and disorganisation in Marx's theory of  
capital and of revolutionary, history-making practice? From Kant we learn to think the 
mutual  implication  of  theory  and  practice  through  the  concept  of  orientation. 
Furthermore,  we show that  Marx's  concept  of  organisation was inspired by Hegel's 
Philosophy of Nature,  which starts from the problem of atomised individuals whose 
reproduction is contingent. Thus, organisation, when appropriately historicised in terms 
of this condition of contingency, does not start from the relation between capital and 
labour, but from the problem of reproduction. In conclusion we arrive at a concept of 
struggle that starts from resistances and struggles for reproduction, and which poses the 
question of their combination, self-organisation, and generalisation.
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Preface
This thesis was written during the unfolding global crisis, and it was disorientated and 
reorientated by it. I first started my research a year after the crash, in September 2009, 
at Queen Mary University. The initial project was to theorise contemporary money in 
relation  to  abstraction  and production.  This  research  was interrupted  by the student 
movements of 2010 and derailed by the year of 2011, in which I, like so many others, 
lived  the  Egyptian  Revolution,  the  Indignados,  the  August  riots,  and  the  Occupy 
Movement mostly vicariously. And with enthusiasm, anticipation and foreboding. By 
2012 the project had definitively turned to look at the central condition of the modern 
power of money: the separation between individuals and between individuals and their 
means of reproduction, and the problem of abolishing these conditions. Finally, the last 
and most important stretch of writing, from the beginning to the end of 2013, has been 
undertaken in Vienna, among new friends, many of whom have left behind the recent 
crises of Southern Europe, and the long ones of Pakistan, Morocco and Nigeria. While 
crisis, movements and friends did much to transform my topic and method, the work 
itself has mostly been lonesome: an enthusing conversation with the dead about the 
problems we share,  and a  time of withdrawal  from the joys  and frustrations  of the 
creations of resistant sociability that took place around me. This contradiction has been 
a source of disorientation and of many of the hopefully productive tensions that run 
through the pages that follow. 
Many can be thanked for their challenges, inspirations and suggestions, and for their 
caring help in sustaining me, the spaces that we share, and each other, together through 
life. 
First, my supervisors Matteo Mandarini and Amit Rai, for their patience, and for their 
intelligent  and  idiosyncratic  comments,  and  for  their  sometimes  daring  leniency. 
Hopefully in the future we will take some time discuss the silent partners of this thesis, 
your Lenin, Schmitt, and Tronti, Spinoza, Guattari, and Deleuze. I should also extend a 
thank-you to  my early  supervisor  Peter  Fleming,  who stated  so  clearly  that  money 
cannot be understood without reference to fear.
A great thank-you to Tarek Salhany, for his expert comments and proof reading, and to 
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our common friends Erik Empson and Arianna Bove who directed me to him. To my 
friends Nic Beuret and Paul Rekret who took time to read parts of this thesis, and to 
those who have commented on some of the writing that occurs transformed within it: 
Paolo Plotegher, Manuela Zechner, and Mikkel Thorup. 
For inspiring conversations, for comments to conference papers, and for invitations to 
speak or publish: Chris Arthur,  Emmanuel Renault,  Giorgio Cesarale,  Louisa Corna, 
Oxana Timofeeva, Jamila Mascat and Gregor Moder at the Jan van Eyck,  Historical  
Materialism conference  and  journal,  Marx  and  Philosophy,  Seongjing  Jeong for 
Marxism21, Honor Brabazon at Oxford Radical Forum, Stevphen Shukaitis for Minor 
Compositions,  Modkraft, Kulturrisse,  Turbulens,  Silvia  Federici,  George  Caffentzis, 
Mikkel  Thorup,  and Hans-Jørgen Schanz.  And to  Stathis  Kouvelakis  and Sebastian 
Budgen for putting me in touch with the folks at Queen Mary. 
As important – for we need not say more – is a resounding thank-you to the friends, 
with whom I have shared the thoughts and doubts, the dances, the foods and the chores 
of everyday life:  to  the young intellectuals at  Pevensey House:  John Cooper,  Adam 
Fabry, Matthias Hansl and Paolo Chiochetti. And the Millfields crew, for long dinners, 
garden fires, laughs and crazy videos: Mara Ferreri, Rakhee Kewada, David Latto, Fabi 
Borges, Alice and Riccardo. To the folks at Redwald Road, for so many lovely times in 
that  kitchen:  Gabriella  Alberti,  Josie  Cousins,  Claire  English,  Arthur  Swindells,  and 
Maria Papadoupoulos. And finally, under the roof on Dresdner Strasse, Birgit Mennel, 
and the talented lumpenproletarians and eternal migrants, Yassine and Marcus. 
And then thanks and thoughts to all the friends and spaces from whom I have learned so 
much: the usual suspects from King's College: Aude Lupa de Caunes, Lorenzo Fusaro, 
Adam, Stathis, Celine Cantat, Paolo Chiocchetti. And Chris Barnes, Sonia Cala-Lesina 
and Alex Pearce. Not least to the inventive qmary countermappers: Liz Mason-Deese, 
Tim Stallmann,  Catalina  de  Soto,  Camille  Barbagallo,  Rakhee,  Mara,  and  Manuela 
Zechner. The beloved nanopolitics group: Nelly Alfandari, Paolo Plotegher, Gabriella, 
Jorge Goia, Emma Dowling, Manuela and Mara. From the Precarious Workers Brigade, 
the wonderful Adriana Eysler, Janna Graham, Susan Kelly, Nico Vass, Mara, Manu, 
Nelly, etc., etc., And to Nic, Camile, Paul, Saskia Fischer, Tarek, John Hutnyk, Laura 
Schwartz, Pantxo Salvini, Vittorio Bini, to name only some of the cool people of The 
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Paper.  And to  the  BUSMAN  infiltrators,  for  scheming  and  drinks:  Saskia,  Emma, 
Valeria  Graziani,  Toni  Prug,  Marina  Vishmidt,  Tim Edkins,  Stefano  Harney,  Gerry 
Hanlon, Matteo, Amit and Arianna. And finally to the kids for letting me hang with their 
parents and with them: Azadi, Bastian, Assia, Zac, Lola, and Gene.
Further, my thanks and appreciation for all the other processes I have participated in, 
and to the friends that made them work: the time bank, radical collective care practices, 
sounds of movement, Krisenyt, the social crisis meetings and list, and Vienna Precarity 
Office, Krise Konference, Refugee Protest Vienna. Many have been mentioned above, 
others are: Julia, Katrin, Numan, Clifford, Katerina, Efi, Giorgos, Iván, Käthe, Nico, 
Katharina, Markus, Lisa, and Lisbeth. And to Manu for inspiring me to participate in so 
many of these projects.
To my friends in Copenhagen and Aarhus for being there, even if I have stayed away 
longer  than  they  expected:  Rune  Møller-Stahl,  Agnete  Seerup,  Signe  Lupnov,  Eva 
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And thoughts and cheers to my old friends from Skanderborg and Ifakara who were so 
important at an important time: Kristen, Elias, Martin, John, Charlotte og drengene.
Finally, to Manu, for the challenges and the times of learning together.
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Introduction, by way of some conclusions
Like God, capitalism does not exist. ... Capitalism is still  
marginal even today. Soon people will realize that it is  
universal only in the imagination of its enemies and 
advocates.
  - Bruno Latour1
1. A Crisis of Capital, a Crisis of Historical Imagination
If the moment of Bush and Bin Laden put a big question mark next to the thesis of the  
final victory of liberal democratic capitalism, the end of Lehman Brothers can be said to 
coincide with the end of the moment of Latour and the thesis of the irrelevance of the 
concept of capital. However, if global capital suddenly appeared as such, rather than as 
the  semi-naturalised  idea  of  'the  economy',  the  renewed  possibility  of  cognitive 
mapping was perhaps more productive of a feeling of powerlessness than anything else. 
The crisis has not only revealed the contradictions of global capitalism, but also the 
difficulty  of agency on the level of the world system, whether  it  be in  the form of 
technocratic policy making or oppositional politics. 
In his book on utopianism Fredric Jameson distinguishes between utopia as  program 
and as impulse. Whereas the political forms of the former refer to revolutionary practice 
or intentional communities, the latter is expressed in political and social theory, even in 
its strictest realism, as well as in social democratic and liberal forms, when they aim at 
the transformation of the social totality. In either case, utopianism refers to an avowed 
or  disavowed desire  to  transform the  social  totality,  which  Jameson  describes  as  a 
'commitment  to  closure'.  With Roland Barthes  he suggests  '“here  as  elsewhere  it  is 
closure which enables the existence of system, which is to say, of the imagination.”'2 
The current crisis can thus be understood as a crisis of utopian politics, which is to say a 
certain politics based on a hopeful orientation towards the future. On the side of the 
1 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 173.
2 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science  
Fictions, First Paperback Edition (London: Verso Books, 2007), 5.
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project, this  hopeful  orientation  is  based  on  a  connection  which  has  now  been 
questioned, that of the relation between totality and the possibility of agency. What is in 
crisis on the side of the utopian impulse which sustains different forms of 'reformism' is 
the belief that the dynamic of the whole is benevolent, not to say providential.  This 
belief becomes unsustainable in a moment where this dynamic is pushing us ever closer 
to the abyss. Capital is not organising its gravediggers, but setting adrift that part of the 
world,  which  cannot  simply,  in  the  apt  phrase  of  Geoff  Berner,  'move to  a  higher 
ground': drifting ever deeper into environmental disaster, precarity and immiseration. So 
when we turn to an analysis of the orientation of revolutionary practice, it is not simply 
because this is our interest, but because the current moment imposes such an interest on 
ever greater swathes of humanity living in the lowlands.
The current crisis is not merely the crisis of the totality, but its reassertion under the 
condition of a gross asymmetry between the scale of the task and the hopes we may 
foster. This marks out our moment as radically different from the last sequence in which 
revolutionary  practice  was  on  the  agenda  a  mere  quarter  of  a  century  ago.  In 
revolutionary theory, what has perhaps most fundamentally changed is the conception 
of  historical  agency  and  subjectivity.  This  introduction  will  thus  start  with  a 
contextualisation  of  the  problematic  of  this  thesis  in  terms  of  the  contemporary 
challenges for revolutionary theory, and their differences with respect to yesterday's. It 
does this through a rough periodisation of the last 50 years in terms of two shifts in the 
relation between the Marxian critique of political economy and revolutionary practice. 
This  periodisation  will  allow  us  to  rephrase  the  classical  question  of  the  relation 
between theory and practice in terms of orientation and organisation, which brings us 
from  an  opposition  between  knowledge  and  action  to  a  relation  which  is  more 
existential and ontological.
2. The Ends of Progressivism and the Great Symmetry
During the cold war capital and its opponent appeared as geopolitical  blocs lead by 
sovereign state actors: West versus East, the USA against the USSR. Within the relation 
between capital and labour, a similar symmetry could be imagined: against capital, the 
proletariat  was gradually becoming unified and homogenised; workers'  organisations 
seemed to develop in tandem with capital's increasing organisation of the working class. 
Today, we might  retrospectively say that this was obviously never the case, except for 
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anyone  deaf  and  blind  to  the  struggles  of  women,  racialised  populations,  and  the 
inhabitants of industrialising post-colonial territories. However, it is perhaps too crude 
to say that the proverbial male industrial  workers and their  intellectual and political 
representatives were oblivious to the fact that populations of the dispossessed potential 
wage workers were always heterogeneous. In any case, this heterogeneity was greatly 
underestimated  as  a  practical  problem for  organising,  and  as  a  weapon  of  capital. 
Thought within the framework of Eurocentric theories of development and progress, 
proletarian  heterogeneity  could  be  imagined  as  disappearing  through  the 
homogenisation  of  the  global  working  class.  We  can  perhaps  best  capture  the 
hegemonic colouring of revolutionary hope in this period, by referring to its belief in 
what  we  can  call  the  'Great  Symmetry  Thesis',  according  to  which  there  was  a 
deepening symmetry between capitalist and working-class organisation and between the 
development of capitalist actuality and proletarian potentiality. This is not a symmetry 
of self-constituted opposites, of course, but rather of two competing parties within an 
antagonistic whole.3
The power of conviction of this thesis was based on what we with Kant can call 'rough 
indicators' or 'historical signs',  which, despite setbacks, connect the past, present and 
future of the present (rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognostikon) under a general 
tendency. As Kant remarks, the sign of progress in his time is the enthusiasm invoked in 
the spectators  by the French revolution.4 While  this  can easily  be understood as  an 
almost apolitical notion of spectatorship, we need to understand it as more than that. 
The  revolution  itself  was  merely  a  sign  of  the  singular  French  situation,  whereas 
enthusiasm elsewhere is a sign that the revolutionary sentiment is contagious. It is a 
sign  of  a  subjective  ground for  revolutionary  wagers  elsewhere.  For  Marx already, 
revolutionary hope was premised not  merely on agency,  but  on a  historical  process 
providing the conditions for agency: '[t]he coincidence of the changing of circumstances 
and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only 
3 Théorie Communiste's notion of programmatism comes close to describing this: 'programmatism is 
defined as a theory and practice of class struggle in which the proletariat finds, in its drive toward 
liberation, the fundamental elements of a future social organisation which become the programme to  
be realised. Programmatism is not simply a theory — it is above all the practice of the proletariat, in 
which the rising strength of the class (in unions and parliaments, organisationally, in terms of the 
relations of social forces or of a certain level of consciousness regarding “the lessons of history”) is 
positively conceived of as a stepping-stone toward revolution and communism'. Théorie 
Communiste, “Much Ado About Nothing,” Endnotes 1 (London: 2008): 155.
4 Immanuel Kant, “The Contest of Faculties,” in Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nesbit, 2nd ed.. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 181–83.
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as revolutionising practice [revolutionäre Praxis].'5
Thus,  the  rough  indicators  in  the  period  of  the  Great  Symmetry  Thesis  were  the 
increasing degrees of working-class organisation, the development of welfare states, the 
successes  of  liberation  movements  and  early  developmentalist  experiments,  the 
explosions  following 1968 and the enthusiasm they evoked across the globe.  All  of 
these allowed subjects to imagine a progressive tendency of the whole, and hence to 
hope  and  meaningfully  work  to  realise  it. Due  to  its  character  of  projection  and 
commitment, the thesis could not, strictly speaking, be wrong. It was not a hypothesis 
about a state of things, but a thesis to be proven through determined organising efforts. 
However,  we  must  also  notice  the  ambivalence  of  the  post-war  period:  while 
progressivism was deeply disturbed by the war itself, the Great Symmetry Thesis was 
challenged by anti-colonial freedom struggles, and black, women's and gay movements 
from the 1960s. Yet, while these struggles often proceeded through a falsification of 
claims of progress or of the universality of proletarian organisation, their successes and 
partial incorporation into more official modes of struggles were easily taken to justify 
both. By all accounts, the end of this period was signalled by the political and economic 
events of the late '70s and '80s: stagflation and repression of the post-'68 movements, 
the on-march of neoliberalism and structural adjustment programmes.6 In countries such 
as  Italy  and  France,  the  sensitivity  to  the  shift  was  perhaps  more  developed  than 
elsewhere because of the early local crises of the post-war settlement, as well as the 
strong leftist critiques of trade unions and communist parties emerging particularly after 
1968,  which  slowly  migrated  into  the  conception  of  capital  lacking  an  'outside',  a 
characteristic central to the post-modernism of Lyotard and Baudrillard.7 The moment 
of 1989 did not sink the thesis of the Great Symmetry, but was rather the moment when 
it was broken up on the shore of 'the End of History'. As has often been noted, this was 
not the end of utopianism, but the victory of liberal utopianism..8 
5 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,”  Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), 
14.
6 This periodisation is not so much historical as contemporary and theoretical: the aim is not to 
understand what happened, but to understand the present moment. 
7 We can here follow Bifo's tracing of the historical awareness of the end of progressivism and the 
Great Symmetry, to the sensitivities of punk and autonomia and the year 1977. Franco “Bifo” 
Berardi, After the Future, ed. Gary Genosko and Nicholas Thoburn (Edinburgh; Oakland, CA; 
Baltimore, MD: AK Press, 2011).
8 Slavoj Žižek, “Post-Wall,” London Review of Books 31, no. 22 (November 19, 2009): 10.
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3. Hope and Objectivity Divided
So what is the world that replaces the world in which the Great Symmetry Thesis was a 
convincing wager? Here, a brief characterisation of the present period will be sufficient: 
capital  today operates through an increasingly global differentiation and competition 
between all those that are compelled to engage in wage labour or to make themselves 
dependants on people with money, as debtors, wives, domestic servants, etc.. This is the 
proletariat  in  its  broadest  definition as  a  condition or problem. Capital  operates not 
through unification,  conjunction  and homogenisation,  but  through concentration  and 
dispersion,  disjunction  and  differentiation.  Global  capital  is  not  the  imagined 
homogenising  industrial  machine  of  Fordism,  but  rather  a  financial-logistical  relay, 
mediating a productive apparatus that can best be described in terms of its uneven and 
combined extraction of surplus value. After the political deregulation of capital flows 
and  the  technical  revolution  in  logistics,  global  capital  has  become  capable  of 
disciplining  policy  makers  and  populations  alike.  The  swelling  ranks  of  the  global 
reserve  army of  labour  intensifies  competition  between  workers,  lowers  wages  and 
makes it ever harder to unionise in defence of wages and conditions. Capital does not 
tendentially organise proletarians, but rather modulates the existence of the proletariat 
between superfluousness, marginality, migration, precarity and overwork, relying on the 
state to organise, police and discipline, incarcerate or super-exploit those populations 
that become temporarily or permanently superfluous as regular wage workers. In other 
terms, there is a radical disconnection between capitalist organisation and proletarian 
organisation. After the end of the Great Symmetry Thesis, it appears that development 
of the productive forces is the condition of the impossibility of the emancipation of the 
proletariat.  Thus we have a compensatory re-emergence of forms of the problem of 
orientation.
It  is  here useful to bring up the Kantian concept of orientation.  According to Kant, 
theory  is  needed  when  the  knowledge  of  the  phenomenal  and  objective  world  is 
insufficient  to  act.  Orientation  speaks  of  a  practical  requirement  for  a  connection 
between the phenomenal and the practical, the noumenal and the theoretical.9 As Kant 
notes, ‘To orientate oneself in thought means to be guided, in one’s conviction of truth, 
by  a  subjective  principle  of  reason  where  objective  principles  of  reason  are 
9 Kimberly Hutchings, “What Is Orientation in Thinking? On the Question of Time and Timeliness in 
Cosmopolitical Thought,” Constellations 18, no. 2 (2011): 191.
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inadequate.’10 Kant's concept of orientation speaks of a practical, even existential need 
for orientation: to exist as a rational moral being,  I need to supplement reality with 
certain  theoretical  principles  that  make  such  rational  moral  action  possible,  where 
reality itself is not moral or rational. In short, moral action is based on faithfulness to 
subjective  principles.11 Morality  in  history,  and  thus  in  politics,  depends  on  the 
theoretical postulate that history is not a chaotic process, but tends towards realising the 
telos of  mankind.  These  teleological  postulates  are  introduced  as  supplements  to 
practical reason, making it possible: for if the world was  ruled by chance and chaos, 
what reason would there be to hope, to not become a cynic, a nihilist, an opportunist, an 
egotist?12 The consequence of introducing the problem of orientation into philosophy is 
thus  the 'penetration of  philosophy into the present'  and a  'reciprocal  penetration of 
politics and the actuality of the present into philosophy.'13 
The  difficulty  of  radical  philosophy  after  the  Great  Symmetry  was  the 
phenomenological experience of global capitalism as the ambient atmosphere in which 
we live, a system of necessitation without an outside, where the internal contradictions 
of bourgeois society are no longer signs of the openness of history. The awareness of 
crisis did not disappear, but lost its historical meaning. It became a condition, a specific 
experience of disorientation proper to post-modernity, or simply the normal mode of 
capitalist regulation, taking the form of 'a proliferation of minor and indefinite crises, or, 
as we prefer, to an omni-crisis.'14 The struggle here is not between alternative projects of 
closure, but the struggle given by the reality of closure which normalises crisis and the 
state of exception. Here, the role of theory becomes simply to hold open the possibility 
of  something  different.  As  Marx  notes,  without  proletarian  struggle  and  a  mature 
objective  situation,  communist  'theoreticians  are  merely  utopians  who,  to  meet  the 
wants of the oppressed classes, improvise systems and go in search of a regenerating 
10 Immanuel Kant, “What Is Orientation in Thinking?,” in Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nesbit, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 240.
11 Ibid., 243.
12 Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in Political Writings, 
trans. H.B. Nesbit, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 41–53.
13 Benjamin Noys, “The Arrow and the Compass” (presented at the “Waiting for the Political 
Moment,” International Conference, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 2010), 3,
14 Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” New Left Review 
I/146, no. July-August (1984); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 189. Following Reinhart Koselleck, Hardt and Negri define modernity as 
crisis; their understanding is that it results from the 'conflict between the immanent, constructive, 
creative forces and the transcendent power aimed at restoring order.' The difference introduced by 
post-modernity is that there is no longer any outside, and thus no longer any coherence to the crisis, 
which comes to diffuse the whole social body. Ibid., 76.
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science.'15 Thus, since  Great Symmetry Marxism and leftist theory has not produced 
revolutionary theory proper, but a series of attempts to speculatively hold together the 
analysis of globalising capital and the ideal possibility of communist movements, to 
keep open hope against cynicism and the liberal triumphalism of 'the End of History'.16 
The 'divorce' of theory from struggles is not just an effect of the waning of struggles, 
but of the crisis of the previously dominant articulation of theory and practice around 
the Great Symmetry Thesis. 
In  a  statement  which  Žižek  turned  into  a  veritable  sales  pitch  for  theory,  Fredric 
Jameson remarked that it ‘seems easier ... to imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of 
the earth and of nature' – or 'the end of the world' in Žižek's formulation – than the end 
of capitalism.17 In this period, the whole was represented by radical theory as totally 
enveloping; Jameson saw the last remaining 'precapitalist enclaves' of nature and the 
unconscious as totally colonised and penetrated by the logics of capital.18 Alain Badiou 
spoke of 'the state',  referring both to a logical state and the political  state,  a part  of 
which is the economy, as 'a sort of metastructure which has the power to count over all  
the subsets of the situation.'19 And finally, Hardt and Negri spoke of a global Empire and 
biopolitical  production  which  envelops  the  world,  making  any  symmetrical 
contradiction between capital and labour as collective subjects impossible, replacing it 
with  the  antagonism between  the  actuality  of  capital  and  the  virtual  power  of  the 
multitude.20 
Inscribed in a situation where objective principles provide no points of orientation, it is 
no coincidence that these thinkers, rising to global fame in the decade before the Great 
Financial  Crisis,  all  developed  more  or  less  Kantian  solutions  to  the  problem  of 
orientation. Žižek turns back, along with Badiou, to a subjective principle, the 'idea' of 
communism, while Hardt and Negri inscribed the multitude in a teleology according to 
which  the  development  of  the  productive  forces  under  capitalism  gradually  makes 
15 Karl Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy,” in MECW, vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), 
177.
16 Fukuyama, however, notes that the time of liberalism triumphant is also the 'very sad time' of 
Nietzsche's pitiably pragmatic and unheroic 'Last Man.' Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and 
the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2012), and Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” 
The National Interest 16, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 25.
17 Fredric Jameson, “The Antinomies of Postmodernity,” in The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on 
the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London: Verso, 2009), 50.
18 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1991), 48–9.
19 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. Jason Barker (London; New York: Verso, 2011), 143.
20 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 24, 359.
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capital  itself  a parasitic fetter  on its  own process.21 Jameson's proposal of 'cognitive 
mapping' as a re-actualisation of the orientating use of the theory of the capitalist mode 
of production under conditions of post-modernity poses the problem as one of 'some 
weakness  in  our  imagination.'22 However,  given  the  enveloping  condition  of  late 
capitalism, cognitive mapping merely gives us a map of our misère, and can, at best, be 
supplemented  by a  'politics  of  utopia',  which  keeps  the  possibility  of  revolutionary 
practice open.23 
Here it is interesting to discuss Jameson, as his both detailed and broad-stroked critique 
of  the  post-modern  condition  has  some  moments  in  common  with  the  crisis  of 
revolutionary  practice,  which  we have described above in  terms of  the  crisis  of  its 
utopian support (the spatial thesis of universalisation, unification and homogeneity, and 
the temporal thesis of progress).  For Jameson, the problem is presented as an epochal 
disorientation, in which subjects have lost their bearing and thus their capacity to act. In 
this context, he proposes the concept of global cognitive mapping, 'in which we may 
again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and regain a 
capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralized by our spatial as well as our 
social confusion.'24 However, where Jameson poses the problem in terms of an aesthetic 
and a pedagogy, the problem we noted is of an organisational kind. What interests us is 
not first of all the individual subject's capacity to situationally represent its place within 
the  'vaster  and  properly  unrepresentable  totality  which  is  the  ensemble  of  society's 
structures  as  a  whole;'  even  if  the  difficulty  of  doing  so  is  clearly  related  to  the 
organisational problem we are trying to describe.25 The crisis of the revolutionary theory 
of old is indeed a crisis of certain programmatic and ideological figures which gave 
subjects  their  bearing  and  allowed  them  to  engage  in  a  certain  practical  wager. 
However, we must note that this theoretical complex – The Great Symmetry Thesis and 
the  progressivist  conception  of  history – would have  been nothing without  the real 
success of a certain organisational model, and the belief that it was generalisable (just as 
it would be hard to imagine Kant's secular historical teleology outside the context of 
dawning capitalism and colonialism). Thus, the crisis of the Symmetry Thesis must be 
21 As Lucio Magri wrote, the faith in the multitude can easily be read as a mirror image of the faith in 
progress. “Parting Words,” New Left Review 31, no. II (February 2005): 103.
22 Jameson, “The Antinomies of Postmodernity,” 50. Tanner Mirrlees, “Cognitive Mapping Or, the 
Resistant Element in the Work of Fredric Jameson,” Cultural Logic 8 (2005).
23 Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future.
24 Jameson, Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 53.
25 Ibid., 50.
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related to the attacks and fracturing of workers' organisations, the restructuring of the 
labour  process,  and  shift  in  employment  contracts,  which  increased  competition 
between workers, etc.. This paradigm was premised on a certain symmetry between the 
organisation  of  capital  and  the  organisation  of  the  proletariat,  in  both  theory  and 
practice. Perhaps the problem of the post-modern and neoliberal condition is not that 
there is too little communist theory to orientate revolutionary practice, but that there is 
too little communist organisation to orientate revolutionary theory? Today, theory seems 
to be operating with what we can describe as an Asymmetry Thesis, which sees both 
capitalist organisation (neoliberal governance, logistics, etc.) and disorganisation (crisis, 
surplus-population) as leading to the disorganisation of workers' organisations. How to 
think  revolutionary  practice  –  if  at  all  –  when  changing  circumstances  seem  to 
undermine the capacity for human activity and self-change?
4. Questions of Contingency and Organisation
The crisis and the struggles of 2011, to put it metonymically, have reopened history, as 
Francis  Fukuyama  recently  admitted,  and  therefore  the  possibility  of  revolutionary 
theory as such.26 Insofar as any true crisis always comes as a surprise, it also presents 
the period preceding it with a certain clarity: the symptoms of the crisis that was coming 
suddenly appear with great clarity. The crisis can be read as a crisis of the closure of 
capitalism, a revelation of the at least passing impossibility of controlling the exception 
or normalising crisis. Where crisis is a systemic irruption of contingency – where the 
flows and relations  necessary for the reproduction of  the system are destabilised or 
break down – the condition of crisis is that necessity never abolishes contingency, but 
rather  manages  and organises  it.  Thus,  recent  writings  by Angela  Mitropoulos  have 
suggested  how  capitalism  must  be  understood  as  a  constant  attempt  to  deal  with 
contingency  by  means  of  insurance  and  contracts,  as  forms  of  risk-distribution.27 
Melinda Cooper has shown how the contingency of wage labour under conditions of 
precarity and surplus-supply must be transformed into necessary labour by means of the 
forced system of workfare.28 
26 Francis Fukuyama, “The Future of History,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (January-February 2012),
27 Angela Mitropoulos, “The Time of the Contract: Insurance, Contingency, and the Arrangement of 
Risk,” South Atlantic Quarterly 111, no. 4 (Fall 2012): 763–781; Angela Mitropoulos, Contract and 
Contagion: From Biopolitics to Oikonomia (Brooklyn, NY; London: Minor Compositions, 2012).
28 Melinda Cooper, “Workfare, Familyfare, Godfare: Transforming Contingency into Necessity,” South 
Atlantic Quarterly 111, no. 4 (Fall 2012): 643–661.
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With the crisis  –  and the  retrospective  gaze  it  allows us  to  cast  on the period  that 
precedes it – we find ourselves in a new circle of struggles, and faced with a capital 
whose totalisation clearly equals not merely the subsumption of activities and things 
into its processes of accumulation, but also the abjection of surplus-populations, and the 
build-up of risk and contingency in the system. What is new is the urgency with which 
new struggles around the problem of reproduction arise; these are of course resistances 
short of revolution. Contingency hence no longer refers merely to the overflowing free 
creativity  of  living  labour  or  a  moment  of  capitalist  control,  but  rather  to  the 
contingency  of  proletarian  reproduction  and the  urgency  of  this  problem.  As  Marx 
writes  in  the  Grundrisse,  the  sale  of  the labour  power of  the  proletarian  'is  tied to 
conditions which are accidental for him, and indifferent to his organic presence. He is 
thus a virtual pauper.'29 If contingency is tied to freedom, it is tied to that most ironic of 
freedoms, the freedom from the means of production. The contingencies of capital – the 
problem of  the  repayments  of  debts  and the  realisation  of  value  for  instance  – are 
immediately linked to the contingent reproduction of proletarians. A capital that fails to 
achieve the profits necessary for its self-reproduction sheds or flexibilises labour; labour 
thus unemployed or underemployed fails to consume enough or repay its loans. Crisis 
is, in Koselleck's paraphrase of Marx, 'always ... a product of the dependency of the 
proletarian class on capitalists. Every crisis is thus at once a “crisis of work’’ and a 
‘‘crisis of capital.”'30 The existence and concept of crisis, however, does not in itself 
provide an answer,  but a  problem, which must be posed as a  question.31 For Marx, 
revolutionary  theory  was  never  a  matter  of  providing  utopian  supplements,  but  of 
speeding up the self-recognition of struggles: 'we shall simply show the world why it is 
struggling,  and consciousness of this is a thing it  must  require whether it  wishes or 
not.'32 For Marx, the condition of overcoming the situation in which theorists 'science in 
their minds' rather than 'take note of what is happening before their eyes and to become 
its  mouthpiece',  is  that  'history  moves forward'  and that  'with  it  the  struggle of  the 
proletariat  assumes  clearer  outlines.'33 To  move  beyond  utopianism  and  abstract 
principles,  the  task  today  would  then  be  to  rethink  the  connection  between  the 
29 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), The 
Pelican Marx Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 604.
30 Reinhart Koselleck, “Crisis,” trans. Michaela W. Richter, Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 2 
(April 2006): 396.
31 For the political limitations of theories of crisis, see appendix 0.2. and 0.3.
32 Karl Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” in Early Writings, 1st ed. (London: 
Penguin, 1992), 209.
33 Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy,” 1976, 177.
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tendencies of capitalist development and struggles.  We will argue that a revolutionary 
theory might again be possible, if we let it be orientated by the struggles for proletarian 
reproduction in the face of virtual and actual poverty, if we start from the contingency 
of proletarian reproduction and do not limit ourselves to the wage-relation.
5. The Aim of this Thesis
We start with the premise that Marx's critique of political economy is still unrivalled as 
a basis for understanding the actuality of capitalist totalisation.34 However, because the 
Great  Symmetry,  i.e.  concept  and actuality  of proletarian organisation and historical 
development that sustained the revolutionary orientation of this theory, is no longer in 
place,  the concept  of totality  that  used to  be conceivable as  an ultimate horizon of 
revolutionary  practice,  today  becomes  the  horizon  of  proletarian  impotence,  unless 
supplemented by an orientation to something like the virtual multitude, 'the desire called 
Utopia', or the communist hypothesis, or the elective communities of rural communes. 
The crisis of revolutionary thought, we have argued, is a result of the disappearance of 
the  previous  paradigm  of  organising.  The  problem  for  theory  today  is  not  show 
theoretically how the totality itself is tending toward revolution, but to become sensitive 
to how existing struggles might be organised to offer better  resistance,  and how the 
limitations  of  these  struggles  might  pose  the  problem  of  revolution.  The  thesis  is 
interested  in  discovering  what  role  Marx's  theory  might  play  in  orientating 
revolutionary practice under conditions where progressivism and the symmetry between 
proletarian and capitalist organisation are no longer convincing. The ambition here is to 
develop such a theory in integral connection with Marx's critique of capitalist actuality 
rather than as a supplement to it. In other words, our general quetion is: what resources  
are there  in  Marx  for  thinking the  revolutionary  potentiality  of  the  organisation  of  
struggles, beyond the Symmetry Thesis?
In  Kant,  what  allows  the  circulation  of  philosophy  into  reality  and  reality  into 
philosophy  is  the  use  of  figurative  notions which  can  attach  abstract  concepts  to 
intuitions derived from possible experience, making 'such concepts, which are not in 
other respects drawn from experience, suitable for use in the experiential world.'35 But 
34 We bypass here the debate over the role of revolutionary theory or science in Marxism, as 
exemplified in Lenin's slogan that '[w]ithout revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary 
movement'. See appendix 0.0. and 0.1. for some remarks on this relation.
35 Kant, “What Is Orientation in Thinking?,” 237.
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where for Kant these are mere supplements, Marx's orientation is based on a conception 
of the contradictory unity between reality and conceptuality, which means that they are 
conceptually isomorphic. The condition of the reality of knowledge lies in the immanent 
intelligibility of the real, in the Hegelian sense, that reality is 'whole' and 'rational'.36 To 
be  whole  and  rational,  in  the  Hegelian  sense  which  does  not  respect  the  binary 
materialism-idealism, is to be self-organised, and self-positing. This is not a matter of a 
higher  purpose,  but  of  an  immanent  purpose  in  a  mode  of  organisation,  emerging 
through the combination of what is otherwise disorganised or merely juxtaposed. Here 
we must remember that Marx always strives to present a fully immanent orientation, i.e. 
one that does not rely on principles external to the matter at hand. Ultimately, there is 
not one science of actuality and another of principles or potentialities in Marx. This 
means that where Kant needs figurative notions to translate between abstract ideas and 
concrete situations, in Marx the abstract and concrete is treated by the same models. 
Marx does not start with two domains, but with the orientated middle between them. 
Our hypothesis is that what unites Marx's methodology and his ontology, or in other 
terms his theory of theoretical practice and his historical materialism, are the concepts 
of  organisation  and  disorganisation.37 For  Marx,  as  for  Hegel,  the  organisation  of 
actuality is irreducible to the material elements in any situation, actuality is always also 
'ideal',  but  in  a  very materialist,  relational  and processual  sense.  Practice requires  a 
moment  of  thought  to  orientate  itself  in  relation  to  this  organisation  of  reality 
(Wirklichkeit), and its own re-organising efforts are themselves 'idealising'.38
Indeed,  the  present  thesis  attempts  to  answer  its  general  question,  by  asking  more 
specifically:  what  is  the  orientating  role  of  the  concepts  of  organisation  and 
disorganisation in revolutionary theory and practice? 
To answer this  question we cannot  go directly to  Marx's  explicit  organisational and 
strategic  writings,  which  are  written  under  the  sway  of  the  Symmetry  Thesis.  Our 
approach will instead be to ask if there is in Marx another logic which will allow us to 
pass between the critique of political economy and politics in ways that are different 
from those of the Symmetry Thesis. We will here follow a dual strategy: On the one 
hand  we  will  engage  in  a  critique  of  the  moments  of  Marx's  writings  where  his 
36 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet, new ed. 
(Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20; G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. 
Miller, new ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 11.
37 We leave it to others to analyse the related series form, formation and deformation.
38 Richard Gunn, “Practical Reflexivity in Marx,” Common Sense no. 1 (May 1987): 39–51.
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projections are shaped by the logics of progressivism and symmetry. Here we will see 
that the classical theories of totality as always-already, and often concomitant reduction 
of theory to the question of systematic dialectics, are hard-pressed to think revolution 
beyond the Symmetry Thesis. Thus we will, on the other hand, engage in a rereading of 
the dialectic which does not presuppose the existence of totality, but sees totalisation 
instead  as  an  ongoing  process  requiring  the  use  of  force  to  deal  with  its  own 
contingencies.  To  do  this,  we  will  focus  on  Marx's  use  of  materialist  concepts  of 
organisation and formation, and their origin in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, rather than 
the  Phenomenology of Spirit.  Whereas the latter starts with the contradictory unity of 
consciousness, the former begins with the real oppositions of exterior elements, and 
their material synthesis through combination and organisation.39 Alfred Schmidt notes 
how the central concepts of Hegel's philosophy of nature, mechanism, chemism and 
organism/teleology, 'are of the greatest importance for the understanding of [Marx's] 
materialist  dialectic.'40 While the words mechanism  and chemism,  and words for the 
relations  they  name,  composition  and  combination,  do  not  occur   often  in  Marx's 
writings, we will show that the concepts they refer to are central to the logics of Marx's 
writings, and to understanding his dialectic as one that sees totality as result. Not only 
does Marx's  theorisation of systematic totality,  of actuality,  operate according to the 
materialist logics of organism, organisation and teleology; the organisation of totality 
always includes and requires processes of combination, which are contingent because 
composition is the possibility of other combinations or non-combinations.41
39 We spend some time pointing out the relation between Hegel's Philosophy of Nature and Kant's 
introduction of organisation into the concept of nature in the Critique of Judgement. We focus on 
Hegel's Naturphilosophie, rather than Schelling's otherwise important contribution, because of 
Marx's intimate familiarity with it. It deserves mention that while Marx was studying Hegel's 
philosophy of nature, Engels was polemicising against Schelling in his 1841 Friedrich Engels, “Anti-
Schelling,” in MECW, vol. 2 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975).
40 Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx (London: New Left Books, 1971), 105.
41 In Hegel the notions of mechanism, chemism and organism are not only levels of reality with the 
specific relations (composition, combination and teleology respectively), but include or map onto 
other central concepts, developed on other levels of abstraction: 
• mechanism (difference, chance/possibility, encounter, repulsion/attraction).
• chemism (identity, contingency, subsistence, synthesis/division). 
• organism (differentiation, necessity, reproduction, organisation).
G. W. F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences  
with the Zusätze, ed. Theodore Geraets et al. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992), 273–286; G. 
W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Nature, Vol. I, trans. M. J. Petry (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1970). 
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6. The Structure of this Thesis
The thesis  is  divided into  two parts,  which roughly  cover  the  young Marx and the 
mature Marx, respectively. Part I is focused on Marx's early method of orientation, his 
concepts  of  organisation  (particularly  atomism  and  organism),  as  they  develop  in 
intimate connection with his shifting practice; from aspiring academic, to newspaper 
editor, to communist revolutionary. Instead of presuming that theory is orientated, this 
allows us to ask the question: how does theory orientate itself?42 The answer, in short, is 
through the utilisation of the theoretical models at hand, and through letting itself be 
orientated by social and revolutionary practices. 
Chapter 1 sets out from Marx's early engagement with the theory of atomism in his 
1841 Doctoral Dissertation. We see how Marx was interested in the Epicurean idea of 
the primacy of free materiality. While not affirming the Hegelian system, Marx was 
criticising  atomism  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  theory  of  organisation  of  the 
disorganised, separated and free atoms. What Marx found useful in Epicurus was the 
fearless  and  uncompromising  autonomous  orientation  of  the  atomic  swerve,  the 
performative practical energy of the abstractions of atomism. We discuss Althusser's 
critique of Marx's Dissertation as an idealistic theory of freedom which provides merely 
a concept of ideal freedom used in the critique of actuality. From here we ask to what 
extend Marx's dissertation, drawing on the most materialist aspect of Hegel, implies a 
theory of a practice of constitution and organisation.
Chapter 2 explores Marx's orientating use of an organic conception of society and an 
Enlightenment  philosophy of history during his time as an editor  of the  Rheinische 
Zeitung,  and  their  implications  for  his  theories  of  bourgeois  society,  history  and 
revolutionary practice. In this period, Marx begins to reject politics based on abstract 
ideas or schemas. The question becomes one of organisation: the organisation of the 
mass against the state's organisation and separation of the mass into estates. We show 
how this theory of organisational practice follows the categories of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Nature.
Marx  introduced  the  proletariat  in  the  mid-1840s:  considered  both  fundamentally 
organised by capitalism yet abjected from it as paupers, the proletariat develops as a 
revolutionary agent in symmetry with bourgeois society. In chapter 3 we discuss recent 
attempts to avoid the productivist  and sociological  conceptions  of the proletariat  by 
42 For our method of reading in Part I, see appendix 0.4.
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thinking the proletariat as pure negativity. We show that while this brings us beyond the 
Symmetry Thesis, it also misses the importance of organisation for Marx. This chapter 
moves towards a critique of the intimate relation between the Symmetry Thesis and a 
uni-linear and Eurocentric philosophy of history, resting on the assertion that universal 
expropriation and capitalist  development  is  a  condition for  communism. Hereby we 
reach the end of Part I. 
Chapter 4 provides a transition between Part I and Part II. In this chapter we raise a 
series of methodological questions to Marx's conception of history. How is it possible to 
adopt concepts of organisation drawn from the philosophy of nature in the study of 
historical  social  formations,  and  what  is  the  relation  between  these  figures  and 
systematic  dialectics?  We argue  that  while  the  logic  of  capitalism as  a  crisis-prone 
organic whole might be helpful in analysing a structure and its internal tendencies or 
'laws  of  motion',  it  is  less  helpful  in  analysing  historical  change  and  revolutionary 
practice. We see that in the absence of the Symmetry Thesis the concept of capital as an 
organic-systemic  dialectic  can  only  provide  an  abstract  theoretical  concept  of 
revolutionary practice.
Chapter 5 comes back to the atomistic world of exteriority and separation, but attempts 
to historicise the modern applicability of such a theory in terms of the simultaneous 
development  of  possessive  individualism and free  labour  in  the  period  of  primitive 
accumulation and colonial merchant capitalism. The condition of the interiority of the 
capitalist system and the dialectic as the method of analysis proper to this whole is the 
separation between persons, and between proletarians and their means and relations of 
reproduction at the dawn of the capitalist epoch. Capitalism can only mediate but never 
abolish this separation and the contingency of the relation between capital and labour. 
We thusbegin to think capital  in a more political  register,  focussing on contingency, 
resistance, and violence.
Chapter 6 looks at the combination of workers and capital as a contested affair which 
eventually gives rise to the capitalist system and at the applicability of the concept of a 
'social  organism'.  The  regularity  of  the  class  relation  and  the  integration  of  the 
proletariat in capitalist reproduction was only established by a protracted war on self-
reproduction.  The  necessities  of  capitalist  reproduction  thus  also  appear  from  this 
perspective in their contingency and in terms of the  Gewalt  that sustains the system. 
This allows us to begin to theorise a broader range of struggles in relation to capital.  
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This broadens the orientation to potentially revolutionary practice, beyond the question 
of a systemic logic and its Aufhebung, to the systemic implications of resistances. From 
a strict focus on the unity-in-contradiction of capital and labour, we arrive at a notion of 
the  opposition  of  strategies,  which  can  only  succeed  by  expanding  their  respective 
capacities of self-reproduction. We come to see the capitalist totality as a result and the 
domain of the systematic dialectic as a continually imposed through force and against 
contingency.
Chapter  7  starts  from  Marx's  theory  of  surplus-population,  i.e.  of  populations 
'inorganic', to the needs of capitalist reproduction. This theory can help us understand 
the  dynamics  which  produces  the  notion  of  the  Asymmetry  Thesis  that  capitalist 
organisation systemically entails proletarian disorganisation rather than organisation. If 
proletarian disorganisation is  thus a  constant  feature of capitalism,  and a deepening 
tendency,  we  can  understand  the  proletariat's  problem  of  separation  in  terms  of  a 
deepening problem of reproduction. We propose to start neither from Symmetry nor 
Asymmetry,  but  from  the  problem  of  proletarian  reproduction  and  the  manifold 
different practical solutions it gives rise to. Thus the thesis ends with some remarks on 
the  problem  of  proletarian  organisation,  applicable  under  conditions  of  separation, 
contingency, non-reproduction and surplus-population, but also relevant for attempts to 
think the self-organisation of the workers who are still organised by capital.
7. Conclusions
Many have  of  course  analysed  and  practised  the  politics  of  reproduction  and  self-
organisation exceedingly better than Marx. Therefore, even if we insist that Marx still 
provides at least the basis for the best critique of capital, it might seem we need to posit  
a simple division of labour between Marx's negative and critical theory of capital and 
such affirmative politics and theories.  The attempt of this  thesis  does not reject  the 
practical need to also turn to non-Marxist theories and practices. However, it questions 
the opposition between the purely negative theory of the capital on the one hand, and 
the theorists and practitioners of the new world on the other. It does so by arguing for 
the possibility and deepening necessity of self-organised struggles and reproduction in 
Marx. By attempting to bring together practices of organisation and critical analysis of 
the totality we try to ask how what appears as a utopian impulse might again be thought 
as the impetus of what we with Marx and Engels can call real communist movements. 
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To think this after the Great Symmetry is also to ask what revolutionary practice might 
be beyond a commitment to closure 'in the name of autonomy and self-sufficiency and 
which is ultimately the source of that otherness or radical, even alien, difference...'43 Not 
a  turning  against  difference,  as  in  Jameson's  description,  but  an  organisation  of 
difference  giving  rise  to  an  antagonism to  the  social  totality.  Such  resistances  and 
organisations are products of global capital yet irreducible to it. This allows us to ask 
'what is to be done' without presupposing the dominance of theory over practice, or the 
need  to  dispense  with  the  theory  of  capitalist  objectivity  when  it  seems 
disempowering.44 We speak here from the point of view of an immanence which is not 
the  hopelessly  subsumed  immanence  of  the  capitalist  system,  nor  the  teleological 
immanence  of  the  species,  living  labour  or  the  multitude,  but  that  of  practices  of 
resistance and organisation; the immanence of experiments with different solutions to 
the problem of the proletariat towards its revolutionary abolition.
43 Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future, 5.
44 To refer to the discussion staged between Lenin, Foucault and Rancière in appendix 0.0. and 0.1.
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Chapter 1: The Freedom of the Swerve, the Actuality of 
Idealisation
1. Introduction
We start with the end of the prehistory of Marx, at the time of his studies in Berlin. Few 
readings of Marx's thought and practice go back to this period because the writer we 
find here was not yet the 'young Marx' of most Marxists'  interest,  not yet Marx the 
communist,  or  Marx  the  critic  of  Hegel.45 Of  course  the  decision  not  to  read  the 
youngest Marx is often based on the sound principle that one should not give attention 
to writings solely because they were written by someone who would later produce texts 
of  importance.  If  we  are  interested  in  the  young  and  mature  Marx's  orientations 
however,  it  is  useful to go back to the earliest  Marx, and his disorientation.  In this 
period Marx was not what he came to be. To engage with the earliest Marx is to engage 
with a writer who we can only read as differentiating himself, rather than as already 
differentiated.  The  point  is  not  to  stress  Marx's  youthful  originality,  but  his  initial 
differentiation,  his  method  as  a  becoming  in  relation  to  problems  of  his 
contemporaneity.46
In his 1841 Doctoral Dissertation, which is a study of the ancient atomists Democritus 
and Epicurus and the focus of the present chapter, Marx suggested that we see what is 
expressed  'as  a  difference  of  theoretical  consciousness'  as  'a  difference  of  practical 
energy...'.47 This  insight  can  be  applied  to  Marx  himself,  and  the  intensity  of  his 
engagement with philosophy, which his early letters reveal was deeply embodied and 
visceral (see appendix 1.0.). This intensity must be related to the intellectual battlefield 
of which Marx was a part of in Berlin. Marx was not, as some commentators48 would 
have it, a straight Hegelian before his 'break' with Hegel. As Stathis Kouvelakis points 
45 For notable exceptions, see note 58. For an interpretation of Marx's earliest comments on Kant, see 
appendix 1.1.
46 See appendix 0.4. on the idea of approaching Marx not through his method (Lukács definition of 
'orthodox Marxism'), but in his singular path of becoming, a durational engagement with the 
problematics of one's time (the space of contemporaneity).
47 Karl Marx, “Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature - Doctoral 
Dissertation - with Fragments and Notes,” in The First Writings of Karl Marx (Brooklyn, NY: Ig 
Publishing, 2006), 102.
48 For a sketch of the relation between the Left-Hegelian and Young-Hegelians, see appendix 1.2.
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out,  the Hegelian school was already destabilised and riven since the publication of 
David Strauß's The Life of Jesus in 1835. The young Karl's engagement with Hegel and 
Left- and Young-Hegelianism was never with the orthodoxy of a coherent tradition or a 
fully formed school,  but with an intellectual scene in the disarray of a crisis,  and a 
textual  body  always  already  approached  through  intellectual  struggles.49 After  the 
Hegelian system and theology: a world torn apart in a crisis of orientation. Thus we are 
less interested in categorising Marx's positions as belonging to this or that school, than 
in understanding Marx's writings as efforts at orientation in relation to contemporary 
problematics, such as what is or can philosophy be after Hegel? and what is freedom 
and how can it be practiced and become actual?50 The primacy we give to the question 
of orientation means that we cannot follow Althusser's methodological prescription of 
submitting the early Marx to a 'Marxist  theory of ideology',  according to which the 
'ideology'  of the young Marx 'must  be regarded as a real  whole unified by its  own 
problematic.'51 Althusser's principle precludes the very question of theory as an active 
part of orientation, in favour of a demarcation between science and ideology.52 He needs 
to posit ideology as 'a real whole' in order to effect an 'epistemological break' between 
the Young and the Mature Marx.  If Althusser is right that certain shared problematics 
created a kind of 'unity', it was not the unity of a 'real whole', but the negative unity of a 
battlefield  and  a  shared  disorientation,  which  produced  a  number  of  more  or  less 
inventive reorientations. 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  understand  how  Marx's  ideas  of  organisation  and 
disorganisation orientate revolutionary practice. We start with the  Dissertation  for the 
apparently paradoxical reason that it has little discussion of the problem of organisation 
and none of revolutionary practice. This does not mean that it is irrelevant, however, but 
that it gives us both the zero-point of the concepts of orientation and organisation, and 
the theoretical place of their introduction. In 1839, as a part of the preparation for his 
dissertation, Marx carefully transcribed the plan of Hegel's  Philosophy of Nature,  in 
three different versions.53 In this context the question of atomism in the Dissertation, is 
49 Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 236. See also Warren Breckman, Marx, the Young 
Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001).
50 These problems, we must note, cannot clearly be marked off as metaphysical, ethical, or political, as 
such characterisation is precisely one of the questions and stakes of orientation. See appendix 1.3. 
for an example of Marx's early and very acute awareness of writing after the system of Hegel.
51 Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Verso, 2005), 62.
52 Gregory Elliott, Althusser - The Detour of Theory (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2009), 75–82.
53 Karl Marx, “Plan of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature,” in MECW - Marx 1835-1843 (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1975), 210–215.
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always also a question of the ground of the theories of chemism and organism (self-
organisation in nature), and the passage from the most abstract and exterior level of 
multiplicity (atomism/mechanism) to interiority and ideality.  It  is thus an attempt to 
grapple with the question of the emergence of ideality and organisation out of pure 
disorganised chaotic materiality.
But  Marx's  reading  of  Epicurus  is  also,  and  more  conspicuously,  about  the  ethical 
problem  of  freedom  of  thought,  against  religious  authorities.54 There  is  a  strange 
oscillation  between  the  ontological  and  the  ethical  problems  of  freedom  which 
constantly stretches natural philosophy in the direction of the ethical. With Epicurus he 
takes the atom as a concept of freedom and raises the question of the actualisation 
(Verwirklichung) of this freedom. This is an ethics that suspends the presuppositions of 
the  Kantian  concept  of  orientation.  The  atom  needs  no  objective  principles  of 
orientation because it swerves in the void and knows nothing of worlds. And the atom 
needs no subjective principle either, because it is its own principle; for atoms there is no 
first  mover  and  no  final  end.  Epicurus  is  perhaps  unique  among  the  philosophers 
available to the young Marx in providing a principle of orientation that does not entail 
re-erecting the gods or systems which had crumbled at the feet of the Young-Hegelians. 
Marx of course would not follow Epicurus in rejecting actuality and any ordered world 
as an illusion, yet he was fascinated by the practical energy of this outrageous thesis and 
its usefulness as a battering ram against the inverted reality he saw around him. But 
Marx  would  then  demand  of  Epicurus  a  theory  of  actuality  and  its  relation  to  the 
freedom of the atom. Theoretically, Marx would note that Epicurus was not willing to 
think how atoms compose, combine and organise themselves as compound bodies or 
organisms. Practically, Marx pointed out the radical thrust in Epicurus' thesis and its 
essential critical character: if the world consists of free atoms, any world that is not free 
fails to live up to its essence. 
In  the final  part  of  this  chapter  we will  discuss  whether  Marx can  adopt  Epicurus' 
ethical standpoint after having shown it is inconsistent as an ontology. This leads us to 
ask: if Epicurus'  wrong  theoretical standpoint is  correct in practice, what becomes of 
Marx's theoretical critique of Epicurus on the level of practice? What happens if we 
allow the constant stretching of natural philosophy towards ethics to fold back upon 
natural  philosophy  itself?  If  the  atom  can  be  stretched  in  the  direction  of  ethical 
freedom, what happens when the concept of ethical freedom folded back on natural 
54 See appendix 1.4.
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philosophy encounters the problems of chemism and organism? In short, do we find in 
the  Dissertation  the place of a concept of (self-)organisation and actualisation, as an 
hidden logic in the critique of actuality? 
2. An Idealism of Freedom? 
In his late text  'The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter', Louis 
Althusser  briefly  attacks  Marx's  Dissertation for  having repressed  and  perverted 
Epicurus' materialism of the encounter by transforming it into 'an idealism of freedom'. 
For Althusser, Epicurus' materialism is opposed to the disguised idealism of 'rationalist 
materialism',  which  only  seeks  to  explain  necessity  and  teleology,  which  does  not 
respect reality but tries to impose the concept on it.55 As we will see, this reading fails to 
understand that Marx's reading is more nuanced, affirming philosophy as a practice of 
idealisation which is not subsumptive of reality, but a mode of real actualisation, of 
immanent  composition  and  organisation;  this  reading  becomes  possible  once  we 
recognise that an important source for Marx's reading of Epicurus is Hegel's Philosophy  
of Nature.
So the question is whether Althusser is right to reject Marx's reading of Epicurus as an 
idealist conception of freedom which has no room for a materialism of the encounter? 
Does Marx, on the one hand,  reject Epicurus for not having a theory about necessity 
and teleology, and does he, on the other hand, reduce Epicurus' atomism to a rationalist 
idealism of freedom focussed on self-consciousness? While indeed the standard reading 
would suggest so, the reading of Marx as a post-Hegelian reader of Hegel's philosophy 
of  nature  will  suggest  otherwise.  Through  such  reading  we  can  ask:  what  is  the 
difference between Hegel's and Marx's philosophy of nature? In other words, is there 
such a thing as a Marxian event taking place in the Dissertation? The rest of the chapter 
will attempt to outline these questions, arriving at the following four answers. Firstly, 
Marx does criticise Epicurus' philosophy for being idealistic, but his problem is not with 
Epicurus in toto but rather with the theoretical form of Epicurus' statement of atomism. 
55 Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writing, 1978-1987 (London: Verso, 2006), 
168. In a note, Althusser  added: '[Marx] devoted his doctoral thesis to [Epicurus], basing it on a 
splendid piece of nonsense, which the thought of his “youth” made inevitable: an interpretation of 
the “clinamen as “freedom”.' Ibid., 206. On Althusser's critique the 'idealism of freedom', see André 
Tosel, “The Hazards of Aleatory Materialism in the Late Philosophy of Louis Althusser,” in 
Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Radical Thought, ed. Katja 
Diefenbach et al., 1st ed. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012), 11–12.
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Secondly, on the level of the content of Epicurus' theory, Marx's implicit critique of it is 
indeed  based  on  the  idea  that  Epicurus  fails  to  account  for  necessity  and  natural 
teleology. However, pace Althusser, Marx's search for a philosophy of necessity and 
teleology is not posited in  opposition to Epicurus. Rather, Marx poses the problem of 
the passage from the atom to compound and organised wholes;  he does  not  negate 
atomism, but raises the question of how we might think, starting from the atom, lasting 
encounters in terms of their  natural-teleological  organisation.  The question is, in the 
terms of Hegel's philosophy of nature, how does matter involve itself into life? Thirdly, 
while Marx criticises the bad idealistic form of Epicurus' statement, he insists that it is 
effectively, i.e. practically, a materialism moving within and against any such organised 
wholes.  Fourthly,  and  finally,  we  find  in  Marx's  statement  an  implicit  critique  of 
Epicurus' incapacity to orientate himself theoretically in relation to the actuality of such 
wholes because he lacks a theory of the irreducible reality of representations.
Before passing through these four points, we will start by outlining the stakes of the 
Dissertation.  Firstly,  we  will  read  it  as  a  mediation  on  atomistic  ontology,  as  an 
ontology of freedom, and then look at the ethical implications of this theory.
3. What is the Difference of the Epicurean Event?
The  apparently  austere  and  scholarly  project  of  the  Dissertation  was  a  passionate 
intervention in the politically charged philosophical struggles at the time. Speaking to 
the contemporary relevance of atomism Marx exclaims: '[i]s not their essence so full of 
character, so intense and eternal that the modern world itself has to admit them to full 
spiritual citizenship?'56 For our purposes, it is noteworthy that Marx's reading positions 
itself,  as  Kouvelakis  argues  and  we  shall  see,  against  Hegel  in  rehabilitating  the 
subjectivity  of  ancient  philosophers  freed  from fear  of  the  Gods  and  for  Hegel  in 
questioning  the  atomistic  individuality  entailed  in  such  a  philosophy.  This  latter 
tendency of the text which draws on Hegel's  Philosophy of Nature is, as mentioned, 
mainly subterranean, and visible in Marx's remarks about the limitations of atomism. If 
we want to understand the precise relation of Marx's later concept of organisation to 
atomism it is essential to uncover that hidden polemic.57 But while Marx's text tends 
56 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 92.
57 Occupying the peculiar position of having been written before the texts of the canonical 'young 
Marx', Marx's Doctoral Dissertation is often ignored by Marxologists. However, as with almost any 
aspect of Marx, there still exists a wide range of differing interpretations of it. Martin McIvor, “The 
Young Marx and German Idealism: Revisiting the Doctoral Dissertation,” Journal of the History of  
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towards a theory of necessity and  natural  teleology, this does not mean, as Althusser 
implies, that Marx negates the Epicurean position. Rather, Marx's reading of Epicurus 
not only with, but also against Hegel, means that the text must be understood as Marx's 
first attempt to formulate a materialism, which, while leaving out Hegel's insistence of 
an ultimate speculative orientation to the Absolute in favour of a conception of practice, 
learns from Hegel and Epicurus that it does not have to be deterministic.
The  full  title  of  Marx's  Dissertation reveals  its  question  Difference  Between  the  
Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature.58 The stated purpose of this work, 
which was scheduled for publication and seemed a perfect springboard for an academic 
career, 'a preliminary to a larger work', was to contribute a solution to 'an unresolved 
problem in the history of Greek Philosophy' whose stated contemporary relevance was 
to  correct  an  apparently  minor  mistake  of  Hegel's,  namely  his  conflation  of  the 
Democritean and Epicurean philosophies.59 The analysis of the difference between these 
two philosophers is to be understood as the analysis of the difference given in their 
tackling of a common problem. In the Dissertation, Marx is looking for their difference 
in the seemingly least likely place; not in their ethical writings, but in their atomistic 
philosophies  of  nature,  where  Hegel  had  considered  Epicurus  a  mere  follower  of 
Democritus. If these philosophies have met a 'dull ending', Marx writes, it is because 
their difference – expressed in both their life and decay – has not been recognised.
The  Doctoral  Dissertation itself  begins  with  the  call  to  study  the  microscopic 
differences  between  Epicurus  and  Democritus's  philosophies  of  nature.  While  the 
differences  of  their  ethics  and  scientific  practices  are  apparent,  most  historians  of 
philosophy, Marx notes, have overlooked the difference between the two or described 
Epicurus as a confused and inconsistent follower of Democritus. In the notebook, Marx 
merely lists Epicurus and Democritus as two characters in the carnival of philosophy. In 
the  Dissertation, their  respective  roles  become  clearer:  Democritus,  the  'laughing 
philosopher',  took part  in  the  worldly  carnival  and 'threw himself  into  the  arms  of 
Philosophy 46, no. 3 (2008): 400–401. For an extensive survey see Gery Browning, “Marx’s 
Doctoral Dissertation: The Development of a Hegelian Thesis,” in The Hegel-Marx Connection, ed. 
Tony Burns and Ian Fraser (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 131–45; Tony Burns, 
“Materialism in Ancient Greek Philosophy and in the Writings of the Young Marx,” Historical  
Materialism 7, no. 1 (2000): 3–39; Peter Fenves, “Marx’s Doctoral Thesis on Two Greek Atomists 
and the Post-Kantian Interpretations,” Journal of the History of Ideas vol. 47, no. 3 (July 1, 1986): 
433–452.
58 It should be noted here that we are not interested in the question of what Epicurus and Democritus 
wrote or thought, but in Marx's reading of them. 
59 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 88. For the apparent identity and profound differences between the 
philosophies, see ibid., 96–97.
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positive knowledge', while Epicurus is described as 'satisfied and blissful in philosophy' 
with 'nothing but contempt for the physical sciences.'60 Democritus wandered the world 
and studied natural necessity. Epicurus stayed in his garden and rejected any necessity 
in order to live in freedom/happiness,  ataraxy.61 Marx is clear that their difference is 
irreducibly one of both theory and practice, without suggesting that one can be relegated 
to a cause of the other. It is, in short, a difference of orientation. But Marx, according to 
his 1839 notebook, is not so much interested in a  comparative study  as in Epicurus 
himself. Here, he expresses his project to think the event of Epicurean philosophy very 
precisely,  when he says that it  should not be presented as  conditioned by preceding 
Greek  philosophy,  but  as  throwing  a  retrospective  light  on  a  presentation  which  is 
necessary to 'let it express [aussagen] its own specific [eigenthümliche] position.'62 
In the Dissertation, Marx initially poses the question of the difference between the two 
ancient philosophers in comparative terms, a comparison made relevant by the fact that 
they  share  a  common  problematic,  that  of  atomism.  However,  the  tendency  of  his 
account is to stress the novelty of the Epicurean position. Through what he presents as a 
comparison of answers to the same problems, Marx continually stresses the Epicurean 
position as an invention in the face of the problem of Democritean determinism. The 
Epicurean event, and the minimal, decisive difference of Epicurus is his introduction of 
the clinamen of the atom. Whereas Democritus' ontology was one of strict necessity and 
causality  where  the  atoms  would  follow  the  straight  line  of  their  fall,  Epicurus 
introduced this minimal and unpredictable swerve of the atom, reserving a place for 
chance, and a condition of freedom.63 This resonates with  Hegel's critique of vulgar 
mechanism: 
This  external  manner  of  thinking  always  presupposes  motion  as  already 
externally  present  in matter,  and it does not occur to it to regard motion as 
something immanent and to comprehend motion itself in matter, which latter is 
thus assumed as, on its own account, motionless and inert. This stand-point has 
before it only ordinary mechanics, not immanent and free motion.64
The critique, since classical times, of Democritus was that if atoms fall in a straight line 
they will never meet. In other words, Democritus cannot think the genesis of combined 
60 Ibid., 99–101.
61 Happiness conceived as freedom and absence of fear of death and the Gods. 
62 Ibid., 201, translation ammended.
63 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 102–103, 117.
64 G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1969), 181.
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bodies, let alone a world, but can only conceive of its facticity in contradiction to its 
elemental conditions. Epicurus also starts with imagining the atom as falling according 
to a straight line; every body, insofar as it is falling, is thus a moving point and draws a 
line. However, by falling, the atom is negated by the straight line, just as the spatial 
point is negated (aufgehoben) in the line; if the fall is its only determination, there is 
nothing solid  about  the  point  and it  disappears  into the straight  line.65 Insofar  as  it 
moves in a straight line, it exists in a mode of being in which it surrenders its singularity 
(Einzelheit). Epicurus' solution, in Marx's reading, was to suggest that the atoms must 
be self-determined prior to their determination as what falls in a straight line. The atoms 
are  not  determined  by  anything  but  themselves;  their  movement  cannot  thus  be 
determined relatively to anything, including the notion of a straight line – reversely it is 
only according to such a measure that atoms swerve. So what is this singularity which 
Democritus  cannot  think?  The atom, considered  as  a  spatial  point,  is  a  negation of 
abstract indeterminate space, of the void; in this moment the atom negates all relativity 
and is only for itself. It is a singular intensity.66 
The solidity, the intensity, which maintains itself in itself against the incohesion 
of space, can only be added by virtue of a principle which negates space in its 
entire domain, a principle such as time is in real nature.67
In  short,  the  singularity  of  the  atom  as  solidity-intensity,  is  not  a  purely  spatial 
determination,  but one that is  temporal.  Hegel similarly analyses time in terms of a 
negativity inherent in space, between indeterminate space (the void) and determinate 
space (the point). However, he stresses time as universal, a fact of all spatiality given its  
inner  negativity.68 Thus it  appears that  there is  but  one time.  However,  this  time is 
immediately  the  time  not  of  'one'  negativity,  but  of  the  singular  intensity  of  any 
atom/point, of which there is a multiplicity. This argument easily disappears in Hegel's 
exposition in the Philosophy of Nature, which follows only one direction of negation, 
namely that which drives the overall dialectic onwards. What does this mean? While 
Marx's reading follows Hegel's general principle that the line negates the point, Marx's 
65 Without making explicit reference to it, Marx is here superimposing the section on space and time 
with those on motion and matter in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of  
Nature, Vol. 1, trans. M. J. Petry (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970). As mentioned, Marx's 
surviving notebooks suggest that he studied this carefully. Bue Rübner Hansen, “Hegel’s Concept of 
Time” (Paper presented at the Telos and Totality Conference, Jan Van Eyk Academy, Maarstricht, 
December 3, 2012). See appendix 1.11.
66 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 129.
67 Ibid., 111-12.
68 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature I.
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suggestion is  that for Epicurus the negation also works the other  way around;69 the 
atom, in its intensity, negates the relativity of the straight line. Yet this temporality is not 
the linear time of the fall, but the temporalisation proceeding from its singular intensity. 
The atom swerves, 'in time, in place unfixt' (Lucretius), the clinamen is not a sensuous 
quality,  but  'the pulse'  or  'the  soul  of  the  atom',  'immanent  and absolute  movement 
itself.'70 The atom is not 'in' time, but rather temporalises and spatialises itself:
The  atoms  are  purely  self-sufficient  bodies  or  rather  bodies  conceived  in 
absolute  self-sufficiency,  like  the  heavenly  bodies.  Hence,  again  like  the 
heavenly bodies, they move not in straight, but in oblique lines. The motion of  
failing is the motion of non-self-sufficiency.71
Where the fall is relative, the swerve is absolute and self-suffient. Taking seriously the 
radical primacy of the clinamen, its opposition to determinism is no longer central. The 
atom can no longer be defined in terms of determinism/indeterminacy, but only qua 
itself, as a concept of singular movement. The atom, defined by the clinamen, 'is the  
cause of everything, hence without cause itself.'72 Thus, if clinamen means something 
like freedom, it is a freedom neither opposed to necessity, nor realised in necessity (as 
the  classical  idealist  notion  of  freedom).  It  presents  us  with  a  concept  of  absolute 
freedom and self-causation not on the level of God, but on the level of untotalisable 
multiplicities.
Marx's Epicurus does not deny the compulsions of the everyday or the appearance of 
relations of causality. He is fully aware that the actuality of our everyday life, language 
and  experience  is  full  of  necessities  and  composite  bodies.  The  philosophy  of  the 
swerve is not a theory of actuality, but a theory of the deeper reality of possibility which 
explains the actual. The clinamen is thus prior to the actual, and the encounters of atoms 
are not determined by what is actual but are constitutive of the actual itself. The swerve 
is the fully real yet indeterminate condition of reality, the possibility which grounds any 
69 Epicurus can do this, according to Marx, because he operates in the domain of immediate being, in 
which determinations are immediate and reciprocal as immediate relatities (ibid.)
70 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 194, 196. This definition of matter itself as immanent and absolute 
free movement, resonates with Hegel's critique of Kant's notion of forces: 'This external manner of 
thinking always presupposes motion as already externally present in matter, and it does not occur to 
it to regard motion as something immanent and to conprehend motion itself in matter, which latter is 
thus assumed as, on its own account, mtionless and motionless and inert. This stand-point has before 
it only ordinary mechanics, not immanent and free motion'. Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969, 181.
71 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 112. See appendix 1.10.
72 Ibid., 114. In philosophy and theology God has often been defined as this cause and origin (arché) of 
everything, himself without an cause or origin himself (he is anarchos). Here the anarchos/God is 
immediately multiplicity. 
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actuality.  In the case of the explanation of real phenomena, Marx stresses that unlike 
Democritus,  who was interested in  real  possibility  as the explication of  the relative 
necessity of a phenomenon in terms of its network of conditions, causes and reasons, 
Epicurus was interested in abstract possibility.73 Thus, beneath this question of the real 
possible, on the level of the atom, there is something more like the virtual, which brings 
us closer to an aesthetic principle of intuition and an ethics of possibility against any 
politics of the actual. 
4. The Ethics of the Atom
For Marx's Epicurus there is no clear separation between the atomism and ethics, the 
freedom of the atom is, immediately, the possibility of freedom of self-consciousness.  
The impossibility of separating the ontology and the ethics of atomism is apparent not 
only in the ethical lessons drawn from the ontology, but also from the appearance of 
ethical analogies in the description of the atom itself. Thus, the declination of the atom, 
so writes the Epicurean Lucretius, 'breaks the bonds of fate, the everlasting sequence of 
cause and effect', in the domain of physics as well as in “consciousness”: 
although  many  men  are  driven  by  an  external  force  and  often  constrained 
involuntarily to advance or to rush headlong, yet there is within the human 
breast  something  that  can  fight  against  this  force  and  resist  it 
[entgegenkämpfen und widerstehen].74 
The singular intensity of the point is thus the minimal and fundamental principle of 
resistance to the machinations of external causality; it  is the condition of freedom – 
understood as  arbitrium (contingency, chance, indeterminacy) – of both the atom and 
consciousness. The clinamen of the atom is not defined by space or time, it is not a 
sensuous quality, but a  potestas,75 noumenal  rather than  empirical,  virtual rather than 
actual. 
Defending Epicurus against Cicero's critique,76 Marx's shows how the swerve is not an 
inconsistent  addition  to  Democritus'  strict  determinism,  but  the  central  principle  of 
73 Ibid., 105.
74 Titus Carus Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans. Martin Ferguson Smith, 2nd Revised edition 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 2001) quoted in “Doctoral Dissertation,” 171 and 197.
75 Marx, a law student and classist familiar with Roman Law, must have been aware of the distinction 
between potentia and potestas. For a brief discription of the difference between this distinction in 
Aristotle and Roman Law, see Andre Santos Campos, Spinoza’s Revolutions in Natural Law 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 90.
76 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 110–13.
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Epicurean philosophy which reappears also in the ethical ideal of a life in ataraxy of 
individual self-consciousness, a life undisturbed by mundane matters and free of fear of 
the Gods.77 Indeed, the apparent materialist-physicalism of this thesis, shows its own 
idealist/metaphysical character by setting in motion only 'conscious' ethical energies. As 
an  ethics,  this  mode  of  thought  might  appear  strictly  individualist  to  the  point  of 
suggesting a withdrawal from worldly affairs (just like the Gods themselves must be 
considered to live in harmonious withdrawal), but it also suggests an ethics of the self: 
'for man as man to become his own real object', Marx writes, 'he must have crushed 
within himself his relative being, the power of desire and of mere nature.'78 This formula 
brings into mind Kant's radical rejection of all 'pathological' motivations, yet it comes 
with a major difference: the Epicurean Gods cannot serve as principles of postulates of 
practical faith; they are radically indifferent or resistant to the affairs of men. Here we 
can usefully contrast the Epicurean concept of orientation from Kant's. 
Kant  had  insisted  that  practical  (moral)  orientation  requires  the  assumption  of  an 
intelligent creator who has ordered the world justly and with a view to the happiness of 
man.79 This need of reason leads to the assumption of God’s existence as a  subjective  
principle (rather than a dogmatic truth), a principle which is necessary not only ‘if we 
wish to pass judgement, but because we must pass judgement.’80 Without this postulate, 
'we'  cannot  formulate  moral  laws  without  which  'we'  cannot  navigate  the  world 
practically.  Further,  if  such  law is  not  provided,  libertinism and the  lawless  use  of 
reason will come to dominate, and require the authorities to repress it and possibly all  
free thinking. Kant's appeal against lawless reason is thus also premised on fear.81 What 
the postulate of God founds, the moral law, is the final end to ground all teleologies. 
Why? Precisely because it is in this moral law, and only here, that we find a being 
which has its reason of existence in itself, an end residing in the supersensible faculty of 
77 Ibid., 115. Given that Marx focuses on Epicurus' atomistic theory rather than his ethics, the shift 
from the freedom of atoms to the ethics of self-consciousness, in which intensity and self-movement 
folds over into reflexivity, is not made clear. It is however apparent that, with the ethics, we shift 
from a register of natural freedom to the problematic of autonomy, of willing one's own 
freedom/swerve, making it a principle, a law of one's being. Appendix 1.8.
78 Ibid., 117.
79 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 276 §86. In a 
polemic against the ‘physico-theological’ attempts by Spinoza, Kant argues that it is impossible to 
propose a purely theoretical concept of God. Ibid., 269, §85.
80 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nesbit, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 242.
81 Immanuel Kant, “What Is Orientation in Thinking?,” in Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nesbit, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 248–49.
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freedom.82 Only here do we find a true final end. In their days in the Tübinger Stift, the 
young Hegel and Schelling had been fiercely critical of Kant's move to subordinate the 
freedom of  reason,  which  he  had  so  carefully  constructed  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  
Reason,  to the postulate of God. They saw it as reopening the door to religious belief 
and the authority of the Church in moral matters.83 The young Schelling, as Marx was 
aware, was not just a critic of Kant's subjective God, but also of any objective God. 
Thus, when he characterises the Epicurean affirmation of the irrelevance of Gods to 
ethics, he quotes Schelling: 'when you presuppose the idea of an objective God, how can 
you talk of laws that reason produces out of itself, since autonomy can only belong to an 
absolutely free being.'84 
The atom swerves. It is attracted or repulsed. It has no need for orientation. It simply is  
orientated  in  its  movement  within  a  non-totalised  space.  The  powers  of  God,  the 
sovereign and teleology no longer have any transcendent or transcendental jurisdiction; 
primacy lies with individual forces who might subdue each other, but never dissolve 
themselves  into  unities.  Through  the  philosophy  of  the  swerve,  any  materialist 
orientation becomes irreducible to any unity or sovereignty that might try to subsume, 
subject or organise it. Marx's Epicurus's thus provides an ethics of resistant subjectivity. 
Yet we find in the  Dissertation  certain hints in the direction of a political reading of 
Epicurus, the discussion of which we save for the final part of this chapter.
5. The Metaphysics of Atomism
We start with Marx's critique of the theoretical form of atomism, which he shared with 
Hegel.  For the atomists,  everything in  the world consist  of  atoms, a  multiplicity  of 
atoms, which are essentially external to one another, but which appear as unified in our 
senses  and  imaginations.  Thus,  organisations,  totalities  and  worlds  are  mere 
appearances. But how then, goes the Hegelian question, could pure exteriority produce 
the  universal  concepts  through  which  this  exteriority  can  be  theorised?  Is  not  the 
82 ‘He is the only natural creature whose peculiar objective characterization is nevertheless such as to 
enable us to recognize in him a supersensible faculty—his freedom—and to perceive both the law of 
the causality and the object of freedom which that faculty is able to set before itself as the highest 
end—the highest good in the world’.Kant, Critique of Judgement, 264, §84.
83 Terry P Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 33–38. See 
also “Dominant Philosophical-Theological Problems in the Tübingen Stift During the Student Years 
of Hegel, Hölderlin, and Schelling” in Dieter Henrich, The Course of Remembrance and Other  
Essays on Hölderlin (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 31–54.
84 In a fragment of the Dissertation appendix Marx quotes this passage and criticizes the older 
Schelling for having forgotten the truth of his youthful radical philosophy. Marx, “Doctoral 
Dissertation,” 161.
 40
philosophy of atomism essentially subsumptive of its own object, rather than expressive 
of it? The contradiction is that they, despite themselves, reproduce a sharp distinction 
between truth and knowledge, universality and particularity, between the philosophical 
principle of the world and its manifestation; thus, they are unable to 'reach the concept', 
the concept  being exactly  that  which would grasp,  or  be the conscious  side of,  the 
mediation between form and content.85 Everywhere, notes Marx, Epicurus assumes that 
conceptual distinctions are real ones: 'Just as his principle is the atom, so is the manner 
of his cognition itself atomistic ... every determination assumes the form of isolated 
individuality.'86 The  atom is  not  merely  a  principle  (atomoi  archai)  of  multiplicity, 
indivisibility, singularity, but the elementary substance of the world (atoma stoicheia). It 
is at once absolute self-reliant form and absolute substance, which becomes clear when 
atoms are considered in their conglomerations, which gives rise to quality, to the world 
that appears to us. It is an abstract determination as well as a real one.87 The atom is not 
merely the existence of a content (stoicheion) – as Democritus claims – but the essence 
(arché) of what appears. The problematic of both Democritus and Epicurus, in Marx's 
as well as Hegel's interpretation, is caught in the dilemma of proposing an empiricism 
which  banishes  abstract  thought,  yet  needing abstract  thought  to  formulate  its  own 
proposals of the universality of the atom as a philosophical statement:88
we do not escape metaphysics (or, more precisely, the tracing back of nature to 
thoughts) by throwing ourselves into the arms of Atomism, because, of course, 
the atom is itself a thought, and so the interpretation of matter as consisting of 
atoms is a metaphysical one.89
The problem which Epicurus has with explaining the universality of his own philosophy 
of the atoms, given the premise of unbridgeable separation, reveals another difficulty: 
that of thinking freedom beyond abstract singularity. As Hegel notes, the problem is not 
metaphysics  as  such,  but  whether  this  is  the  right  kind of  metaphysics,  particularly 
whether  it,  like  atomism,  approaches  the  matter  in  the  one-sided  way  of  the 
understanding, or thinks the articulation of thought and reality as organised. Only in the 
latter case can it 'form the basis both of our theoretical and of our practical action. This 
85 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldane (marxists.org, 1892), Part 
1, Section 2, B.
86 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 128.
87 Ibid., 125-31.
88 McIvor, “The Young Marx and German Idealism,” 402.
89 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 156, §98.
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is the reproach that strikes down the philosophy of Atomism.'90 Hegel, in other words, 
finds  atomism wanting  because  it  cannot  orientate  us,  it  cannot  bring  together  the 
practical and the theoretical.
The resistance to gods and real wholes means that Epicurus's philosophy can only finds 
its  home  in  practical  separation  from  the  world.  He  rejects  the  problem  of  the 
actualisation of freedom through the constitution of a world or through its actualisation 
in the world.91 So the question is not just how to think the abstract universality of the 
atom, but how composite bodies – the sine qua non of philosophy and any world – can 
be made possible in a world of separated atoms. This is the question of the reality of 
abstractions, and of the real combination of atoms into bodies. 
6. From the Atom to Organisation
The Epicurean notion of body (soma) includes both simple, indivisible bodies – the 
atoms – and the compound bodies that we can familiarize ourselves with through our 
senses. But there is a curious dualism or contradiction here, Marx remarks. As the world 
changes, and appearances are annihilated, the atom persists; it is the eternal foundation 
of the changing world, but as such it never appears; it becomes the essence underlying 
the world of pure appearances, which are closer to semblances than appearances in the 
Hegelian sense (which are the  necessary  expression of existing essence).92 While the 
meeting of atoms, which is paradoxical to Democritus, is made possible by the notion of 
their swerve, Epicurus', in Marx's reading, insists that the encounters do not abolish the 
swerve: the self-reliance of atoms asserts itself as repulsion in their encounters.93 This 
tension  between  attraction  and  repulsion  is  central  to  Marx's  reading  of  Epicurus' 
atomism; it means that the only possible combination of atoms into a body is based on 
their singular attractions rather than on external subsumption and that this attraction 
does not abolish the swerve.  The atom is the movement of the swerve, and a simple 
affective binary: attraction and repulsion. In this sense the atom is no subject, because it 
has no object, only encounters and affects. 
90 Ibid.
91 In a mythologising note, Marx posed the question of a re-construction from the rubble 
(Democritus/Epicurus), after the fall of the system (Aristotle/Hegel). Whereas he likened the latter 
pair to Prometheus, he seems to see his own time as that of Deucalion. See appendix 1.3.-1.5. and 
1.9.
92 'Essence therefore is not behind or beyond appearance, but since it is the essence that exists, 
existence is appearance', while semblance, on the contrary, is not 'independent and self-supporting' 
Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 199, §131.
93 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 116.
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Even if attraction creates compositions, it does not abolish the swerve. For this reason 
all  conglomerate  bodies  have  only  a  temporary  and  regional  existence.  The  very 
principle of their combination is also the inner principle of the eventual separation of 
any one given body. The starting point – the separation of atoms – always reasserts 
itself. The composition of atoms does not abolish their exteriority, but only creates a 
semblance of interiority. The atoms do not involve themselves into life. So, when the 
atom 'proceeds to reality' (Wirklichkeit,  actuality) and comes into appearance, it never 
exists as itself,  but always as something else, as the bearer of forms indifferent and 
external to it. 
On this basis, Epicurus cannot think actuality as actuality. He can only separate actuality 
into its component parts, not think its immanent organisation. Ultimately Epicurus can 
only  dissolve  any  organisation;  the  fear  that  the  thought  of  a  whole  might  distrub 
ataraxy  becomes  an  incapacity  to  think  the  self-organisation  of  matter.  Marx's 
formulation of this problem is telling: Epicurus' incapacity to think organisation 'is a 
necessary  consequence,  since  the  atom,  presupposed  as  abstractly  individual  and 
complete,  cannot  actualise  itself  as  the  idealising  and  pervading  power  of  this  
manifold.'94 Later Marx writes in a parenthesis, '[Epicurus] knows no other nature but 
the mechanical.'95 The reference to these 'real idealising powers' and a nature beyond the 
mechanical would have been clear to many contemporary readers of Hegel:96 in the 
Philosophy of Nature, the first such power – following the section on mechanism – is 
chemism,  the  combination  of  that  abolishes  their  individuality  in  creating  a  new 
compound body.97 After chemism, Hegel introduces  organics, with the organism as a 
truly idealising power organising the multiplicity of its elements according to its own 
principle, its own idea. In Marx's own abbreviated summary of Hegel's  Philosophy of  
Nature,  this  is  'singular  nature.  The determination of  subjectivity,  in  which  the real 
distinctions of the form are likewise brought back to ideal unity, which is self-found and 
for itself — Organics.'98 Idealisation is, as noted by Catherine Malabou, a process of 
simultaneous condensation and synthesis of what is different, both an abstraction and a 
contraction.99 Thus, the reference of Marx's subdued critique of Epicurus is clearly the 
94 Ibid., 130. My emphasis. 
95 Ibid., 142.
96 Mechanical here does not mean deterministic, but refers to the play of forces, of matter, weight, 
motion, attraction and repulsion.
97 For an elaboration of the concepts of chemism and organism, see chapter 2, and appendix 1.12.
98 Marx, “Plan of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature,” 510.
99 Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic (London: Routledge, 
2004), 60.
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Hegelian conception of  organism.  Contra Althusser,  this  does  not mean that  Marx's 
critique is idealistic in an anti-materialist sense. In fact the concept of 'idealising power' 
refers, in the case of organisms, to a materialist  concept of organisation and natural 
teleology.100 It simply means that  organisms are self-generating and self-reproducing, 
and that their elements are determined and alive in relation to the whole. The organism 
has a temporal and local purpose and cause of itself in the sense that it is irreducible to 
external causations and organised according to its own principle. An organic whole is an 
Idea insofar as it is not localisable in any part or any limited set of relations between the 
parts. An organism is always in a relation to the outside, not merely consuming it, but 
idealising it. As Stephen Houlgate writes:
Life not only 'idealizes' matter into the organs of the body; it also 'idealizes' 
objects and materials outside the body by assimilating them into itself. “If life 
were a realist”, Hegel remarks, “it would have respect for the outer world: in 
fact, however, it always inhibits the reality of the other and transforms it into its 
own self.”101 
Thus Marx judges Epicurus on a standard drawn from Hegel. It refers to a concept of 
the idea as something not abstractly universal and external to matter but immanent to 
the organisation of matter. Such organisation, considered as a process of idealisation, 
refers  not  just  to  the  actual  (Wirklichkeit),  but  to  actualisation  (Verwirklichung).102 
Epicurus'  atoms do not  explain  how a  virtual  multiplicity  can  actualise  itself  as  or 
around an 'idealising and pervading power', how essence must come to exist, and how 
the existing essence must appear. Why is actualisation linked to idealisation, and what 
is meant by idea here?  In a text written during the same year as Marx's  Dissertation, 
Engels launched a critique of Schelling which draws on this Hegelian principle: 
Being is thinkable for him only as matter, as hyle, as wild chaos. ... The chief 
meaning which Schelling attributes to it is ... that of possibility, and so we have 
a philosophy based on possibility.  In this respect,  Schelling rightly calls his 
science of reason the “none-exclusive” science, for in the end everything is 
100 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, 105.
101 Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History: Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 163. 'Hegel refers to organic self-renewal as 'reproduction.' He understands 
reproduction, therefore, to be the process whereby an organism continuously produces and preserves 
itself as the singular organism it is - the process of 'self-producing.'
102 Wirklichkeit is a core Hegelian concept, which is translated as 'actuality', and sometimes as 'reality.' 
It relates to the verb wirken, to effect or to work (lit. an activity which changes a state of things). See 
appendix 1.6. for a note on Hegel's use of the concept of Wirklichkeit. 
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possible.  What  matters,  however  [contra  Schelling],  is  that  thought  should 
prove its worth by its inner force to become real.103
Potential in the sense spoken of here does not refer to logical possibility, but to a mode 
of being which is not actual. Thus, to understand actuality it is insufficient to proceed in 
an empiricist fashion from sensual impressions (such immediate proximate truth is mere 
semblance), or through abstract ontological speculation, say by positing a field of atoms 
(a multiplicity). The proper method for understanding actuality is to understand the path 
of  actualisation,  or  idealisation.104 This  passage  from possibility  to  actuality  moves 
through contingency, it does not abolish chance but produces its own power and its own 
necessity of self-preservation. What is actual is necessary; not in an absolute sense, but 
in the sense that an organism's self-reproduction is necessary. Just as an organism can 
change,  decay  and  die,  possibility  and  contingency  still  form  moments  of  finite 
necessity; they are part of any process of actualisation, as well as of actuality itself.105 
Here, Marx and Hegel's critique that Epicurean philosophy fails to account for itself (the 
pure immanence of the multiplicity of atoms is an abstraction which is only possible in 
thought, yet atomism does not provide a way to explain how this thought of the atom 
becomes possible) is redoubled when Marx enters into the content of Epicurus' theory. 
In either case the problem is not the conceptual or 'real' abstractness of the atoms, but 
the lack of a passage from the abstract to concrete actuality. Thus Marx's reading of 
Epicurus does not, contra Althusser, entail a praise to teleology and necessity against the 
swerve. Rather, it criticises Epicurus for not theorising the passage from the atom to the 
actual, for one-sidedly insisting that the swerve is subversive of any whole, rather than 
potentially  productive  of  compound  bodies,  and  how  encounters  might  lead  to  the 
generation of organised bodies. The freedom of the atom therefore appears as opposed 
to the necessity of composed bodies, just as possibility appears opposed to actuality. 
Epicurus, in Marx's interpretation, cannot think the possibility of freedom in compound 
bodies.  If  freedom is  the  swerve  of  the  singular  absolute  atom,  the  organisation  of 
bodies can only be the repression of this freedom. This is not to say that it is abolished 
in  compound  bodies,  but  rather  that  it  cannot  be  more  than  the  principle  of  the 
contingency of  abstract  bodies.  The atom's  '[a]bstract  individuality  is  freedom from 
being, not freedom in being.'106 
103 Friedrich Engels, “Anti-Schelling: Schelling and Revelation,” in MECW, vol. 2, 1975, 207.
104 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 209–213 §140-141.
105 Ibid., 217 §145, see also §148.
106 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 130–31. My emphasis.
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But,  in  a  world  full  of  fear  of  authorities  and  gods,  Marx  can  still  take  Epicurus' 
atomism as a model for philosophy despite its limitations.  This is where Marx goes 
beyond Hegel's critique of Epicurus, towards an affirmation of the practical implications 
of Epicurean philosophy.
7. Turning Against the World: Practical Energy
As we have seen, Marx's reading of Epicurus is guided by Hegel's critique that atomism 
is characterised by the contradiction between concept and existence, between form and 
matter. These contradictions become most clear when Epicurus refuses to theorise the 
existence of meteors. For Marx the issue of meteors, as they were thought by Epicurus' 
contemporaries, becomes a paradigmatic problem of Epicurus, because they share the 
characteristics  of  the  atom (unchangeability,  self-centeredness,  and  the  swerving  in 
empty space), yet are actual rather than merely possible, concretely universal rather than 
abstractly so. The fact that Epicurus would not face, according to Marx, is that '[t]he 
heavenly bodies are ... the atoms become real [wirklich].'107 This reveals the priority of 
Epicurean ethics over its physics. Once an actual composite body appears as a force 
great enough to crush an individual self-consciousness, or rather to cause it to fear such 
annihilation,  Epicurus  deconstructs that force:  he insists  that there is  a multitude of 
explanations for the meteor, and that it thus cannot be a unified object.108 That he turns 
against any composite bodies which have achieved an existence of their own is both 
Epicurus' 'most glaring contradiction' but also his 'profoundest knowledge'. It reveals the 
absolute priority of ataraxy in his thought. Epicurus' reluctance to grant to the composite 
bodies  of the heavens a concrete  empirical existence possessing the qualities of the 
atoms reveals that his priority lies with constructing a practice free of fear, leading him 
to affirm abstract singular self-consciousness against what Greeks would have taken as 
a  clear  example  of  an  actual  self-subsisting  body  outside  consciousness.  Epicurus' 
priority  is  hence  not  a  natural  science  of  actuality,  but  a  'natural  science  of  self-
consciousness'.109 
For  Epicurus,  what  is  absolute  is  not  the  system,  but  the  abstract-singular;  an anti-
philosophy within philosophy.  Moving against  appearances  – refusing to  be  a  mere 
107 Ibid., 142.
108 Ibid., 140.
109 The affirmative principles of Marx's Epicurus, swerve and ataraxy, are immanent to matter , which is 
why Marx can speak of it as a 'natural science' of self-consciousness. Ibid., 143 and 146.
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medium of nature's self-reflection – this is a self-consciousness whose timeliness is as 
abstract as the singular movement of the atom, it is a process of self-temporalisation, an 
affirmation of abstraction from the world. Epicurus' position as Marx sees it is deeply 
materialist precisely because of the profound practical implications of its idealism. In 
pressing Epicurus' contradictions, what he in a draft called the 'immanent dialectics' of 
Epicurean philosophy,110 Marx shows how their movement is the movement of the atom 
and of  individual  self-consciousness.  Furthermore,  he shows how they pass  into  an 
affirmation,  that of ataraxy, against  the given. This is  not an idealism attempting to 
subsume the world under the theoretical concept, but one that can only be practiced. 
While this might appear as the moment where Marx, as noted by Althusser, subsumes 
Epicurus to the tenets of Hegelian Idealism, the result is also the exact opposite: He 
discovers  that  Epicurus's  philosophy  is  a  practical  philosophy,  whose  foremost 
procedure is  the  affirmation of  'the absoluteness  and freedom of  self-consciousness' 
against  systematic  philosophy.111 Contra  Hegel,  in  Marx's  reading,  Epicurus' 
metaphysics  is  practical precisely  because  it  provides  a  theoretical  orientation  that 
refuses to submit itself to the actuality while being actual itself: it is, we might say, a 
practice  of  abstraction  or  subtraction  which  reveals  a  vision  that  is  not  distributed 
according to the modal categories of the the actual and the possible, but in terms of the 
actuality of conflicting actualities.112
Here we see again, that, however much Marx interpreted Epicurus through Hegel, Marx 
was  also  already  writing  from a  distance  of  Hegelianism after  the  collapse  of  the 
ambition to provide an absolute system. What we have seen in the case of the meteor, is 
that Marx discovers the question of the practical-performative dimension of Epicurus' 
philosophy. It allows us to understand how the zero-level of teleology, organicism and 
dialectics  which  we  have  located  at  the  beginning  of  Marx,  not  just  through  its 
deficiencies nor as an internal background against which the rest of the oeuvre can be 
contrasted. Just as importantly, it gives us an alternative image of practice and thought, 
which perhaps remains open as a subterranean possibility in Marx's writings. While 
Marx collapses singularity into abstract individuals that are considered as self-identical, 
it is clear that the affirmative force of philosophy is not reducible to individuality, it is  
differentiating, a singular force:
110 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 186.
111 Ibid., 145.
112 See appendix 1.14.
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It is a psychological law that the theoretical mind, once liberated in itself, turns 
into practical energy, and, leaving the shadowy empire of Amenthes as will, 
turns itself against the reality [Wirklichkeit] of the world existing without it.113
Whereas Epicurus carried atomism to its most radical conclusion, namely the practical 
and  'conscious  opposition  to  the  universal  [the  meteors  as  concrete  individual 
universals]',  Democritus  merely  saw the  atom as  an  abstract,  objective  category  of 
natural philosophy, not as an 'active [energisches] principle'; the atom, for this reason, 
'remains without actualisation'.114 If for Epicurus the atom is pure possibility, the ethics 
implied by this possibility turns it into a practical force; in terms of the Aristotelian 
distinction,  theoretical  dunamis becomes  practical  energeia,  an  actual  force  in 
opposition with other forces. Marx shows that the practical truth of Epicurus' abstract 
notion of singularity is that it ceases to be an abstract concept and becomes part of a 
struggle  in  and  against  universality,  thought  in  terms  of  resistance  rather  than 
actualisation.  But  this  concept  of  active  freedom,  even  if  actual,  is  totally 
underdetermined and abstract: it provides no answer to Marx's own question of how 
freedom  might  be  actualised  in  a  manifold,  or,  in  political  terms,  how  individual 
freedom can be thought concretely, socially, politically. Marx's preferred method here 
becomes  that  of  the  critique  of  the  untruth  of  the  world,  rather  than  that  of  the 
construction of a world.
Describing the German philosophical scene in the same note, he describes the positive 
and the critical philosophy as two 'parties', the party of the concept or critique and the 
party of the non-concept, or positive philosophy.115 Marx counts Epicurus to the side of 
critical philosophy, and Democritus to the side of positive philosophy. While the activity 
of  the former turns  to  the outside of philosophy we have just  seen,  the latter  turns 
towards  the  inside  of  philosophy,  merely  applying,  developing  and  entrenching  its 
categories.  If  positive  philosophy  'knows  that  the  inadequacy  is  immanent  in 
philosophy', critical philosophy 'understands it as inadequacy of the world which has to 
be  made  philosophical.'116 Both  parties  inhabit  an  inverted  world,  but  positive 
philosophy finds contradictions only in thought, and is thus forced to live the inversion 
(Verkehrtheit) as madness (Verrücktheit).  The party of the concept, on the other hand, 
achieves real progress because it knows this madness to be real. While as philosophy's 
113 Ibid., 149.
114 Ibid., 146.
115 See appendix 1.15.
116 Ibid., 151.
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notion of freedom provides a measure by which the world can be found wanting, it 
cannot  actualise  it  without  transforming  itself.  What  was  a  systematic  philosophy 
becomes a practical philosophy, it is 'lowered to an abstract totality', it becomes a force 
of change by loosing the system, by becoming worldly, by actualising itself as a part of 
worldly struggles.117 
The  cry  for  the  philosophy  to  become  worldly  and  for  the  world  to  become 
philosophical recurred, as we will see in the next chapter, in Marx's writings until the 
mid-1840s. The figure presents us two complimentary moments. One is philosophy's 
critique of the world as it is, the other the actualisation of philosophy in the world. On 
the one side a critique of actuality, on the other a practice of actualisation. If the Marxist 
tradition is saturated with readings of Marx as a critic of actuality, most Marxists reject 
the early Marx's notion of the actualisation of philosophy as idealist or affirm this very 
idealism through the concept of the 'idea of' (freedom, equality, communism). We find 
Althusser  in  the  former  camp.  In  this  reading,  Marx's  Dissertation  is  idealist  and 
rationalist because it appears to Althusser that the actualisation of philosophy means the 
actualisation of the abstract freedom of the atom. In this light, Marx's argument as we 
have recounted it appears somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, Marx criticises the 
theoretical form of Epicurean philosophy from the point of view of the concrete. On the 
other hand, it seems that he, in adopting the practical thrust of Epicurean philosophy, 
adopts  the  very  abstraction  that  he  rejects.  Thus,  as  claimed  by  Althusser,  Marx's 
reading and use of Epicurus seems to cast him as an idealist and anti-materialist. 
The premise of this argument is that there is not merely a practical but also a logical 
opposition between actualisation and actuality, between the idealist concept of freedom 
and the materialist concept of actuality. They appear as concepts of a different order, 
like the difference between resistance and revolution. However, where Althusser sees an 
opposition between idealist spiritualisation and the materialist theory of combinations, 
we will propose that what we find in Marx's materialist critique of Epicurus – posed in 
his question of idealisation – is a theory of the actuality of spiritualisation. Further, in 
his  'idealist'  theory  of  actualisation,  we  might  find  a  materialist  principle  of 
combination. All this makes sense if we understand Marx as a follower of the Hegelian 
notion of actuality in nature whose structure is ideal,  yet describing an ideality that 
emerges out of a material process of combination, looping back on itself:
117 See also appendix 1.3.
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Whereas the actualisation of philosophy relates to the potential of self-consciousness, 
idealisation, in the materialist terms of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, is the emergence 
of actuality through processes of  composition, combination and  (self)-organisation.118 
The idea of self-consciousness on its own remains abstractly universal; only the notion 
of idealisation/organisation can give us a concept of concretely universal and material 
actualisation, of the freedom in being – as Marx points out in his critique of Epicurus. 
But to do so, it must not presuppose organisation, but rather show the passage from 
composition  and  combination  to  organisation  (and  thereby  its  reversibility,  through 
putrefaction and decomposition).119 For this natural philosophy, 'idealisation' means the 
self-organisation of a manifold, or more precisely the passage to 'life'. Only when the 
chemical  passes  over  into  the  organic  do  we  have,  according  to  Hegel,  a  self-
reproducing process, and only here do we have the recursivity of the ideal, a certain 
finite self-relating teleology, and self-causation: freedom in compound bodies.120 
This opens for two different approaches to idealisation. Firstly, a critical approach that 
picks apart an actual concrete body and shows the process by which it is constituted and 
structured and how it contains and organises a manifold which remains irreducible to it.  
On the other hand, there is the possibility of a constructive approach which attempts to 
organise a manifold, i.e. to constitute actualise itself. What the rest of this chapter will 
suggest is, firstly, that where the  critique of actuality  uncovers a situation in which a 
manifold is organised through an alienated idea, actualisation of philosophy refers to the 
actualisation of an idea in the precise sense outlined above: as the self-organisation of a 
manifold. We start with an analysis of Marx's early notion of critique: 
In a note on ontological proof and money, which was written during the period in which 
he composed his dissertation, Marx suggests that God and money are very real.  The 
imaginary character of God (just as money) does not make the idea any less effective: 'it 
works on me (das wirkt auf mich).  In this  sense all gods, the pagan as well  as the 
Christian ones, have possessed a real existence (eine reelle Existenz).'121 The problem 
here  is  that  these  ideas,  even  if  imagined,  are  actualised  through  the  activity  of  a 
common imagination.  They  are  effective  and actual  (das  wirkt) insofar  as  they  are 
118 See appendix 1.6.
119 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Nature, Vol. III - Part II of the Encyclopaedia of the  
Philosophical Sciences, trans. M. J. Petry (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970).
120 See also Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 156, §256.
121 'Did not the ancient Moloch reign? Was not the Delphic Apollo a real power [wirkliche Macht] in the 
life of the Greeks?' Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 160.
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practised in a definite 'country' through exchange or worship.122 The manifold of the 
believers are organised by this idea, but through their own activity.123 God and money 
are not  irrational  because they are 'ideal'  rather  than 'material',  as  if  the material  is 
somehow more real than the idea which emerges out of material practices. No, God and 
money are irrational and false because they present themselves as self-grounding and 
self-positing:  they  present  themselves  as  independent  facts,  by  hiding  the  material 
practices  of  idealisation  that  sustains  them.  They  present  an  actuality  without  the 
activity of actualisation that sustains it. The truth of God and money, what for human 
beings can be truly self-grounding and self-positing is only human self-consciousness 
itself. Here we are back to the truth of Epicurus in Marx's reading:  an ethics of self-
consciousness.
However,  if  critique  demonstrates  the  conflict  between  what  is  (religion,  money, 
unfreedom) and what could be (freedom, self-determination of reason), does this not 
leave Marx with a political equivalent of Epicurus' rejection of the consistency of real 
meteors in the name of a freedom which remains abstract? Given that Marx criticizes 
Epicurus'  atom  for  not  providing  a  concept  of  idealisation,  organisation  and 
actualisation, might we not criticise Marx's notion of self-consciousness in precisely the 
same  terms?  When  we  fold  Marx's  ethics  back  on  the  natural  philosophy  it  was 
developed  as  a  critique  of,  this  ethics  has  to  face  itself  the  questions  the  natural 
philosophy was subjected to. Under this challenge, what we have is no longer merely an 
ethics  of  self-consciousness  –  the  'truth  of  atomism'  which  is  the  result  of  Marx's 
investigation – but the challenge to develop a politics of constitution or organisation. 
The final section before the conclusion of this chapter will present some traces of a 
political philosophy in the Dissertation that render it probable that Marx was aware of 
at  least  the  possibility  of  developing  such  a  politics  on  the  basis  of  the  overall 
framework of natural philosophy (which as we have seen, did not end with atomism for 
Marx).
8. The Missing Political Philosophy of the Dissertation
While Marx's critique of Epicurus relies on the criteria of self-organisation in natural 
philosophy, the question remains if and how Marx would carry that on in relation to 
122 We are here reminded of Althusser's thesis that ideology has a material existence. Louis Althusser, 
On Ideology (London: Verso, 2008), 42.
123 For a more extended analysis of this note, see appendix 1.7.
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Epicurus' remarks on the social and political. However, here we find ourselves if not in 
a blind alley, then at the entry to a bridge that is missing its central section. But the 
political reading of atomism was, as pointed out by Hegel, quite widespread at the time:
In  modern times, the atomistic view has become even more important in the 
political  than in the physical. According to this view, the will of the single 
[individuals] as such is the principle of the State; what produces the attraction 
is  the  particularity  of  needs  [and]  inclinations;  and  the  universal,  the  State 
itself, is the external relationship of a contract.124
The missing section is the lost parts of the Dissertation appendix which dealt explicitly 
with  social  and political  matters.  We can only  imagine what  was written  under  the 
headlines we do know, such as “The Longing of the Multitude” and “The Pride of the 
Elected”. However, some comments on political questions survive in the thesis and the 
notes, and they reveal that Marx did not see Epicurus' practical philosophy as incapable 
of  thinking  the  political  constitution  of  social  bodies.  The  Epicurean  theory  of  the 
atoms, and hence the notion of freedom, physical, ethical and political, given with it, 
relies  on  the  presupposition,  shared  with  Democritus,  of  a  fragmented  world  – 
materially and politically.125 If the philosophy of the atoms rules out the possibility of 
moral,  religious  and  historical  unifications  along  transcendent,  transcendental  or 
sovereign lines, it  still  manages to produce a unique conception of community.  It is 
precisely Epicurus' introduction of the swerve which 'changed the whole inner structure 
of the domain of the atoms' that makes this possible.126 Because atoms swerve, they do 
not simply fall side by side, but encounter one another. The political consequence of this 
is that 'the covenant, in the social domain of friendship' is possible as a real organisation 
of 'atoms', because their meetings might produce an attraction. Marx quotes Diogones 
Laertius' writings on Epicurus in a footnote:
Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to 
the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice  
or injustice. And those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual 
covenants to the same end are in like case. There never was an absolute justice, 
but only an agreement made in reciprocal intercourse, in whatever localities, 
now and again, from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering 
124 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 155, §98. Hegel's italics removed.
125 See appendix 1.13.
126 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 118.
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of harm.127
Justice and injustice, as well as social order and disorder, are not eternal, but emerge 
through social combinations, through covenants. If Epicurus' philosophy is a practice 
against actuality, the idea of contracts and covenants must be read as practice of social 
composition, and therefore against the mythologies of social contract theory. Attacking 
Max Stirner's understanding of Epicurus' philosophy four years later, Marx wrote: 
To  give  our  saint  [Stirner]  some  indication  of  the  real  base  on  which  the 
philosophy of Epicurus rests, it is sufficient to mention that the idea that the 
state rests on the mutual agreement of people, on a contrat social, is found for 
the first time in Epicurus.128
Contra  Althusser's  critique  of  Marx,  it  is  clear  that  Marx is  familiar  with  Epicurus' 
notion of (temporarily) lasting encounters, the creation of social bodies ex novo, outside 
teleologies and pre-given norms. Such encounters are contingent insofar as the capacity 
cannot be referred back to any essential human or animal capacity, but to circumstances, 
decisions and/or desires. However, the priority of repulsion is clear in Marx's reading of 
Epicurus'  political  atomism:  thus  he  stresses  the  Hobbesian  characteristics  of  the 
encounters. For instance, when he speaks of the swerve as a resistance to being driven 
by external force to advance or rush headlong, Marx's mobilisation of military analogy 
is marked. As an alternative model to this outer compulsion, he speaks of individual 
heroes  fighting  a  'war  omnium  contra  omnes'.129 The  horizon  of  encounters  never 
abolishes the separation, or only does so temporarily. As Marx the law student must 
have been aware, it is this latent possibility of civil war arising from the separation of 
individual interests, which for Hobbes necessitates the mechanical order imposed by 
sovereignty and law, and for Hegel the organic articulation of law and sovereignty with 
the dynamics of civil society itself. While civil war is the reason for forming a new 
state, this state does not abolish power relations and resistances, and thus it never makes 
itself superfluous. We will see in chapters 3 and 4 that Hegel's position on the state and 
organism is far from homoeostatic and harmonious.130
127 Ibid., 173. It must be noted, even if Marx does not, that Epicurus' Garden included both women and 
slaves, a fact highly controversial at the time, and unusual for philosophical schools throughout 
history.
128 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The German Ideology,” in MECW, vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1976), 141.
129 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 197.
130 See, for instance, G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §276, p.314. Hegel, Lectures 
on the Philosophy of World History, Volume I: Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 
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Epicureanism, in  Marx'  reading,  rejects  this  organic  logic in  favour  of  an ethics  of 
freedom and war, which is based on a dis-articulation of the relationship between war 
and state. Marx's theoretical critique of Epicurus from the standpoint of the involution 
of life  through the organisation of atoms, in this context is exactly what the Hegelian 
critique of this political philosophy would be: it fails to account for actually existing 
social bodies and for the possibility of the  political, social  actualisation of freedom. 
Political freedom for Epicurus is merely freedom from the polis, not the freedom of the 
polis, to paraphrase Marx's formula. Given his Hegelian insistence that the atom needs 
to be thought in relation to the organisation of atoms into organisms, Marx would seem 
to be committed to push the project of political freedom towards the question of its 
'organic' actualisation. If the truth of Epicurean atomism is practical rather than merely 
contemplative,  then  the  idea  of  a  social  covenant  also  cannot  be  taken  as  a 
contemplative theoretical construct, but as a practical principle of constitution. Thus the 
practical implication of Marx's theoretical critique is the orientation of practice toward 
the organisation of freedom, as the self-organisation of the social against the inverted 
reality of the present; in chapter 2 we will find a sketch of mass organisation which 
shows that Marx did take up this argument against the conservative, right-Hegelian idea 
of the ideally homoeostatic social organism.
Whereas  the  late  Althusser's  philosophy  of  the  encounter  sides  with  Hobbes  and 
Epicurus, Marx's Dissertation might help us critique the ontology of separation implicit 
in all three. In their divergent conceptualisations of possible social bodies, Althusser, 
Hobbes and Epicurus remain on the level of forces and their relations, on the level of 
'mechanism'.131 It is clear that Marx's  Dissertation does not eternalise teleology or the 
social organism, and that it accepts the irreducibility of the swerve. However, if it is 
insufficient to oppose meteors with abstractly individual atoms, it also is insufficient to 
oppose social organisms to a principle of abstract free individuality, even if that does 
have an important  practical  energy irreducible  to  actuality.  This  is  the most glaring 
contradiction of the Dissertation. 
It would seem that the practical philosophy sufficient to live up to Marx's theoretical 
critique  of  the  Epicurean  philosophy  of  nature  would  be  orientated  toward  the 
organisation of free singularities under the condition of exteriority.  The possibility of 
1822-1823 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 100. See also appendix 1.16. for a historical 
sketch of the passage from Hobbes to Hegel.
131 On the late eighteenth century passage from a mechanistic to an organic conception of society, from 
Hobbes to Hegel, as it were, see appendix 1.16.
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organising a manifold relies on the premise that it is not already fully organised. Self-
organisation draws on what is partially or fully withdrawn from – or is abjected by – the 
powers that attempt to organise it, whether heavenly or earthly. Thus, we find in Marx's 
contradiction the means to reverse the idealist drift of his argument into a philosophy of 
materialist organisation and consistency. 
9. Conclusion
In  this  chapter  we have  introduced what  might  be considered  the  zero-level  of  the 
problems  of  organisation  and  orientation:  a  materialism  radically  inorganic,  non-
teleological, non-systemic; a fundamental ontology of the swerve and of fragmentation. 
Epicurus gave Marx an image of a world of absolute exteriority, where there is no state, 
no law, no sovereign, only singular swerving atoms. What Marx's Epicurus contributes 
to the overall argument of this thesis is, first of all, a non-Kantian subjective principle of 
orientation in practice: this is a philosophy that is fully committed to free orientation, 
that is an orientation that is neither bound up on the fear or hope in gods and sovereigns. 
Marx's study of the difference between Democritus and Epicurus' philosophies of nature 
proceeds by highlighting the inherent contradictions of both positions. We have seen 
how  Marx's  immanent  critique  follows  Hegel's  critique  of  atomism  as  well  as  his 
Philosophy of Nature on the central points in the argument. Through a critique of the 
contradictions of Epicurus,  Marx finally  triumphantly produces a reversal:  Epicurus' 
philosophy  of  nature  is  in  fact  a  practical  philosophy  of  self-consciousness  against 
actuality. The theoretical problem that Epicurus' theory of the atom cannot explain how 
the essence of the atom becomes the actuality of the phenomenal world, is reversed into 
a strength in his ethics: it becomes a violent rejection of a false reality in the name of 
the essence of freedom. This gives us the famed viewpoint of critique, the revelation of 
a world that fails to or even represses the actualisation of its own potential for freedom. 
In the next two chapters we will  see how this logic plays out in Marx's critique of 
bourgeois society and capitalism, and how it is intertwined with a philosophy of history 
that sees actualisation first as the more or less natural course of history (under the figure 
of progress) or as a matter of a historical struggle of the new against the old, or the more 
fully developed against the lesser. 
However, this chapter also argued that the natural-philosophical framework of Marx's 
reading of Epicurus necessitates a concept of real organisation, which is material and 
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ideal all at once. While we have seen that Marx shows that the truth of the Epicurean 
atom is the affirmation of the freedom of the separated individual – and as a radical 
ethics against actuality – this does not mean that he adopts this position wholesale. We 
have argued that the critique of atomism's inability to think composite bodies must recur 
on  the  level  of  ethics,  and  push  Marx  towards  a  politics.  Given  the  conceptual 
framework  of  the  Hegelian  Philosophy  of  Nature,  such  a  politics  must  be  one  of 
organisation and idealisation. This gives us the possibility of a philosophy that goes 
beyond the critique of the unactualised freedom within actuality, to the question of the 
overcoming of  the problem of  separation.  This  Marx will  be  important  in  the  final 
chapters  of  this  thesis.  This reading will  help us ask the question of how the most 
separated  –  those  separated  from  their  means  and  relation  of  reproduction  –  are 
combined  and  organised  by  capital,  and  how  they  may  combine  and  organise 
themselves against it.
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Chapter 2: Orientation in Actuality and the Orientation 
of Actualisation
1. Introduction
After  finishing  his  dissertation,  Marx  became  a  journalist  and  an  editor  of  the 
Rheinische Zeitung  in Cologne.  Moving from philosophy to public polemics, Marx's 
praise of the Epicurean practice  against actuality was complicated by the question of 
orientation  in the  present,  in  actuality.  How can one  orientate  oneself  in  the  social 
conflict-ridden, developing social order of which one is a part of, and how can freedom 
be actualised within it? Our reading of Marx's situated practical orientation revolves 
around two axes opened by his entry into journalism. On the one hand, there are the 
theoretical questions of the critique and the mapping of actuality around the structure or 
organisation of the present, and of its tendencies over time: what is the state, what is  
society, and what are the traces of progress in their development? What is the essence 
that struggles to be born? This orientates, on the other hand, a set of practical questions 
of the strategies and priorities of practice,  but also the existential  orientation of the 
practice; is it hopeful or opportunistic? 
However, the journalistic practice that had challenged Marx to engage in the theoretical 
reorientations was soon made impossible. Marx was pushed into exile, leaving him the 
choice between abandoning his politics or inventing a new practice. If he had hitherto 
conceived the actualisation of freedom as an ongoing process that could be helped along 
by the midwifery of enlightened journalism, it now emerged as a problem which could 
only be solved by revolutionary practice. Here Marx raised the question that had already 
been operative in the theoretical schema of the Dissertation, namely the question of the 
combination  and  organisation  of  the  disorganised  masses,  the  organisation  of  a 
revolutionary practice,  i.e.  a practice of the actualisation of freedom in a composite 
social  body.  When  Hegel's  organic  notion  of  the  state  becomes  posed  as  merely 
possible,  constitution  and organisation  become practical,  historical  questions.  In  the 
logic of organisation that Marx mobilises to handle this question we will find the tools 
with  which  we  can  think  both  the  problem  of  global  capital  and  revolutionary 
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organisation, in the contemporary crisis of the symmetry thesis, tools for critique as well 
as practice.
2. Orientation and Actuality
The  orientation  of  revolutionary  practice  must  find  its  bearings  in  the  actual,  and 
overcome it. The critique of actuality reveals the potentials for this overcoming. Kant, 
as  suggested by Michel  Foucault,  was  perhaps the first  to  pose the question of the 
present philosophically. Where philosophers had in the past thought of the present in 
terms of its passage towards the future, or in its difference from the past, Kant's text 
What is Enlightenment? isolates the question of contemporaneity: he does not ask what 
is  the  difference  between yesterday  and  today,  but  '[w]hat  difference  does  today 
introduce with respect to yesterday.'132 The possibility of a philosophy of the present 
tears the subject out of the grasp of eternity and the flow of history. This allows an 
orientation that is not marked by contemplation or submission to the laws of history. 
'Kant', Stathis Kouvelakis notes, 'is no doubt the first to have redeployed the reflexivity 
of the subject as a ‘sagittal’ relationship to its own present [actualité] rather than as a 
trajectory internal to a consciousness that has withdrawn into its own depths.'133 From 
this, Foucault draws out the notion of modernity not as an epoch but as an attitude, a 
way of relating to contemporary reality, to others and oneself, 
an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and 
the  same  time  the  historical  analysis  of  the  limits  imposed  on  us  an  an 
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.134
The swerve is not in the void, but in actuality. Where the ethics of the swerve requires 
an  absence  of  fear,  the  Kantian  swerve  requires  the  courage  to  use  one's  own  
understanding  in the context of the present. But courage, for Kant, is not enough, it 
needs to be guided by universal principles of reason. There is dual risk in using one's 
reason, the inner risk of fanaticism (Schwermerei135) and libertinism and the outer risk 
132 Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1984), 34.
133 Stathis Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx, trans. G. M. Goshgarian 
(London: Verso Books, 2003), 2.
134 Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?,” 50.
135 Litterally 'swarming' in a derogatory sense: 'swarming like an insect around a fire.' On Kant's 
concept of Schwermerei, see Alberto Toscano, Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea (London: Verso, 
2010), 120–132. 
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of repression by the authorities: courage must be practiced with caution.136 Clearly the 
theoretical  assurance  that  autonomy  is  universal,  which  is  grounded  finally  in  the 
transcendental subject, is not enough for Kant here. To suggest that the subject can be 
trusted and trust itself, Kant needs a supplement that gives hope and belief. He finds this 
in a set of teleological figures, which are not theological as such, but natural-organic, 
connecting the subject to a developing natural-history rather than to the divine. They all 
concern some immanent organising function in the world which gives action meaning: 
if the world were ruled by chance and chaos, what reason would there be not to be a 
cynic, a nihilist, an opportunist, an egotist?137 Kant here explicitly argues against the 
Epicurean notion that states are formed by random collisions which, by chance, produce 
formations capable of survival, and in favour of the idea that nature follows a regular 
course of self-actualisation.138
To have the courage to use one's own understanding is thus to exit one's self-incurred 
immaturity; courage, for Kant, is not a groundless decision or pure possibility, a leap, 
but  a  choice  of  maturation,  of  the  actualisation  of  ones'  potentials.139 Similarly  the 
courage to act in history with an aim to improve it, especially through education, is 
orientated not by 'progress' abstractly speaking, but by the figure of the maturation of 
the species, and the promise of the eventual realisation of all its ends.140 The temporal 
and organic figures of maturation and ordering refer at once to the intelligibility of the 
space of action,  and to a subjective principle of hope. Orientation becomes possible 
because  actuality  is  organised  and  hence  orientable, and  orientation  can  become 
progressive (or revolutionary) because this actuality can also be taken to be the product 
of  a  universal  or  universalising  process  of  actualisation. Figures  of  organisation  or 
disorganisation (chaos, social organism, the species, the state system, etc.) are not not 
merely maps for subjective action in the present, they direct this action, they produce a 
hopeful  or  cynical,  a  courageous  or  fearful  subject.  However,  if  these  are  initially 
supplements  rendering  hopeful  orientation  possible  in  a  world  that  is  otherwise 
confusing,  this  supplement,  to  be  convincing,  must  be  related  to  a  convincing 
philosophical interpretation of history. The relation to actuality for Kant only refers to 
an experimentation with possibility to the extent that actuality itself is seen as an as yet  
136 Kant, “What Is Orientation in Thinking?,” 248–49.
137 Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 42.
138 Ibid., 48.
139 Immanuel Kant, “What Is Enlightenment?,” in Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nesbit, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 54.
140 Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 42.
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insufficient actualisation of what is possible.141 The theoretical supplement to practice 
takes over, and we are not far from practice becoming a supplement to the process of 
history. Whereas Kant is quite explicit on the orientational supplementarity of what he 
calls 'prophetic history' and 'historical signs', Marx's early theorisation of society tends 
to put practice into the service of theory. We can also say that to the extent that the 
orientation in society is determined by a historical orientation structured according to 
the modal categories of (species) potentiality and (organic social) actuality, the struggles 
of the present are always read according to a theoretical schema rather than according to 
the strategic and political questions of struggle and resistance. This concept of history, 
of course, is that given with the idea of Enlightenment. 
For Marx and the Young-Hegelians the central problem of continuing the Enlightenment 
after  Hegelianism was to  produce a  subjectivity  irreducible  to  actuality.  The central 
strategy was to  orientate  the subject  to  some essence or  potentiality  that  is  not  yet 
actualised, placing it in relation to what is not present, yet of the present, as a potential 
more than a possibility, a promise, an opening. Andrew Chitty presents the early Marx's 
interest in the relation between actuality and essence in the following terms:  
in  1837  Marx  was  setting  himself  the  project  of  showing  that  the  state  is 
‘firmly  based’ in  some underlying  essence  of  which  it  is  the  realisation  or 
actualisation .... If he could discover this essence, it would enable Marx not 
only to explain the shape of existing states, as the realisation of that essence, 
but also to criticise them to the extent that they failed to realise that essence 
adequately.142 
Chitty refers to Marx’s  Doctoral Dissertation  to suggest that Marx's interest was 'to 
measure  ...  the  individual  existence  by  the  essence,  the  particular  actuality  by  the 
idea.’143 If  the  theoretical  set-up  of  the  dissertation  allowed  the  development  of  a 
practical philosophy of constitution and organisation, Marx was indeed tending towards 
a critical rather than practical approach. As Marx became a journalist, it was the critical 
path that become dominant.  This new field of activity meant that Marx was forced to 
face actuality head on, but from the point of view of the public intellectual. Had Marx 
141 Ibid.
142 Andrew Chitty, “The Basis of the State in the Marx of 1842,” in The New Hegelians: Politics and 
Philosophy in the Hegelian School, ed. Douglas Moggach (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 222. 
143 Ibid., translation amended by Chitty. Chitty, “The State in Marx”; Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 
149.
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simply juxtaposed, in a philosophical fashion, the abstract idea of freedom with the base 
actuality of Prussian society, he would have encouraged fanaticism or cynicism. Here, 
the historical model of Enlightenment, which was common sense among liberals in the 
Rhineland, enabled him to present the potential of freedom at work in the determinate 
analyses of society and its development. Actualisation, as presented by the philosopher, 
is not a matter of practical constitution and organisation in the broadest sense, but of 
Enlightenment. This task is at once practical and theoretical, critical and pedagogical, it 
aims at the change of social objectivity by means of a subjective change. As with any 
philosopher who takes up popular writing, Marx was challenged to change his discourse 
when his medium became the pages of a daily newspaper which was reaching broad 
layers of liberals in the Rhineland, as well as the censors of the Prussian government. 
His new job, to  put  it  profanely,  created  a  need for  reorientation  in  relation  to  the 
problems of Prussian contemporaneity, a new practice of writing, as well as a shift in 
subjectivity coming with the new activity and position.  First on the agenda was the 
freedom of press itself, which he with Kant saw as the condition for the communication 
of all other principles of freedom.
3. The Freedom of the Press
In  a  series  of  six  articles  written  in  May  1842,  Marx  followed  the  debates  in  the 
Assembly  of  the  Estates  on  the  freedom of  the  press.  In  this  context,  the  division 
between public polemics and philosophical argument becomes blurred, perhaps to the 
point where we must question the idea that Marx's journalism is a practice  mediating 
between philosophical ideals and social reality. Marx's articles affirm the freedom of the 
press as a  species-freedom,  and unfreedom as loss of self,  a 'real  mortal  danger for 
mankind.'144 In short, censorship is an assault on the actualisation of the potentials of the 
species. If we take seriously the creative form-giving activity of this actualisation, we 
see how the role of journalism is not merely critical – to reveal how actuality does not 
live  up  to  the  possibility  of  human  freedom  –  but  to  reveal,  performatively  and 
practically, the potentiality of the species through the composition of texts. 'Truth … is 
common to all – it does not belong to me, it belongs to everybody, it possesses me, I do 
not  possess  it.'145 We  are  here  dealing  with  a  temporal  conception  of  essence  as 
something  that  does  not  pre-exist  its  emergence,  similarly  to  Feuerbach's  species-
144 “Essays on the Freedom of Press,” in MECW, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 161.
145 Ibid., 112; S. Prawer, Karl Marx and World Literature, 2nd ed. (Verso, 2011), 34. Cf. appendix 2.2.
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essence, which, unlike the species-being of the human animal, emerges only in time.146 
In Feuerbach, finite human animals reveal themselves to be capable of abstraction and 
of  cognising  the  infinite when  they  imagine  themselves  as  subjects  of  God.  This 
happens  even  if  they  do  not  recognize  that  this  shared  abstraction  is  in  fact  their 
common capacity, their common potentiality for producing a common knowledge of 
themselves as community without the alienated mediation of God.147 Marx's writing on 
the  task  of  journalism can  be  interpreted  as  the  reverse  of  Feuerbach's  critique  of 
religion: both reveal the human essence in its unfolding and developing potential (rather 
than past and given). In Feuerbach this is revealed in its alienated and abstract form, in 
religion, in Marx as an unalienated and practical activity, as journalism. But this figure 
only goes so far; Marx was painfully aware (or was made so by the censors) that he was 
not  writing for humankind in  general,  but for a Prussian public  and under Prussian 
jurisdiction. In short, it was a priority to speak of the matters of the Prussian state and 
society. Not to the species and the universal citizen, but to the citizens of what Hegel 
called the 'state organism' of Prussia as one particular embodied organisation of the 
species. 
Feuerbach equally insisted upon the situatedness of 'real living being' and the necessity 
of founding reason on a 'determination of place.' Indeed,  '[r]eason orients itself only in 
space.'148 Space  only  exists  as  place,  and  with  the  determination  of  different  places 
'organized  nature  begins'.  To  situate  oneself  is  the  first  question  of  the  awakening 
consciousness and the first question of the 'wisdom of life'; whoever does not understand 
this is either a child or a fool.149 To reach reason, the fool must bind himself to a place. 'To 
place different  things in  different  places or to distinguish spatially  what  is  qualitatively 
different is the condition for every economy, even for the spiritual economy.' But whereas  
Feuerbach  had  insisted  on  place  in  order  to  ground  orientation  in  the  situated  rational 
sensuousness of the subjects together, in their relations of 'reason, will and affection', as he 
called  in  1841,150 Marx  the  journalist  would  have  to  situate  himself  in  relation  to  the 
146 Cf. appendix 2.3.
147 The human species is infinite in that there is no limit to 1. its accomplishments, 2. the number of 
members, and range of abilities, 3. its species-powers, which transcends the limitations of 
individuals. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 1989), 7.
148 This and the following quotes are all from Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the  
Future, trans. Manfred Vogel (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1986), 61, §44. My emphases.
149 Henri Lefebvre is here surprisingly close to Feuerbach: 'In the beginning was the Topos. Before – 
long before – the advent of the Logos ... lived experience already possessed its internal rationality ... 
long before the analysing, separating intellect ... there was an intelligence of the body'. The 
Production of Space (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2011), 174.
150 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 3. Reason, will and affect are neither individual nor species 
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German situation and mores, in relation and opposition to the ancien regime.  Marx's path 
would  thus  mark  out  one  possible  orientation  of  radical  practice,  whereas  Feuerbach's 
would another.151
4. Actualisation and the Rationality of the Social Organism
In May 1842, Marx engaged in a heady polemic against his Young-Hegelian comrade 
Moses Hess.  Adopting the standpoint  of the highest  ideals  of philosophy,  Hess  had 
insisted that the question of the centralisation of the state, considered from this higher 
standpoint, '“falls away of itself as being futile,” for “if man is really what he should be 
by his essence, individual freedom is not separate from general freedom.”' To this, Marx 
noted sarcastically that  it  is  indeed impressive with what  '“astonishing ease” ...  this 
standpoint is  able to  orient itself',  yet  an orientation which is  not a 'solution of the 
problems' at hand is of little value.152 Against these 'abstractions' of the 'imagination', 
Marx insists on an orientation toward actuality. Marx still affirms philosophy, but no 
longer abstractly, or 'foolishly' to use Feuerbach's term. The question of the essence of 
actuality for this philosophy is not the essence that provides an abstract solution, but 
rather that of the concrete potential inherent in the problem of the present.  And for a 
man of the press the problem first of all is Sittlichkeit, which descriptively refers to the 
state of mores, habits and modes of relation common to the people, and normatively to 
the level to which freedom is realised in the social body.
A central argumentative move in Marx's defence of the free press was to affirm 'the 
intellectual  heroes  of  morality,  such  as  Kant,  Fichte  and  Spinoza',  against  the 
Censorship Instruction. For these thinkers the problem of the actualisation of morality – 
a  concept  here  invoking social  normativity  only via  the  notion  of  autonomy  – was 
conceived in terms of a contradiction between religion and morality, heteronomy and 
autonomy.153 A contradiction; whenever we see Marx point out a contradiction we have 
become accustomed to interpret it as  historical and its overcoming as revolutionary.  
However,  this  reading is  less convincing when dealing with texts from before what 
possessions but something that pulls us along. Feuerbach's text proposes a practice which is similar 
to Epicurean ethics or Foucault's ethos in that it is the sufficient ground of itself; it does not, in other 
words, ask if it is adequate in relation to some power transcending it or a totality that includes it.
151 On Feuerbach's radical philosophy of the species as a philosophy of the future, see appendix 2.3.
152 'The Question of Centralisation in itself and with regard to the Supplement to No. 137 of the 
Rheinische Zeitung Tuesday, May 17, 1842' in MECW - Marx 1835-1843 (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1975), 183.
153 Marx, “Freedom of the Press,” 119.
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Althusser speaks of as Marx's discovery of the continent of history, his break.154 Thus, in 
the  texts  on  the  freedom of  the  press Marx's  solution  to  the  contradiction  between 
morality  and  religion,  autonomy and  heteronomy,  and  freedom and  necessity,  is  to 
propose  what  we  can  call  a  problematic and  a  method  of  actualisation.  The 
contradiction names a problem: how to actualise freedom, autonomy and morality? The 
solution  to  this  problem is  not  a  historical  overcoming  of  the  contradiction,  but  a 
practice of actualisation. Actualisation is here not against the social order as such, but 
against the immaturity of this order. Here, Marx resorted to the image of the socio-
political  order  as  an  organism, in  its  Hegelian  formulation.155 To  think  society  as 
actuality, in the Hegelian terms of the young Marx, means to think it as a set of elements 
(individuals, families, civil society, the state) that inter-relate with a certain necessity, 
mutually presupposing and reproducing one another. In short, they relate organically; 
unlike the atomic freedom of the swerve, such freedom includes reproduction within 
itself. Such organisation is 'rational' in the sense that its own reason is inherent in it, it is 
self-positing,  and  as  such  intelligible  in  its  immanent  ordering.  It  is  a  whole  (ein 
Ganze), not in the sense of an aggregation or composition of external elements, but in 
the  sense  that  it  organises  its  elements  according  to  its  own  principle  of  self-
reproduction.156 
Marx  charged  against  the  Prussian  Censorship  Instruction  that  its  trust  in  the  state 
institutions such as the police and censorship betrays a fundamental mistrust in the state 
organism,157 a pathologising medical gaze cast on the rationalities of social life:
The human body is mortal by nature. Hence illnesses are inevitable. Why does 
a man only go to the doctor when he is ill, and not when he is well? ... Under 
constant medical tutelage, life would be regarded as an evil  and the human 
body as an object for treatment by medical institutions. … The starting point of 
the  censorship  is  that  illness  is  the  normal  state,  or  that  the  normal  state, 
freedom, is to be regarded as an illness...158
154 Althusser, For Marx, 14.
155 A contemporary dictionary defines organism thus: 'the association of different organs in viable 
whole, and the organisation of this whole: life is a repeated motion and the reciprocal influence 
[wechselseitige einwirkung] of all elements in an individual body'. Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm 
Grimm, “Organismus,” Deutsches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: Verlag von H. Hirzel, 1854), 1340
156 For a brief overview of the notions of rational, actual, organic and the whole, with some mention of 
their connections, see Michael Inwood, Hegel Dictionary (Oxford; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1992), particularly pp. 34, 177, 244, 309.  'Whole' here does not refer to something closed or 
harmonious, but a contradictory and perishable organisation of singular elements.
157 “Freedom of the Press,” 122.
158 Ibid., 163.
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Normality, for this Marx, is not what is, but what could be in what is. On this basis, 
Marx asserted his belief in the unfolding organic rationality of the social organism, its 
functional  differentiation  necessary  relations,  and  the  intrinsic  rationalities  of  this 
organisation. The way this organism is taken up has everything to do with Marx's new 
practical  engagements;  crucially,  it  does  not  play  the  role  of  a  merely  theoretical 
concept,  but  it  is  immediately  a  concept  for  struggle  and construction,  and  an 
orientating tool, i.e. a conceptual answer to the need to situate oneself within a wider 
social, political, intellectual space.159 In his engagement with the notion of the organic 
structure  of  society,  Marx  followed  Hegel  in  suggesting  that  the  social,  economic, 
political whole as actuality, in its intelligibility, can be known (or at least approximated) 
as a system. 
Within the socio-political body, the press is the eye and intellect, the 'ubiquitous vigilant 
eye of a people's soul, the embodiment of a people's faith in itself.'160 Without the press, 
the social  organism would be dumb and blind,  and the state's and law's attempts to 
mediate  contradictions  and ameliorate  social  tensions  would  be  ill-advised,  and the 
body would risk dissolution. The press is the soul of the public sphere, charged with 
cultivating  an  'embodied  culture  that  transforms  material  struggles  into  intellectual 
struggles and idealises their crude material form.'161 This idealisation is an immanent 
one,  not  the  practical  organisation  of  what  is  separate  which  we saw emerge  as  a 
possibility in the  Dissertation,  but the always-already of social organisation. It is, in 
other terms, a theoretical figure of self-organisation,  devised along Kantian lines,  to 
expel the authorities' fear of lawless freedom. But there is an implicit threat also, not 
visible in Kant, which reveals the tactical intent and intelligence of the statement: the 
radical proposal for full freedom of the press is addressed to absolute monarchy as the 
only way to avoid the danger of a revolutionary upheaval. 
159 We can here contrast the richness of Marx's concept-creation with Reinhardt Koselleck's notion of 
polemical concepts (Kampbegriffe) or counter-concepts (Gegenbegriffe), which tend to reduce the 
politics of concepts to their opposition and enmity. “The Historical-Political Semantics of 
Asymmetric Counterconcepts” in Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical 
Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 155–191. Niklas Olsen, History in the Plural: 
An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 188.
160 Marx, “Freedom of the Press,” 164.
161 Marx, MECW vol. I, 164.
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5. The Orientation of the Press
Here it is time to enter into a closer reading of the concept of the orientating function of 
the  press,  and  how Marx  relates  it  to  the  purpose  of  promoting  public  orientation 
towards  the  development  of  the  species,  or  enlightenment.  Kant’s  reflection  on 
enlightenment, as Foucault notes, is rather ambiguous; it is at once characterised as an 
ongoing process, a task, and as an obligation.162 As such it is both a collective process 
and a personal responsibility which requires courage. Individuals are, at once, elements 
and agents of enlightenment. So what is Enlightenment? It is, first of all, use of reason 
for reasoning’s own sake, its motto being ‘Sapere aude!’, dare to know.163 Yet, almost 
immediately, Kant mentions the monarchical addendum: 'but obey!'. This  demand for 
obedience  does  not  refer  to  a  freedom  of  private  thought  as  opposed  to  public 
submission. On the contrary, Kant defends the free  public  use of reason, whereas he 
agrees that its private use must be submissive. This can be taken as a historical sign of 
the shift from the post-reformation, and late-absolutist forms of power, via the French 
revolution to bourgeois forms of power and social relations. If the revolution has set 
free public man, private man is not free, but is an element of the social organism, a 
member of a class, a worker, a professional, a tax payer, in short a person of private 
interests and passions, directed and invested by particular rules and ends (Kant would 
elsewhere  devalue  these  as  ‘pathological’  motivations,  and  subordinate  them  to 
autonomous  reason,  which  was  negatively  defined  by  its  capacity  to  curb  these 
motivations164). Public man, on the other hand, is a man of letters, criticising the laws 
that he, as a private citizen, conscientiously obeys.165 In Kant, the role of the free press is 
precisely to function as an 'organ' of the free public use of reason, an organ of the self-
enlightenment  of  the  species.  Following Kant's  lead,  Marx defines  the  press  as  the 
exceptional profession, where private man has as his job to further the public use of 
reason:
If the press  itself is regarded merely as a trade, then, as a trade carried on by 
means  of  the  brain,  it  deserves  greater  freedom than a  trade  carried  on by 
means of arms and legs.  The emancipation of arms and legs  only becomes 
humanly significant through the emancipation of the brain, for it is well known 
162 Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?,” 35.
163 Kant, “What is Enlightenment?,” 54.
164 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas K. Abbott (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 2004).
165 Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?”.
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that  arms and legs become human arms and legs only because of the head 
which they serve.166
Hegel  had  recognised  the  importance  of  the  press  for  orientation  within  objective 
morality,  Sittlichkeit, but also suggested that the consumption of newspapers is  of a 
somewhat passive and habitual nature:
Reading the newspaper  in  the early morning is  a  kind of  realistic  morning 
prayer. One orients one's attitude against the world and toward God, or toward 
that which the world is. The former gives the same security as the latter, in that 
one knows where one stands.167 
Our attention is here directed to the very quotidian function of the newspaper, which is 
often overlooked in analyses of its role in spreading the revolutionary  enthusiasm  of 
universal and world-historical events, such as the revolutions in France and Haïti.168 The 
newspaper  helps  situate  the  reader,  but  in  a  place  quite  different  than  Feuerbach's 
placing of the singular subject  in situ,  or his universal  orientation  to the species. The 
newspaper, as it were, mainly operates in that problematic middle region of state and 
nation, between the singular and the universal, a region which to enthusiastic spectators 
and libertines always seems to fail to live up to the universality of the species or the 
singularity of embodied experiences. 
But whether we speak with Marx the editor, Feuerbach the lover of humanity, Hegel's 
believer or Kant's moral subject, there is the presupposition of a need for orientation in 
relation to greater powers. For the Epicurean gardener practicing the autarchy of the 
swerve  there  is,  ideally,  no  such need,  except,  of  course,  in  relation  to  nature,  the 
weather  and  the  sun.  The  Epicurean  orientation  is  the  negation  of  the  need  for 
orientation in society, an orientation toward ataraxy and self-affirmation, whereby all 
apparently  unitary  phenomena  can  be  picked  apart  into  small  explanations.  The 
difference between these modern thinkers and Epicurus is perhaps the insistent actuality 
of a society that imposes itself as a temporality and a rationality that organises us, as an 
alien power. Marx must therefore go beyond Epicurus and introduce the orientating tool 
of  critique  when he starts  to think how  representations such as money and god are 
actual, and how they organise the activity of the people who relate through them.  In 
166 Marx, MECW I, 272.
167 Hegel quoted in Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh, PA: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 49.
168 For the influence of the latter on Hegel, see Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History.
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other words, the need for orientation in social actuality emerges because society cannot 
be separated into component parts, but imposes itself as an  organising principle over  
and against individuals. 
During his time at the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx orientates his discourse and his reader 
by way of the metaphor of the 'organic' system: 'One form of freedom governs another 
just  as one limb of the body does another.  Whenever a particular freedom is put in 
question,  freedom in general  is  put in  question.'169 The existential  orientation of the 
intellectual, unlike other trades (e.g. crafts which simply mediates as labour between the 
latent potential of an object and the telos of the plan), is one tasked with mediating 
between  the  objective  parts  of  society  and  its  own  telos,  in  order  to  secure  their 
convergence. The metaphorics of the social body play out the organic stratifications so 
common  to  nineteenth-century  biology:  the  sovereign  as  the  will,  the  press  and 
philosophers as the mind, the people divided into estates as the different limbs.  While 
this  organicist  argument  made  the  point  of  the  interdependence  of  freedoms,  the 
metaphor  implies,  as  Kouvelakis  notes,  a  hierarchicisation  which  is  immediately 
gendered and classed: the self-reflexive masculine brain of the press would enlighten 
and temper the sensualist feminine heart of the people.170 It is not enough to simply refer 
to the gendered and classed character of the metaphor itself. In her book on the matter, 
Sara Ahmed continually demonstrates that orientation is not only a turning toward, but 
also  a  turning  away  from.  Orientation  always  entails  a  certain  blindness,  or  wilful 
abstraction from, or forgetting, and a certain gendering and racialisation.171 
While it would appear that it is the model of the social organism that is the problem here 
– as opposed to the universalistic notion of humanity – perhaps it is in fact the opposite. 
What  produces the hierarchicisation of  the social  body and the undervaluing of  the 
passions,  and  bases  labours  of  care  and  production,  is  not  necessarily  the  organic 
figuration of society, but the reading of the notion of the organism through the definition 
of the truly human as  will  and reason  (narrowly conceived). This is nothing but the 
division between the human and the (human) animal, and a valorisation of the former 
over the latter. At issue is not only the division of the organism, but the idea of the 
political  primacy  of  reason  and  will.  A  broader  concept  of  rationality  as  self-
organisation,  as given in the  Philosophy of Nature,  goes beyond this  diremption:  in 
169 Marx, MECW vol. I, 180.
170 Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 273. 
171 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology - Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham, NC; London: Duke 
University Press, 2006). For an example of this in the early Marx, see appendix 1.5.
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Hegel's  Philosophy of Nature,  the  rational organisation of the organism in general is 
essentially that of its  self-production and  reproduction.172 Thus, the subordination and 
devaluing of the labours of production and reproduction are, perhaps surprisingly, not a 
function  of  the  organic  metaphor  as  such,  but  rather  of  the  universalism  of  the 
conception of freedom, which relies on a diremption within the human body, the state 
and the species, between reason and passion, will and base needs.173 We have here seen 
how Marx's practice as an editor aimed to help along the actualisation of freedom in the 
social body, through the enlightenment of the reading populace about the nature of its 
unfreedom and about its capacity for freedom. But more than that: he presented his very 
effort  itself  as  a  practice  of  actualisation  both  through  the  communication  of  and 
production of truths. Finding and fighting for his place in Prussian society, Marx had 
certainly moved beyond the ethereal foolishness of the philosopher of abstract essences. 
He found his very 'organic' role as a passionate functionary of the Prussian soul. In the 
period  of  the  Rheinische  Zeitung, Marx's  politics  were  radical,  but  within,  even  if 
sometimes  at,  the  limits  of  the  law;  his  practice  can  perhaps  best  be  described  as 
reformism, trying to help along progressive tendencies and spur on any openness for 
reform within the Prussian territories.  However,  his  defence of the press as the last 
bulwark against revolution, and the first step towards liberal reforms, soon broke down. 
In his seminal reading of the young Marx's trajectory, Stathis Kouvelakis convincingly 
demonstrates that Marx's theoretical break – Althusser's thesis of Marx's invention of 
the science of historical materialism – was predicated by a political break, by the leap 
out of his liberal politics as a journalist. But it is tempting to describe the conditions of 
the political break with the tools inherited from Marx's historical materialism. We can 
say,  retrospectively,  that  the  arguments  for  progressive  reform did  not  only  fail  to 
convince the authorities, but had done so for reasons that were necessary. Increasing 
pauperisation and occurrences of civil unrest created an ever greater audience for liberal 
publications and agitation,  and for this very reason the authorities began to suppress 
liberals and the press. Given the social situation, political debate – even of the reformist 
character Marx had practised – was becoming subversive. He was eventually forced to 
resign from the Rheinische Zeitung, which soon after closed. 
172 'Hegel refers to organic self-renewal as “reproduction.” He understands reproduction, therefore, to 
be the process whereby an organism continuously produces and preserves itself as the singular 
organism it is - the process of “self-producing.”' Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History: 
Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1991), 163. 
173 Of course this diremption is no mere fiction, but a very real division within bodies and between 
different people.
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6. The Production of a New Possibility
In the remainder of this chapter we will cover two steps taken by Marx in the uneasy 
passage between events. First, we will inquire into the character of the political break 
and  its  invention  of  a  new possibility,  that  of  a  hopeful  orientation  conditional  on 
partisan  struggle  beyond  the  midwifery  of  enlightened  publicism.  Secondly,  Marx's 
theoretical break, as indicated by Kouvelakis, was delayed with respect to his political 
break. However, we will not explore this period under the headline of a lag, but rather in 
terms of the continuity of the orientating figures of the social organism, in order to trace 
its mutations and its path into Marx's early critique of political economy, which is the 
subject  of  the  next  chapter.  More  importantly,  we  will  show  how  this  period  of 
theoretical reorientation – which produced Marx's lengthy and unpublished Critique of  
Hegel's  Doctrine  of  the  State –  entailed  a  reactivation of  the  logic  of  composition-
combination-organisation  from  the  materialist  dialectic  of  mechanism-chemism-
teleology. What had been implicit in his critique of Epicurus, now became explicit, for a 
moment,  in  his  theory  of  revolution.  This  logic  will  not  travel  into  Marx's  first 
engagement with political economy from the mid-1840s onwards, but will be crucial for 
us in our reading of Capital in chapters 5 to 8.
……
Marx's political break was not the product of a choice or a theoretical discovery, but of 
an impossibility, the impossibility of continuing his practice as a journalist and editor. 
The social and political crisis which was intensifying in Prussia forced the “will” of the 
organism to suppress its “intellect”; critical intellectuals either withdrew in pessimistic 
silence,  or  remained  vocal  only  in  exile  or  clandestinely.  Without  job  and income, 
literally  expelled  from  what  he  had  seen  as  his  functional  role  within  the  social 
organism, Marx, like many others with him, was free as an atom rendered 'inorganic'.174 
Before the suppression, German radicals  had experienced an increasingly intolerable 
daily pestering and policing. They were caught in an intensifying contradiction between 
obeying the necessities of German actuality or affirming the potentiality of freedom. 
When the space in which Marx had operated finally closed on him, he expressed a deep 
relief.175 However,  even  if  the  Prussian  government  had  shown  its  true  face  and 
dispelled the illusions of reformers, such an advance was not as automatic as Marx's 
174 One should bear in mind that his wife Jenny Marx (née von Westphalen), along with the labour of 
Helene Demuth and the financial support of Friedrich Engels and others, was the contingent 
condition for the reproduction of Marx, and thus for his effective autonomy.
175 Karl Marx, “Letter to Arnold Ruge, Jan 25, 1843” in MECW I, 379.
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statement  seems  to  suggest.  Marx's  new freedom came not  only  at  the  cost  of  his 
livelihood and eventual exile, but it also forced him to reorientate himself. The agitation 
for freedom would no longer be a defence of an idea, and the practice of freedom would 
no longer be a profession: both now entailed the fearless choice of a life. The crisis 
produced the necessity of a decision but did not determine it. The contradiction did not 
itself offer up any Aufhebung; indeed, the choice of continuing politically (affirming his 
practice  or  negating  the  repression)  was  impossible,  practically  speaking.  And 
furthermore,  theoretically  speaking,  the  timely  orientation  toward  the  progressive 
realisation of freedom was no longer possible. Marx would have to rethink the temporal 
determination of the problematic relation between essence and actuality. The situation 
posed a problem in the deeper sense: one that is overdetermined by neither existing 
solutions nor questions, but a problem that required the invention of a new possibility.  
To make possible a practice of actualisation, the mutation in the problem of the present 
would have to be related to a new potential. With the newspapers closed or under hard 
censorship, the option of going clandestine was, strictly speaking, the only possibility 
for a radical writer, and, at the same time, not possible at all if he was to put food on his  
table. If history is not made under conditions of our own choosing, as Marx later said, 
we  must  add  that  sometimes  it  is  only  made  by  exploding  these  conditions,  by  a 
revolutionary  decision to  wager  everything on the  establishment  of  another  base  of 
agitation,  social  as  well  as  material.  As  Kouvelakis  puts  it,  'Marx's  revolutionary 
political position [was] not a free choice among several 'positive' possibilities, for it 
proceeds, literally, from an impossibility: it is the production of a new possibility.'176 
Materially speaking, this possibility is developed through cohering a large number of 
German exiles in Paris around the publication of the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,  
which also worked as a kind of correspondence society with radicals who remained in 
Germany.
As the state suppressed the press – the agent of enlightenment – it was clear that there 
was no longer any elevated position from which to observe the unfolding of progress in 
history;  one would have to become a state intellectual,  an armchair  pessimist  or an 
authentic radical. Orientation – as a subjective disposition towards action, and not just 
objective mapping – would have to be partisan in a social organism riven with explosive 
contradictions. At this point the significance of this rupture is not primarily theoretical, 
but rather practical and existential. Practice is still supplementary to the theory of a real 
176 Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 278.
 71
historical  process  whose  direction  gives  reason for  hope,  but  differently  so.  As the 
actualisation of freedom becomes a matter of struggle rather than enlightenment, the 
theory which orientates practice becomes aware of its own limitations: the promises and 
contradictions it points to can only be realised and resolved in the domain of practice. In 
other words, rather than being simply a process of actualisation, history now becomes a 
matter of material struggle between the agents of this actualisation and the defenders of 
the ancient regime.
Engaging with what he saw as the central  problem of the present,  the contradiction 
between essential species-freedom and actual unfreedom, Marx had first imagined the 
philosophical activity of the concept, and thus the press as better mediations (considered 
as  activities)  of  this  contradiction,  an activity  which  could bring forth  the potential 
implicit in the social whole, actualise it. With the repression of the press, this position 
had become untenable.  Marx  had to  either  give  up  the  idea  of  the  actualisation  of 
freedom, or engage in the social contradictions in a partisan way, as he had previously  
become a partisan in philosophy. Marx chose the latter, '[n]othing prevents us … from 
taking sides in politics, i.e. from entering into real struggles and identifying ourselves 
with them.' No longer a partisan of the doctrinaire idea which actualises itself through 
the education of the species, but which actualises itself through rendering the struggles 
of the world conscious:
we shall develop for the world new principles from the existing principles of 
the world. We shall not say: Abandon your struggles, they are mere folly; let us 
provide you with the true campaign-slogans. Instead we shall simply show the 
world why it is struggling, and consciousness of this is a thing it must require 
whether it wishes or not.177
But why is the world struggling, and how does this struggle progress the realisation of 
freedom in history? How did Marx's becoming a partisan affect his conceptualisation of 
the historical whole-as-process of which he was a part of?
7. The Navigator on the Ship of Fools
The image Marx used to  convey this  particularly German situation  in  his  letters  to 
Arnold  Ruge and the  readers  of  the  Deutsch-Französische  Jahrbücher  drew on the 
classical trope of the ship of fools quarrelling and navigating without orientation at the 
177 Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” 209.
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mercy of the winds. At the time of writing, and as a consequence of the troubles in 
Germany, Marx was travelling in Holland, writing to Ruge from a 'barge on the way to 
D.'.178 Kouvelakis presents Marx in his perilous situation as himself a madman, reading 
this passage through Foucault's analysis of the Narrenschiff.179 Like Foucault's madmen, 
Marx has indeed been expelled to his ship, caught in the uncertainty of the passage to 
nowhere; the town of 'D.' is clearly not his destination but another point of passage in 
his exile.  Foucault's evocative figure would here agree with Feuerbach: no longer 'in 
place', Marx and many of his contemporaries became fools again. However, this was 
not the no-place of philosophy, but the madness of displacement,  die Verrücktheit der  
Verrückten. As Marx had written two years prior, the trick is to know in what sense this 
madness is real, actual.180 In this sense, he already had the figure of reorientation at his 
finger-tips: thus the political break itself did not produce the theoretical break from the 
problem of the social organism. In several different ways, Marx continued to draw on 
this figure as a concept of orientation in relation to the organisation of the state and civil 
society.
So why is the world struggling? The immediate answer was close to the old answer: the 
contradiction  between  what  society  could  be  and  what  it  is,  between  essence  and 
actuality. At one point, Feuerbach translates this notion into a secularised conception of 
sin, understood as the 'contradiction of myself with myself – that is, of my personality 
with my fundamental nature.'181 Similarly, in his letter to Ruge, Marx attempts to invert 
the  subjectivating  mechanisms  of  patriotism  and  religion  (national  shame  and  the 
confession of sin) in order to turn them into tools of revolutionary subjectivation. He 
suggested that the potential of freedom could come to orientate Germans,  once it  is 
related to the tyranny in the present: this would produce a national shame, an 'anger 
turned in on itself', turned against their complicity with despotism.182 Furthermore, a 
comparison with other nations might make Germans realise they are  fools for being 
liberal and patriots under conditions of 'repulsive despotism', make them feel shamed 
when faced by the 'opinions of foreigners about the Prussian Government' and with the 
Dutch who 'are still citizens.'183 Those who confess to this madness, possess a negative – 
critical – truth of the untruth of German consciousness: 
178 On the trope of the ships, stars and navigation, see appendix 2.9.
179 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization (London: Routledge, 2003), 9.
180 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 151.
181 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 28.
182 Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” 200.
183 Ibid., 199–200.
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[To attain] self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age … [w]hat is 
needed  above  all  is  a  confession,  and  nothing  more  than  that.  To  obtain 
forgiveness for its sins mankind needs only to declare them for what they are.184
That Marx orientates himself with such ease, like a navigator on the ship of fools, is due 
to  his  inscription  of  the  new situation  within  the  theoretical  apparatus  he  had long 
carried with him. Of course, the reorientation around this negative truth – the insight 
into  madness  –  does  not  explain  Marx's  practical  and  political  transformation  nor 
negates the eventual character of his leap into a revolutionary orientation. But this does 
not  mean  that  we can  conclude  that  his  theoretical  conception  was  simply  lagging 
behind his practical invention. While the analyses of the political break speaks of urgent 
practical exigencies, the direction of this leap, as well as the fact that Marx took these 
circumstances  to  call  out  for  a  leap  at  all,  is  a  testimony to  a  certain  still  hopeful 
orientation. If there is a lag, the leap might be unimaginable without it. For instance, 
Marx could have interpreted the impossibility of  continuing his former practice as a 
contingent  event,  a  postponement  and  temporary  setback,  something  that  need  not 
challenge his progressivist interpretation of history. He could have seen it as yet another 
of the exceptions of which history is full of, and which, according to Kant, must simply 
be ignored and inscribed in a teleology if we are to have any hope. Like his practical 
reorientation,  Marx's  intellectual  reorientation  is  not  by  any  means  given  by  the 
situation. So why can Kouvelakis interpret Marx's revelation in the face of these events 
'as thought's new awareness of its own historicity'?185 Even before the 'invention'  of 
historical materialism, Marx saw the suppression of the press as non-contingent, and his 
own position within these events as  necessary.  Why? Precisely because his thought is 
organised around the notion of the organically integrated whole. Before and after the 
break,  the  problem  of  actuality  (the  contradiction  between  potential  and  actuality, 
between freedom and despotism) remains the same, as does the aim of his politics (the 
actualisation of freedom). Marx's conception of the unrealised potentiality of the species 
becomes  one  that  stresses  contradiction,  a  contradiction  which  is  both  social  and 
internal to the subject, a contradiction which is developing towards 'the approaching 
revolution.'186 This courage to take this leap is premised precisely on the continuity of a 
certain  philosophically  founded  belief  in  the  direction  of  history.  If  hope  becomes 
184 Karl Marx, Early Writings, 1st ed. (London: Penguin, 1992), 209. On Marx's references to 
confession and his comparison of the revolutionary philosopher with Luther, see appendix 2.7.
185 Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 280.
186 Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” 200.
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conditional on practice, the passage to action remains related to a hope in the historical 
process.  Had  such  belief  lacked,  Marx's  leap  would  have  either  been  an  act  of 
voluntarism or fanaticism, or would not have happened at all. 
What we are interested in here is how the space between the practical salto mortale and 
the theoretical invention of historical materialism saw a mutation of Marx's theoretical 
apparatus, which happened by way of a return to the question of the composition and 
organisation of actualisation.
8. The Orientation of the Political Revolution
In the spring and summer of 1843, after  his forced resignation from the  Rheinische 
Zeitung, Marx wrote a long critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state.187 This commentary 
is helpful in giving some background for the correspondence with Arnold Ruge, which 
was going on in the same period. We have already seen Marx contrast the potential 
freedom and generic capacity of humankind, an ideal at once real and unactualised, with 
the real unfreedom blocking its realisation.  And from the beginning of the  Critique, 
Marx engages in a close immanent critique of the question of concrete freedom and the 
social organism in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Whereas Hegel had defined actuality in 
the  Logic as the realisation of an idea, of reason, as the unity of inner and outer, of 
essence and appearance, in the PR, the work that supposedly celebrates the actuality of 
the (Prussian) state, he defined the state in the following way:
In contrast with the spheres of private rights and private welfare (the family 
and civil society), the state is  on the one hand an external necessity and their 
higher authority; its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate 
to it and dependent on it. On the other hand, however, it is the end immanent  
within them...188
Hegel does not theorise the potentials in the 'immanence' of the family and civil society, 
but merely posits it as the sphere of contingency of the everyday in which the individual 
'is visibly mediated by circumstances, his caprice and his personal choice of his station 
in life.'189 Thus, in Marx's reading of Hegel, the family and civil society appear 'as the 
dark ground of nature from which the light of the state is born'; they are a mere material  
187 He focussed on paragraphs 261-313 in the Philosophy of Right.
188 §261 in Hegel, Philosophy of Right; quoted in Karl Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the 
State,” in Early Writings, 1st ed. (London: Penguin, 1992), 58.
189 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §262; quoted in Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 61.
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for the state, the passive content subsumed under the state form.190 For Marx, the real, 
i.e. the  actualising  relationship, is the opposite: 'The family and civil society are the 
preconditions of the state; they are its true agents; but in speculative philosophy it is the 
reverse'; here they are 'not regarded as true, necessary and self-justified.'191 But when 
Hegel fails to show how the state grows out of the needs of families and civil society, 
his description is both 'false' – undialectical – insofar as it does not trace the movement 
from content to form, and 'correct' insofar as it describes the Prussian state and its lack 
of true actuality. The problem is not straightforwardly that Hegel does not comprehend 
the 'real relations', as in Althusser's notion of ideology, but that his mode of argument 
takes the form of 'Vorstellung', which sees contingency instead of potentiality. In short, 
it precludes the perspective of affirmation. Marx's early inversion of Hegel thus takes 
the perspective of the rationality and freedom of the species: the real everyday material 
relations  and  exchanges  of  bodies,  in  the  spheres  of  reproduction  (the  family)  and 
production  and  social  exchange,  or  intercourse  (civil  society).192 In  other  words  he 
follows  Hegel's  extension  of  the  idea  of  the  social  organism into  the  questions  of 
reproduction.  The  problem,  for  Marx,  is  that  Hegel  takes  these  spheres  as  mere 
phenomena which realise the idea of the state, whereas the state for Marx is supposed to 
be the actualisation of the life of the people.193 Hegel takes the empty idea as subject, 
rather than as predicate. Yet early on, in Jena in 1801/02, Hegel had presented the life of 
the people (Volksleben) as a matter of the philosophy of nature:
It would consist in a process by which the more organic forms of existence 
incorporate  in  their  internal  unity  the  otherwise  dispersed  elements  of  the 
inanimate forms that precede them. This is a process that ultimately leads to the 
creation of a social organism.194
The Hegel  Marx read had repressed this  passage,  prioritising instead the systematic 
dialectical exposition of the state as already individuated and self-positing. Against the 
Hegel of the Philosophy of Right, who says that the 'organism of the state' is the subject, 
'the differentiation of the Idea into various elements and their objective reality', Marx 
reverses subject and predicate:  the differentiation of state or constitution is  organic.  
190 Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 61.
191 Ibid., 62.
192 The German term for intercourse, Verkehr, refers to social, metabolic, sexual and communicative 
exchange, and besides that, to trade and circulation. 
193 On the notion of the life of the people, see appendix 2.5.
194 Giovanni’s introduction to the Science of Logic, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), xviii–xix.
 76
Rather than the noun organism, Marx proposes the adjective organic, which comes to 
work as a concept of the organisation of society. The concept of an organism itself does 
not answer the question of the  specificity of that organism: the noun organism itself 
does not tell us if it is an animal or a political organism.195 To determine this differentia  
specifica  of a species is not a matter of conceptual distinction, but of determining its 
Gattungswesen, i.e.  a  generic difference.  If  the  state-organism is  considered  as  the 
totality, its component parts are nothing but a determination of a passive content, of 
diversity, or the many subsumed under this one. Against this, Marx states that the 'real  
differences or the various aspects of the political constitution are the presupposition, the 
subject. ... the Idea must be developed from the real differences.'196 Thus Marx criticises 
Hegel  for presupposing the universal  and deriving the particular  from it.  Instead of 
developing the  state  from the  immanent  contradictions  of  civil  society  itself,  Hegel 
starts with the Idea of the State (of the whole, the One), and then goes on to examine its  
internal differences, or parts, i.e. the family and civil society.197 
This opens for a more radical conception of actualisation, starting from the differences 
of  the sphere of production,  reproduction and intercourse.  However,  as we will  see 
toward the end of this  section,  Marx,  like Hegel,  will  still  limit  the political  to the 
freedom-will-reason  nexus,  defined  in  opposition  to  the  functions  that  sustain  the 
'human animal', production, reproduction and social intercourse. Civil society and the 
family are the powerful and active, yet always and per definition politically  passive, 
basis of the state. So what is the active, actualising subject of the state, what is the 
power that  constitutes this  state? Marx's answer is not individuals, but  the people –  
however not as a pure agglomeration of individuals. So how to conceive of the people? 
For  Hegel,  the  people  is  only  sovereign  as  state  through  its  representation  in  the 
particular body of the sovereign, the monarch. Instead of positing the subjects of the 
state as those who produce the state, Hegel suggests that the state produces its subjects. 
We are here reminded of Althusser's 'ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals 
as concrete subjects', and 'there can only be such a multitude of possible ... subjects on 
the … condition that there is a Unique, Absolute,  Other Subject', i.e. the king in this 
case.198 For Marx, on the contrary,  the monarch can only be the 'representative and 
195 Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 67.
196 Ibid., 66.
197 As we see in appendix 2.10. – which deals with the concept of differentia specifica and essence in 
Hegel – Marx's line of argument here follows Hegel's own critique of 'Observing Reason' in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, 146–148.
198 Althusser, On Ideology, 47 and 52.
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symbol of sovereignty of the people. The sovereignty of the people is not based on him, 
but he on it.' Marx continues: 'The state is an abstraction. Only the people is a concrete 
reality.'  Thus  Marx  can  speak  of  the  monarchical  constitution  as  a  'form'  which 
'subsumes' what really has produced it, namely the people.199 Marx insists on seeing the 
'Subject' as a result of democracy,  seemingly paradoxically given the obvious fact that 
more or less all monarchical states at Marx's time lacked democratic constitutions. He 
can do this because his measure is not the 'real relations', but the potentiality inherent in 
actuality.  Against  the  surprising  alliance  of  Althusser  and  Hegel,  Marx  claims 
democracy as the truth of monarchy, as democracy in contradiction with itself.   Why? 
Because  democracy  gives  a  principle  of  constitution  (it  is  'the  generic  constitution 
[Verfassungsgattung]'),  whereas  monarchy  is  merely  the  result,  constituted,  which 
negates its process of constitution: power can only be centralised in the one through the 
activity of the many. Democracy is generic not just in the taxonomical sense that it is 
the  genus  of  all  species,  of  constitution,  but  more  fundamentally  because  it  is  the 
generative force of all existing constitutions.200 In short, in a democratic constitution, 
the  universal  genus  democracy  encounters  the  democracy  as  a  species  of  itself.201 
However, from the point of view of the orientation to revolutionary practice that Marx 
was developing, these merely formal determinations do not take us far.
The problem that the notion of the people raises, is the fact that the elements composing 
it are differentiated into families, civil societies and the estates, who have differing and 
competing interests. Given that the family and civil society are private, the properly 
public and political problem of this differentiation only emerges with the estates, which 
Hegel defines,  in Marx's paraphrase,  as  'civil  society's deputation to the state ...  the 
illusory existence  of  the affairs  of  the  state  as  being  an affair  of  the people ...  the 
political illusion of civil society.' By mediating between the people and the executive, 
the  estates  prevent  the  isolation  of  the  crown and  connect  the  internally  diverging 
interests  of different sectors of civil  society.  But more importantly,  they prevent the 
organisation of the people as a 'powerful bloc'. They 'prevent individuals from having 
the  appearance  of  a  mass or  an  aggregate',  and  keep the  people  disaggregated  and 
disorganised,  'and  so  from acquiring  an unorganised  opinion and volition  and from 
199 Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 85.
200 Ibid., 87. See also appendix 2.5.
201 For an elaboration of this logic, see Žižek in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000), 
314–15.
 78
crystallising  into  a  powerful  bloc  in  opposition  to  the  organised  state.'202 The  state, 
again, is seen as organised and organising its elements. As long as the people appears as 
organised by the state, its own capacity of self-organisation remains unknown to it. The 
point is not that the state renders the people powerless, but that it alienates its power, 
monopolising and exploiting it. Here it becomes: 
evident not that a particular interest contradicts the state, but rather that the 
actual organised universal thought of the mass and aggregate is not the thought 
of the organised state and cannot find its realisation in the state.203
Thus, the self-actualisation of the people is blocked by the dual working of the state: it  
divides the social body into competing part, and organises them to its own advantage. 
Marx  here  gives  us  a  significant  characterisation  of  revolutionary  practice  as 
composition,  combination  and  organisation.  The  aim of  such  practice  is  'the  actual 
universal  thought  of  the  mass',  following  the  model  we  saw  in  chapter  1  of  the 
organised body as the 'the idealising and pervading power of this manifold.'204 However, 
this is not achieved in a simple reversal of the organisation of the state, but from below. 
The condition of possibility of the self-organisation of the mass is that it first appears to 
itself as an disorganised mass, subtracted from its role in the division of labour. The 
estates, as a mode of integration that works against such subtraction by representing 
particular interests, prevent the:
unorganised  opinion  and  volition  from  crystallising  into  an  opinion  and 
volition in  opposition to  the state,  through which  determinate  orientation it 
would become an organised opinion and volition.205 
For the mass to pose a threat, three steps need to be fulfilled: the unorganised mass must 
first appear, it then gains a direction and orientation by crystallising into a bloc, but only 
truly becomes a threat when it  organises itself.  The problem of a democratic struggle 
against the state goes through a minimal movement of active disorganisation, before it 
can combine and organise itself against the  state. 
If  the  Dissertation  mainly  raises  the  issue  of  the  passage  from  disorganised  over 
combined to organised simply to point out what is lacking in Epicurus, this section from 
the Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State presents the concepts in positive form, the 
202 Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 132.
203 Ibid.
204 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 130.
205 Ibid.
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middle term being crystallisation. It is here worth looking at the specificity of this term 
in  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Nature.206 The  passage  from  atomism  or  mechanism to 
chemism in general is the event through which elements combine to form composites 
that have different characteristics than they have when separate. Combination is nothing 
but a lasting encounter between two elements, lasting in the sense that they will remain 
combined until some other element or chemical separates them. Crystallisation is the 
aspect  of  chemism which  marks  the  limit  to  organism.  The  first  minimal  form of 
crystallisation happens in simple chemical encounters, such as that between acids and 
alkalies which results in the crystallization of salt, which 'is not just the simple abstract 
unity of chemical elements',  but combines the elements into something qualitatively 
new.207 But crystallisation goes all the way to the limit of life. Whereas life proper is 
process  and  self-formation,  'animated  singularity,  what  we  can  call  advanced 
crystallisation  is  a  chemical  process  that  reproduces  itself,  [is]  a  process  which  is 
sensitive to the environment, such as changes in temperature.'208 As Hegel puts it, the 
basic 'crystal of animation' is the concrete coming together of 'sensibility, irritability and 
reproduction.'209 Crystallisation thus plays a crucial role in a theory of the  'generatio  
aequivoca' (what is also called heterogenesis or abiogenesis) of life, as a 'general mode 
of  vitalisation.'210 However,  the  passage  to  animation  proper  is  rare  because  such 
'immeasurable multitudes' of ephemeral 'points of life' have the 'objective organism' of 
earth outside them.211 In this hostile environment they rarely differentiate themselves 
into proper animals that reproduce ex ovo through generatio univoca.212
Where  Hegel  in  his  Philosophy  of  Right had  posed  the  state  as  a  solution  to  this 
problem, Marx the journalist had argued that this problem would be overcome through 
the gradual process of the self-actualisation of freedom. Faced with the blockage of this 
process, and the abjection of the radicals who had carried it forward, Marx developed a 
theory of the heterogenesis of democracy, the actualisation of freedom against the state 
through the self-organisation of the masses.  However,  this conceptualisation of self-
206 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature III, 215–17. As Petry notes in his commentary Hegel was here 
following contemporary and eighteenth-century natural scientists such as Charles Bonnet, J. C. Reil, 
K. H. Schultz and  J. F. L. Hausmann.
207 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Nature, Vol. II - Part II of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical  
Sciences, trans. M. J. Petry (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), 34.
208 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature III, 131.
209 Ibid., 127. Plasticity is an important link between crystallisation and organic formation, which in this 
context refers to a process of contraction or idealisation. See Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 59–60.
210 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature III, 36.
211 Ibid., 34.
212 Ibid., 36. See appendix 2.8.
 80
organisation is premised on the idea of the members of the mass in their equivalence, 
rather than their heterogeneity. Marx introduces the mass as a starting point for self-
organisation which is not caught up and complicit with the competitive differentiation 
of the state. The mass both represents the modal category of possibility – the possibility 
of freedom and self-organisation – and that of actuality – resisting the division of labour 
and  its  organisation  by  the  state.   Marx  importantly  insists  on  the  impossibility  of 
conceiving the revolutionary formation of a 'bloc' starting with particular interests. The 
orientation of the universal thought of the mass is directed towards its own organisation 
against  the  state.  This  orientation  suspends  the  opportunism or  cynicism of  private 
competing  individuals.  The  orientating  point  is  thus  developed  immanently  from a 
fidelity to the compositional-organisational process itself. 
However,  the idea  that  the mass  composes  itself  purely as  'opinion  and volition'  is 
telling.  The socio-organic moments  of  production,  reproduction and intercourse  and 
bodily capacities for affect, love and sensuousness (to follow Feuerbach's anthropology) 
are all subsumed under the category of heteronomy. Even if Marx is right to question 
whether  self-organisation  can  start  with  the  particular  moments  of  the  mass  (the 
competing interests, as particular moments of the state), his humanist frame precludes 
any consideration whether the 'animal' aspects of human existence (the 'passions' and 
the  activities  of  production,  reproduction  and  intercourse)  can  also  singularise 
themselves, just as the will and opinion can. In other words, he reduces the possibility 
of  composition  to  the  abstract  compossibility  of  atomic  subjects,  rather  than  the 
complex organisation of organic bodies.213 
We  have  seen  how  Marx  steered  through  his  disorientation,  not  just  through  the 
negative insight into disorientation, but because he held on to a concept of species-
essence,  his  'humanism'.214 Marx's  idea  of  the  human  was  not  simply  a  theoretical 
concept and political epiphenomenon, but, like God and money, a Vorstellung, a concept 
which was an index of the actual practices of humanisation within a country. Thus Marx 
took the relatively low political currency of humanist discourse as a sign of the meagre 
transformatory potentials of the German situation. He noted that if to be human is to be 
political, as Aristotle had said, Germany, the most philistine [spießbürgerlich215] of all 
213 We borrow the notion of compossibility from Leibniz, simply to speak about the possibility of 
composition.
214 For a note on the Young-Hegelian critique of humanism, see appendix 2.4.
215 See appendix 2.6.
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countries, was an 'animal kingdom' in a 'dehumanised world'.216 The problem of German 
foolishness is not that the Germans are too idealist, but that they are too realistic:
The Germans are such prudent  realists  that none of their  wishes or wildest 
fancies ever extend beyond the bare actualities of life. And this reality, no more 
no less, is accepted by those who rule over them. They too are realists, they are 
utterly  removed from all  thought  and human greatness,  ...  but  they  are not 
mistaken, they are right; just as they are, they are perfectly adequate to the task 
of exploiting and ruling over this animal kingdom – for here as everywhere 
rule and exploitation are identical concepts.217 
The realism of  the world of  fantasies  and abstractions is  the realism of  a  world of 
domination and exploitation. The human differentia specifica of politics cannot unfold 
itself in this world where individuals become merely concerned with their reproduction: 
'Muta  pecora,  prona  et  ventri  oboedientia; the  herd  is  silent,  docile  and  obeys  its 
stomach.'218 To be human is to be political: active, affirmative, autonomous, not on an 
individual level, but collectively. Again, Marx's method is not to contrast lofty ideas 
with 'real relations', but to affirm the powers that might be actualised. However, like 
Hannah Arendt, he limits these potential powers to the Greek ideal of politics. To be a 
political animal is to be a Greek citizen rather than a slave, or, falling short of that, to be 
a  free  man  rather  than  a  housewife;  autonomy  happens  on  the  unquestioned  and 
apolitical basis of heteronomy.219 
These  remarks  show  the  limits  of  Marx's  particular  formulation  of  the  concept  of 
revolutionary self-organisation, in its link with the conception of the political subject in 
terms of will and consciousness, abstracted from affects and appetites.  However, they 
also show that these limits are external to this model of practice and orientation itself, 
and bound up with a particularly humanist conception of political agency.
9. Smoking, Eating and Drinking
As  mentioned  by  Kouvelakis,  the  political  break  did  not  immediately  produce  the 
famous  theoretical  break.  Driving  Marx  towards  this  break  was  the  labour  of 
216 Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” 202.
217 Ibid. My emphasis.
218 Ibid., 205.
219 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd Revised edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999).
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understanding the  apparent  blockage of  the  German  situation  and its  potential  new 
openings. Observing the dawning industrialisation of western Prussian provinces, Marx 
recognised that the ancient regime harboured within itself  a surprising revolutionary 
force: not that of the people, but bourgeois civil society itself. In the 1844 introduction 
to  the  Critique of  Hegel's  Philosophy of  Right,  Marx notes  that  'the relationship  of 
industry and the world of wealth in general to the political world is one of the main 
problems of the modern age.'220 In short, Marx increasingly rejected the idea that rule 
and 'rule and exploitation' are identical concepts. The central antagonism was not the 
one that pitted the mass against  the state,  but the struggle within civil  society itself 
which pushed society into conflict with the state, as the latter remained a crusty old 
expression of the former social relations that were rapidly being revolutionised. This 
allowed a precise analysis of the failure of the reform project: the reforms which would 
have been needed to respond to the developing situation would simply not be possible 
within the old political system. This contradiction, and not the stupidity or sadism of the 
rulers,  was the reason why the 'brutal  state of affairs'  could only be maintained 'by 
means of brutality.'221 This understanding of the causes of this state of affairs in turn 
implied a new theory of the conditions of revolution, starting not with repression, but 
with the disruptive dynamics of production and trade: 
[T]he system of industry and commerce, of property and the exploitation of 
man will  lead  much faster  than the increase  in  the  population to  a  rupture 
within  existing  society  which  the  old  system  cannot  heal  because  ...  The 
existence  of  a  suffering  mankind  which  thinks  and  of  a  thinking  mankind 
which is suppressed must inevitably become unpalatable and indigestible for 
the animal kingdom of philistines...222 
Contrary to Ruge, who is yearning for the healing of the wounds of the social organism 
and the creation of the institutions needed to accommodate the pressing change, Marx 
finds that  the thinking and the suffering are pregnant with the future,  a potentiality 
coming closer to perfection 'the more time history allows' these two groups to reflect 
and gather strength, respectively.223 While not ready, it seems that they will necessarily 
be so; if this is a disorientated ship of fools, Marx seems to find solace in the idea that it 
220 Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction,” in Early 
Writings, 1st ed. (London: Penguin, 1992), 248.
221 Marx, Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” 205.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid., 206.
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is caught in the winds of history.  Marx's position here is, as it was in the letter dated 
September 1843 quoted above,224 still characterised by a belief in progress which the 
ancient regime will either have to accommodate or be crushed by. But another strata of 
thought can be uncovered here, one that is not necessarily dependent on progressivism: 
Marx speaks of a very different temporality, one that is not a tendency of history, but 
happening in its space, in need of time, which history can only give it as an allowance. 
This is the time of the development of affective, sensory modes of living, the common 
problem of capitalism – thinking and suffering – and the combination of the embodied 
forces of thought and needs. 
This redrawing of the central line of antagonism around a new contradiction and a new 
site  of  disruptive  unfolding  potentiality  entailed  a  reconsideration  of  the  relation 
between politics and economics. In the face of the discovery of the deepening economic 
antagonism of civil society and actuality of class struggle, the revolutionary practice of 
self-organisation – given its reduction to the purely political manner – would seem of 
less relevance. Marx, and especially the Marxist tradition, would later take this route. 
The reduction of the mass to its 'political' aspects would be followed by a tendency to 
reduce  the  proletariat  to  its  purely  economic  interests  and  an  obsession  with  the 
interiority of capitalism. However, Marx's discovery of the political centrality of the 
spheres  of  production,  reproduction  and intercourse does  not  immediately  lead  to  a 
separation between the  economic  animal  and the passionate,  affective,  thinking and 
loving side of  the human-essence.  While  this  may be the case in  Marx's  later  anti-
humanist writings, his notion of the human had, for a period, the conceptual force to 
hold together all these aspects of human-potentiality worthy of actualisation. But more 
than  that,  Marx  saw,  for  the  first  time,  all  these  dimensions  of  life  and  struggle 
combined as he engaged with the 1844 rebellion by the Silesian weavers, and then with 
the communist workers circles during his exile in Paris.  
In his article on the Silesian weavers ('the theoreticians of the European proletariat') he 
criticises  the  reduction  of  the  human  to  the  political  will  or  to  other  such  shared 
characteristic. The human is, instead, something that needs to be composed. Marx asks: 
'do not all rebellions without exception have their roots in the disastrous isolation of 
man  from  the  community?'  The  common  community  here  is  not  the  political 
community,  but  the  'human'  community  of  life,  'physical  and  spiritual  life,  human 
224 Ibid., 206-9.
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morality,  human  activity,  human  enjoyment,  human  nature.'225 If  truth  is  not  a 
description of objective relations, nor an affirmation of equality, but an actualisation or 
idealisation which suspends the impossibility of relating, which suspends separation and 
indifference, it is aimed not only against the bourgeois solution to this separation (the 
state  and wage labour),  but  toward  the  construction  of  a  new society.226 The  social 
revolution takes the form of an antagonistic mode of self-organisation:
All revolution – the overthrow of the existing ruling power and the dissolution 
of the old order – is a political act. But without revolution, socialism cannot be 
made possible. It stands in need of this political act just as it stands in need of 
destruction and dissolution. But as soon as its  organizing functions begin and 
its goal, its soul emerges, socialism throws its political mask aside.227
What does it mean to say that the human only emerges through composition? In the 
manuscripts of 1844 we find a notion of communism which explains this conditional 
character of the human. If private property represents the human as an abstract capacity 
for  labour,  and  thus  makes  the  common  essence-potentiality  appear,  Marx  writes, 
communism is humanism mediated with itself in an overcoming of private property. It is 
not  the  realisation  of  a  pre-given  abstract  essence,  but  the  first  real  emergence  of 
humankind.228 Here, the intersubjective dimension missing in the negative vision of the 
proletariat as paupers and fully subsumed by money and the wage in the positive vision 
of the collective worker, reappears. Humanism in this sense is the unity of 'idealism and 
materialism',  the vital  powers,  drives  and passions  of  corporeal  men and women.229 
Communism can only be the result of real communist activity which happens, as Marx 
describes in very concrete terms, at the site of the encounter between the philosophy of 
potentiality and working bodies:
When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, 
propaganda, [in short, to find orientation] etc. But at the same time they acquire 
a new need – the need for society – and what appears as a means has become 
225 Karl Marx, “Critical Notes on the Article ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian,’” 
in Early Writings, 1st ed. (London: Penguin, 1992), 418.
226 For Hegel the passage from inorganic bodies – the inorganised bodies of chemistry and physics – to 
organic bodies is the passage from the mere 'prose' of inorganic material existence to the 'poetry of 
nature' the creation of a common soul or 'spiritual bond' between the parts. Philosophy of Nature II, 
220, §336. and Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 315, note to §38.
227 Marx, “Critical Notes on the Article ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian,’” 420.
228 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Paris 1844,” in Early Writings, 1st ed. 
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an  end.  The  practical  development  can  be  most  strikingly  observed  in  the 
gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, eating and drinking, etc., are 
no  longer  means  of  creating  links  between  people.  Company,  association, 
conversation, which in its turn as society as its goal, is enough for them. The 
brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of 
man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures.230
This rich vision of communism as a new need emerging from the conviviality around 
political subjectification and need satisfaction, is striking in its description of affective 
micro- and nanopolitical sensitivities and passions as the basis of a new composition of 
bodies  in  a  common  struggle,  producing  something  far  beyond  mere  resistance  or 
making  links  beyond  those  of  shared  individual  interests.231 Unlike  political  and 
economical organisation, which focuses on organising people according to their will and 
interest  respectively  – whether  by an employer,  a  trade union or  as  a  voter  –  self-
organisation does not reduce the elements of its composition. Rather, the composition of 
workers creates the condition of the development of new needs, the crystallisation of 
community  around  a  heterogeneity  of  activities.  But  while  this  might  give  us  a 
necessary  condition  for  revolutionary  self-organisation,  it  is  not  sufficient.  The 
orientation  of  revolutionary  practice  raises  the  questions  of  antagonisms  and  aims 
beyond current actuality. Whereas this chapter has outlined these abstractly, the next 
will raise the question of Marx's critique of the actuality and tendencies of bourgeois 
society  and  his  introduction  of  the  proletariat  as  a  notion  of  the  compossibility  of 
resistances and of revolutionary organisation.
10. Conclusion
In this  interregnum between Marx's  reform-oriented journalism and his invention of 
historical materialism, between the two breaks, we have found important hints towards 
a practice of organisation within and yet against the dialectic of the state. In a surprising 
resurfacing of the arguments drawn from the philosophy of nature,  we have a brief 
proposal for a revolutionary practice of self-organisation or social composition. This 
does not, of course, give us any theory of self-organisation, but something more like the 
230 Ibid., 365.
231 In chapter 7 and appendix 7.4. we will be discussing the importance of combining activities of 'need 
satisfaction' and resistance (community self-defense and self-help) with political pedagogy and 
training. 
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outline of a logic for such a theory, and what is more, its place within the wider critique 
of bourgeois society, Or rather, it raises the question of a displacement or subtraction of 
the multitude or mass from its organisation within bourgeois society. Self-organisation 
proceeds  from  a  minimal  moment  of  disorganisation,  and  through  combinations 
established through the sharing of food and pleasures as well as ideas, strategies and 
long term aims. However, we as we do not have a theory of organisation, nor a theory 
proper of the moment of disorganisation. 
In  his  last  Jahrbücher  letter  to  Arnold  Ruge  Marx  had  gone  beyond  liberalism in 
insisting  that  rule  and  exploitation  are  identical  concepts.  Nonetheless,  he  was 
beginning to realise that the rapid development of industry in the Rhineland was starting 
to put its own pressure on the political order, that there was a dynamic exceeding in 
force his liberal readership's educated advocacy of political freedom. Marx was about to 
make a monumental discovery for himself, that of the proletariat. In the next chapter we 
will enter into a reading of Marx's theory of revolution as it grew out these insights in 
the mid to late 1840s. Here he introduced the theory of the proletariat as a paradoxical 
product  of  bourgeois  society:  at  once  a  radically  negative  mass  abjected  and 
disorganised, and a class of productive workers fully organised and exploited. In Marx's 
theorisation the proletariat turns into a figure of hope, because he reads the development 
of bourgeois society as a real teleology, attempting to subsume the world. Through this 
process  Marx's  predicts  the simultaneous growth of  the  number,  the power  and the 
misery of the proletariat, and thus its growing need and organised capacity to abolish 
bourgeois society. However, we will also see how Marx overlooks three counterveiling 
tendencies:  the  growth  of  state's  welfare  and  repressive  apparatuses  as  well  as  the 
colonial pressure valve, as predicted already by Hegel in relation to the rabble. 
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Chapter 3: The Rabble and the Proletariat
It is the bad side that produces the movement which makes  
history, by providing a struggle.
- Karl Marx232
Universal history must be construed and denied
...there is disintegration by way of integration
- Theodor Adorno233
1. Introduction
As  Marx's  theoretical  orientation  shifted  from  the  problem  of  the  state  to  that  of 
bourgeois  civil  society  (Bürgerliche  Gesellschaft),  his  political  vision  of  self-
organisation slipped out of sight, yet he did not reject it. Marx became more and more 
interested  in  the  contradictions  and  forms  of  organisation  inherent  in  civil  society.  
Organisation became focused on this systemic contradiction rather than the combination 
and organisation across and against the divisions imposed by bourgeois society. Rather 
than  a  set  of  exterior  conflicting  classes,  Marx  theorised  bourgeois  society  as  a 
contradictory whole with certain developmental tendencies.  This theorisation doesn't 
merely posit the actuality of organisation, but moreover that of a certain telos specific to 
the organisation, a telos which drives the expansive development of bourgeois society. 
This  chapter  aims  to  show  that  the  critique  of  this  real  'teleology'  is  useful  for 
orientation in relation to the dynamic organising processes that characterise the system. 
It  is  in  this  concept  of  totalisation  we  find  the  specifically  Marxian  notion  of 
revolutionary practice for the first time, one that is not reducible to political revolution, 
secession or resistance, but one that aims at changing the conditions under which human 
beings  produce  and  reproduce  themselves,  which  aims  at  emancipation  from  both 
exploitation  and  domination.  However,  we  need  to  be  careful  in  distinguishing  the 
logics of bourgeois-capitalist organisation from the philosophy of historical progress so 
232 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, trans. H. Quelch, New edition edition (Prometheus Books 
UK, 1995), 132.
233 Theodor W Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 2004), 320, 24.
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intimately connected to it. Thus we must beware of the implicit philosophy of history 
that comes with Marx's prediction that the real teleology of capital would organise its 
gravediggers.  According  to  this  conception,  bourgeois  society  would  increasingly 
generalise itself,  subsuming more and more human activities, still  larger populations 
and ever greater parts of the globe. In doing so, it would create an ever larger proletariat 
and, henceforth,  the potential  for communism. We will  see here how the Symmetry 
Thesis arises in Marx, and how its orientation to the potentials in capitalist orientation 
turns  our  attention  away from the  fate  and potentials  of  those  populations  that  are 
fighting  proletarianisation.  Thus,  the  conjunction  of  historical  teleology  and  the 
Symmetry Thesis allowed Marx and untold numbers of followers to neglect the problem 
of organisation beyond the capital-labour relation. 
Our reading in this chapter will proceed through four steps. Firstly, it will introduce the 
problematic of the real teleology of civil society, and its relation to Hegel's notion of 
spontaneous social order ('the cunning of reason') as well as the problem of the rabble in 
the  Philosophy of  Right.  In doing so,  we become able  to  account  for  the  Hegelian 
context of Marx's concept of the proletariat, as well the specificity of Marx's position. 
Secondly, we will discuss Marx's initial formulation of the problem of the proletariat as 
the radical negative truth of civil society, and thus as a figure that introduces the idea of 
universal  yet  partisan  knowledge.  This  will  allow us  to  discuss  –  on  the  terrain  of 
Marx's text – the limitations of a line of argument which have attempted to sustain the 
possibility of revolutionary theory with a claim on totality after the Symmetry Thesis. 
Both  have  done  so  by  focusing  on  the  proletariat/rabble  as  a  universal  exception, 
rejecting the sociological or production-centred notion of the working class. One such 
argument, found in Kouvelakis' reading of Marx, draws on the proletarian exception as 
the  negation  of  any  ideological  claims  to  closure,  as  the  negative  truth  of  totality, 
following Žižek. Another argument, found in Frank Ruda, takes the radical need and 
dispossession of the proletarian as an ontological figure of universality and rebellion, 
following Agamben. In either case, we find that the reading of the proletariat solely in 
terms  of  negativity  and  exceptionality  leaves  us  without  a  concept  of  proletarian 
organisation. Where the former is merely critical, the latter leaves us with a messianic 
hope premised on immiseration and spontaneous insurrection. Furthermore, we have to 
move  beyond  both  appraisals  of  negativity  to  understand  why  Marx  became 
increasingly focussed on the productivity and organisation of the proletariat by capital, 
which,  while  closely connected to  the Symmetry Thesis,  had an important rationale 
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beyond it. Both the Symmetry Thesis and the idea of the purely negative exceptional 
proletariat give revolutionary hope by projecting the multiplication and deepening of 
proletarian negativity in the process of capitalist  development.  This means that both 
conceptions  of  the proletariat  as a  subject  of  history,  be it  as  an organised class  or 
messianic non-class, end up premising their orientation on the real teleology of capital. 
In doing so, they easily reproduce Marx's problematic unilinear conception of history, 
even when they are critical of Marx's Symmetry Thesis and his sometimes prophetic 
promises of necessary revolutions.234 Only if we acknowledge the need for a positively 
defined organised proletariat, can we divorce the problem of the proletariat from the 
philosophy of history, and develop the concept of revolutionary (self-)organisation for 
which we are looking.
2. Antagonism of the Whole and Partisan Knowledge
Marx had taken  his organic model of civil society from Hegel.  Like Hobbes, Hegel 
recognised the conflictual  dynamics  of bourgeois  society,  but he followed Kant and 
Adam Smith in transforming this vision, which in Hobbes' theorisation had required the 
artificial  imposition  of  order,  into  an  immanent  teleological  conception.235 Whereas 
Kant  had his  'asocial  sociability'  and Smith  the  'hidden hand of  the  market',  Hegel 
proposed the formula of the 'cunning of reason'.236 Crucially, this meant that Hegel's 
conception is not one of a harmonious or even 'ideally' harmonious social body, but one 
integrating  within  itself  the  contradiction  between  the  antagonism  of  atomised 
individuals  and  their  mutual  dependence.  This  contradiction  is  fundamental  to  the 
modern state as the only social organisation which is truly historical, prosaic rather than 
poetic-mystical. As opposed to the poetry of the myths and legends of 'people without 
history', the modern state organises
a  world  of  finitude  and  mutability,  of  entanglement  in  the  relative,  of  the 
pressure of necessity from which the individual is in no position to withdraw. 
For every isolated living thing remains caught in the contradiction of being 
234 For an explication of the versions of this argument of capital and its gravediggers, see appendix 3.0.
235 On this shift from a mechanic notion of the 'body politic' to the organicist notion of the 'social 
organism', see Bue Rübner Hansen, “The Crisis Is the Organism’s Mastering of Itself – A Conceptual 
and Practical History of the Problem of Crisis through Koselleck and Hegel,” in Conceptions in 
Economic History, ed. Mikkel Thorup (Springer Press, 2014).
236 'Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, 
each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance 
along a course intended by nature.' Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 41.
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itself in its own eyes this shut-in unit and yet of being nevertheless dependent 
on something else...237
The historical social body is not the realisation of a human plan (a 'contract')  nor a 
divine plan, but of the immanent forces of integration and organisation in the historical 
process, always viewed under the perspective of Minerva's owl, i.e. retrospectively. The 
passions of humans are then inseparable from the development of this universal history. 
This may be called the cunning of reason, — that it sets the passions to work 
for itself, while that which develops its existence through such impulsion pays 
the penalty and suffers loss. For it is phenomenal being that is so treated, and of 
this, part is of no value, part is positive and real. The particular is for the most 
part  of  too  trifling  value  as  compared  with  the  general:  individuals  are 
sacrificed and abandoned.238
It might be tempting to conclude that Hegel recognised the systematic production of 
misery in bourgeois society but inscribed it within a generally benevolent teleology of 
the whole. However, these two moments are strictly corollary for Hegel. It is the real 
teleology of bourgeois society that produces this misery. Or, it is Hegel's recognition 
that bourgeois society is a whole with a certain telos that structures it and drives it ahead 
which allows him to see that misery is neither an accident nor a remnant of the past.  
Whereas historical teleology in Kant takes on the orientating function of an ideal, in 
Hegel  it  takes  the  form of  an  actual  idea  that  is  a  concept  of  an  actual  mode  of 
organisation.239 As we will see, he was fully aware that this did not mean the abolition of 
the problem, but its amelioration. The actualised state of freedom contained within itself 
a necessary exception, yet one that could be dealt with through charity, welfare, and the 
police. 
While Hegel presents misery as an unfortunate product of civil society that is to be 
managed, he does not think the rabble as a historical residue. This fact presents us with 
a different version of social organisation, one which allows Marx to think the rabble as a 
universal exception and the standpoint of partisan knowledge. For Marx, the proletariat 
237 G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 150. 
In Chapter 1 we have seen that Hegel noted how this fact was reflected in modern political theory.
238 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Volume I: Manuscripts of the 
Introduction and the Lectures of 1822-1823, ed. Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson (OUP 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) §36.
239 For the notion of partisan knowledge, and its relevance for the Leninist and Lukácsian conception of 
revolution, see Alberto Toscano, “Partisan Thought,” Historical Materialism 17 (September 2009), 
175–191.
 91
became the name of this exception, both the truth of the untruth of the whole, and the 
point from which truly universal liberation could be achieved, the point of subtraction 
from  the  merely  particular  interests  of  the  estates,  the  families  and  the  competing 
interests of civil society.  The proletariat that entered Marx's philosophy was at first a 
philosophical concept  of  a  subject  adequate  to  actualise  the  promises  of  German 
philosophy, rather than the empirically existing labouring and dispossessed populations. 
Marx hence granted practical import to his philosophy by granting philosophical import 
to this population.240 The search for possible revolutionary subjects – the mass which 
soon became the question of the proletariat – was thus overdetermined by the search for 
a subject to actualise the promises of German philosophy, which were, we need to add, 
the promises of the French Revolution.241 
The  political  regimes of  the German states  –  economically  backwards  compared to 
industrialised England, and politically retarded compared to France – appeared to Marx 
as truly ancient. German philosophy, however, a brain overdeveloped in a stunted body, 
he considered to be the philosophy of the future: the potentiality of German actuality, 
Marx asserted, has foremost been developed in philosophy, thus the issue is not simply 
to  overcome abstract  philosophy,  but  to  actualise  it.  'You cannot  abolish [aufheben] 
philosophy  without  actualising  it  [verwirklichen].'242 This  process  is  essentially 
undertaken in praxis, but philosophy itself becomes a practical force, when it takes grip 
of the masses, which it can when it becomes radical – goes to the root of matters – 
which for humankind is man itself; i.e a theory which demonstrates 'ad hominem' goes 
to the root of things, to mankind itself, as the root of all matters human. Revolution thus 
became a question of the meeting between philosophy and the proletariat.
[R]evolutions require a  passive element, a  material basis. Theory is realised 
[verwirklicht] in a people only insofar as it is the fulfilment of the needs of that 
people. But will the enormous gap that exists between the demands of German 
thought  and  the  responses  [Antworten,  answers]  of  German  reality 
[Wirklichkeit] now correspond to the same gap between civil society and the 
state and civil society and itself? Will the theoretical needs be directly practical 
needs? It is not enough that thought should strive to realise itself; reality itself 
must strive towards thought. … A radical revolution can only be the revolution 
240 On why Marx is not caught in the problematic of the 'ends of man', see appendix 3.1.
241 Stathis Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx, trans. G. M. Goshgarian 
(London: Verso Books, 2003).
242 Marx, “Critique of Hegel. Introduction,” 250. Translation amended.
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of radical needs...243
It is this radical need, or proletarian non-reproduction, which is not just a symptom of 
the real disintegration or internal 'impossibility' of society, which as problem is the site 
of  the possibility,  and the human necessity of revolution.244 As the exception to the 
realisation of freedom in society, radical needs tell a universal truth about this society. 
Thus any practise and theory beginning from this standpoint is true precisely because of 
its partisan orientation, and constructive of real universality precisely because it does 
not fight for a particular interest within a system of rights, but to abolish the conditions 
that produce it as an exception, and thus to abolish rather than promote its particular 
interests.
But why doesn't Marx present an argument against the proponents of public relief and 
charity, the default arguments and institutions working against the production of any 
radical need? What makes this problem, and therefore its solution, radical? How can 
Marx simply presume that his readers will agree that the problem of the proletariat can 
only  be  solved  by  radical  means,  that  the  proletariat  was  a  necessary  product  of  
bourgeois  society,  i.e.  one  that  can  only  be  abolished  through  revolution? Here  it 
becomes useful  to  return to  a standard text  in  the German philosophy of bourgeois 
society, which was well-known by Marx's contemporaries, namely Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right. This text is not only interesting because it supplies implicit arguments against 
'reformist' proposals that charity and public relief will solve the problem of poverty, but 
also because it seemingly provided the model for Marx's initial theorisation of the role 
of the proletariat in relation to the problem of what Hegel had called the rabble, which 
is the equivalent of the Latin proletarius.245
3. The Problem of the Rabble, and the Solutions of the State
In a few often overlooked paragraphs of the  Philosophy of Right  which have recently 
been given a central role in an important study by Frank Ruda,246 Hegel analyses the 
phenomenon  that  the  poor  –  defined  as  those  that  lack  the  means  to  reproduce 
themselves ('natural means of acquisition' and 'bonds of kinship')247 – tend to become a 
243 Ibid., 252.
244 On the concept of need in Marx, see appendix 3.2.
245 On the Roman genealogy of the concept of the 'proletariat', see appendix 3.4.
246 Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble: An Investigation into Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Continuum 
Publishing Corporation, 2011).
247 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet, new 
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“rabble” (Pöbel),  '[w]hen the activity of civil  society is unrestricted,  [and] occupied 
internally with expanding its  population and industry.'248 The poor becomes a rabble 
when they fall  out of the organic mediation of society,  wage labour,  and develop a 
subjectivity antagonistic to labour ('frivolous and lazy') and 'against the rich, against 
society, the government', etc.. Hegel describes this as a particular societal condition, not 
as natural poverty; it is thus a 'hardship … inflicted on this this or that class', which is a 
problem  which  'torments  modern  societies  especially.'249 The  impoverished  masses' 
refusal of work and the work ethic is produced by the lack of self-respect, motivation 
and  skill  produced  by their  initial  expulsion  from work,  their  unemployment  itself. 
However, putting them to work is no solution:
...their  livelihood might be mediated by work … which would increase the 
volume of production; but it is precisely in overproduction and the lack of a 
proportionate  number of consumers  who are themselves  productive that  the 
evil  consists  … This  shows that,  despite  an excess  of  wealth,  civil  society 
(bürgerliche  Gesellschaft)  is  not  wealthy  enough  –  i.e.  its  own  distinct 
resources are not sufficient – to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation 
of a rabble.250
While the problem of overproduction is theorised in its classical terms as one of excess 
and lack (underconsumption), the problem of the rabble is considered in terms of two 
excesses: excess wealth and excess poverty. Poverty is not merely a lack of wealth, but 
an  excessive  existence  of  an  impoverished  mass.  This  problem  was  not  Hegel's 
discovery, and his originality can be exaggerated.  Albert O. Hirschman claims that it is 
unlikely that Hegel – whose  Philosophy of Right  was published in 1820 – could have 
been aware  of  either  Sismondi's  theory  of  generalised overproduction,  published in 
1819,  or  Malthus'  theory  of  over-population,  published in  1820.251 In  any  case,  the 
central logic combining the dynamic antagonism of bourgeois society with the growth 
of  the  rabble  is  particularly  interesting  in  Hegel  because  it  is  lodged  within  his 
systematic and dialectical understanding of the modern state. We can say that, in some 
sense, the methodological principle that the whole must be thought in its contradiction 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 265 §241. 
248 Ibid., 266, §243.
249 Ibid., 266f, §244.
250 Ibid., 267, §245.
251 Albert O. Hirschman, “On Hegel, Imperialism and Structural Stagnation,” in Journal of  
Development Economics 3 (1976), 3. For Sismondi's critique of Malthus, see appendix 3.3.
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gave Hegel the sensitivity needed to appreciate the radicality of the relation between the 
production of wealth and of paupers, not just as a problem of civil society, but one for 
the state as well as the social body as such. Crucially, for Hegel the only remedies of 
this problem go against the very principles of civil society: poverty is a structural, we 
can say organic, feature of modern societies. 
By establishing the insights developed in Hegel's rabble as the precondition of Marx's 
proposal of the proletariat, we can note that the problem of the proletariat is from its 
beginning – even if not introduced as such by Marx – not a purely economic or national 
one, but articulated with the state (in terms opening both to biopolitics and discipline), 
as well as with colonialism and globalising trade. Without noting the relation to Hegel's 
rabble, Étienne Balibar similarly notes that Marx's proletariat renders his orientation 
irreducible  to  the  classical  distinctions  of  nineteenth-century  political  thought: 
state/society, politics/economics, public/private, etc.252
For Hegel, the problem of the rabble forces the state to intervene in civil society. Frank 
Ruda lists a number of such solutions, or ameliorations, to the problem of the rabble, 
arguing that they are all insufficient either for Hegel himself or for reasons of Hegelian 
logic:253 1) There is the possibility that  the poor can be taken care of by  civil society  
itself. However, this contradicts the principle of civil society, which is accumulation; it 
makes civil society appear as a family, and annuls the need for labour as mediation in 
civil society. 2) The rabble could survive through public begging; however, this  could 
instil in people the habit of not working and would also risk demoralising the working 
population, thus undermining a key principle of civil society, that of work. 3) The right  
of distress, i.e. the right to steal or withhold payment in a situation of urgent poverty. 
This casts the poor as beasts, living and stealing from necessity rather than as free moral 
beings who can be required to respect the law. This contradicts both the principles of 
property and that of human freedom. 4) The problem of poverty could also be solved 
through the  redistribution of labour. However, this means that the poor now produce 
what others would have produced; this either pushes the problem to other producers 
who become poor, or results in civil society producing too much; or both. 5) Another 
solution could lie in  the corporation and its ethics (of responsible consumption). The 
corporations, Hegel's prototrade union,254 is an exclusive institution which only supports 
252 Étienne Balibar, “In Search of the Proletariat,” in Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and  
Philosophy before and after Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994), 136.
253 Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 15ff.
254 Ibid., 22.
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the  poor  it  knows;  paupers  migrating  from  other  countries  will,  in  particular,  be 
excluded from it. 6) The last solution to the problem of poverty is the classical one of 
the police, and, in combination with it, religion (in the form of charitable institutions).255 
This criminalises the paupers without dealing with the causes of poverty, and charity, 
again, produces lazy asocial people, i.e. people whose relation to society is not mediated 
by money/labour, and therefore contradicts the principle of civil society.
So the rabble cannot be abolished without going against the principles of civil society 
(points  1-3),  nor  without  displacing  and  thereby  perpetuating  the  problem (4),  nor 
through exclusive or superficial measures (5-6). Finally, Hegel mentions the possibility 
of  exporting  of  surplus-commodities  to  countries  with  lower  productivity  ('which 
generally lag behind ... in creativity'), and of exporting the poor through colonization:256
Civil society is driven to establish colonies. The increase of population alone 
has this effect; but a particular factor is the emergence of a mass of people who 
cannot gain satisfaction for their needs by their work when production exceeds 
the needs of consumers.257
Hegel does not provide a critique here, but, as Ruda notes, colonisation is not a solution 
to the problem, but a temporary postponement which function through a logic of 'bad 
infinity'; in other words, it does not lead to the sustainable self-positing of civil society, 
but drives it ahead in an expansionary thrust which must end.258 Although Hegel does 
not allude to this end himself, it is clear that he must have been familiar with theories 
that posited a limit to the growth of civil society. Indeed, the issue of an end to growth,  
of the market, production and population, was a common theme to classical political 
economists.259 Adam Smith,  one of Hegel's primary resources in matters of political 
economy,  had,  in  fact,  predicted  that  the  demographic  growth  and  expansionary 
tendencies  of  manufacture  and trade  would  eventually  exhaust  themselves  allowing 
capitalism to peacefully arrive to a stationary state.260 Furthermore, as Smith did notice 
the social misery produced as a necessary effect of capitalist development, he readily 
255 Ibid, §242. Note that police at the time of Hegel referred to any administrative body taking care of 
public order, including sanitation, urban planning, poverty relief and ambulance services, as 
theorised in the Polizeiwissenchaft of Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717-1771).
256 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 269, §248.
257 Ibid.
258 Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 20.
259 Kenneth E. Boulding, “The Shadow of the Stationary State,” Daedalus 102, no. 4 (October 1, 1973), 
89–101.
260 Ege Ragip and Jean-Daniel Boyer, “A Seminal Source for Kant and Hegel” (presented at the Annual 
Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought, Thessaloniki, 2009).
 96
proposed the solution that the government must ameliorate the situation.261 Thus Hegel's 
solutions  to  the  problem  of  the  rabble  can  be  read  as  mutually  complimenting 
mediations which do not abolish the problem but ameliorate it, and, precisely by doing 
so, allow the perpetuation of the 'solutions', providing the state, religion, charity with an 
inextinguishable raison d'être.262 This is how for Hegel the contradiction between civil 
society and the state, and the sacrifice of human beings, is normalised, ameliorated, and 
rendered  both  productive  and  reproductive  through  the  state  itself.  The  state  thus 
appears  as  the  commensuration  of  history,  conceived  reflexively,  retrospectively, 
systemically. 
Marx's initial response to this formula of history takes the form of a purely temporal 
manipulation, generally by suggesting that we are not  yet  at the end of history, and 
particularly  by  presenting  Prussian  development  as  retarded,  a  remnant  of  the  past 
rather than a modern state. This gives us unfinished actualisation on two levels: the 
level  of  the  species  and  that  of  the  state.  While  both  Marx  and  Hegel  speak  of 
antagonism within civil society, and a contradiction between civil society and the state, 
they diverge on two crucial points. First, Marx's above mentioned recognition of the 
disruptive  character  of  the  dynamism  of  bourgeois  society  differs  from  the 
contradictions identified by Hegel in  The Philosophy of Right.  In the latter text these 
contradiction are containable within the state and the solution to the problems of society 
is a stable one: 'the true reconciliation, which reveals the state as the image and actuality 
of reason, has become objective',  whereas for Marx the contradiction tends towards 
becoming explosive.263 Second, Marx adopts the partisan orientation of the subjective 
intolerability of the proletarian condition. 
The situation is thus  unsustainable  both subjectively and objectively. As the  objective 
tendency is determinant, it renders it impossible to solve the problem of poverty within 
its current systemic solutions – state welfare, charity, and full employment. Without a 
theory of the deepening contradictions of capital, the problem of the proletariat would 
merely  persist,  with  the  estates,  the  police,  charity  and  colonisation  acting  as  a 
countervailing tendencies. The notion of the revolutionary potential of the proletariat is 
not merely premised on the fact that charity and state policy cannot abolish it, or that 
261 See appendix 6.3.
262 For such an 'ethical' reading of Hegel, see Joel Anderson, “Hegel’s Implicit View on How to Solve 
the Problem of Poverty - The Responsible Consumer and the Return of the Ethical to Civil Society,” 
in Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism: Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. Robert 
Williams (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), 185–205. 
263 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 380, §360.
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such proposals contradict the principles of civil society as in Hegel, but the thesis of the 
tendential deepening of these contradictions, whose force is ultimately greater than that  
of the countervailing measures. 
This allows Marx to retain a hopeful orientation premised on the progress of bourgeois 
society, albeit one progressing by its bad side. However, structuring history around such 
a  narrative  of  progress,  or,  alternatively,  basing  politics  solely  on  the  unfolding 
tendency, easily entails a certain blindness to those 'sacrificed and abandoned' by the 
'cunning of reason'; it involves a blindness with regards to those that are not part of the 
partisan “we” that can be considered to be on the good side of the bad side of history. To 
see but one example illustrating the question of proletarian reproduction outside the 
wage-relation, we will now turn back the clock six months to the autumn of 1842. 
4. The Margins of Civil Society and the Estovers of the Rhine Valley
In 1842, Marx was challenged to think the relation between socio-economic processes 
and the legal and institutional arrangements and politics of the German lands – a first 
and  somewhat  embarrassing  venture  into  the  discussion  of  material  interests,  as  he 
described  it  years  later.264 This  effort  consisted  in  a  series  of  articles  covering  the 
debates of the Provincial Assembly of the Rhine on the criminalisation of the collection 
of wood by the rural poor, prompted by increasing instances of theft of wood in  the 
Moselle  valley.  In  these  articles,  Marx  deconstructed  the  argumentation  of  the 
landowners through the standard of natural justice; he attempted to reveal how their 
crude and self-interested provisions made a mockery of the law, which 'is the universal 
and authentic exponent of the rightful order of things.'265 The silences implicit in this 
approach are telling insofar as they are necessary silences for a conception of history in 
which  historical  teleology  is  conceived  in  progressivist  terms. The  foremost 
contradiction of the situation outlined by Marx is the contradiction between the reality 
and the idea of bourgeois law, but he shows little knowledge of customary right and 
what E.P. Thompson has called the moral economy of the poor.  What is silenced, as 
Peter Linebaugh has shown, is the struggles and practices of those populations who 
resist capitalist 'development'.266 Indeed, Marx did not analyse how the peasant had been 
264 Preface to Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” in MECW, Marx 1857-
61, vol. 29 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987).
265 Karl Marx, “Proceedings of the Sixth Rhine Province Assembly. Debates on the Law on Thefts of 
Wood,” in MECW, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 224.
266 Peter Linebaugh, “Karl Marx, the Theft of Wood and Working Class Composition,” Crime and 
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displaced from their land through the dual pressures of falling prices on agricultural 
produce due to the heightened competition brought about by the German customs union 
(Zollverein) of 1835, nor did he look at the expropriations by the big landowners.  He 
also did not raise the question of traditional rights to estovers and the commons, nor of 
the  practices  of  commoning  and  sustainable  living  of  the  paupers,  which  Peter 
Linebaugh describes (while warning against romanticisation) as superior to what took 
its place, modern industrial forestry based on the new science of sylviculture.267 Marx's 
polemics  are  limited,  as  polemics  often  are,  to  ridiculing  lawmakers  and  fellow 
members of the sphere of reader-writers, and misses the struggles of those who practice 
what  is  ridiculous  as  a  mere  slogan  and  do  so  according  to  their  own  situated 
rationalities, situated within broader social developments.268 The sub-economic practices 
of  the  commoners  and  rural  proletarians  (the  labours  of  Pyrrha  and  Gaia)269 are 
withdrawn from the calculation, invisible, or at least unaccounted for by Marx, just as 
they were in the struggle for democratic representation and capitalist valorisation at the 
time. Here it is the production of society, modern industry and commerce, considered as 
a necessary organic unfolding of actuality, which casts the shadow. Commons and small 
peasants,  and  the  becoming  dependent  of  women  on  wage  earners  (i.e.  the  non-
reproduction  of  unmarried  proletarian  women),  are  as  silent  in  the  analysis  of 
production and reproduction as they are in Marx's affirmation of political  autonomy 
dating  from the  same period.  The  critique  of  the  inner  contradictions  of  bourgeois 
society  here  turns  its  back  on  the  destruction  and  subsumption  of  what  lies  at  its 
margins.  We will  see this  repeated  later  in  Marx's  early discussions  of  colonialism. 
However,  for  now,  we  are  interested  in  Marx's  partisan  theory  of  the  proletarian 
revolution, as it is articulated with the theory of the dynamics of civil society.
5. The Universal Negativity of Proletarian Need
The hopeful orientation, given with the prediction of a developing potential and need 
for  revolution  is,  as  we  have  seen,  premised  on  the  theory  of  the  deepening  and 
expanding contradiction inherent in civil society. The characteristics of the proletariat 
are, from the start, determined by the problematic of the actualisation of universality on 
Social Justice 6 (Fall-Winter 1976), 5–16.
267 Ibid. For a broader historical outline of these issues, see Peter Linebaugh, The Magna Carta 
Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009).
268 Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction,” 248.Ibid. 
269 Cf. appendix 1.5.
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the level of society. For such an agency to be possible, a collective subject sharing needs 
and interests  must  be able  to  cohere.  The proletariat  is  the answer to  the need and 
interest of philosophy in finding an agent of the actualisation of freedom, a 'universal  
representative' of society, whose claims can be the claims of society itself.270 For Marx, 
the proletarian revolution is not an invariable possibility of bourgeois society. Instead, it 
relies on the creation of a class with radical rather than particular needs, that is a class 
whose interest is the expression not just of its own position, but of the whole of society. 
Marx  contrasts  this  with  the  merely  particular  character  of  the  French  revolutions. 
Unlike the classes in France who through the revolutions of 1789 and 1830 became for-
themselves,  he  considers  the  proletariat  to  be  the  'passive  element'  of  a  German 
revolution. The proletariat is the name of the pure possibility of revolution, situated in 
the problem of the impoverished and exploited masses. It not a class in the usual sense, 
but a 'radical class', in Marx's terms. This class is universal, because it embodies the 
'universal  offence',  'a  general  limitation',  and  the  'notorious  crime  of  the  whole  of 
society.'271 This mass is the general negativity of society; it claims no particular right 
because it  suffers  wrong  in  general,  its  claim is  not  historical but  'merely  human', 
suffering a 'total loss of humanity' in the nakedness of its existence.272 The passivity of 
this element is not a passivity of its members, but the passivity of the class as a class, 
the masses  produced by the 'emergent  industrial  movement',  living not  'natural'  but 
'artificially produced poverty'.273 The concept of the proletariat does not correspond to 
the  needs  of  an already existing and given population,  but  to  the  possibility  of  the 
conjunction of two needs, those of philosophy and those of a class in formation.274 
Two readings suggest themselves forcefully here: this proletariat is not, contrary to how 
it  has  often been conceived,  a  sociological  category  (a  class  in  the classical  sense) 
naming a positively existing and productive population.  Instead,  it  is the name of a 
certain embodied negativity vis-a-vis society, a mass that is a necessary exception to the 
social  order,  similarly to  Hegel's  rabble:  'The  emergence of  poverty is  in  general  a 
consequence of civil society, and on the whole it arises necessarily out of it... A rabble 
arises chiefly in a developed civil society.'275 Second, it is precisely this negativity that 
270 Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction,” 254.Marx, “A 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction,” 254.
271 Ibid., 254.
272 Ibid., 256
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid., 252, 254
275 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 453, addition to §244. On Balibar's insistence on the need for reading 
the proletariat as both mass and class, see appendix 3.4.
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makes the proletariat universal, the negative truth of society. These readings contain an 
important critique of the long tradition of substantialist, essentialist Marxist conceptions 
of  the  proletariat.  However,  I  will  briefly  outline  below how the  evacuation  of  all 
proletarian positivity is  in  fact  what  enables  Marx to  develop the well-known more 
substantialist account. The problems with both conceptions will lead us to propose a 
more materialist theory of the problem of the proletariat in chapters 4-7.We will now 
examine the purely negative account of the proletariat.
Stathis Kouvelakis has pointed out that the proletariat first emerges in Marx's writings 
as  a  'paradoxical  protagonist'  devoid  both  of  the  sociological  substantiality  and 
Feuerbachian positivity that was characteristic of the contemporary Engels' study of the 
Condition of the English Working Class.276 He productively interprets the proletariat, as 
presented in the 1844 Introduction, as 'the void that is constitutive of the existing order', 
and 'lacks any transcendent “guarantee”', and thus 'confronts that society with its own 
impossibility,  its  pure  difference.'277 Such  manoeuvres,  which  make  it  possible  to 
reaffirm class antagonism and totality without invoking a positive communist project (in 
Kouvelakis' words, '[t]he problematic of the radical revolution and the constitution of 
the  proletariat  poses  politics  as  permanent  revolution'),  had  a  certain  strategic 
importance as levers against first Stalinist and then liberal triumphalism in the post-
1979 and 1989 epoch (to  choose  two dates  marking the  exhaustion and end of  the 
twentieth-century circle of struggles) – for instance, think of the political adoption of 
Lacan in Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek. While Kouvelakis' argument – which clearly draws 
on the early Žižek – usefully demonstrates the impossibility of a closure or 'suture' of 
the social totality, we get a sense of its limits through the simple question: who claimed 
this possibility of closure or homoeostasis in the first place? Clearly the negation here 
stays invested in the organicist conception it rejects. Take away the organicism and you 
lose the critique. In short, it operates as a critique of the fantasy of the closure of a more 
conservative organistic philosophy. This reading, while productive, functions primarily 
in the mode of ideology critique.
Furthermore, this underdetermination of the problem of the proletariat is exactly what 
lends a certain universality to its negativity. The capacity of the proletariat to carry the 
276 Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 329–30.Ibid.
277 Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction,” 256.Ibid. 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical  
Democratic Politics, 2nd ed (London: Verso, 2001); Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 
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abstract humanism of philosophy is premised on the erasure of its positive traits. Frank 
Ruda thus argues that the pure indeterminacy of the dehumanised masses is what makes 
them most generically human, i.e. least marked by mere particularity, most capable of 
the 'universal production' of species-essence.278  Unlike the 'working class', a term only 
adopted by Marx slightly later  on,  particularly from Engels,  the proletariat  is  not  a 
positive socio-economic determination of the social  whole,  but an  excess or residue 
with respect to the organisation of society, a notion of the impossibility of the closure of 
the social whole, in short an 'inorganic element' – as Marx writes, without a claim on 
history, it has only a claim on humanity.279 Thus the proletarian revolution is not the 
mere revolution of a class affirming itself, but the 'total redemption of humanity' at the 
point  of  'society's  acute  disintegration.'280 Whilst  there  is  much  to  this  reading  of 
species-essence as purely generic and a principle of infinite differentiation, the question 
of  how this potentiality is actualised  remains  unanswered in Marx's as well as Ruda's 
text. Like Agamben's homo sacer, which Ruda refers to, the tabula rasa of dehumanised 
humanity easily becomes a pure inscription-surface for the ideas of the philosopher. 
Marx's  pedagogico-political  self-understanding  shines  through  in  the  gendered 
metaphors with which he describes this paradoxical actualisation of the non-body of the 
proletariat: the material weapons of the proletariat must be supplied by the intellectual 
weapons of philosophy. If the lightning of thought 'struck deeply into this virgin soil of 
the people, emancipation will transform the Germans into men.'281
The  head of  this  emancipation  is  philosophy,  its  heart the  proletariat. 
Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence [Aufhebung] of the 
proletariat,  and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization 
[Verwirklichung] of philosophy.282
In the universal victim the philosopher finds a muted body-without-mind that can be 
spiritualised and moved only by philosophy and the basest of physiological needs. The 
actuality of revolution only comes about through the combination of the trajectory of 
philosophy with that of the proletariat, a combination focused around the metaphor of 
the  life-giving  lightning.  This  actualisation  takes  the  form of  a  paradoxical  idealist 
278 Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 172.
279 Frank Ruda convincingly connects Marx’s introduction of the proletariat to Hegel’s notion of the 
rabble. Ibid., 170.
280 Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction,” 252.
281 Ibid., 257.
282 Ibid.
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reversal:  it  is  not  the  actualisation  of  real  potentialities,  but  the  actualisation  of  a 
potential precisely because this potential has been absolutely curbed, a body redemptive  
because crucified, as it were. If what is struggling is the human species, not understood 
as one particular class in a social body, but precisely in its inorganicity and negativity as 
an excretion of that society, then it is 'nothing' and yet it 'must be everything.'283 The 
relative socio-economic pauperisation of the proletariat becomes an absolute poverty in 
comparison with the infinite potentiality of the human species as revealed in the abstract 
infinity  imputed  to  God  and  experienced  in  the  false  infinity  of  the  expansion  of 
capital.284 There is in this negative proletariat something like a Christology, a kind of 
kenosis,  an emptying out  which leads  to  the  absolute  receptivity  to  the  message of 
philosophy.285 Just  as  the  Messiah  is  always  a  figure  of  theological  orientation,  the 
proletariat is an orientating figure of radical philosophy. But whereas theology pushes 
the Messiah ahead of it into an unknown future, radical philosophy looks in the present 
for the potentiality of the realisation of freedom. What will be a Messiah is now a mass 
whose  historical  mission  must  be  communicated  to  it  from without,  or  for  whose 
uprising the prophet philosopher must wait silently. The proletariat thus takes the form 
of the male fantasy of the feminine body, which can give birth to all of humankind, but 
can only do so passively and under the condition of her impregnation by philosophy.
The idea that the actualisation of freedom can only come about through an embodiment 
of spirit and a spiritualisation of the body attests to the experience of their separation 
and a desire to reunite them which is common among thinkers friendly to the events of 
1789. Another figure is perhaps more useful to look at from the point of view of the 
question  of  organisation.  Think of  the  logic  of  Mary Shelley's  Frankenstein  –  The  
Modern Prometheus  for one, a logic very much with us in Marx's discourse above.286 
This  analogy  opens  for  a  consideration  of  the  separation  and  daily  sacrifice  of 
proletariat, as the bodies of which a monster might be composed. The question becomes 
how two 'inorganic' and radically negative elements of society, the radical intellectual 
283 Ibid., 254
284 Cf. Feuerbach, appendix 2.3.
285 It is tempting to take this kenosis, Entäusserung in the translation of Luther and Hegel, as the 
moment where – like Christ at Calvary – the proletariat empties itself of the particularity of its own 
suffering and universalises it. We are here reminded of the last paragraph of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, where comprehended history (the unity of contingency and comprehended organisation) 
internalises this suffering 'as the actuality, truth and certainty of his own throne, without which he 
would be lifeless and alone'. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, New Ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 493
286 For a reading of the proletariat as a monster along the model of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, see 
David McNally, Monsters of the Market (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012).
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and the dispossessed masses, can combine and organise themselves into a new social 
body. But this concept of idealisation or spiritualisation fails to consider organisation 
and rationality as immanent and emergent. It appears the problem is not so much the 
empty negativity of the proletariat as the  problem of the isolation of the philosopher 
from  the  proletariat,  which  makes  it  appear  unthinking.  Marx  himself  implicitly 
questioned this conception, which repeated the organicist non-critique of the division of 
labour  between  'hands'  and  'head',  as  early  as  1844  when  he  hailed  the  rebellious 
Silesian  weavers,  and  metonymically  the  German  proletariat  as  such,  as  the 
'theoretician of the European proletariat'.287 
The negative conception of the proletariat importantly stresses the truth of antagonism 
in  bourgeois  society,  and thus  the  truth  of  partisan  orientation  within  it.  It  does  so 
against the flat  sociological conception of classes according to which there are only 
particular interests, and the bourgeois foreclosure of antagonism and its reduction of all 
conflict  to  negotiable  conflicts  between  particular  interests.  The  proletariat  is  the 
universal truth of bourgeois society both in its sacrifice and its thinking. However, how 
does this orientate revolutionary practice? It  merely holds up the image of enforced 
impotentiality on the one side, and full self-actualisation on the other, a real suffering 
contrasted  with  an  utopian  image.  In  the  absence  of  a  concept  of  practices  of 
organisation  and  actualisation,  the  only  actualisation  of  communism  possible  is 
messianic. 
The need for a concept of a force which would be able not just to destroy a world, but to 
actualise itself and build a new world leads Marx to retain the concept of the infinite 
productivity  of  the  species  (which  was  later  transformed  into  the  affirmation  the 
productivity of the working class against the lumpenproletariat).288 Moving beyond the 
purely negative definition of the proletariat,  Marx began to study the world-building 
capacity  of  the  workers under  the  impression  of  Feuerbach's  concept  of  the  human 
species-essence.  In  other  words,  he  became  critically  interested  in  the  productive 
actuality of the workers, not the pure possibility, or indeterminacy of the species, but the 
effective,  developing  potentiality  of  the  working  proletariat.  Where  money  and  the 
wealth of civil society are merely the products and representations of the workers, the 
task is to find it  as the basis of both the workers and the unemployed the common 
287 Marx, Early Writings, 415.
288 For Engels' and Marx's position on the lumpenproletarian, and the problem of lumpen 'parasitism', 
see appendices 3.5.-3.6.
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productive power. Whereas for Hegel the division between the rabble and the employed 
producers is produced by the tendency of the activity of civil society to specialised and 
limit work,289 Sismondi, whom Marx studied in Paris in 1844,290 had already in 1819 
insisted that,  in the words of Marx, '[t]he Roman proletariat lived at  the expense of 
society, while  modern society lives at the expense of the proletariat.'291 From here on, 
Marx became interested in how the workers produce both civil society  and their own 
poverty. Where Hegel had seen the rabble as a product of civil society, Marx reversed 
Hegel's  formula,  just  as he had reversed the relation between the sovereign and the 
people (chapter 2).292
6. The Organised Proletariat
Marx's earliest studies of political economy can be taken as a investigation into the 
economic cause of the production of the proletariat. In this sense, Marx's critique of 
political  economy was  from the  beginning  a  study of  the  conditions  of  revolution. 
Whereas Marx's first presentation of the proletariat in the introduction to the critique of 
Hegel presents is in terms of its negativity and as a universal exception, he was quick to 
develop a theory of the relation between the bourgeois organisation of the proletariat 
and proletarian counter-organisation. The Holy Family, the 1844 text which was the first 
to be co-authored by Marx and Engels, attacks Bruno Bauer's conception of criticism as 
'organising work' which is necessary to organise the 'raw material' of the mass. While 
rightly deriding Bauer's elitist idea that philosophy as Spirit must organise the 'rest of 
the human race as Matter', pointing to how the prose and poetry of the lower classes 
demonstrates their capacity to 'raise themselves spiritually', Marx and Engels' critique of 
Bauer implicitly sidelines the question of self-organisation against the differentiation of  
bourgeois  society: they  insist  that  there  is  no  problem  of  organisation,  because 
'bourgeois society,  the dissolution of the old feudal society,  is this organisation of the 
mass.'293 We might take this as the first expression of the Symmetry Thesis in Marx: 
from now on, the problem of the subtraction from the estates and the division of labour 
289 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 266 §243.
290 MECW, 3, p. 596 – editor's remarks.
291 1869 Preface to Karl Marx, “18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), 395.1869 Preface to Karl Marx, “18th Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), 395.
292 Marx here transfers several of the defining trait of the species to the proletariat. See appendix 3.4.
293 Karl Marx, “The Holy Family,” in MECW, vol. 4 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 135-36. My 
emphasis.
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– the appearance of a mass to itself (cf. chapter 2) – disappears. The problem is no 
longer  how  the  people  might  appear  despite  its  organisation  into  estates,  but  how 
bourgeois  society's  organisation  of  the  proletariat  is  be  turned  against  it  through 
workers' organisation.
In  the  Manifesto, proletarian  organisation  becomes  increasingly  necessary  because 
under modern industry the class antagonism, which exists in all written history, tends to 
intensify towards pauperisation and precarity. The possibility of proletarian organisation 
grows along with its necessity, as the condition of the working class is equalised and 
distinctions  of  labour  are  obliterated  with  the  introduction  of  machinery  and  the 
reduction of wages 'nearly everywhere … to the same low level.'294 Furthermore, this 
possible organisation becomes increasingly powerful: the proletariat 'not only increases 
in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels 
that strength more.'295 
Of  all  the  classes  that  stand  face  to  face  with  the  bourgeoisie  today, the 
proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and 
finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special 
and essential product.296
The proletariat becomes  actually revolutionary because crises, bourgeois competition 
and the replacement of workers with machinery 'makes their livelihood more and more 
precarious.'297 Workers  begin  to  form  combinations  (unions),  clubs  and  permanent 
associations,  to  bargain,  keep  wages  up  and  make  provisions  for  their  occasional 
revolts. Due to the deepening precarisation and pauperisation of proletarians, collisions 
in the work-place increasingly appear as collisions between classes. This is what builds, 
through victories and defeats,  'the ever expanding union of the workers'  enabled by 
modern means of communication and the railways. The 'more or less veiled civil war' 
on which bourgeois society is founded eventually breaks into revolution and the violent 
overthrow of the bourgeoisie, by an 'independent movement of the immense majority, in 
the  interest  of  the  immense  majority.'298 This  struggle  culminates  when  bourgeois 
domination comes into immediate contradiction with the reproduction of the proletariat. 
294 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), 117.
295 Ibid.
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The bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels write, is 'is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to 
assure an existence to its slave within his slavery.'299
The power of the revolutionary Symmetry Thesis is the premise that capital and labour 
are, from the outset, exterior to one another and in a state of civil war. This means that 
class struggle is defined not as the negotiation, pressure and counter-pressure of two 
interdependent parts of a whole (as unity in contradiction), but as tending towards real 
opposition.300 But still  the primacy lies with the overall  process;  the combination of 
capital  and  labour  in  the  exploitation  of  wage-labour  in  modern  industry.  The 
temporality  and  spatiality  of  this  process  is  linear:  a  simple  process  of  outward 
expansion and growth, with very little sensitivity to the spatio-temporal differentiations 
of  the  process.  The  overall  historical  tendency  outlined  still  has  the  form  of  the 
philosophy  of  history:  linear,  expansive,  homogenising  and  unrelenting.  It  is  only 
because the symmetry is that of an opposition, and because the overall process is that of 
a linear development, that Marx can state that:
The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the 
very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. 
What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. 
Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.301
This  prophetic and hope-inducing orientation must be read as a partisan wager, which 
did  look  successful  for  a  long  time.  Yet  capital  later  proved  perfectly  capable  of 
integrating the labour movement and of turning opposition into a dialectic contradiction, 
if only under pressure of the threat of revolution and because of the possibility of a 
differentiated global system of exploitation and colonial looting.
The remainder of this chapter will problematise the historical orientation founded on 
productivity and the development of the mode of production that subtends the reduction 
of history to the symmetry between the productive proletariat and capital. This produces 
a  blindness  to  the actuality  and history of other  struggles:  future and contemporary 
struggles against colonialism and proletarianisation, to which we turn shortly, and the 
past and continuous struggles around the gendered division of labour. As concerns the 
latter, it  is worth noting that Marx and Engels' attempt at a historical anthropology in 
299 Ibid., 119.
300 For the relation between real opposition and dialectical contradiction, see the discussion of Colletti 
in appendix 4.2.
301 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), 119.
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The German Ideology casts the gendered division of labour, which they claim develops 
'“naturally”' (their scarecrow), as more fundamental than the division between manual 
and mental labour, and as being at the root of property relations: ‘This latent slavery in 
the family [of women and children] … is the first property, but even at this early state 
corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists who call it the power of 
disposing of the labour-power of others’.302 The historical development of the species-
powers in different modes of production as class societies thus rests on a  primordial  
and continuing  subordination of women and children. The 'most developed' historical 
potentiality of the species does not manifest itself in the species-reproductive activity of 
women, but only in the social division of labour, that is to say in the social labour of the  
proletariat as universal producer. If hope rests with the progressive tendencies of history,  
if the proletariat is redeemed by its productivity as well as its negativity, what is the  
hope  of  those  who are  consigned to  do  a  labour  primordially  repressed  as  merely  
reproductive, neither productive nor negative? 
7. History, Colonialism and Invisibility
While the species in its difference only exists, i.e. reproduces itself, in particular modes 
of production, there is still  a difference between the generic capacity for differential 
(re)production and the determinate modes of (re)production. It is only with the capitalist 
mode  of  production  that  history  becomes  world  history. Already  in  The  German 
Ideology Marx and Engels argue that:
The further the separate spheres, which interact on one another, extend in the 
course  of  this  development,  the  more  the  original  isolation  of  the  separate 
nationalities is destroyed by the developed mode of production and intercourse 
and the division of labour between various nations naturally brought forth by 
these, the more history becomes world history. …303
Indeed  the  species  itself,  as  a  real  universally  communicating  and  reproductive  
302 It is important to note the tense of the prose of this historical sketch. It is written in the present 
perfect of what has been in what is – in Marx and Engels' space of contemporaneity – hence the 
invisibility of matriarchal societies and divisions of labour without hierarchy. Ibid., 33-34. Engels 
made up for this much later on in his Origins of the Family which was based on Marx's ethnological 
notebooks. Friedrich Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State,” in MECW, 
vol. 27 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990).
303 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The German Ideology,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1969), 39. My emphasis.
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totalisation,  is only historically becoming actual, in a process still unfinished. It only 
becomes so by replacing 'the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency' with 
'intercourse  in  every  direction,  the  universal  inter-dependence  of  nations.'304 The 
development of the species as a true potentiality arises through the integration of its 
reproduction  and  communication  on  a  global  scale:  'Influence  of  means  of 
communication. World history as not always existed; history as world history a result.'305 
Despite the fact that world history is premised on the daily sacrifice of individuals and 
the appropriative and exploitative processes of colonisation and the capitalist world-
market, Marx does not reject this process outright. Rather, his method compels him to 
develop a situated critique of this actuality, and to relate it to a subjective orientation 
towards the potentialities created through 'universal intercourse', universal destruction 
and  the  possibility  of  global  crises.  While  local  communisms  have  always  been 
possible,  only  with  global  expropriation  does  it,  paradoxically,  become  a  global 
possibility.306 
Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples 
“all at once” and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development 
of productive forces  and the world intercourse bound up with communism. 
Moreover, the mass of propertyless workers – the utterly precarious position of 
labour-power  on  a  mass  scale  cut  off  from capital  or  from even  a  limited 
satisfaction  and,  therefore,  no  longer  merely  temporarily  deprived  of  work 
itself  as  a  secure  source  of  life  –  presupposes  the  world  market  through 
competition.  The  proletariat  can  thus  only  exist  world-historically,  just  as 
communism, its activity, can only have a “world-historical” existence. 307
The  development  of  a  world-historical  problem  makes  possible  a  world-historical 
solution; communism has nothing to do with resistance, but only with the actualisation 
of  the species  made possible  by the historical  existence of  the proletariat. It  would 
therefore seem that  the possibility  of  communism is  hence premised on the  violent 
proletarianisation of populations on a world scale,  which in turn is premised on the 
dispossession and criminalisation of the commoners and the reproductive activity of 
304 Marx and Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” 112.
305 Marx, Grundrisse, 109. Balibar's reformulation poses this as a general theoretical point: 'a synthetic 
concept of time can never be a pre-given, but only a result.' Étienne Balibar, “The Basic Concepts of 
Historical Materialism,” in Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1970), 
297 and 280.
306 Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1969, 37.
307 Ibid.
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women and children. While communism is the violent overthrow of bourgeois society, it 
still appears that the bourgeois brutalisation of the world will ultimately be for the better 
of  mankind,  forcibly  developing  its  potentialities  through  expropriation  and 
exploitation. Indeed, Marx's infamous article 'The British Rule in India', written for the 
New  York  Tribune  in  1853,  is  an  outright  celebration  of  the  historical  role  of 
colonisation, despite the brutality and destructiveness of its methods, and vileness and 
stupidity of its intentions:
England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan, was actuated 
only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. 
But that is  not the question.  The question is, can mankind fulfil  its  destiny 
without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever 
may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history 
in bringing about that revolution.308
This role concerns not only the destruction of the caste-system and slavery of a society 
incapable of change itself in its 'undignified, stagnatory and vegetative life', but also of 
the 'brutalising worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the 
sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Kanuman [sic], the monkey, 
and  Sabbala, the cow.'309 The world-historical role of capitalism is thus negative and 
destructive, advancing history by the bad side, to use the formula Marx devised against 
Proudhon.310 While  this  formula  is  devised,  writes  Balibar,  against  a  moralising, 
optimistic historical teleology which draws on Hegel, it is Marx's response that is truly 
Hegelian, an invocation of the cunning of reason, the capacity of the historical dialectic 
of  'converting  war,  suffering  and  injustice  into  factors  of  peace,  prosperity  and 
justice.'311 However,  as  Daniel  Bensaïd notes,  Marx is  no Hegelian insofar  as  he  is 
writing about a future yet to be,  the potentiality inherent in the struggle to which the 
'bad' side gives rise. Thus, Marx seeks to 
extricate himself from the abstraction of universal History … without lapsing 
308 Karl Marx, “The British Rule in India,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1969), 493.
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difficulty is rather deeper, it lies in Marx's unilinear historical schema. Edward W. Said, Orientalism 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 153–55. See also Kevin B. Anderson's discussion of Said's 
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311 Étienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx (London: Verso, 2007), 98.
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into the insane chaos of absolute  singularities;  and without  resorting to  the 
trump card of progress. In so far as universalisation is a process, progress is not 
conjugated in the present indicative, only in the future anterior: conditionally.312
Marx  is  thus  positioning  himself  squarely  beyond  the  dilemma 'progress  or  chaos' 
which is the premise of the Kantian orientation in history.313 Moreover, the issue is not a 
calculus  of  good  and  bad  according  to  a  moral  standard,  but  an  affirmation  of 
potentialities produced by the crisis of the old world and the composition of the new. 
This modern bourgeois society is one that – as we saw in the beginning of this chapter – 
is like a sorcerer that has lost control of his own spells, of the dynamism of trade and 
industry.314 Modern history – which Marx counts merely 'many a decade' into the past – 
is the history of 'the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of 
production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the 
bourgeois and of its rule.'315 The production of wealth and poverty on two sides poses a 
radical problem not so much on its own account, but on account of the deepening of this 
contradiction towards crisis: 
It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put 
the  existence  of  the  entire  bourgeois  society  on  its  trial,  each  time  more 
threateningly. … In these crises, there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier 
epochs, would have seemed an absurdity — the epidemic of over-production. 
Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it 
appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation, had cut off the supply of 
every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and 
why? Because there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, 
too much industry, too much commerce.316
The problem this poses is not that of absolute lack and poverty, nor the problem of the 
virtual poverty of the proletariat, but the deepening contradiction between the forces of 
production and the relations of property. But while these crises have solutions – like 
Hegel noted – they are only temporary: 
how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced 
312 Daniel Bensaïd, Marx for Our Time: Adventures and Misadventures of a Critique (London: Verso, 
2009), 61.
313 Cf. Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 42.
314 Marx and Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” 113.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid., 113–4. On the notion of crisis in nineteenthcentury Germany, see appendix 3.8.
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destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new 
markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, 
by paving the  way for  more  extensive  and more destructive crises,  and by 
diminishing  the  means  whereby  crises  are  prevented.  ...  not  only  has  the 
bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into 
existence the men who are to wield those weapons — the modern working 
class — the proletarians.317
The optimism of Marx's passage is premised on the conviction that the contradictory 
development of bourgeois society not only leads to crises, but to successively deeper 
and more wide-reaching crises, in the process of which the development of productivity 
as well as radical needs will produce a radical revolution of the producers of history. 
But  what  Bensaïd's  reading  does  not  appreciate  is  how  this  entails  consigning  the 
struggles of the 'people without history', to use a phrase central to the demarcation of 
Hegel's  Philosophy  of  History,  to  the  definite  past,  to  political  irrelevance,  i.e.  to 
consider not only their struggles but their modes of life as bereft of potentiality in the 
present.  This  concerns  not  only  the  'exo-colonisation'  of  non-European  lands,  by 
territorial might and capitalist relations, but also Marx's analysis of the bourgeois 'endo-
colonisation' of Europe.318 Further, as Peter Osborne notes, 
[c]risis ‘theory’ is ... in principle inadequate to thinking the historico-political 
meaning of crises   – and this includes Marx’s own account (or ‘theory’) of 
capitalist crises, however central to such a thinking it might be.319
The notion of crisis does not in itself hold the political key, this is rather found in the 
projection  that  the  dynamic  of  bourgeois  society  tends  towards  a  symmetrical 
development of capital and its gravediggers. It is on the validity of this prediction that 
Marx's conditional optimism is premised. 
Marx does not present this as an automatic process of growth and development, but a 
violent process of the destruction of previous modes of production. Capital might tend 
towards  becoming  an  Absolute  Subject  –  world  history  or  the  universal  mode  of 
317 Ibid., 114.
318 This terms were introduced in a Marxian context in Jason Read's Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of  
Capital (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2003). However, one should keep in mind the earlier use by Paul 
Virilio, who presents both as essentially territorial military logics, in which a state colonises its own 
population. 
319 Peter Osborne, “A Sudden Topicality - Marx, Nietzsche and the Politics of Crisis,” Radical  
Philosophy 160, no. Mar/Apr (2010), 21.
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(re)production – but it is merely an expanding teleology, in a world that consists of as 
many histories as there are modes of (re)production (and infinitely more myths, legends 
and shared memories, of course).320 The question is whether subsuming, world-subduing 
history can ever become History, contemporalise and synchronise all other histories.321 
Marx notes that the bourgeois mode of production is built on the 'ruins and elements' of 
vanished social formations 'whose partly still unconquered remnants are carried along 
with it.'322 As Dipesh Chakrabarty insists, looking at what Marx says capital 'encounters 
[...] as antecedents [but] not as antecedents established by itself, not as forms of its own 
life-process', there continues to be a non-totalised substance of histories irreducible to 
this subject of History.323 Chakrabarty is interested in how these 'interrupt and punctuate' 
the life-process of the 'self-reproduction of capital'  as a basis of a 'politics of human 
belonging and diversity',324 or how, in a beautiful definition, 'the subaltern is that which 
constantly,  from within  the  narrative  of  capital,  reminds us  of  other  ways of  being 
human than as bearers of the capacity to labour.'325 The issue of 'capital antecedents', is 
generally one of elements that might and might not be(come) part of the reproduction of 
capital. After the sentence cited by Chakrabarty, Marx continues: '[i]n the same way as 
it  [capital]  originally  finds  the  commodity  already  in  existence,  but  not  as  its  own 
product,  and  likewise  finds  money  circulation,  but  not  as  an  element  in  its  own 
reproduction'.326 
However, the issue for Marx is of course not one of small subtractions, resistances and 
histories,  of  the  persistence  of  difference  and other  forms  of  life  within  capitalism 
(Chakrabarty's History 2). Indeed, if such small narratives are to have any significance 
on the level of Marx's critique they must be related to the problem of History (History 
1). Here the question becomes whether lives other than those of labour, marginal or 
non-reproductive of surplus-value are antagonistic to capitalist reproduction, whether 
such  lives  are  self-reproductive,  and  whether  both  the  antagonism  and  the  self-
reproduction  of  this  non-reproduction  of  capitalist  relations  is  at  least  potentially 
320 Ranajit Guha, History at the Limit of World-History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
321 As would be the claim of theories (to which we will return in chapter 7), that due to the real 
subsumption of society, today any outside can only be a fantasy produced with capitalism, i.e. not an 
other in itself, but an other of capitalism.
322 Marx, Grundrisse, 105.Marx, Grundrisse, 105.
323 Marx’s Theories of Surplus-Value quoted by Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (new ed.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2007), 63. 
324 Ibid., 64, 67. See also Althusser, “The Object of Capital,” 99-100.
325 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 94.
326 Addendum 2. “Interest-Bearing Capital and Commercial Capital in Relation to Industrial Capital” in 
Karl Marx, Economic Manuscripts: Theories of Surplus-Value (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1863).
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generalisable. I will ask the question of such histories from the point of view of Marx's 
practical  energy,  his  orientation towards  a  dissolution of  the problem of  capitalism, 
based  neither  on  a  state  of  affairs  nor  an  ideal,  but  on  the  potentiality  of  a  'real 
[wirkliche] movement which abolishes [aufhebt]  the present state of things',  starting 
with the conditions now in existence.327 The logic of this movement in this quote from 
The German Ideology is  presented as an  Aufhebung,  but what is  the precise logical 
structure of this movement? From Marx's noted unilinear progressivism of the 1840s, 
the next chapter will engage with the writings of the period where he was beginning to 
question this conception of history, and open to a multi-linear conception of history.328 
The first  event  that  truly challenged the unilinear  conception was the failure of  the 
revolutions of 1848. If Marx adopts his early philosophy of history from enlightenment 
thought, it is significant that his sensitivity to crisis and contingency immediately allows 
his own texts to question it, while his orientation towards revolution maintains it, as a 
form of  speculative and  partisan thought  of  the  possible  on  the  level  of  the  total 
historical  process.  Speculative  thought  is  not  cancelled  when  its  promise  does  not 
materialise, rather, it raises the question of a catechon holding back the revolution: thus 
Marx  did not challenge his schema as much as introduce the notion of a proletarian 
obstacle to proletarian revolution (the lumpenproletariat) and the insistence of the need 
for a historical leap, anticipated through 'a poetry of the future'.329
8. Conclusion
We have seen how Marx's faith in the coming revolution is based on a belief in the 
growth of both aspects  of the proletariat  at  once.  However,  our discussion has also 
shown that Marx's texts reveal the existence of at least three countervailing tendencies, 
whose impact he implicitly shows are negligible: First, there is the activity of the state, 
charities  and  the  estates,  which  ameliorate  social  tensions  in  Hegel's  theory  of  the 
rabble. Second, there is the logic of the division and competition between the negative, 
unemployed and disorganised lumpenproletariat on the one hand, and the productive, 
positive and organised proletariat on the other hand (with its passive and only indirectly 
organised basis  in domestic  labour).  Third,  there is  the globalising extension of the 
problem of capital through trade and colonisation.330 Focusing on the dynamism of the 
327 Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1969, 38.
328 Anderson, Marx at the Margins, 2010, 3.
329 See appendix 3.5 for the former, and 3.7. for the latter.
330 In the broadest of terms, the problem of capitalism is also the problem of colonialism, both in its 
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contradiction within civil society, and its contradiction with the ancient regime, Marx 
underestimated  the  mediating  role  of  the  state  in  organising  and  controlling  the 
disorganised through measures of violence and welfare, as well as the  problematic of 
the globalising  divisions  between proletarians. In order to bypass the problem of the 
heterogeneity and difference  of  the proletariat,  the  idea  of  the proletariat  had  to  be 
homogenised into the figure of the (male) wage worker. The system-immanent analysis 
of  capital  and  its  drive  to  organise  a  still  greater  portion  of  the  globe  orientates 
revolutionary  practice  toward  the  already  organised  proletariat  and  its  systemic 
contradiction with capital.  As long as another orientation toward organisation is  not 
found,  this  analysis  will  be  bound  up  with  a  belief  that  colonialism  and  capitalist 
expansion in general – however regrettable and violent – is historically progressive, as 
the condition sine qua non of the possibility of communism. The problem – and thus the 
solution  –  of  the  proletariat  are  both  overdetermined  within  this  real-teleological 
horizon. 
The very same logic that makes the proletariat the revolutionary agent of world history, 
also makes these colonisations world-historically progressive. What we have seen above 
is a certain blindness to the potentialities of those who form the 'reproductive' basis of 
capitalist history (women and children), and to those which are in the process of being 
subsumed (the commoners). All these will only possess historical potentiality once their 
powers in the present have been expropriated, and once they become exploited. Once 
the  actuality  of  such  activities  is  naturalised  or  made  invisible,  its  potentialities 
disappear from the concepts of not just history and revolution, but from any concrete 
description of the development of the species itself. As long as it focuses its hopes for 
communism on the dialectic of its object, even the most radical theory is, to steal words 
uttered in a very different context,  'compelled to reproduce, to reduplicate in itself the 
law of its object or its object as law; it must submit to the norm it purports to analyze.'331 
Or as Jean Baudrillard put it:
The  logic  of  representation  –  of  the  duplication  of  its  object  –  haunts  all 
rational discursiveness.  Every critical  theory is haunted by this surreptitious 
religion, this desire bound up with the construction of its object, this negativity 
specific sense of territorial domination, but also in its economic sense as exploitation or 
expropriation ex novo (what we in chapter 5 will see Marx theorise as formal subsumption and 
primitive accumulation). 
331 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 97.
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subtly haunted by the very form that it negates.332
Ernst  Bloch's  Principle  of  Hope  shows that  such  haunting,  when  made  explicit  by 
critical  thought,  is  not so much a trap of critical  theory as a utopian supplement to 
orientation produced by human beings in their  misery.  To translate this unconscious 
utopianism into  a  real  effective  utopianism it  is  necessary  to  provide  a  critique  of 
actuality. There is little doubt that the formalism of the critique of bourgeois society is  
necessary for orientation, in so far as this society consists of a set of forms (the legal-
form, the money-form, the state-form, the value-form, etc.). In Marx's method  Bloch 
finds such a  theoretical mode of orientation under capitalism. Marx must be able to 
think like a detective, who 'is homogeneous with the criminal — where nothing but the 
economic aspect has to be considered; and only afterwards to imagine a higher life.'333 
Through Bloch's  method the surreptitious utopianism of critical  theory can be made 
explicit, as the becoming conscious of spontaneous utopianism. I will argue – agreeing 
with Bloch – that the project of revolutionary orientation today must carefully distance 
itself  not from the immanence of Marx's critique to bourgeois society,  but from the 
tendency, visible in Marx, but even more so in a long line of “Marxist” readers,  to  
reduce his orientation to the forms and logic of his object. Bloch's defence against this 
reduction,  however,  does  not  sufficiently  challenge the  reduction  of  actuality  to  the 
actuality  of  the  capital-labour  relation,  it  merely  counterposes  reality  with  utopian 
desires and the imagination of a higher life. The question of revolutionary orientation 
demands and implies more than this, just as we must understand the ways in which 
actuality  itself  –  the  actuality  of  Soviet  power,  the  cataclysmic  world  war,  and the 
unexhausted power of the workers movement – made Bloch's concept of hope more 
than an abstract concept of the unconscious or conscious imagination of a higher life. 
The question of  revolutionary orientation asks  how we can maintain the critique of 
capitalist forms and organisation – as an indispensable form of cognitive mapping – 
while  not  reducing  practical  actuality  thereto,  thus  keeping  open  the  question  of 
revolutionary composition and organisation within and against actuality, without which 
utopianism becomes abstract.
332 Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 1975), 50–1.
333 Ernst Bloch, The Spirit of Utopia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 242.
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Chapter 4. The Problem of History
1. Introduction
In  Part  I  of  this  thesis  we  saw  how  Marx's  theory  in  the  mid  to  late  1840s  was 
profoundly  concerned  with  the  problem  of  revolutionary  orientation  within  the 
teleology  of  bourgeois  society.  On  the  one  hand  we  found  the  conception  of  the 
contradictory  real  teleology  of  bourgeois  society  and  capital,  undermining  itself  by 
destabilising  its  own  state-form,  producing  a  revolutionary  underclass  and  tending 
towards crises. The reason this theory is not catastrophist or messianic is that it sees in 
this process the secular development of another potentiality, that of the proletarian mass, 
pauperised,  organised and made into a  majority  by capital. In this  linear  projection 
toward the final struggle between capital and labour, the struggles against colonisation 
and  proletarianisation  become  irrelevant,  reduced  to  pitiable  resistances  against 
modernisation,  against  history  itself.334 The  theory  of  the  revolutionary  proletariat 
becomes  insulated  from  the  struggles  of  those  who  are  being  dispossessed  and 
colonised.  The  problem  of  organisation  is  reduced  to  that  of  the  inversion  of  the 
bourgeois organisation of the proletariat. 
The aim of this chapter is to show how this whole conception, which was outlined in 
Part I (chapter 1-3), is deeply connected to the systematic ambitions of the systematic 
dialectic, and its tendency to reduce the problems of orientation and organisation to the 
interiority of the always-already totalised bourgeois society. The idea is neither to reject 
the dialectic as such, nor to reject the concept of a specific real teleology of capital, but 
to lay the ground for an argument that stresses the contested and reversible relation 
between  disorganisation  and  organisation,  and  the  need  to  think  more  complex 
temporalities of struggle and history. Through this, we lay the ground for the argument 
in Part II (chapter 5-7), which will propose a historical, social and political reading of 
the central orientating logics of Part I – atomism, organism, tendency of organism to 
crisis – in order to arrive at a concept of the organisation of capitalist societies which 
334 Marx and Engels, “The Communist Manifesto”, Section 1. For a discussion of the unilinear 
conception of history in the Manifesto, and Marx's overcoming of it in the early 1850s, see Kevin B. 
Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 2010), Chapter 1. 
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sees organisation not merely as a logic, but as a constant effort that requires the use of 
force.  By  thus  explicating  the  orientating  use  of  these  materialist  concepts  of 
organisation and disorganisation, we come closer to our aim of developing a concept of 
revolutionary organisation which is not reliant on the Symmetry Thesis, i.e. a concept of 
organisation which does not limit itself to the organisation of the working-class. This 
chapter will take a first step in this direction by questioning the unilinear concept of 
history in the Communist Manifesto, and by raising the question of the relation between 
the capitalist process of totalisation and different temporalities.
2. Species History and Modes of Production
It is useful to start with one of the most influential critiques of the elements of Hegelian-
style  systematic  dialectic  in Marx, that  of Louis  Althusser.  As Althusser points  out, 
historicism, humanism and economistic determinism share a common problematic: the 
idea of a continuous homogeneous time (history) in which change happens, a common 
substance of that change (humanity), and a law governing this movement, be it that of 
human progress, of history, or of economic laws.335 The common problematic of these 
approaches, which need not overlap, is their reliance on the category of a greater subject 
(History,  Humanity,  the  Economy),  which  necessarily  introduces  a  teleological 
distortion into the study of history, and reduces its time to the one time of the 'essential  
section'  that  defines the essence of the subject of history.  To think beyond the One 
history of  the subject  of  history,  and the reduction of  analysis  to this  one mode of 
production and its categories, Althusser proposes a different concept of structure and 
time:  complex  variable  time  of  a  decentered  structure,  of  peculiar  relatively  
autonomous histories punctuated by peculiar rhythms.336 These are not independent of 
the whole: 'the specificity of each of these times and of each of these histories ... is 
based on a certain type of articulation in the whole, and therefore on a certain type of 
dependence  with respect  to  the whole'.337 This  presents  us  with a  theory of the co-
articulation of different subjects and non-subjects, which avoids the reduction of the 
historical orientation of a subject to its participation in some universal subject, be it the 
transcendental subject or the Absolute. History is only ideally synthetic, in actuality it is 
335 Louis Althusser, “The Object of Capital,” in Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New 
Left Books, 1970), 138–40.
336 Ibid., 99.
337 Ibid., 100.
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conjunctive  and  disjunctive.  Beyond  the  particularity  of  social  formations,  and  the 
universality of the species, this concept of complex variable time gives the outline of a 
thinking  of  time  that  is  not  teleologically  unified.  Althusser's  proposal  outlines  the 
conditions for an articulation of the relation between different times, and the persistence 
of the problem of synchronisation, i.e. the perpetual non-synchronicity of history. From 
this perspective we can retain the concept of the singular temporalisation introduced by 
the  Epicurean  swerve,  a  time  which  is  'relatively  autonomous  and  hence  relatively 
independent, even in its dependence, of the “times” of the other levels.'338 It is tempting 
to take this, as many have done, as a final statement against the Marxian concept of real 
teleology. 
In what  follows we will  first  attempt to  show that  this  critique has  some purchase 
against the Marx we have seen in chapters 2 and 3, yet how the later Marx goes beyond 
some of the problems of this approach.  On the background of these chapters we can 
argue that Marx's conception of history in the 1840s remained entangled with Kantian 
orientation.  Kant himself  insisted that Enlightenment,  that is  the actualisation of the 
human capacity for autonomy, would have to proceed through 'many revolutions.'339 The 
actualisation of the species is  immanent  to,  yet  comes into conflict  with,  the actual 
organisation of societies. In Marx we have a similar double assertion of teleology in 
history,  the  species  as causa-sui against  the  goal-driven  globalising  totalisation  of 
bourgeois society.340 Whereas the latter gives us the historical form of a certain organic 
social structure, the former gives the condition of any form, the generic capacity of the 
species.  This  suggestion  of  teleology  in  history  needs  to  be  distinguished from the 
Enlightenment-era species history of Kant's classical text Idea for a Universal History  
with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in which he asserts that the 'natural capacities of the 
[human  species]  are  destined  sooner  or  later  to  be  developed  complete  and  in 
conformity with their end [reason].'341 In Kant the species is immediately an organism 
developing  in  history.  There  are  three  elements  to  this  conception:  First,  history  is 
unified in a singular subject, humanity. Second, the singularity of this subject is also its 
autonomy; its progress happens not in relation to nature, but  from nature; its progress 
338 Ibid., 99.
339 Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 51.
340 We will return to the question of the drive of capitalism in chapter 6. De Angelis makes finer 
distinctions than Marx in respect to the drive of capitalism, seeing it at as the telos of expansion,  
which has the urgency of a drive (non-fulfilment is crisis), thus it is also conatus, the striving for 
self-preservation. Massimo De Angelis, The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global  
Capital (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 39–43.
341 I here synthesize Kant's first and second proposition. Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 42. 
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happens not in a complex interplay with the multiple temporalities of nature, but in 
homogeneous and empty time, to draw on Walter Benjamin.342 Third, the teleology is 
not deterministic, but prophetic and regulative, in the worlds of Kant's The Contest of  
Faculties, it serves an orientating purpose and as a principle of hope, the sine qua non 
of a meaningful practical promotion of this ideal.343 
In Part I we have traced three distinct meanings of history in Marx: for the early Marx 
(1842-1845)  the  concept  of  the  species  was  a  lively  teleological  philosophy  of  a 
political character: the telos is mankind in its infinity and universality. Species-essence 
is a rallying cry against all religious institutions, a program to make visible the common 
and singular powers of the self-actualisation of human beings in the present. This time 
is predicated not on a futurity as such, but on what we can call, following Sartre, a 
prediction  of  the  present:  a  judgement  on  the  present  sub  specie  futurae.344 Such 
prediction  is  based,  minimally,  on  the  wager  that  the  truth  of  the  present  can  be 
comprehended as a becoming-whole (a process of totalisation, in Sartre's words). Here 
the model of the judgement is that of an organism striving to realise its inner potentials, 
progress is instituting 'orientated change'.345 Secondly, the species-history operative in 
The German Ideology (1845) begins with the reproductive differentiation of the human 
species from animals, and, implicitly, from their own animality.346 This latter concept of 
the species is the generic condition of history, of the differentiation of the species into 
different historical modes of (re)production: 'They themselves [the humans] begin to 
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to  produce  their means of 
subsistence.' Following this definition human beings are the beings that are substantially 
defined by having a  mode of  production.  Finally,  in  the  later  writings,  but  already 
incipiently in The German Ideology – which as Althusser has noted is the 'work of the 
break'  –  Marx begins  to  question  the  idea  of  the  species  as  the  subject  of  history,  
focussing instead, first, on 'real material individuals', and later, on modes of production. 
In  either  case  the  subject  is  not  given,  but  must  be  produced  temporally,  as  the 
becoming self-reflexive and willing of what is already unconsciously self-positing and 
self-reproducing.
342 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt and 
Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), Thesis XIII.
343 Kant, “The Contest of Faculties.” Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 52–3.
344 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason - Volume 2, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith, new ed. 
(London: Verso Books, 2006), 407.
345 Ibid., 408.
346 Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1969, 20.
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Althusser blamed the young Marx for his Hegelian use of teleology for a historicism 
similar to Kant's, and replaced the conception of teleology with that of 'complex and 
non-linear time.'347 However, we will aim to show that Marx does not move beyond 
such a conception (we thus cannot agree with Althusser's claim that Marx left Hegel 
behind). Instead, Marx's conception of dialectic mutated in crucial respects. Given that 
Althusser does not recognise this,  he does nothing to help us understand why Marx 
would  introduce  Capital  in  terms  of  a  social  organism in  natural  history.  We must 
therefore  show  how  the  conception  of  organic  totality  operative  in  the  systematic 
dialectic and in Marx's later works is different from (or at least not reducible to) the 
Kantian  and  Hegelian  historicism criticised  by  Althusser.348 We  can  do  so  by  first 
considering the relation between the study of historical modes of production as organic 
wholes and the general, or generic species horizon of natural history. As we have seen, 
Marx's progressivist philosophy of history is closely connected to the notion of species 
history.  The  critique  of  progressivism  would  thus  seem to  be  accomplished  by  an 
insistence of bracketing the contemporary epoch – considered systematically – from this 
wider narrative, and to conceive class struggles and the possibility of communism only 
from a viewpoint immanent to this epoch. The end of this chapter discusses this attempt, 
exemplified by Chris Arthur, examining its consequences for revolutionary thought, and 
its  difficulties  with  producing  a  concept  of  communist  organisation  and  resistance 
beyond the Symmetry Thesis.
3. The Natural History of Modes of Production
I have already mentioned that Marx often casts the analysis  of capital in the terms, 
relations and forms of organisation drawn from the study of nature. Importantly, both 
the methodology and the object of  Capital is introduced in such terms. Indeed, in the 
preface  to  the  first  edition  of  Capital, Marx  presents  his  method  as  analogous  to 
chemical analysis and microscopic anatomy', as a procedure of abstraction starting with 
the 'economic cell form' of bourgeois society.349 The object of the study itself is 'the 
development of the economic formation of society ... as a process of natural history...'350 
347 Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left 
Books, 1970), 101.
348 On the argument for the need to think totality, see appendix 4.0.
349 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 93.
350 Ibid., 92.
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Human history is part of natural history in a dual sense. First, the interaction between 
humankind and nature, what Marx would call their metabolism, Stoffwechsel, following 
the bio-chemist Justus Liebig,  is itself natural-historical. Second, the history of human 
societies  considered  in  themselves  is  natural  insofar  as  it  is  determined  by  certain 
emergent  laws  and regularities,  which  are  not  intended by any one  subject,  neither 
individuals nor society itself. Thus, to start with the second point, this does not merely 
entail  an understanding of  society 'as  a  real  part  of  natural  history',  as he put  it  in 
1844,351 but the use of the modes of relation and organisation of nature in the study of 
society. In The German Ideology Marx and Engels noted: 
We know only a single science, the science of history. One can look at history 
from two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of men. 
The two sides are, however, inseparable; the history of nature and the history of 
men are dependent on [or qualify, bedingen] each other so long as men exist.352
The  real,  actual  science  [wirkliche  Wissenschaft]  of  human  beings  begins  with  the 
representation [Darstellung] of the practical production and reproduction of life, under 
definite conditions.  Also, in Capital, the inscription of the history of societies into the 
history of nature plays the role of casting the analysis of social developments in terms 
of a process realising itself behind the backs of its actors, but through their activity: 
'they do this without being aware of it',  as Marx puts it in the section on the fetish  
character of the commodity.353 Or in the more general methodological formulation of the 
preface to the first edition: 
My standpoint,  from which  the  development  of  the  economic  formation  of 
society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make 
the individual [den einzelnen] responsible for relations whose [social] creature 
he remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.354
Thus the preface speaks of society as 'an  organism capable of change, and constantly 
engaged in a process of change.'355 As we would expect from the organic metaphor this 
perspective is explicitly teleological, speaking about the 'economic law of motion of 
351 Marx, “1844 Manuscripts,” 355.
352 Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1969, 17. For an argument in favour of the historicisation 
of the laws of nature, made from within natural science, see I Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order 
out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Bantam, 1984).
353 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 166.
354 Ibid., 92, translated altered.
355 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 93, my emphasis.
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modern society', whose specific 'natural phases of development' cannot be skipped or 
removed by decree; not only is the subjective control of this organism not actual, it is 
not  possible  in  itself,  but  requires  the  transformation  of  the  life-process  of  society 
itself.356 It is from this organic teleological perspective that his study of England, as the 
'locus classicus' of the capitalist mode of production is applicable to Germany, telling 
the Germans: 'De te fabula narratur! ... The country that is more developed industrially 
only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.'357 The law of capitalist 
development is, however, not a  law of nature, but a law in natural history, a specific  
historical form of social reproduction:
The  law  of  capitalist  accumulation,  mystified  by  the  economists  into  a 
supposed law of nature, in fact expresses the situation that the very nature of 
accumulation excludes every diminution in the degree of exploitation of labour, 
and  every  rise  in  the  price  of  labour,  which  could  seriously  imperil  the 
continual reproduction, on an ever larger scale, of the capital-relation.358
This  law  is  not  natural,  but  natural-historical:  historical  because  limited  in  its 
applicability to the capitalist mode of production, natural because a condition of the 
reproduction  of  this  historical  mode  of  production.  In  other  words,  its  functional 
necessity, its character of law, is premised in its place in the organic reproduction of this 
society. It is the ultimate unity of natural history and history – or the fact that human  
nature is defined by its having changing modes of production –  which legitimates the  
application  of  forms  from  the  domain  of  natural  history  ('organism',  'evolution',  
'metabolism', etc.) in the study of societies. 
One of the most sophisticated Marxist approaches to the dialectic between history and 
nature has been proposed by Alfred Schmidt.359 In his account, Schmidt points out that 
Marx consistently considered the study of history (and its relation to nature) to be a part 
of natural history and warned against an abstract fundamental ontology of matter (like 
the one later proposed by Engels in The Dialectics of Nature,  but also, we might add, 
the non-dialectical ontology of Althusser in The Philosophy of the Encounter)360. Marx 
and Engels write that 'the celebrated “unity of man with nature” has always existed in 
356 Ibid., 92.
357 Ibid., 90–91.
358 Ibid., 772.
359 Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx (London: New Left Books, 1971), 32. 
360 Ibid., 43–45 and 35 respectively. On Dialectical and Historical Materialism, see appendix 4.1. and 
4.2.
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industry and has existed in varying forms in every epoch according to the lesser or 
greater development of industry.'361 Schmidt stresses that Marx rejected the separation 
between history and nature, or rather insisted on their dialectical co-constitution as a 
part of the common process of Nature, 'conceived in its widest sense as the total reality 
comprising both moments.'362 In both the 1844 Manuscripts and the Grundrisse, Marx 
describes nature as the 'inorganic' body of mankind:
Nature is man’s  inorganic  body,  that is to say nature in so far as it is not the 
human  body.  Man  lives from  nature,  i.e.  nature  is  his  body,  and  he  must 
maintain a continuous dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man’s 
physical and spiritual life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked 
to itself, for man is a part of nature.363
… and, as such a member [of a community], he relates to a specific nature (say, 
here, still earth, land, soil) as his own inorganic being, as a condition of his 
production and reproduction.364
In his  later  works Marx began to describe this  process,  the human interaction with 
nature, as 'metabolism' [Stoffwechsel]:
Different use values contain very different proportions of labour and natural 
products, but use value always comprises a natural element. As useful activity 
directed to the appropriation of natural factors in one form or another, labour is 
a natural  condition of human existence,  a  condition of material  interchange 
[Stoffwechsel]  between  man  and  nature,  quite  independent  of  the  form  of 
society. On the other hand, the labour which posits exchange value is a specific 
social form of labour.365
The relation to nature is an invariable of the history of economic formations, but one 
that  is  realised  differently,  in  specific  socio-historical  forms.  If  the  relation  is  itself 
transhistorical, it is so in a fully undetermined fashion; its determination is always and 
immediately  historical.  The German  Ideology suggests  that  the  human  species  is 
transhistorically  characterised  by  this  relation,  that  the  beginning  of  history  as  the 
361 Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1969, 28.
362 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, 16. 
363 Marx, “1844 Manuscripts,” 328.
364 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rrough Draft), The 
Pelican Marx Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 489.
365 Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” 278.
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production of humankind's own means of subsistence produces this gap and thus both 
nature and history at once. In this perspective the natural history of the species might 
appear as a linear progression of the generic (the species, or genus,  Gattung) through 
different social-organic forms, i.e. different modes of production.366 To disentangle the 
relation between the generic  (the universal  Gattung)  and the specific  (the particular 
social formation, or 'organism'), it is useful to contrast Marx's views to those of Hegel 
and Darwin who both influenced his concept of nature.
In a recent survey of the use of organic models or metaphors in Marx, Arno Wouters 
shows that  Marx's  conception of social  organisation hinges  on the same concept  of 
Organisation developed by his contemporary Karl Ernst von Baer, an embryologist and 
founder  of  Teleomechanical  Biology.367 Wouters  argues  that  the  similarities  between 
Marx's and Darwin's methods are relatively superficial and convincingly demonstrates 
that  the  centrality  of  concepts  of  organic  organisation  in  Marx's  study  of  social 
formations  is  drawn  from  the  tradition  starting  with  Kant's  reintroduction  of  the 
Aristotelian  notion  of  the  intrinsic  teleologies  of  organisms  in  the  Critique  of  
Judgement368 rather   than from Darwin. However, there is one crucial omission from 
Wouters' otherwise extensively researched article: Hegel.369 This omission means that he 
misses the direct influence of Hegel's concept of organism on Marx, and underestimates 
the importance of Darwin for Marx. Very briefly put: whereas Hegel rejects the notion 
of a history of nature, including evolution, Marx emphatically agrees with thenatural 
historical  perspective  drawn from Darwin,  whose  work  he  considers  as  a  proof  in 
natural  science  that  history  does  not  proceed  in  a  universal  teleology,  but  through 
struggle. Thus he wrote to Lasalle, January 1861: 
Darwin’s work is most important and suits my purpose in that it provides a 
basis in natural science for the historical class struggle. One does, of course, 
have  to  put  up  with  the  clumsy  English  style  of  argument.  Despite  all 
shortcomings, it is here that, for the first time, ‘teleology’ in natural science is 
not  only  dealt  a  mortal  blow  but  its  rational  meaning  is  empirically 
366 For a discussion of Marx’s conception of the relationship between the human species and nature in 
ecological terms, see John Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett, “The Dialectic of Organic/Inorganic 
Relations Marx and the Hegelian Philosophy of Nature,” Organization & Environment 13, no. 4 
(December 1, 2000),: 403–425.
367 Arno Wouters, 'Marx's Embryology of Society', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 23, no.2 (1993); 
149–179.
368 On Kant's theory of 'natural ends', see appendix 4.3.
369 For a comparison of Hegel's and Kant's concepts of the organism, see Stephen Houlgate, An 
Introduction to Hegel Freedom, Truth and History, 2nd Edition (Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 162.
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explained.370
Indeed, as in Darwin's work, teleology only appears retrospectively,  as the result  of 
struggles. However, unlike in Darwin, each historical formation is defined by its own 
particular mode of antagonism, its legal and institutional apparatus and so many failing 
attempts  to  stabilise  the  antagonism and  exploit  the  antagonistic  part.371 Marx  had 
already in 1847 noted this.372 Moving beyond providential development, or the idea that 
essences  pre-exist  their  realisation, Marx's  theory  retains  the  rational  content  of 
Hegelian  natural  teleology:  a  process  of  emergent  self-positing  self-organisation, 
starting from exteriority. It emerges when a "chemical" process (which is self-organised 
in the sense that the combination is given with the properties of the elements themselves 
and no external principle) flips back on itself and becomes self-reproductive. But unlike 
Hegel,  Marx insists  that  nature has a  history,  and cannot  be comprehended without 
attending to its struggles and openness. Marx is not proposing that history is chaotic or 
radically contingent, however. Rather, each epoch is organised around its own specific 
lines of antagonism; this is the basis of the structure of any social formation. Insofar as 
antagonism is fundamental, any attempt to mediate it results in contradictions, internal 
contradictions which permeate the whole. Or, perhaps we better phrase this reversely: it 
is  precisely because antagonism is  not  dissolved but mediated,  that  it  remains.  This 
fundamental problem is thus both explanatory of and explained by the whole. If Marx 
was in agreement with Darwin's historical and conflictual approach to nature, he was 
closer  to  Hegel  in  his  adoption of  the  thesis  of  the  internal  contradiction of  social 
wholes. 
4. Organism: Necessity of Contingency and Crisis
When  it  comes  to  the  analysis  of  capital,  as  we  have  seen,  Marx's  perspective  is 
resolutely 'organic' within a universal, natural-historical frame. We might say that this 
functions as a transcendental horizon in Marx, which functions as a condition of the 
intelligibility of historical specificity. Marx was, as we have seen in chapter 1, familiar 
370 Marx to Lassalle, 16 January 1861 in Karl Marx, MECW - Marx and Engels: 1860-64, vol. 41 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), 246. Here Marx seems to lift the description of Darwin 
directly from a letter he received from Engels one year prior. Engels to Marx, 11 or 12 December 
1859 in Karl Marx, MECW - Marx and Engels: 1856-59, vol. 40 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1983), 550.
371 In a letter to Engels Marx notes that Darwin's struggle for existence is Hegel's civil society and 
Hobbes' bellum omnium contra omnes in the animal kingdom. 18 June 1862MECW 41, 41:381.
372 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, trans. H. Quelch, new ed. (Prometheus Books UK, 1995), 
132.
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with Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Contrary to the old misunderstanding of Hegel as a 
thinker of harmony and necessity, it is from him that Marx takes the notion that organic 
structures, while self-organised wholes, are not homoestatically balanced and whole, but 
contradictory  for  the  reason that  they  organise  within  themselves  forces  that  might 
break free.  In  his  Encyclopaedia Logic,  Hegel theorises the organism in the following 
terms: 'these (elementary powers of objectivity) are … continuously ready to jump to 
begin their process within the organic body, and life is the constant fight against such a 
possibility.'373 It is for this reason that the very notion of an organic structure entails 
contingency and the possibility of crises. Crises entail the necessary 'excretion' of sweat 
in fever, for instance; but excretion is a symptom, which does not secrete the disease 
itself.374 We must note here, that this conception is strictly speaking not ecological, but 
relates to the inner organisation of an organism rather than to its environment.
The Marx that Wouters reconstructs so elaborately, on the other hand, is one without 
notions of contradiction,  contingency or crisis. All this serves to position materialist 
dialectics as the problematisation proper to a system which, while reproducing itself 
organically,  is  always shot  through with the struggles of matter.  And in fact,  in  the 
postface to the second edition of Capital Marx stresses the centrality of the concepts of 
contradiction and crisis to his method: the dialectic of Capital distinguishes itself from 
the 'mystified form' fashionable in Germany, in that it  recognises  'the contradictions 
inherent in the movement of capitalist society … the summit of which is the general 
crisis. … [T]he universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action', he finishes, 'will 
drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-
German empire.'375
Thus for Marx, rational dialectics are dialectics which recognise and are proven by the 
contingency,  contradiction  and  crisis  of  the  existing  order.  Crisis  is  a  possibility 
because, even though an organism must be conceived in terms of its inner structure of 
necessitation, this necessity is not absolute, but merely a concept of what mediations 
and  exchanges,  flows  and  productions  are  necessary  for  the  organism to  reproduce 
itself.  It  is  precisely  the  contradiction  between  a  structure  of  necessitation  and  the 
contingency it cannot abolish that produces the possibility of crisis. For instance, for 
373 G. W. F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the “Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences” with the Zusätze: Part 1, ed. Theodore Geraets and et al (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Co, Inc, 1992), 293, §219 add., translation amended.
374 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Nature, Vol. 1III, trans. M. J. Petry (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1970), 201.
375 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 103.
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capitalist  reproduction to happen,  it  is  necessary that  the commodities produced are 
sold, that their value content is realised, that there is a effective demand. Because buyers 
and sellers are separated, there is no guarantee that the latter will find a consumer for 
their product or the former a commodity to fulfil their need.  While money mediates 
exchange  by  avoiding  the  necessity  for  a  direct  meeting  of  buyer  and  seller,  this 
mediation also  deepens  the separation of the two by dissociating the acts of purchase 
and sale of commodities in time and space. 
[T]he exchange of commodities  implies contradictory and mutually exclusive 
conditions. The further development of the commodity does not abolish these 
contradictions, but rather provides the form within which they have room to 
move. ... In so far as the process of exchange transfers commodities from hands 
in which they are non-use-values to hands in which they are use-values, it is a 
process of social metabolism.376
The interruption of this process of circulation – the fundamental form of capitalist crisis 
– is thus not only a crisis of the realisation of capital (i.e. the sale of a commodity  
above, or minimally at its value), but a metabolic crisis of the social organism.
To  say  that  these  mutually  independent  and  antithetical  processes  form an 
internal unity is to say also that their  internal unity moves forward through 
external antitheses.  These two processes lack internal independence because 
they  complement  each  other.  Hence,  if  the  assertion  of  their  external 
independence  [äusserliche  Verselbständigung]  proceeds  to  a  certain  critical 
point, their unity violently makes itself felt by prooducing – a crisis.377
Thus,  even  though  sale  and  purchase  are  thus  organically  related,  they  do  not 
necessarily coincide, they are indeed temporally and spatially antithetical. Yet the two 
cannot separate, cannot become truly independent; they mutually rely on each other. 
'Crisis  is  nothing but the forcible assertion of the unity of phases of the production 
process which have become independent of each other.'378  Or as Marx says, '[t]he most 
abstract  form  of  crisis  (and  therefore  the  formal  possibility  of  crisis)  is  thus  the 
metamorphosis of the commodity itself.'379 
376 Ibid., 198.
377 Ibid., 209.
378 Karl Marx, “Theories of Surplus-Value,” in MECW, vol. 32 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), 
140.
379 Ibid.
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The metamorphosis of commodities relies not only on money, but on a set of juridical 
relations and other basic conditions generally guaranteed by the state – particularly the 
enforcement  of  contract  and  the  guarantee  of  the  currency  of  national  monies.380 
However,  as these are empirical conditions of the possibility  of the actual  capitalist 
mode of production (not  logic  conditions), we shall focus with Marx on the abstract 
form of this mode of production, the practices that sustain or perform these abstractions, 
and the methodological and epistemological consequences of these abstractions.  The 
concrete organic system of capitalism is thus based in the everyday acts of practical or 
real  abstraction  in  commodity  exchange,  which  in  turn  are  based  on  a  continued 
separation between buyers and sellers.381
Hence the magic of money. Men are henceforth related to each other in their 
social process of production in a purely atomistic way. Their own relations of 
production therefore assume a material shame which is independent of their 
control and their conscious individual action.382
If bourgeois society is an organism it is one that is highly abstract; it does not consist of 
the immediate concrete relations between individuals, rather this society is the structure 
of  abstractions  (the  commodity-form,  money-form,  value-form,  wage-form,  capital 
form, etc.) that mediates the practical abstractions through which individuals reproduce 
themselves as atomised. Capital can thus be seen as a system of abstractions which is 
reproduced  behind  the  back  of  individuals.  Capital  is  therefore  not  an  ordinary 
organism. It is not a self-reproducing life sustaining itself in an ecology. Its teleology is 
not concrete and biological but historical and abstract. In Kantian terms, capital does not 
operate as a ‘self-organised being’ according to its own ‘intrinsic’ or ‘natural’ telos, but 
according to an extrinsic or final goal. Tellingly Kant chooses the logic of rent/profit 
and investment/speculation to exemplify such teleology: 
a house is certainly the cause of the money that is received as rent, but yet, 
conversely,  the  representation  of  this  possible  income was the  cause  of  the 
building of the house. A causal nexus of this kind is termed that of final causes 
(nexus finalis).383
380 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 178, 222–226.
381 I will return to the problem of real abstraction as an effect of commodity exchange, drawn from 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel, in the next chapter. Alfred Sohn-Rethel, “Intellectual and Manual Labour: A 
Critique of Epistemology” (London: Macmillan, 1976).
382 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 187.
383 Kant, Critique of Judgement, §63, p.196 and §65, p.200.
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Capital, in Marx's theorisation, is centred and driven by a final end:  its teleological 
mission is its  expanded  self-reproduction – M-C-M’, or  money makes more money  – 
which requires the exploitation of bodies, and the violent conversion of any ecology into 
an  objectified  environment,  either  into  an  externality  or  a  resource. Capital’s 
subsumption of  other  bodies displays an abstract  striving,  a  super-sensible and thus 
insatiable  hunger,  which  demands  the  blood  and the  flesh  of  bodies,  the  lives  and 
materials of the world. Capital is not a final teleology that has 'taken possession' of a  
social organism, it is the very organisation of that organism itself. Yet it pursues its goal 
at  any cost to the lives which produce it  and measuring everything according to its 
abstract credo. Capital, in these abstract terms, is an automaton positing itself in total 
disregard for any intrinsic telos (any life, project or desire) it cannot render productive 
for itself and any ecology it cannot carve up and commodify, colonise and privatise.
……
Marx thus inscribes the social wholes into the natural history of societies. Does this 
entail,  however,  a narrative of progressive development of human societies 'through' 
history, in which the struggles of one epoch naturally lead to a crisis, whereby one form 
of society develops into the next? In other words, does this entail a teleology through 
which humanity is the substance going through these changes? In a rejection of such a 
reading, proponents of the so-called 'Systematic Dialectics'-approach384, have recently 
argued that Marx and Hegel's dialectics are mainly 'concerned with the articulation of 
categories designed to conceptualise an existent concrete whole' rather than a 'historical 
dialectic.'385 The Systematic Dialectics-approach is concerned with the structures of a 
whole in its 'synchronic', or rather synchronizing, expansive organic reproduction. As 
we will see, this reading is closely aligned with the method of the later Marx; it is 
important in that it does not reject Marx's later continued use of the concept of species 
history  or  social  wholes,  but  instead  follows  his  more  historically  sensitive 
reformulation  of  these  problems outside  the  remit  of  any classical  philosophy  of  a 
384 Alternative names given to this set of new – i.e. post 1989 – dialectical reinterpretations of Marx, 
include 'the New Dialectic' and 'New Hegelian Marxism'. These draw a great deal on a dominant 
Marxist interpretation in the 1970s, the so-called Neue Marx Lektüre. See Christopher J. Arthur, 
New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 1. Roberto Fineschi, “Dialectic of the 
Commodity and Its Exposition: The German Debate in the 70s: a Personal Survey,” in Re-reading 
Marx - New Perspectives after the Critical Edition, ed. Riccardo Bellofiore and Roberto Fineschi 
(New York: Macmillan, 2009).  Other contemporary authors writing in this tradition include Moishe 
Postone, Patrick Murrey and Geert Reuten.
385 Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 4.
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history or organicist conception of society. 
5. From Dialectical Reason to Systematic Dialectics
We will now establish the connection between dialectics and real teleology in order to 
account for the argument that a systematic dialectic is needed to orientate ourselves in 
capitalist actuality. 
Different notions of totality are at play in the relation between the history of the natural 
history of the species and that of modes of production; by implication this gives us 
different methods as well as different theorisations of history in terms of totality. First, 
there is the issue of a history which diachronically and synchronically involves many 
modes of production, and, perhaps, floating disorganised elements. Secondly, there is 
the totality of a mode of production, as the 'idealisation of a manifold', i.e. as an organic 
teleology, self-positing, self-reproductive. The former opens the question of the totality 
or set of all totalities: either a substantial non-subjective 'totality' of elements external to 
one another, like Spinoza's 'Deus, sive Natura', or the Hegelian speculative, subjective  
unity of a teleology of teleologies.386 Hegel's thesis challenges the formulation of the 
Spinozist  notion  of  substance  in  a  similar  way  that  he  challenged  the  principle  of 
atomism (cf. chapter 1). While Hegel accepts the notion of physical nature as a non-
totalised multiplicity, he insists that this concept of Nature is impossible without Spirit, 
and that Spirit must be shown to have arisen from the interiorisation of this nature itself, 
the comprehension of which is only possible retrospectively as the Spirit's recognition 
of itself in exteriority.387 The  Philosophy of Nature  starts  with this exteriority of the 
Spirit  to  itself  in  an  abstract  substantial  nature  without  teleology,  but  proceeds  to 
teleology,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  concept  of  organic  life,  following  Kant's 
Critique of Judgement.388 
While  Marx,  of  course,  shows  little  interest  in  this  debate  over  the  philosophical 
concept  of  God,  his  approach  is  interesting  in  that  it  rests  neither  on  a  purely 
immanentist rejection of the reality of teleology, nor on the stereotypical image of the 
386 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics (New York: Hafner Press, 1949); Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969. For a 
discussion on Hegel's critique that Spinoza's substance 'lacks the principle of personality' or 
subjectivity, see Pierre Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, trans. Susan M. Ruddick (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012), 13–19.
387 Note here the famous transition from the Encyclopedia Logic to the Philosophy of Nature, whereby 
the former grounds the latter.
388 On the difference of Hegel's notion of intrinsic teleologies, see appendix 4.3.
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Hegelian  reduction  and  subsumption  of  the  differences  of  the  world  to  the  great 
teleology of the Spirit.389 Instead, he tries to hold up both images at once. In doing so, 
we might see him adopting Hegel's more circumscribed perspective on nature both as 
the  existence  of  elements  in  their  exteriority,  treated  by  the  Understanding,  and  as 
actuality of great many teleologies (natural and historical) in their interiority, grasped 
through dialectical  reason.390 Whereas  the  Understanding treats  things  as  exterior  to 
itself and each other, as things, 'Dialectical' or 'Negative' Reason includes within itself 
the perspective of the movement and self-reflexivity of the thing. It is the 'immanent  
transcending [immanente Herausgehen], in which the one-sidedness and restrictiveness 
of the determinations of the understanding displays itself  as what it  is,  i.e.,  as their 
negation.'  As thus it  is  'the principle through which alone  immanent  coherence and 
necessity  enter  into  the  content  of  science...'391 As  Sartre  states  in  his  Critique  of  
Dialectical Reason: 
If dialectical Reason exists, then, from the ontological point of view, it can only 
be a developing totalisation, occurring where the totalisation occurs, and, from 
the  epistemological  point  of  view,  it  can  only  be  the  accessibility  of  that 
totalisation  to  a  knowledge  which  is  itself,  in  principle,  totalising  in  its 
procedures.392 
The theoretical orientation toward totality must therefore be understood not as a pure 
need  of  reason,  but  as  an  imposed  need  by  the  developing  totalisation  in  which 
theoreticians  –  be  it  Marx  or  Silesian  proletarians  –  find  themselves.  The  two 
perspectives on dialectical Reason, one 'ontological'  the other 'epistemological',  pose 
here the  ideal of an orientation in which they coincide, and their split: orientation is 
precisely needed because these perspectives do not coincide.393 If Kantian critique is the 
389 Hegel is careful to insist that nature is irreducible to conceptual thought. 'As thoughts invade the 
limitless multiformity of nature, its richness is impoverished, its springtimes die, and there is a 
fading in the play of its colours. That which in nature was noisy with life, falls silent in the quietude 
of thought; its warm abundance, which shaped itself into a thousand intriguing wonders, withers into 
arid forms and shapeless generalities, which resemble a dull northern fog. ... By thinking things, we 
transform them into something universal; things are singularities however, and the lion in general 
does not exist.' Hegel, Philosophy of Nature I, 198.
390 For an explication of the difference between the Understanding, Dialectical Reason and Speculative  
Reason, see Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 125–34, sections 79-82.
391 Ibid., 128, §81.
392 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason - Volume 1, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith, new ed. 
(London: Verso Books, 2004), 47.
393 Perhaps the quintessential concept of this coincidence is given by Hegel: 'The absolute Idea has 
shown itself to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical idea.' Hegel, Science of Logic, 
trans. (Miller Trans.), 824.
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study of the conditions of possibility of a given object, dialectics is the form of critique 
appropriate  to  an  immanent  totalisation,  a  process  which  posits  itself  and  whose 
elements mutually presuppose one another, that is to say a process which is, in short, 
'organic' or 'teleological.'394
The idea of a systematic  as opposed to  historical dialectic  can be understood as an 
answer  to  and  a  defence  against  the  Althusserian  attack  on  the  historicism  and 
economism of Hegel-inspired readings of Marx, as well as an internal critique of the old 
Hegelian Marxist of the  philosophy of history  as such, which had gone into disrepute 
through the experiences of the world-wars and Stalinism. As such, it was an attack on 
the uniform interpretation of history according to general transhistorical trends, but an 
attack carried out from the standpoint of a basic faithfulness to dialectics. Thus, unlike 
Althusser's proposal of structural causality which eliminates the subjective unification 
of history ('history as a process without a subject'), the systematic dialectics approach 
theorises  history  in  terms  of  the  figure  of  a  subject  in  history,  but  limits  it  to  the 
capitalist epoch. In  Capital the abstract and impersonal power of capital is itself  an 
historical actor,  a self-developing, automatic subject. Its value form is 'the dominant 
[übergreifendes] subject of this process.'395 It is important to note, however, that these 
two conceptions are  not mutually exclusive.  Capital  as a subjective force in history 
might be taken as a regional subject within the overall process of history, which has no 
subject. This is indeed the route we will take. 
If the research programme of systematic dialectics is limited to the historical epoch, this 
limitation functions precisely through the positing of capitalism as a real subject, whose 
history can be understood, retrospectively, as the unfolding of its essence. The negation 
of the historical dialectic in favour of a systematic dialectic situates us within a given 
organic whole, and allows us to study the systematic, reproductive relations between its 
parts.396 Historical  interpretation,  for  Chris  Arthur,  itself  becomes  'irrelevant'  to  the 
study of totalities and their reproduction, understood as the 'circuit  of reproduction of 
these moments by each other.'397 He follows here Marx's strict insistence on the priority 
394 The dialectic is critical insofar as it inquires into conditions of an existing object. However, unlike 
the Kantian critique which aims at providing the transcendental conditions of the possibility of an 
object whose existence is taken for granted, the Hegelian dialectic is interested in the inner 
conditions of necessitation of the object itself. 
395 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 255.
396 'If the dialectic as inquiry is the search for internal relations within and between abstracted units, the 
dialectic as exposition is Marx's means of expounding these relations to his readers.' Bertell Ollman, 
Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in a Capitalist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976), 65. 
397 Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 64.
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of the being over capital over its historical becoming, and that the starting point of any 
cognition lies in the orientation vis-a-vis actuality, indeed that any orientation is also an 
effect of actuality:
In the succession of the economic categories, as in any other historical, social 
science, it must not be forgotten that their subject – here, modern bourgeois 
society  –  is  always  what  is  given  in  the  head  as  well  as  reality  [der  
Wirklichkeit]...398
This reality must be considered in terms of actual organisation and production, rather 
than its history. In bourgeois society capital is the 'all-dominating power.' 
It  would  therefore  be  unfeasible  and wrong to  let  the  economic  categories 
follow one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically 
decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another 
in  modern bourgeois  society,  which is  precisely the opposite  of  that  which 
seems  to  be  their  natural  order  or  which  corresponds  to  historical 
development.399
Any object of study which is a totality requires such a systematic method, which in turn 
will  allow insight into 'the  necessity of  certain forms and laws of movement of the 
whole under consideration.'400 This systematic, and contradictory character of capital is 
what  gives  it  its  specific  dynamics  and tendencies,  a  temporality  which  is  its  own, 
irreducible to natural history. Pace Althusser, the 'essential section' of capital is valid 
because  this  essential  conflict  is  what  makes  capital  appear,  with  necessity,  as  an 
abstract subject.
If  there  is  no dialectic  of  history  as  such,  but  only  of  specific  historical  modes  of 
production, at the very least the capitalist one, does that entail a total negation of natural 
history?  Does that,  qua the thesis  of  the  co-constitution  of  real  totalisation and the 
knowledge  of  that  totalisation,  entail  a  thesis  that  each  epoch  is  only  truly 
comprehensible to itself? And does this throw us back to a kind of radical historical 
solipsism limited to the interiority of capital?
398 Marx, Grundrisse, 107.
399 Ibid.
400 Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 64.
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6. Retrospective History and Abstraction
The  'Introduction'  which  Marx'  drafted  in  September  1857,  and  which  was  later 
published with the notebooks known as the Grundrisse, contains what is perhaps Marx's 
clearest  subordination  of  species-history  to  the  history  of  modes  of  production. 
Criticizing the ahistorical methodology of classical bourgeois economics, particularly 
the Robinsonades of the eighteenth century, and the abstract applications in economics 
of categories such as production, consumption, labour, etc. Marx's main argument was 
that 
[t]here are characteristics which all stages of production have in common, and 
which are established as general ones by the mind; but the so-called  general  
preconditions of all production are nothing more than these abstract moments 
with which no real historical stage of production can be grasped.401
In this sense we can say that the reproduction of the species – from the moment it began 
producing its own means of subsistence – is the  problem to which different means of 
production are solutions; a problem which only exists through its solutions (the problem 
arises  retrospectively from the first  solution;  the absence of a  solution would mean 
extinction or a becoming-animal of the species). This brings us to the specific histories 
of  different  modes  of  (re)production,  or  different  historical  epochs  in  their  internal 
temporalisations. History is thus not a universal temporal 'within which', but on the one 
hand the 'substantial' time of the species and on the other the 'subjective' time of always 
finite modes of (re)production. But these modes of production work retrospectively as 
the conditions of the retrospective cognition of species history, precisely because they 
are part of a developing history:
Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of 
higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be 
understood only after the higher development is already known. The bourgeois 
economy thus supplies the key to the economy of ancient, etc. But not at all in 
the manner of those economists who smudge over all historical differences and 
see bourgeois relations in all forms of society.402
This is not, however, a traditional teleological narrative of the progress of the species. 
This  developing  history  is  only  understood  through  'rational  abstractions'  such  as 
401 Marx, Grundrisse, 88.
402 Ibid., 105.
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production  in  general.403 But  such  abstractions  have  not  been  cognitively  possible 
throughout history and have only become so in a particular mode of production. Thus 
the  abstractions  'production'  and  'labour',  which  are  indifferent  to  the  specificity  of 
different productive activities, presuppose 
a very developed totality of real kinds of labour, of which no single one is any 
longer pre-dominant. As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the 
midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as 
common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form 
only.404
But Marx is quick to point out that this is not just a matter of the concepts being the 
mental product of the concrete totality of labours. Rather, this indifference in thought 
corresponds to the real indifference towards the specificity of labours, when labour 'in 
reality [in der Wirklichkeit] has … become the means of creating wealth in general, and 
has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form.' 
Such has only become the reality in the most developed bourgeois society, the United 
States, only here has the abstraction of the category 'labour' become 'true in practice.'
The simplest abstraction, then, which modern economics places at the head of 
its discussions, and which express an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all 
forms of society, nevertheless achieves practical truth as an abstraction only as 
a category of the most modern society.405
The theorisation of the universal history of humankind is thus only possible from the 
point of the bourgeois mode of production, in which for the first time the abstractions 
necessary  for  grasping  species  history  in  its  manifold  differences  and  specificities 
becomes practically effective on a social scale, become actual.406 This has two related 
implications:  First,  it  forces  us  to  recognise  the  historicity  of  the  transcendental 
framework  of  history;  the  universal  history  of  the  species,  while  a  transcendental 
condition  of  historical  knowledge  is  itself  conditioned  by  the  real  abstractions  of 
capitalism.  Second, the  fact  that  the  general  concepts  of  the  analysis  of  capital  are 
403 Ibid., 85. 'All production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within and through a 
specific form of society'. Ibid., 87.
404 Ibid., 104.
405 Ibid., 105.
406 Marx distinguishes between the 'barbarians who are fit by nature to be used for anything, and 
civilised people who apply themselves to anything.'. The racism of this remark is not just Marx's, nor 
only ascribable to the narrative of progress, but a feature of the capitalist mode of production's 
relation to 'less developed' societies. Ibid.
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concepts of a systematic dialectic means that the concepts of this analysis can only be 
used in relation to other (past or contemporary) modes of production by ridding these 
concepts of their theoretical determinacy, or, if possibly, by constructing them anew. For 
Marx, history can be narrated  retrospectively as a  history of potentialities, cognizable 
only in their actualisation, yet always very real. Thus the categories made possible by 
bourgeois  society  are  still  valid  –  but  only  abstractly  –  for  previous  epochs;  the 
historicity  of  the  transhistorical  perspective  does  not  limit  historical  cognition 
absolutely. In the words of the 1857 Introduction, the example of abstract labour
shows strikingly how even the most abstract categories, despite their validity – 
precisely because of their abstractness – for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the 
specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic 
relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations.407 
Marx's organic conception of bourgeois society, as we saw above, is conceived in terms 
of a natural history, but as a history of second nature folding back on and reworking first 
nature. Here it is important to distinguish Marx's approach from vulgar evolutionary 
narratives  of  the  Enlightenment  variety,  according  to  which  history  can  be  read 
prospectively as the development and unfolding of a pre-given essence. Against this, 
Marx's evolution is, as in Darwin,  retrospective. It is only retrospectively that history 
can  be  interpreted  as  an  evolutionary  development.  No  prospective  laws  can  be 
predicted, except the law of antagonism, which is open to contingency. The rational 
meaning  of  teleology  in  history,  history  as  a  rational  (i.e.  intelligible,  organised) 
development, lies in the interpretation of the past in terms of the present insofar as it is 
intelligible, organised, we could say 'meaningful'.
But is it possible that while we cannot grasp the 'real laws of development' except like 
the owl of Minerva, history in-itself does indeed unfold according to such laws? In the 
Grundrisse, Marx  approaches  a  more  radical  position  which  posits  the  primacy  of 
chance over necessity in history. Marx outlines the following oblique notes at the end of 
the 1857 Introduction:
(5) Dialectic of the concepts of productive force (means of production) and 
relation of production, a dialectic whose boundaries are to be determined, and 
which  does  not  suspend  (aufhebt,  sublate)  the  real  difference  (die  realen 
407 Marx, Grundrisse, 105.
 138
Unterschied).408
So any given historical dialectical totalisation can never be total.  The seventh point in 
Marx's  note  to  self  breaks  open  what  otherwise  appears  as  a  closed  circle  of  the 
essential (i.e. necessary, yet contradictory) unity of forces and relations of production. 
'This conception appears as necessary development. But legitimation of chance.'409 The 
historical  process  leading  to  the  necessity  of  this  relation,  this  interdependence,  is, 
considered prospectively, ruled by chance; the future of the past was not predictable, not 
a causal result of past events.  Thus, the possibility of progressive history lies with the 
models  used  to  interpret  history,  models  that  have  themselves  emerged  through 
historical  struggle.  In  other  words,  the  logic  of  an  unfolding  system  and  its  inner 
necessities (i.e. a real teleology) cannot account for the emergence of that system, and 
its  constituent  parts,  nor for its  own becoming through chance.  For this  reason, the 
explanation  of  past  events  cannot  be  folded over  to  become a  guide  to  the  future. 
History can only orientate us in the sense that it allows us to understand the historical 
emergence of the problems around which the present is  organised.  While  giving no 
guidelines  to  action,  it  can  nevertheless  help  us  understand  the  conditions  and  the 
structure of the openness of the present, by connecting the antagonisms and crises of the 
present with epochal problems and the structures maintaining and ameliorating them.
When the study of history is limited to the interiority of capitalist mode of production, 
this does not mean that historical species teleology is eliminated, but rather that it is 
rendered retrospective and secondary. Furthermore, the real teleology of capital in the 
present posits once more the problem of how theory orientates revolutionary practice. 
The classical dialectical Marxist approach has been that such orientation would still be 
fully immanent to the historical process of capital, but stressing the 'bad side' of this 
dialectic, and the openness of history given by the notions of contradiction and crisis. 
The next section will aim to show that the limitation of theory to systematic dialectics 
entails, when it comes to the orientation of revolutionary practice, a reintroduction of 
the historical dialectic, only this time as a projection.
408 Ibid., 109.
409 Ibid.
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7. Transitions Between Modes of Production
We have seen that the systematic study of bourgeois society in 'organic' terms does not 
entail  a  progressivist  philosophy of history,  but  rather  a  self-reflexive theory of  the 
retrospective  nature  of  the  knowledge  of  history.  However,  this  does  not  bring  us 
outside the remit of the Symmetry Thesis' reduction of historically relevant struggles to 
those of capital and labour. Here we will see how the classical Marxian conception of 
revolution  is  based  on  the  Symmetry  Thesis,  and  how  the  rejection  of  this  thesis 
produces a purely formal understanding of transitions between modes of production.
In  a  chapter  towards  the  end  of  Capital  on  the  'Historical  Tendency  of  Capitalist 
Accumulation', Marx outlines the passage from the beginning of capital to its end, from 
its pre-history to its post-history. Insofar as the systematic dialectic is taken as proper 
only  of  capital,  this  chapter  provides  a  kind  of  historical  frame  of  the  historical 
boundaries not only of capital, but of the validity of the systematic dialectic. Marx's 
projection of the end of capital followed, in broad outlines, the one developed 20 years 
earlier  (cf.  chapter  3): a  communist  revolution  becomes  possible  as  a  result  of  the 
increasing concentration of capital and the deepening proletarianisation of the masses of 
society:
Along with the constant decrease in the number of  capitalist magnates, who 
usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, the 
mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation and exploitation grows; but 
with this there also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly 
increasing  in  numbers,  and  trained,  united  and  organized  by  the  very 
mechanism of the capitalist process of production.410
Like  in  the  Manifesto,  Marx  does  not  suggest  that  degradation  will  itself  lead  to 
revolution, but that revolution can only come from the organisation of the proletariat as 
a class, which becomes possible through its relation with capital. The introduction of 
machinery makes the livelihoods of the proletarians ever more precarious,  and their 
organised power makes them ever more capable of overthrowing capital. Similarly, in 
the  Manifesto,  the revolutionary implications of Marx and Engels' sketch of capitalist 
crisis and immiseration is premised on the existence of workers' combinations (trade 
unions), clubs and permanent associations, as we saw in the previous chapter.411 The 
410 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 929.
411 Marx and Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” 116–17.
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reformist philosophy of progress of the social-democrats, which projected that increases 
in capitalist productivity would allow working-class wages to rise without necessitating 
revolution,  also relied,  unknowingly or  not,  on the organised  strength of  the  global 
working classes, revolutionary or otherwise.412
In chapter 32 of Capital, the workers' movement, even if it is a sine qua non in Marx's 
sketch of a revolutionary epoch-making transformation, is mentioned merely in passing. 
The real and combative existence of this movement was too powerful to be forgotten by 
the contemporary reader. Today, after the belief in the Symmetry Thesis, the references 
to the working class 'united and organized' by capital, can be easily glanced over. We 
are  left  with  a  purely  schematic  presentation  of  transition:  'the  expropriators  are 
expropriated … capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, 
its own negation. This is the negation of the negation.'413 In the passages just before this 
future transition beyond capitalism, as  Étienne Balibar points out,  Marx presents the 
past transition to the capitalist mode of production. Both are presented as homologous 
in terms of the dialectical logic of the negation of the negation. In Balibar's summary:
First  transition:  from  the  individual  private  ownership  of  the  means  of 
production,  based on personal labour ('the pygmy property of the many') to 
capitalist  private  ownership  of  the  means  of  production,  based  on  the 
exploitation  of  the  labour  of  others  ('the  huge  property  of  the  few').  First 
transition, first expropriation. Second transition: from capitalist ownership to 
individual ownership,414 based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era, on co-
operation and the common possession of all the means of production, including 
the  land.  Second  transition,  second  expropriation.  These  two  successive 
negations  are  of  the  same  form,  which  implies  that  all  the  analyses  Marx 
devoted to primitive accumulation on the one hand (origin), to the tendency of 
the capitalist mode of production on the other, i.e., to its historical future, are 
similar in principle.415
It would seem that capital negates pre-capitalist modes of production, and that socialism 
negates the capitalist mode of production in a simple historical dialectic; as such this 
412 This optimism was pithily criticised by Walter Benjamin: 'Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History”, thesis XI.
413 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 929.
414 Ibid.
415 Étienne Balibar, “The Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism,” in Reading Capital, trans. Ben 
Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1970), 274–75.
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negation of the negation takes us back to pre-capitalist ownership while incorporating 
the  gains  of  capitalism.  We  have  seen  that  dialectical  contradiction  always  has  a 
common element,  that the dialectic presents us with a unified process. So does this 
mean that we are dealing with a transhistorical perspective which sees before, during 
and after  capitalism under  one perspective,  that  of the transition between modes of 
production considered as a part of species history? No, as Balibar, and less explicitly so 
Chris Arthur,416 point out that this homology conceals how the substantial analysis of 
primitive accumulation presents us with a history of the transition to capitalism which is 
a  discontinuous,  contingent,  violent  and organising  political  process.  The  schematic 
reading of the transition to capitalism in chapter 32 is totally bloodless and schematic, 
unless one remembers the chapters on primitive accumulation preceding it, which we 
will revisit in our chapter 5.
It  seems  that  the  material,  historical  logic  of  either  transition  is  violent,  political, 
contingent  and  organising.  Only  from  the  standpoint  of  the  result  –  capitalism  or 
socialism – can transition be considered in terms of the dialectics of the negation of the 
negation. What is then lost when one assumes, as Chris Arthur does, the strict priority of 
the  systematic  dialectic  of  capital,  with  the  commendable  intention  of  escaping the 
philosophy  of  history?  For  Arthur  the  homology  of  the  two transitions  contains  an 
'abandonment of the historical perspective,  and the problematic  of causal genesis  in 
favour of the question of 'the ground of the system's self-production.'417 For Balibar, 
the analysis  of  the  historical  tendency of  the capitalist  mode of  production 
seems to be one moment of the analysis of the capitalist mode of production, a 
development  of  the  intrinsic  effects  of  the  structure.  It  is  this  last  analysis 
which  suggests  that  the  (capitalist)  mode  of  production  is  transformed  'by 
itself',  through  the  play  of  its  own peculiar  'contradiction',  i.e.,  through  its 
structure.418
Arthur stresses that the question of transition is secondary to the critique of capitalism 
as  a  'self-subsistent'  and  'self-reproducing  totality'.419 In  Arthur's  strictly  system-
immanent  perspective  this  becomes  the  unity  of  a  substance  which  is  essentially 
contradictory.  For him the transition to socialism is  not a matter 'of  returning to an 
416 Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 116.
417 Ibid.
418 Balibar, “The Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism,” 275.
419 Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 118.
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original  Golden  Age,  but  of  liberating  an  interior  moment  within  the  capitalist 
moment.'420 This liberation is based on the contradictory developments of capital itself, 
which does not mean that this liberation proceeds as a law-like consequence of this 
development.421 Arthur again brackets the past, and posits the future in the light of the 
present.  While  usefully  orientating  us  away  from  nostalgic  imaginaries  and  the 
philosophy of history, his logical opposition between the capitalist mode of production 
and pre-capitalist modes of production cannot be temporalised. Once posed in historical 
terms,  we  have  a  sterile  periodisation,  which  has  no  concept  of  what  matters  for 
political practices of resistance and revolution: violence, contingency, organisation.
Thus  it  seems  that  the  systematic  dialectical  critique  of  the  capitalist  mode  of 
production can only produce merely  formal figures of the transition to capitalism as 
well  as  beyond  it.  In  the  absence  of  a  theory  and  method  that  can  deal  with  the 
contingencies produced by misery and workers' competition, a method of combination 
and organisation,  historical change appears either  as radically  un-determined  (to  the 
extent  that  the  dialectical  transition  is  taken  to  be  merely  logical)  or  as  radically 
overdetermined (to the extent that the dialectical transition recognised retrospectively is 
taken to present the immanent logic of what really happened – or of what will have 
happened). The former presents us merely with a critique of reified reality. The latter 
reintroduces a philosophy of history, albeit one that is strictly historically situated. Both, 
respecting the division of labour between theory and practice, provide only orientation 
in objective social space, and thus only half an orientation. That other, practical side of 
orientation was, as seen in Marx, closely connected to the organisation of the workers' 
movement.
8. Break or Accelerate! The Limits to Critique Without Organisation
Perhaps the best way to describe the effect of the crisis of the Symmetry Thesis, is to 
describe it  as the divorce between objective and subjective orientation: between the 
orientation in actuality and that of actualisation, in other words, between the orientation 
in that which is organised and the orientation of organisation. This produces a strange 
effect  in  radical  theory,  which,  unwilling  to  limit  itself  to  exposing  the  dialectical 
structure of  Capital,  still  yearns to think the temporality of revolution.  To think the 
overcoming of capitalism without organisation but with Marx, leaves, broadly speaking, 
420 Ibid., 122. 
421 Ibid., 132.
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two orientations: the via positiva of revolutionary accelerationism or the via negativa of 
messianic  catastrophism.422 Both  try  to  think  the  conditions  of  revolution  on  the 
background  of  what  we can  call  the  Asymmetry  Thesis,  which  sees  both  capitalist 
organisation  and  disorganisation  as  leading  to  the  disorganisation  of  workers' 
organisations. Here, we will leave the critique of historical teleology behind, and enter 
into a brief critique of the critique of this teleology, as it proposes itself as an orientation 
without organisation.
The space for revolutionary accelerationism in Marx is given by his theory that the ever 
faster, contradictory development of capitalism will by itself lead to a final crisis. Here 
we find a special teleology of the history of capitalism, i.e. one that studies the internal 
history of capitalism as a necessary tendency towards its own limit, and crisis. Here the 
contradictory character of capital itself and the ever deeper misery and negativity of the 
proletariat, demonstrate the openness of history towards the overcoming of the current 
order, even without a party or a labour movement. This teleology is very inorganic and 
focussed on the species. Whereas for Hegel an organism which reaches its inner limits 
begins it decline and then dies, revolutionary accelerationism interprets the crisis and 
'death' of bourgeois society as well as the production of the conditions for communism 
as  part  of  the same process.  The reason the  death  of  capitalism pure and simple – 
without the victory of the organised proletariat – can be considered revolutionary rather 
than catastrophic, is that accelerationism believes in the teleological development of the 
species, and particularly that of its technologies.
Messianic catastrophism refers to the more pessimistic position, which recognises that 
the  deepening immiseration  and sacrifice  of  life  under  capitalism will  not  by  itself 
produce a revolutionary reversal, and that capitalist technology is deeply destructive and 
designed  to  discipline.  Thus,  rather  than  acceleration,  a  rupture  is  needed,  an 
interruption of the whole process. Walter Benjamin suggests here a corrective to the 
overwhelmingly accelerationist Marx: 
Marx says that revolutions are the locomotive of world history. But perhaps it 
is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the passengers on this 
train – namely, the human race – to activate the emergency brake.423
422 I borrow the concept of accelerationism from Benjamin Noys. Benjamin Noys, The Persistence of  
the Negative (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
423 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, ed. Howard Eiland and Gary Smith (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 1996), 402.
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Whereas  accelerationism thinks  the  transition  to  communism as  an  Aufhebung,  the 
emergency break functions more on the level of an  interruption, which opens for an 
abolition of capitalism.424 The logic of capital – which is also embodied subjectively and 
materialised in machinery – is either raised to a higher level, or totally done away with. 
So  revolution  is  either  –  Messianically  –  an  evental  break  with  history,  or  its 
commensuration – epically – through the acceleration of the tendencies of history. 
The basic temporal structure of this dilemma – to break with history or to accelerate it – 
is not merely produced, as claimed by Étienne Balibar, by the progressive, evolutionary 
linearity of the conception of history that accompanies it, but by the totalisation of the 
process of history, the interconnectedness of all parts in the process.425 At the same time 
they are both predicated on a critique of the organisational paradigm implied by the 
Great Symmetry Thesis, but the absence of a concept of organisation, apart from that of 
capital. The crisis of the previously dominant notion of organisation becomes a crisis of 
radical theory's ability to think organisation in general – at least as long as other modes 
of organisation remains invisible to it.  The first step to open for another concept of 
organisation, would be to ask the question of multiple times. Capitalist history is not 
totality,  but  totalisation,  not  organised,  but  organising;  it  must  be  theorised  as  an 
ongoing attempt to synchronise a manifold and render it contemporaneous which entails 
a multiplicity of times, and potential different synchronisations and rhythms. 
To question the totalisation of history means to begin to think the temporality of other 
processes, not to merely criticise capital for being totalising. In the exclusively critical  
or negative spirit of dialectical Marxism,426 Chris Arthur points to the existence of two 
'others' of capital, yet does not seem to recognize the importance of thinking from the 
point of view of their irreducibility to capital. 
The critical aspect of the dialectic shows that on the use value side capital faces 
two ‘others’ of itself that it cannot plausibly claim – in Hegelian fashion – to be 
only  aspects  of  it  own  self.  Its  external  other  is  Nature  which  capital  is 
degrading at  frightening speed thus  undermining its  own material  basis.  Its 
424 Balibar describes as a central aporia of contemporary history: 'if communism is located outside 
history, that is to say outside class struggles, it is simply another speculative or religious myth; but if 
communism is simply the process of present history (or the direction of present history), it will never 
become real. How to break with the mainstream of history from within?' Étienne Balibar, “The Non-
Contemporaneity of Althusser,” in The Althusserian Legacy, ed. E. Ann Kaplan and Michael 
Sprinker (London: Verso, 1992), 6.
425 Étienne Balibar, Eleven Theses on Marx and Marxism (Swedenborg Hall, London: | Backdoor 
Broadcasting Company, 2011), the last 10 minutes.
426 See appendix 4.4.
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internal  other  is  the  proletariat,  capital’s  own creation,  which  is  potentially 
capable of overthrowing it.427
Insofar as non-capitalist  processes – those of nature,  human bodies,  other modes of 
production – are not thought, we cannot even understand the total process of capital: its 
imposition of its own time through the constant attempt to synchronise its elements, 
happens through a struggle. The systematic dialectic, qua systematic dialectic, confronts 
Althusser's challenge to think the 'real residues' of the purified exposition of capital, 
such as classes beyond capital and labour, the continued existence of other modes of 
production,  and  their  relation  to  the  strict  capital-labour  dialectic,  as  well  as  the 
irreducibility of living labour and nature to its capitalist subsumption, as a starting point 
for orientation and possibly for construction, for organisation.428 In his reading of the 
chapter on the 'Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation', Balibar expressed some 
unease  with  the  dialectic  of  transition.  This  leads  to  him  positing  the  transition  to 
capitalism  as  unfinished:  the  problem  of  the  transition  to  capitalism  is  for  him 
subordinated to a more general task to understand the synchrony than that of the mode 
of production itself, a synchrony 'englobing several systems and their relations.'429 To 
this effect, he quotes Lenin's remarks that there were up to five coexisting modes of 
production in  Russia  prior  to  the transition  to  socialism.430 While  this  opening to  a 
history conceived in the terms of Spinoza rather than Hegel, is appealing, this should 
not lead us to a total negation of teleology or dialectics à la Reading Capital. Thus, as 
we have hinted, Althusser's critique of the 'essential section' fails to come to terms with 
Marx's  own  insistence  on  the  'subjective'  drive  of  capitalism  to  synchronise  and 
contemporalise its component parts, the systematic dialectic is limited to speaking of 
the dynamics of capitalism itself,  and its unilateral subsumption of non-capital.  This 
leaves us with an analysis which can only approach the analysis of the temporality of 
the whole through a conjunctural analysis starting from a situated present. The whole 
can,  as  noted  by  Peter  Osborne,  only  be  approached  through  the  aggregation  of 
427 Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 77.
428 Althusser, “The Object of Capital,” 196. While Althusser does not himself take matters so far, Robert 
C. Young has shown the importance of Althusser's gesture in terms of opening Marxism for a 
reconception of the post-colonial that does not reduce world history to the history of the capitalist 
subject. Robert J. C. Young, White Mythologies: Writing, History and the West, 1st ed. (Routledge, 
1990).
429 Balibar, “The Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism,” 307.
430 Ibid., 308. And we could also quote Marx's remark in the 1857 'Introduction', that the bourgeois 
mode of production is build on the 'ruins and elements' of vanished social formations 'whose partly 
still unconquered remnants are carried along with it.' Marx, Grundrisse, 105.
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disjunctive analysis of different temporalities, but it precludes the analysis of a whole as 
mode  of  production  or  history;  in  our  terms,  it  precludes  the  theorisation  of  real 
teleologies  operating  through  contemporalising  and  synchronising  mechanisms.431 
Althusser's complex variable time negates the possibility of thinking the temporality of 
the whole as whole, his procedure operates in the mode of a negative totalisation. 
9. Conclusion
Insofar as practice is orientated by a theory which is exclusively focused on the interior, 
systematic  contradictions  of  capitalism  it  cannot  provide  a  concept  of  organisation 
beyond that of the Symmetry Thesis. As Massimo De Angelis remarks, 
within  traditional  Marxist  discourse  we  face  a  key  problem  in  the 
conceptualisation of the 'outside'. It seems to me that this presents itself either 
as  historical  pre-capitalist  ex  ante, or  a  mythological  revolutionary 
postcapitalist ex post. In the middle, there is the claustrophobic embrace of the 
capitalist mode of production, within which, there seems to be no outside.432
Certainly this claustrophobia was nothing but a feeling of class power, at a time when 
there was a strong belief that the proletariat organised in the workers' movement would 
was already leading humanity's march to socialism. The feeling of a lack of an outside 
emerges only when one is no longer on a victory march. The claustrophobia of today is 
not  merely  that  of  Marxist  discourse,  but  of  capitalism itself.  Thus,  today,  Kantian 
figures of orientation are needed for compensation, to maintain hope, as exemplified in 
our  introduction:  the  communist  hypothesis,  the  multitude,  literary  utopias.  The 
reduction of the critique of capitalism to the systemic contradiction between capital and 
labour produces a curiously self-enclosed present in need of utopian supplements, or a 
faith in that the acceleration of the capitalist teleology will liberate us. This is a theory 
which cannot imagine any revolutionary practice which is not fully 'immanent' to the 
class  relation.  Caught  in  this  present,  the  only  hope  comes  from  messianism  or 
insurrectionist voluntarism, or a belief in the ultimately self-defeating movement of the 
whole (or some combination of these). However, De Angelis' 'outside' does of course 
exist, in the form of commoning practices resistant to capital or to proletarianisation. 
This is no pure outside, but rather the present viewed from the point of view of the 
431 Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2011), 
24–5. 
432 De Angelis, The Beginning of History, 229.
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continued exteriority of power relations, the continuity of violence, contingency and the 
ever-renewed attempts at proletarian self-organisation.
The task is, as our final chapters will argue, not to reject the systematic dialectic, but to 
historicise the emergence of a impersonal social subject (to use Marx's term) that can be 
described in these terms, and to understand it in a determinate relation to other non-
systematic logics, such as those of composition and combination, which are conditions 
of organisation,  of emergent systems. Part II of this thesis will propose a historical, 
social and political reading of the central orientating logics presented in Part I, where 
they  were  presented  both  in  ontological-natural-philosophical  (atomism, 
organism/teleology,  crisis  and  abjection)  and  in  practical-political-economic  terms 
(ethical  individual,  social  organism and organisation,  rabble  and crisis).  In  the next 
chapter we will historicise the starting point of the whole movement of Part I, that is the 
ontology of separated elements and the problem of their being organised into society, 
and thus honor the demand put forward by Hegel and Marx that a theory must be able to 
account  for  its  own conditions  of  emergence.  We will  do  this  by  rereading  Marx's 
writings on market individualism and primitive accumulation.  In doing so we will be 
able to develop, in chapter 6, a dialectic which theorizes the emergence of the systemic 
interiority  of  bourgeois  society  through  the  historical  organisation  of  exteriority,  of 
separated individuals. Further, we will see how the problem of separation, once recast as 
a problem of proletarian reproduction, becomes related not merely to the exploitation 
and organisation  of  labour,  but  to  the  problem of  the  disorganisation  of  proletarian 
surplus-populations, and the need and possibility of thinking a mode of organisation that 
starts from the differences and separations between proletarians (chapter 7).
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Chapter 5. The Pre-History and Genealogy of Capital 
Dialectic loves and controls history, but it has a  
history itself which it suffers from and which it does  
not control.
- Gilles Deleuze433
And this history, the history of their expropriation, is  
written in the annals of mankind in letters of 
blood and fire.
- Karl Marx434
1. Introduction: The Problem of the History and Historicity of Capital
It is something of a Marxist truism that Marx's method is distinguished from that of 
contemporary political economists by the historicity of its categories.435 However, this 
suggestion may not be as scandalising as Marxists hope it would; political economy 
knows itself  to be either resolutely transhistorical or methodologically ahistorical.  It 
either takes its categories as valid for all epochs of history, or suggests that the pre-
capitalist  past  is  resolutely  and  definitively  past.  Indeed,  Marx's  own  retrospective 
theorisation ('human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape') and systematic 
approach seem to bring him close to  these positions.  Also the  differentia cannot  be 
Marx's  insistence  on  the  systematic  dialectic  characterised  by  the  fundamental 
antagonism between capital  and labour,  given that  Adam Smith  and David Ricardo 
knew  full  well  that  labour  and  capital  had  systematically  opposed  interests.  The 
difference of Marx's historicisation of the capitalist mode of production does not lie in 
its systematicity or in its knowledge of class antagonism, but in its suggestion that this 
struggle cannot be normalised, and that it has a violent beginning and end. It is in this 
conception  of  history we find a  theory insisting  to  orientate  revolutionary struggles 
towards a revolution against the epoch, and the set of problems that define it. But as 
long as theory is not revolutionary, that is, a part of the epoch's own thrust beyond itself, 
its  standpoint  needs  to  be  that  of  an  imaginary  outside,  utopia,  messianic  or 
433 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: Athlone Press, 1983), 152.
434 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 875.
435 Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital, 19.
 150
voluntaristic. The question here is to think the actuality of organising efforts that point 
beyond the problems of the epoch, and of which theory can become the 'mouthpiece', 
the function that speeds up the process of knowledge.436
In  this  chapter,  we will  begin  to  define  the  epochal  problem of  capital  beyond the 
Symmetry Thesis.  We will  see that  the problem is  not  merely  that  of  the capitalist 
exploitation of the workers, but the separation of proletarians from each other. Here we 
are talking about the separation from means and relations of reproduction caused by 
primitive accumulation, rather than Michael Lebowitz's 'degree of separation between 
workers'.437 Lebowitz is interested in understanding how the rate of  relative surplus-
value is determined through class struggle, that is, dependent on worker's capacity to 
combine and capital's power to separate workers. He thus approaches the problem of 
proletarian  separation  in  terms  of  the  capital-relation.  Methodologically  this  is 
expressed in the priority of totality: 
Understanding capitalism as a system, as an organic whole,  is precisely the 
concern here. What are the conditions for the reproduction of the system? For 
the  generation  of  surplus-value?  For  the  realisation  of  surplus-value 
generated?438
Lebowitz's  important  study  of  the  political  economy  of  the  working  class  is  here 
influenced by Marx's method in the critique of political economy. Capital book starts 
with the abstract form of appearance of capital, the commodity, and shows how this is 
the  minimal  active  mediation,  or  real  abstraction,  upon  which  the  whole  system 
depends.  Marx's  expressed  ambition  is  to  move  from the  abstract  –  the  separation 
between commodity owners, and the exchange mediation of this separation – to the 
concrete – the expanded reproduction of capital and the world-market.439 If we start, not 
with the commodity, but with the abstract existence of 'absolute paupers' for whom their 
relation to capital is merely 'possible', in Marx's words, a number of different actualities 
are given alongside the dominant mode of systemic reproduction.440 This allows us, in 
Part  II,  to  approach the  problem of  proletarian  separation  as  an  open one,  without 
436 Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy,” 1976, 177. Karl Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische 
Jahrbücher,” in Early Writings, 1st ed. (London: Penguin, 1992), 209.
437 Beyond Capital, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 84–88; “The Politics of 
Assumption, the Assumption of Politics,” Historical Materialism 14, no. 2 (2006): 29–47.
438 Michael A Lebowitz, “Trapped inside the Box? Five Questions for Ben Fine,” Historical  
Materialism 18, no. 1 (May 1, 2010).
439 On the method of Capital, see appendix 4.5.
440 Karl Marx, MECW - Economic Works, 1861-1863, vol. 30 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), 
40–41.
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thereby rejecting the idea of the real teleological character capital, and the importance to 
study capital as an organic whole. In studying the genealogy of capital, we will be able 
to break out of the symmetry of the capital-labour relation, and see how capital and 
labour  are fundamentally sets  of heterogeneous elements,  which come into relations 
through a multiplicity of different encounters (exchanges), whereby they combine and 
become organised around the teleology of capital itself (chapters 6 and 7). Capitalist 
organisation is never absolute, but always provisional and 'regional', even when global. 
The  present  chapter  will  consist  in  a  genealogical  reading  of  the  creation  of  the 
separations, which are the conditions for this historical combination. 
This genealogy of capital, which focuses on the emergence of capitalism through trade 
and primitive accumulation, will allow us to historicise the use in political theory of 
atomism,  chemism  and  mechanism,  which  we  saw  in  Part  I.  Furthermore,  the 
theorisation  of  the  beginnings  of  capitalism  is  important  in  that  it  orientates  our 
conception of struggle in the present, and our imaginary of what revolution might be. As 
we  will  see,  historical  studies  of  the  origins  of  capitalism,  exemplified  here  with 
reference to Jairus Banaji,  tend to tell  a  narrative of a  slow process of growth and 
emergence, which stresses the existence of particularly merchant capital in feudal times, 
whileas analyses centred more on Marx's systematic analysis of capital, tend to focus on 
the break between capitalism and feudalism as modes of production. Banaji poses the 
discussion as one between 'trajectories of accumulation' and 'transitions to capitalism.'441 
Our theoretical  orientation  to  revolution  is  greatly  shaped  by  whether  we  think 
historical change in terms of emergence or rupture. In our reading, an orientation based 
on the former will tend to underestimate the systemic articulation of capital, and the 
problem of revolution as an epochal leap, while the latter will tend to think revolution 
in formal logical terms, rather than in terms of situated struggles: this leaves us with the 
always-already of capitalist totality, from where revolutionary practice appears as an 
epochal  logic  of  transition,  quite  divorced  from  more  strategic,  organisational  and 
political logics. While Banaji's distinction is useful to us, our interest in this chapter is 
not  the  empirical  historical  study of  the  complex process  through which  capitalism 
arose, but how Marx's chapters on the beginning of capitalism might help us rethink the 
relation between emergence (the logics of actualisation, organisation, totalisation) and 
rupture (historical leaps, revolution), through the problem of violence (war, struggle, 
441 Jairus Banaji, Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation (Leiden: Brill, 
2010), 347–48.
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force, resistance). In this and the coming chapters  we will attempt to show how the 
historicised logics of separation, combination and organisation, can help us think both 
types of qualitative shifts and their determinate relations, and the contingency of the 
passages from separation to combination and organisation.
2. The Philosophy of Capital or the History of Capital?
Marx's  major  critique  of  political  economy,  Capital,  presents  us  with  three  distinct 
starting  points,  one  logical,  one  historical  and  one  genealogical.  The  beginning  of 
Capital Volume I takes us straight into the bourgeois mode of production, starting with 
the  'immense  collection  of  commodities',  as  the  general  appearance  of  wealth  in 
'societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails.'442 And it goes on to show 
how the  elementary  form of  wealth  –  the  individual  commodity  –  consists  of  two 
contradictory sides, or is split between two relations, that of its value in use and its 
value in exchange. While this first chapter of  Capital  takes us directly to the abstract 
logical beginning of capital, the middle Chapters of capital present us with a historical 
narrative of the emergence of the origin of manufacture and the development of large-
scale industry (ch. 13-15,  vol. I). The final chapters of  Capital (Part 8, i.e. ch. 28-32) 
present us with a pre-history and a genealogy of the creation of the conditions of both 
capitalist circulation and production, namely the capital relation. This last section gives 
us  the  third  beginning  of  capital,  its  beginning  with  processes  of  primitive  
accumulation; it  thereby gives us a narrative of the pre-history of bourgeois society. 
Marx's order of presentation has the effect of prioritising the system, its contradictions 
and laws of movement, over the contingency with which the relations between capital 
and  labour  –  and  indeed  between  proletarians  among  themselves  –  are  made  and 
unmade. Our reversal of Marx's order – starting from genealogy (ch. 5) passing on to 
history (ch. 6) before proceeding to the logic of capital (ch. 7) allows us to reread Marx 
from the point of view of the openness and struggles of the system. This will allow us to 
approach the  question  of  historical  transition  in  terms  of  dynamics  of  struggle  and 
organisation rather than in terms of formal dialectical reversals (cf. ch.4).
Marx's  account of primitive accumulation,  ursprüngliche Accumulation,  in Part 8 of 
Capital Volume I, begins with a critique of political economy's attempt to account for 
the  genesis  of  its  object,  capital,  through  a  theory  of  what  Marx names  'so-called' 
442 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 125
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previous accumulation.443 This critique is couched within a summary of the results of 
the  preceding  25  chapters  of  Volume  I  ('We  have  seen  how...'),  focussing  on  the 
definition  of  capital  as  the  production  and accumulation  of  surplus-value,  and how 
capital accumulation itself presupposes capitalist production, which in turn presupposes 
the existence and productive combination of masses of capital on the one side, and of 
workers on the other. The question of the genesis of capitalism is thus a question not 
only for political economy, but for the book, Capital, itself. 
We  might  say  that  the  chapters  on  primitive  accumulation  present  us  with  two 
beginnings of capital. One is the pre-history of merchant and usurers capitals before the 
capitalist mode of production, the other is the genealogy of conditions of the mode of 
production as such. The former narrative stresses the  emergence  of capitalism out of 
protocapitalist  exchange  and  trade,  and  the  latter  the  beginning  of  capitalism  as 
preceded by the implosion of feudal society, i.e. in terms of historical continuity and 
discontinuity. This prompts the question: what is the relation in Marx's Capital between 
emergent tendencies in history – such as the historical development of exchange and 
international trade – and the historical rupture presented in the chapters on primitive 
accumulation in Capital? 
Before we enter into a reading of Marx's text, we will see how the difference between 
these  two  approaches  has  taken  the  extreme  form  of  the  opposition  between 
philosophical  and historical  readings  of Marx. As we have seen in  chapter 4,  Marx 
himself was well schooled in the ways of dialectical logic, and at times posed it in a 
definite opposition to historical studies:
In order to develop the laws of bourgeois economy ... it is not necessary to 
write the real history of the relations of production. But the correct observation 
and deduction of these laws, as having themselves become in history, always 
leads  to  primary equations ...  which point  towards a  past  lying  behind this 
system. These indications, together with a correct grasp of the present, then 
also offer the key to the understanding of the past -- a work in its own right. 
443 I will here follow the established standard translation (common to Aveling, Moore and Fowkes) of 
Ursprüngliche as 'primitive', even if a more literal translation would be 'original' or 'originary'. Adam 
Smith spoke of 'previous accumulation'. While leaving aside the issue of translation I will clarify the 
conceptual implications of these terms, which in my reading do not suggest a developmental history 
in the sense suggested by 'primitive' nor a history of origins as commonly understood, but rather a 
genealogy. For a critique of the translation 'primitive' see Sweezy in The Transition from feudalism 
to Capitalism, 17. and for a defense, see Michael Perelman, The Invention of Capitalism : Classical   
Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation (Durham, NC; London: Duke 
University Press, 2000), 2.
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This correct view  likewise leads at the same time to the points at which the 
suspension  of  the  present  form  of  production  relations  gives  signs  of  its 
becoming -- foreshadowings of the future.444
Here we see, once more, Marx prioritising the study of the inner forms of necessitation 
of capital, as suggested by the Systematic Dialectics-approach. This tradition's care for 
the logical method of Marx convincingly deals with the the bulk of Volume I of Capital, 
explicating it as a logical representation of the capitalist mode of production, as a set of 
relations, which mutually presuppose and systematically reproduce each other, and thus, 
potentially go into crisis together. In this reading the interest is in understanding the 
specificity of capital,  of capital as a mode of production sui generis.445 It would seem 
that Althusser's critique of Hegel here equally applies to Marx: 
Hegel  …  argues  that  every  consciousness  has  a  suppressed-conserved 
(aufgehoben) past even in its present, and a world ..., and that therefore it also 
has as its past the worlds of its superseded essences. But these past images of 
consciousness  and  these  latent  worlds  (corresponding  to  the  images)  never 
affect  present  consciousness as  effective determinations different from itself: 
these images and worlds concern it only as echoes (memories, phantoms of its 
historicity) of what it has become, that is,  as anticipations of or allusions to  
itself.446
Is  the  idea  of  primitive  accumulation  as  a  historical  rupture  between  modes  of 
production,447 an example of such historical narcissism? The only way to avoid such a 
conclusion is  to show how this narcissism is  produced by the temporal  structure of 
capital  itself,  rather  than  the  theory  that  describes  it.  Capital,  just  as  its  systematic 
critique, closes around the interiority of its own epochal present. It sees the past and 
future of this present purely in terms of a break, a historical rupture.  However, as we 
will  see,  the chapter on primitive accumulation breaks with this complicity between 
interiority and the break.
A very different interest to the philosopher's – one sceptical to the positing of a break 
but  interested  in  the  question  of  systems  –  is  that  of  the  historiography  of  socio-
444 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rrough Draft), The 
Pelican Marx Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 461.
445 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 1035.
446 Althusser, For Marx, 101.
447 See chapter 4.
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economic  systems,  shared  by  Marxists,  and  often  influenced  by  Braudel  and  the 
Annales  School.448 These  approaches  try  to  combine  the  study of  empirical  history 
(what Marx calls 'a work in its own right') with the study of the laws of the present. This 
historiography aims at the comprehensive understanding of capitalism from its smallest 
beginnings  in  (to  pick  Marx's  own  contested  example)  early  renaissance  (or  late 
medieval) Genoa and Venice. Here, the existence of capitalist development prior to the 
period  of  primitive  accumulation  is  stressed,  and  if  quantitative  changes  lead  to 
qualitative shifts this is rarely interpreted as historical breaks, or leaps, but in terms of 
emergence, looking for the roots of capitalist development in feudal society. As Ernest 
Mandel writes in his introduction to Capital Volume I: 'the capitalist mode of production 
emerge[s]  historically  from  the  growth  of  commodity  production.'449 In  short,  the 
question is conceived in terms of the transition between different modes of production, 
or systems, considered as a historical process.450 
Jairus Banaji's historical approach also prioritises emergence, but he is fiercely critical 
of the 'scholasticism' of the focus on the 'capitalist mode of production' drawing on the 
Marxian definition of capitalism in terms of the dominance of industrial capital, and the 
transition  from  feudalism.451 Instead,  Banaji  focuses  on  the  existence  of  merchant 
capital before industrial capital, and sees the emergence of industrial capitalism as a part 
of the trajectory of accumulation of merchant capitals, who simply began to control 
production. In short,  he does not speak of transitions between modes of production, 
considered as systems, but of the emergence of certain social practices and forces prior  
to the emergence of the mode of production they came to characterise. The following 
statement is exemplary:
primitive accumulation is no longer the best way to frame the early history of 
capitalism, and this  not  because the epoch of commercial capitalism  did not 
contribute decisively to the rise of modern production – it obviously did – but 
because  that  remains  a  purely  teleological  perspective and  one  that  diverts 
attention from the real lacuna in materialist historiography, which is the study 
448 Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism; with Capitalist Civilization (London: Verso, 1995). 
Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century - Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times, New 
and Updated Edition (London: Verso, 2010).
449 Ernest Mandel, “Introduction,” in Capital: Volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 
1976), 14. Compare Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism, 14–15.
450 Methodologically such systematic historiography often entails the risk of voiding the concepts 
developed in the critique of capitalism of their rigour and specificity when projecting them back on 
pre-capitalist history with an explanatory purpose. See appendix 5.1
451 Banaji, Theory as History, 61.
 156
and, one hopes, ultimately a synthesis of the emergence of capitalism, which in 
the sporadic form that Marx described it as having was certainly in place by the 
thirteenth century.452
This sketch of the difference between what we can call logical, historico-logical and 
historical approaches to the study of capitalism, is necessarily brief and superficial, but 
it is nevertheless useful in situating our efforts. Next, we will discuss the reading that 
stresses the  emergent  beginning of capital.  We will  then contrast  the latter  with the 
reading that stresses the rupture of primitive accumulation as a  sine qua non of the  
capitalist  mode of production.  In this  chapter we will  see that  the beginning of the 
capitalist mode of production must be understood both in terms of continuity (section 3) 
and rupture (section 4),  but that  the irreducibility  of these two accounts opens to a 
difference, which resists the inscription of the past, present and future into a dialectical 
synthesis (section 5).
3. Historical Emergence and the Question of Generalisation
The person who first  developed a  problematic  of  capital  from the point  of view of 
labour  and  production  (the  point  of  view of  manufacturing  rather  than  commercial 
capital) was Adam Smith. Smith attempted to break the circle of presuppositions and 
account for the beginning of capital by showing how this logical, elaborated system 
necessarily had to have a historical  beginning.  Thus overdetermined by the logic of 
capital,  this  narrative  played,  as  Marx  notes,  the  function  of  the  Biblical  myth  of 
original sin. In Smith's narrative of 'previous accumulation'  an intelligent and frugal 
elite  slowly  build up more and more  wealth  by its  own resourcefulness,  eventually 
allowing it to set to work all those 'lazy rascals [Lumpen] spending their substance, and 
more in riotous living.'453 These lumpen are too inept to accumulate their own surpluses, 
and too poor to refuse the employment offers of the elite; if the myth of original sin 
introduces a primordial debt to God, here the debt is internal to humankind itself.454 
452 Ibid., 43. Banaji is here rejecting the previously dominant perspective on the problem, presented by 
Maurice Dobb. For two classical discussions of the problem of the transition to capitalism, which 
qua their historiographical interest shall remain outside my focus, see Rodney Hilton, ed., The 
Transition from feudalism to Capitalism (London: Verso, 1978). T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin, 
eds., The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial  
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
453 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 873.
454 'Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin [Sünde] fell on the human race', Marx writes, ibid. The 
Sündenfall is the mythical origin of Schuld, the guilt and debt of mankind.
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Against  this  legitimising  morality-tale  Marx  notes,  '[i]n  actual  history  [wirklichen 
Geschichte], it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, 
force, play the greatest part.'455 Slavoj  Žižek presents Adam Smith's mistake as that of 
fallacy of  petitio principii: 'Like every myth, this is circular – it presupposes what it 
purports to explain: the notion of the capitalist.'456 Marx is making a different point here 
however, one about 'actual history'. For Marx the problem is not that Smith explains a 
structural transformation with recourse to a certain subjective mutation (in conjunction 
with  the  land and other  labourers).  The reason to  note  this  is  that  whereas  Žižek's 
argument  consigns  change  to  the  level  of  the  whole  or  of  a  structure,  Marx's 
presentation does not rule out the possibility of emergent norms. Indeed he writes: 
The  transformation  of  produce  into  commodities  occurred  only  at  isolated 
points...  Nevertheless,  within  certain  limits  both  goods  and  money  were 
circulated and hence there was a certain evolution of trade: this was the premiss 
and point of departure for the formation of capital  and the capitalist mode of 
production.457
This does not, of course, prove that Marx's was aiming at a Smithian narrative of the 
quasi-natural emergence of capitalism.458 Indeed, Marx adamantly refused that human 
beings  had a natural 'propensity to  truck,  barter,  and exchange'  despite  the fact that 
markets have existed long before capitalism.459 His basic argument was that markets had 
initially been marginal to the reproduction of communities, and only necessary in trade 
with foreigners. However, for Marx trade has a tendency to posit its own conditions. 
About this process, Marx writes:
The  first  way  in  which  an  object  attains  the  possibility  of  becoming  an 
exchange-value  is  to  exist  as  a  non-use-value,  as  a  quantum of   use-value 
superfluous to the needs of its owner. Things are in themselves external to man, 
and therefore alienable.  In order that  this  alienation [Veräusserung]  may be 
reciprocal, it is only necessary for  men [my emphasis] to agree tacitly [legal 
regulation  is  secondary]  to  treat  each  other  as  the  private  owners  of  those 
455 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 874.
456 Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor, 2nd ed (London: 
Verso, 2002), 211.
457 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 1059–60.
458 For a discussion of the idea that Marx begins Capital with a quasi-Smittian abstract, yet historical 
analysis of 'simple commodity production', see appendix 5.0.
459 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan, 
5th ed. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1904), Book I, Chapter II.
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alienable things, and, precisely for that reason, as persons who are independent 
of each other. But this relationship of reciprocal isolation and foreignness does 
not exist for the members of a primitive community of natural origin, whether 
it takes the form of a patriarchal family, an ancient Indian commune or an Inca 
state.460 The exchange of commodities begins where communities have their 
boundaries, at their points of contact with other communities, or with members 
of the latter.  However, as soon as products have become commodities in the 
external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become commodities 
in the internal life of the community.461
This interpretation is well documented in anthropology; most human 'economies' have 
historically  not  been  characterised  by  the  equivalent  exchange,  but  by  forms  of 
reciprocity  (gift-giving,  sharing,  potlatch)  or  hierarchical  distribution  (generational, 
gender based, etc.).462 We must also note something that Marx does not see: exchange 
itself tends to deepen the hierarchy of any community or family in which the surplus 
product is not collectively managed. When exchange is an option, those that manage the 
surplus have to choose between exchanging it  or sharing it  with other more remote 
community  members  who  might  need  it.  The  representatives  of  the  community  in 
relations  of  exchange,  generally  men,  gain  more  and  more  prominence,  the  choice 
between selling or distributing the surplus product greatly enhances their power over 
their dependants.463 The deepening of exchange is also a qualitative transformation of 
hierarchies; from an explicit customary hierarchy between members of a community to 
an economical hierarchy between individual strangers; this is accumulation on a small 
scale, through trade.464 This account stresses the emergent patters arising from everyday 
460 This logical sketch is based on the more complicated but still rather schematic distinction between 
Germanic, Roman and 'Asiatic' forms of society in the Grundrisse, 483–96.  
461 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 182.
462 David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
463 Silvia Federici's important work on the transition to capitalism, in focussing on the violence of the 
transition, looks into the consolidation of hierarchies involved in the expansion of everyday 
economic exchange. However, she makes the important point that it is only through primitive 
accumulation that the moral economies that dictate that the heads of the community have certain 
responsibilities for the reproduction of other community members is destroyed. Federici writes that 
'while in the upper classes it was property that gave the husband power over his wife and children, a 
similar power was granted to working-class men over women by means of women's exclusion from 
the wage.' Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation 
(Autonomedia, 2004), 98.
464 '...human beings become individuals only through the process of history. ... Exchange itself is the 
chief means in this individuation [Vereinzelung]. It makes herd-like existence superfluous and 
dissolves it.' Marx, Grundrisse, 496. See appendix 3.2. on the decoupling of reproduction and 
community.
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practices:  The generalisation of  exchange is  the  generalisation of  acts of  exchange, 
starting with contingent encounters between communities. The commodities'
quantitative exchange-relation is  at  first  determined purely by chance.  They 
become exchangeable through the mutual  desire  of  their  owners to  alienate 
them.  In  the  meantime,  the  need  for  others'  objects  of  utility  gradually 
establishes itself. The constant repetition of exchange makes it a normal social 
process. In the course of time, therefore, at least some part of the products must 
be produced intentionally for the purpose of exchange.465
The development of exchange – initially merely exchanging the surplus products of the 
reproductive work of the community – thus changes the very reproductive needs of the 
community as well as what, how and for what purposes it produces. This process is that 
of  the widening separation  between exchange and use,  between production for  the 
market and production for own reproductive  consumption. This leads to a deepening 
need  for  money to  mediate  exchange.466 The  existence  of  money is  here  seen  as  a 
'solution' to the problem of exchange, which constantly arises, asserts itself, so long as 
the problem of the opposition, the separation, between buying and selling, between use-
value  and  exchange-value,  persists.  'From that  moment  the  distinction  between  the 
usefulness of things for direct consumption and their usefulness in exchange becomes 
firmly established.'467 As Alfred Sohn-Rethel observes, exchange and use are mutually 
exclusive in time and space: the person who plans to exchange a commodity cannot 
consume  it;  the  one  who  consumes  a  commodity  cannot  exchange  it.  'Whenever 
commodity exchange takes place, it does so in effective “abstraction” from use. This is 
an  abstraction  not  in  mind,  but  in  fact.'468 In  other  words,  it  is  a  real,  or  practical 
abstraction.  Sohn-Rethel  connects  the  structure  of  the  real  abstraction  to  the  fetish 
character of the commodity in which the relations between producers ‘take the form of a 
social relation between the products of labour.’469 Commodity exchange means that all 
commodities and the labour that produced them mirror themselves in money. Exchange 
is  a  practical  abstraction from the qualitative dimensions  of  use-value and concrete 
labour, the establishment of a quantitative equivalence between the products. 
Acts of exchange, however, amount to a 'commodity society', and do not entail that 
465 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 182.
466 Ibid., 181.
467 Ibid., 182.
468 Sohn-Rethel, “Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology,” 25.
469 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 164.
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production becomes capitalistic. Insofar as people still own the land, there is a limit to 
the willingness to work for others, and a limit to the amount of time that is left after  
agricultural work for the production of goods for sale.470 Wage labour and production 
for  exchange  remain  marginal  to  the  overall  reproduction  of  the  members  of  such 
communities. Even if there is an odd Smithian entrepreneur, there will not be sufficient 
labourers to expand production, and even if there were, there would not be sufficient 
consumers. Under such conditions, labour can only be formally 'subordinated' to capital, 
while the mode of production itself has no 'specifically capitalist character.'471 Under 
these conditions we only have the existence of the medieval commercial and money-
dealing capital stressed by Banaji above. In his historical sketch on merchant's capital in 
Volume III of Capital, Marx shows that the problem of the generalisation of this type of 
capital is exactly that its capitalist character – its generation of a surplus (designated as 
C-M-C' as opposed to the the C-M-C of regular exchange), relies not on production, but 
on the mediation of exchange between commercially underdeveloped communities, and 
the exploitation of the price differences of goods in different countries. Commercial 
capital 'is simply mediating the movement between extremes it does not dominate and 
preconditions  it  does  not  create.'472 As  soon  as  the  countries  whose  production  it 
mediates  develop  their  commercial  capacities,  differentials  tend  to  equalise  and 
commercial capital declines.473 While commercial capital  expands trade  it does so by 
exploiting  existing  surpluses  rather  than  by systematically  creating  them.  Thus  'this 
development  [of  commercial  capital  and  commodification],  taken  by  itself,  is 
insufficient to explain the transformation from one mode of production to the other...'.474 
While  'sporadic  traces  of  capitalist  production'  are  found as  early  as  the  fourteenth 
century  in  certain  'Mediterranean  towns'  (Genoa,  Venice  and  Florence  are  obvious 
examples), it is only with the expropriation of a mass of people from their means of 
subsistence that the generalisation of capitalist  production and reproduction becomes 
possible.475 We here encounter the limits of the tale of  emergence:  the pre-history of 
capital,  in  which merchant  and usurers capital  did exist,  does  not  itself  provide the 
470 Also there is the problem of transportation: few goods in an economy that is overwhelmingly based 
on subsistence production will still be consumable after being transported to other regions that have 
insufficient indigenous production of that product.
471 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 900.
472 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume III, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin, 1981), 447.
473 Ibid., 446.
474 Ibid., 444.
475 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 900. On the unevenness and initial reversibility of this process, see 
appendix 5.2.
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conditions  for  the  generalisation  of  the  capital-relation,  and  the  establishment  of 
capitalism  as  a  mode  of  production  sui  generis.  As  Marx  notes  in  'Results  of  the 
Immediate Process of Production':
a highly developed commodity exchange and the form of the commodity as the 
universally  necessary  social  form  of  the  product  can  only  emerge  as  the 
consequence of the capitalist mode of production.476
This, in turn, is the condition of the law of value: 'the full development of the law of 
value  presupposes  a  society  in  which  large-scale  industrial  production  and  free 
competition obtain, in other words modern bourgeois society.'477 The existence of this 
mode of production is not merely a question of quantitative growth of merchant and 
usurers capital, but of a qualitative leap through which capital becomes a self-positing 
system:  '[o]nce  developed  historically,  capital  itself  creates  the  conditions  of  its 
existence (not as conditions for its arising, but as results of its being)'.478
The problem is not that Smith presupposes 'the notion of the capitalist', but that this 
figure  is  insufficient  for  explaining  the  generalisation  of  capitalist  production,  as  a 
condition  for  the  generalisation  of  capitalist  commodity  circulation,  as  the 
generalisation of the exchange abstraction.479 This condition lies in a very different form 
of primitive accumulation than the one suggested by Smith: '[t]he expropriation of the 
agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil is the basis of the whole process.'  
This is a process which at Marx's time had only been carried out 'in a radical manner' in  
England, but which was under way in all of Western Europe.480 
It is for forgetting this violent break, rather than for his presupposition of the capitalist-
prior-to-capitalism, in Adam Smith's explanation of capitalism that Marx indicts him. 
However, this lack of memory is conditioned by the very structure of the historical time 
of the capitalist mode of production itself: after onset of properly capitalist dynamics, 
476 Ibid., 949.
477 Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” 300.
478 Marx, Grundrisse, 459.
479 Sohn-Rethel's definition of capitalism in terms of the mode of social synthesis based on the 
exchange abstraction rather than on the abstraction of labour, is thus insufficient, as also pointed out 
by Moishe Postone Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical  
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 177–9.
480 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 876. This refers to the French translation, which was supervised and re-
edited by Marx himself. Kevin B. Anderson shows how the changes in this edition, many of which 
have not made it into the English translation, are crucial for understanding Marx's intellectual 
development further and further away from a uni-linear conception of history. See Kevin B. 
Anderson, Marx at the Margins : On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies (Chicago,   
IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 179.
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the  original  violence  is  perpetuated  through  the  'silent  compulsion  of  economic 
relations'; increasingly extra-economic force used only in exceptional cases.481 The myth 
or fantasy of the protocapitalist as the sole father of the present, is made possible by the 
absence of living memory. So let us now revisit Marx's reconstruction of a memory of 
the great rupture of primitive accumulation. 
4. A Historical Rupture: Expropriation and Looting
The theory of what is generalised contains within it the question: by which process of 
generalisation  is  the  generalised  (re)produced?  Marx's  analysis  of  primitive 
accumulation, as Balibar points out, 
depends on knowledge of the  result  of the movement … The analysis … is 
therefore,  strictly  speaking,  merely  the  genealogy  of  the  elements  which 
constitute the structure of the capitalist mode of production.482
The history of  primitive accumulation is  not  a  history of  genesis  in  the sense of  a  
prospective  analysis,  but  a  retrospective  genealogy  of  the  elements  of  the  capital-
relation. As Balibar's use of the Nietzschean term genealogy suggests – an apt term for 
Marx's method in these chapters – this is a story that focuses on the establishment of 
right  through  the  normalisation  of  violence.  Behind  the  English  words  force  and 
violence we find the German Gewalt, which positions us not in some pure extra-legal 
violence, nor fully within right, but at operation of force within right, or right as an 
operation of force. In another context Balibar outlines the semantics of this word: 
In  German  .  .  .  the  word  Gewalt has  a  more  extensive  meaning  than  its 
‘equivalents’ in other European languages:  violence or  violenza and  pouvoir, 
potere,  power (equally  suitable  to  ‘translate’  Macht or  even  Herrschaft , 
depending  on  the  context).  Seen  in  this  way,  ‘from the  outside’,  the  term 
Gewalt thus contains an intrinsic ambiguity: it refers at the same time to the 
negation  of  law  or  justice  and  to  their  realisation  or  the  assumption  of 
responsibility  for  them  by  an  institution  (generally  the  state).  This 
ambiguity . . . is not necessarily a disadvantage. On the contrary, it signals the 
existence of  a  latent  dialectic  or  a  ‘unity of  opposites’ that  is  a  constituent 
481 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 899. Étienne Balibar, “The Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism,” in 
Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1970), 283. 
482 Étienne Balibar, “The Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism,” in Reading Capital, trans. Ben 
Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1970), 279.
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element of politics.483 
The issue in the chapters on primitive accumulation is not so much violence 'pure and 
simple'  –  an  ideologically  charged  and  historically  unreliable  concept484 –  but  the 
theorisation of the inauguration or generalisation of the problem of bourgeois Gewalt,  
and the perpetuation in a different form of this founding violence in the displacement-
solutions of the problem and the struggles which attach to these. This Gewalt blurs the 
distinction  between  state  and  economic  power,  or,  to  be  precise,  this  violence 
establishes  the  conditions  under  which  the  distinction  between  economic  and  state 
power can be established:
These methods depend in part on brute force [brutalster Gewalt] … [b]ut they 
all employ the power of the state [Staatsmacht], the concentrated and organized 
force  [Gewalt]  of  society,  to  hasten, as  in  a  hothouse,  the  process  of 
transformation of the feudal  mode production into the capitalist mode, and to 
shorten the transition. Force [Gewalt] is the midwife of every old society which 
is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power [Potenz].485
Gewalt plays an important double role here: it is both extra-economic and economic. In 
its extra-economic brutality Gewalt breaks down resistances and forces the will of the 
state on subjugated populations. As an economic power it extends the reach and depth 
of capitalist firms, it helps actualise the capitalist system that was always the potential 
of the previous forms of proto-capital (merchant, usurers capital particularly). In terms 
of the modal categories, Gewalt is both a question of relations between actual forces – 
following the logic of domination, resistance, opposition, and war – and a concept of 
the temporal passage from potentiality to actuality. Only because it has also the latter 
characteristic  can it  institute  a new actuality:  it  does not  merely impose its  will  on 
resistant elements, it organises them when their resistance is broken down. Thus Gewalt  
in this double sense can result in the transformation of the economy into a self-positing, 
self-reproducing system with its 'silent compulsion', which only needs to resort to 'direct 
extra-economic force [außerökonomische, unmittelbare Gewalt]' in exceptional cases.486 
This transition is reliant on the existence of resistant populations in a form where they 
483 Étienne Balibar, “Reflections on Gewalt,” Historical Materialism 17, no. 1 (2009): 101.
484 Fredric Jameson, Representing Capital: A Reading of Volume One (London: Verso, 2011), 80.
485 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 915–6. For a critique of the metaphor of the midwife, see Federici, Caliban 
and the Witch, 118.
486 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 899.
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can be organised, and the existence of the economic means to organise them. The basic 
components of this 'primary equation' of the capitalist mode of production is capital and 
labour  in  large quantities;  while  this  chapter  looks at  the primitive accumulation of 
wealth  and  workers,  the  next  will  look  at  their  combination,  the  first  step  of  the 
emergence, the becoming-actual, of the capital mode of production.
5. The Primitive Accumulation of Free Workers
Nobody is forced to alienate his natural freedom, to  
sell, rent or hire himself, if he prefers to die of hunger.
- Moses Hess487
The  chapters  on  primitive  accumulation  demonstrate  the  deep  connection  between 
organisation and reproduction. They provide the genealogy of a mass of workers who 
cannot reproduce themselves without engaging in wage labour, that is, without letting 
themselves  be  organised  by  capital.  Organising  workers,  the  economic  power  of 
protocapitalist firms itself changes character qualitatively.  'In themselves, money and 
commodities are no more capital than the means of production of subsistence are', Marx 
writes,
[w]ithout a  class dependent on wages,  the moment individuals confront each 
other as free persons, there can be no production of surplus-value; without the 
production of surplus-value there can be no capitalist production, and hence no 
capital and no capitalist.488
The capital-relation consists of owners of means of subsistence, money and means of 
production eager to valorise what they have by putting others to work, and free workers 
forced to sell their labour to gain an income.  Such forms of capital already existed, 
according to Marx, in the form of usurer's capital and merchant's capital in the Middle 
Ages  and  Antiquity;  'before  the  era  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production  [they] 
nevertheless functioned as capital.'489 However, their generalisation through commodity 
circulation and production, without which there is no capitalist  mode of production,  is 
only possible when money and means of production can be put to work on a mass scale, 
487 Moses Hess, “The Essence of Money,” ed. Adam Buick, Rheinische Jahrbücher Zur 
Gesellschaftlichen Reform, Darmstadt (1845), 11.
488 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 1005.
489 Ibid., 914.
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i.e.  when there  exists  masses  of  'free'  willing  workers.  As  Marx notes,  'the  money 
capital  formed  by  means  of  usury  and  commerce  [two  medieval  phenomena]  was 
prevented  from  turning  into  industrial  capital  by  the  feudal  organization  of  the 
countryside and the guild organization of the towns.'490 That it  was 'prevented'  from 
transforming itself thus suggests that the drive was already there – as mentioned it was 
marginally realised in some larger towns – but that its  generalisation  was blocked.491 
These 'fetters' remained until the violence of primitive accumulation overthrew the old 
social relationships, by which the peasants was set free not only from feudal bondage, 
but from the land that had sustained them. Thus, Marx defines the free worker as a 
person free from 'the old relations of clientship, bondage and servitude' and from his or 
her means of subsistence.492 In Capital he spells out their specificity in that they are
[f]ree workers, in the double sense that they neither form part of the means of 
production themselves, as would be the case with slaves, serfs, etc., nor do they 
own the means of production, as would be the case with self-employed peasant 
proprietors.493
What  this  implies  is  a  shift  from  direct  wealth  extraction  through  domination  to 
capitalist exploitation, which happens through a structural compulsion to work. In the 
latter, the relation and quantity of exploitation is mystified.494 This relates to a crucial 
implicit change in relations of reproduction: the freedom from feudal ties also meant 
that former serfs were no longer 'part of the means of production.' The owner of the 
means of production has an interest in maintaining these means, i.e. taking care of their 
reproduction, whereas the reproductive expenditure is externalised in the case of free 
workers. Labour is therefore also 'free' in the sense that the capitalist does not have to 
pay the full reproduction/replacement cost (as long as there is a reserve of labour).
Whereas the worker is capital for the capitalist in the sense that he 'maintains 
himself',  … it is in the nature of this commodity, a labouring slave, that its 
buyer does not only make it work anew every day, but also provides it with the 
means of subsistence that enable it to work ever anew.495 
490 My emphasis. Ibid., 915.
491 Obviously this list is not exaustive; for instance, the guild-system actively worked against the growth 
of capitalism. See appendix 5.6.
492 Marx, Grundrisse, 507.
493 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 874.
494 For a comparison between exploitation of serf-labour (in the corvée system), slave-labour and wage-
labour, see Ibid., 680.
495 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume II, ed. Friedrich Engels, trans. David Fernbach, vol. 2 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1978), 516. 
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Serf and slave labour is a constant cost, wage-labour is a variable cost. With free labour 
it is thus possible to adjust production to market signals by cutting this variable cost.496 
The fall of this price in the case of wage labour is borne only by the workers, whereas in 
the case of slaves it is also borne by their owners.497 The advantage of free labour is 
therefore not just that it produces a surplus over and above the outlay of the capitalist 
(so does slave and serf labour), but that free workers, unlike guild members, drive down 
their cost through mutual competition, and that loss in the value of their labour-power is 
to the gain of the capitalist.  The definition of a 'free worker' suggests that beyond the 
legal figure of the free individual, which is at the centre of Marx's attention, there is a 
set of other reproductive strategies at play to make up for shortfalls in wages. In other 
words, the worker is not an atom, but an organism that reproduces itself through other 
relations of care and/or dependency. 
We can distinguish between two moments of Marx's sketch of this side of primitive 
accumulation:  First,  the  separation  of  commoners  from their  means  of  subsistence, 
through  enclosures  of  common lands,  direct  expropriation  of  agricultural  lands  and 
forests, and often also of dwellings. This is directly an ecological separation, one that 
tears former agriculturalists and herders away from their directly reproductive relation 
to the land.498 Secondly, by being driven off the land, local community structures are 
destroyed, the now landless masses roam the land as more or less atomised families and 
individuals. Primitive accumulation hence separates the former peasants not only from 
the means of their  (re)production,  but  from their  previous relations of reproduction, 
from  what  Marx  calls  the  commune  (die  Gemeinde)  in  the  Grundrisse.499 This 
expropriation, in Marx's narrative, was not part of a policy to create a working class. 
The  formation  of  a  proletariat  in  need of  wage labour  was,  instead,  a  coincidental 
product of the drive on the part of big landowners to expand sheep farming in order to 
profit  from high wool prices, resulting from the expansion of wool manufacture  in 
496 Charles Post, The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic  
Development, and Political Conflict, 1620-1877 (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 131–33. It 
should be noted that English labour was, at the time Marx was writing Capital, only free for capital, 
as workers were bound to their employers by the penal sanctions for breach of contract until 1875. 
Banaji, Theory as History, 14 and chapter 5.
497 On slavery, intensity of work and extraction of surplus-value, see appendix 5.3.
498 'It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic conditions of their 
metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their appropriation of nature, which requires explanation 
or is the result of a historic process, but rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of 
human existence and this active existence, a separation which is completely posited only in the 
relation of wage labour and capital.' Marx, Grundrisse, 489.
499 'Forms which precede capitalist production.' Notebooks IV and V, Ibid., 471–514.
 167
Flanders,  beginning  in  the  late  fifteenth  century.500 While,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
expansion of capitalist production had been limited by the guildsystem, feudal bonds 
and subsistence production, the growth of the proletariat rapidly outpaced the demand 
for labour. There was no way this rapidly expanding proletariat could be employed by 
the  then  only  nascent  British  manufactures.  Instead,  the  expropriated  commoners 
became paupers, surviving as beggars, thieves, or vagabonds, subject to the control of 
the so-called ‘bloody legislation’: 
at the end of the fifteenth and during the whole of the sixteenth centuries, a 
bloody  legislation  against  vagabondage  was  enforced  throughout  Western 
Europe. The fathers [and mothers] of the present working class were chastised 
for  their  enforced  transformation  into  vagabonds  and  paupers.  Legislation 
treated them as “voluntary” criminals, and assumed that it was entirely within 
their powers to go on working under the old conditions which in fact no longer 
existed.501
The  first  existence  of  the  proletariat  was  not  as  a  class  of  workers,  but  as  a 
heterogeneous  mass  of  people  surviving,  illicitly  or  illegally,  either  through 
vagabondage or theft, or through poaching, food collection in forests and fields, some of 
which  had recently  been theirs  by  tenancy or  customary right.  The problem of  the 
proletarian  condition  thus  allows  us  to  historicise  the  modern  emergence  of 
mechanistic-atomistic theories of the social in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. 
This very problem of the atomised individual is the problem faced by the early state.502 
Like the Roman proletariat, these folks could have continued to exist without becoming 
wage labourers. That they did become wage labourers needs to be explained. While 
legislation slowly forced proletarians into work (as we will see in the next chapter), the 
fact that there would eventually be work for a large part of the proletariat was an effect 
of the accumulation of wealth taking place side by side with the expropriations.503
500 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 878.
501 Ibid., 896.
502 Hansen, “Crisis and Organism”; C. B. Macpherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism:  
Hobbes to Locke, 1st Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
503 As Linebaugh and Rediker note, the first work given to expropriated peasants was often the work of 
primitive accumulation itself. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: The 
Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (London: Verso, 2002), 42–43.
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6. The Primitive Accumulation of Wealth
Marx lists several sources of this wealth in pre-capitalist towns, particularly the wealth 
of merchants and usurers. However, these capitals might appear as 'emergent forces' that 
took  hold  of  proletarians,  and  thereby  produced  industrial  capitalism,  only 
retrospectively. Capitalism proper was not a result of regular trade, nor protocapitalist 
production. Rather than a slow emergence, early capitals leaped ahead through violent 
processes of colonial looting. While rural populations were expropriated, new masses of 
wealth  began  to  flow into  England,  the  loot and  commercial  gain of  colonisation, 
between which there is little difference: 'commercial capital, when it holds a dominant 
position, is … in all cases a system of plunder.' 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and 
entombment  in  mines  of  the  indigenous  population  of  that  continent,  the 
beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa 
into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which 
characterize  the  dawn of  the  era  of  capitalist  production.  These  idyllic 
proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. Hard on their 
heels follows the commercial war of the European nations, which has the globe 
as  its  battlefield.  It  begins  with  the  revolt  of  the  Netherlands  from Spain, 
assumes gigantic dimensions in England's Anti-Jacobin War, and is still going 
on in the shape of the Opium Wars against China, etc.504
The looted wealth itself could only be turned into capital in the mother countries, i.e. 
where there was a proletariat in desperate need of food and shelter, if need be through 
wage labour. The colonies  themselves opened new markets for the commodities thus 
produced  –  and  venues  for  the  cheap  production  of  raw materials  for  the  English 
industries  by  native,  African  and  English  slaves  (indentured  servants).505 While  the 
proletarians at home were punished for their strategies of survival, the colonial system 
was itself financed by public debts, granted by the old banking system, expanding in 
tandem with the conquests. Colonial expansion in turn became the main way to service 
national  debts;  the  trade  and  commercial  wars  were  'forcing  houses  for  the  credit 
504 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 915.
505 Ibid., 918. Thus slavery was not particularly racialised in the early period of English colonisation of 
America. It was only under the development of the regime of free labour that 'slave' would come to 
be synonymous with 'black' in the common imaginary and law. Robin Blackburn, The Making of  
New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800 (London: Verso, 1997).
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system.'506 Furthermore, the modern system of taxation and the modern fiscal system 
developed for the purposes of further financing colonialism and the servicing of state 
debts.507 Whereas Hegel demonstrated that public police and welfare institutions would 
have to develop in response to the problem of the rabble (cf. chapter 3), we now see 
how other aspects of the state developed in order to facilitate colonial expansion and the 
violent containment of the proletariat.
7. The Global yet Local History of Capitalism
Commercial  capital  was  always  transcontinental,  and  expropriation  too.  Both  the 
emergent forces of capitalism and the violent rupture that allowed their generalisation 
were, from the start, part of the same intertwined process of trade, plunder, territorial 
colonisation,  and enslavement in which commercial  capital  and the state were often 
indistinguishable, or in which commercial capitalists took on state-like characteristics in 
the form of chartered companies. So the history of capitalism is not European in any 
narrow sense. Back to question of history: why do we speak of the 'beginning' of capital 
as being the primitive accumulation of paupers and wealth if capital reaches back to 
way before this happened in England? Why do we, as Banaji complains, maintain this 
intellectual  prejudice  against  commercial  capitalism  [which]  is  so  deeply 
rooted that whole swathes of the history of capitalism are ignored by Marxists, 
with  the  result  that  there  is no  specifically  Marxist  historiography  of 
capitalism...508
Marx's own reason for focussing on Britain as the nexus classicus of the capitalist mode 
of production, is that it here the first generalisation of commodity production becomes 
possible  in  the  form  of  first  modern  manufacture  and  then  modern  industry.  It  so 
happens,  in  Marx's  analysis,  because  this  is  where  we  witness  the  first  systemic 
combination of expropriated populations and accumulated wealth, giving birth to the 
industrial capitalist. Marx writes:
The different moments to primitive accumulation can be assigned in particular 
to Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and England, in more or less chronological 
order. These different moments are systematically combined together at the end 
506 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 919.
507 See appendix 5.4. on the role of national debt in primitive accumulation.
508 Banaji, Theory as History, 272.
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of the seventeenth century in England; the combination embraces the colonies, 
the national debt, the modern tax system, and the system of protection. These 
methods depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system.509
In  the  sketch  above,  the  foundation  for  capitalism  (considered  as  a  system  of 
generalised commodity production and circulation) is the combination of the expansive 
yet  for-themselves  ungeneralisable  tendencies  of  commercial  capitalism,  and  the 
creation of a workforce through expropriations. It is the combination of these processes 
that  is  the  condition  of  the  generalisation  of  commodity  circulation  through the 
expansion of commodity production. The 'previous' accumulation based on trade can be 
understood as emerging out of occasional and rather local exchange activities on the one 
hand, and more importantly out of the formation of merchant capital mediating between 
different  localities.  This  latter  mode  or  network  of  exploitation  is  surplus-value 
capturing,  but  not  surplus-value  producing.  It  was  always  already  translocal,  even 
transcontinental. Yet it did not, or only marginally, integrate the extremes it mediated. In 
other words, the producers mainly reproducing themselves through production for trade 
were few, while the vast majority of people had the vast majority of their needs covered 
outside  the  monetarised  markets.  Accumulation  through  pillage  and  expropriation, 
similarly, is described by Marx as both localised and transcontinental at once, yet such 
looting only transfers wealth, it does not constitute a mode of production, an organised 
system.
8. The Role of Violence in Transition
We have seen that the process described in the chapters on primitive accumulation is at 
once local and transcontinental, at once trade-based and violent, at once exploitative and 
expropriative, legal and para- or pre-legal,  a long term  emergent development and a 
break. Given the richness and complexity of these processes, and the many major points 
Marx makes in a rather summary way, it is not surprising that readings of the chapters 
on primitive accumulation often simplify the question of transition a great deal. These 
sometimes necessary simplifications can be used to group different readings, such as the 
historical and the logical readings outlined above. Despite fundamental differences, the 
narrative of the beginning of capital appears in either case to be a history of forms: the 
509 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 915.
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existence  of  embryonic  capitalist  forms  prior  to  capitalism  proper  or  the  eventual 
construction of  the capitalist mode of production. Whether we speak of the continuity 
of  capitalism  or  of  primitive  accumulation  as  a  leap  into  capitalism,  both  tell  the 
narrative retrospectively from the point of view of  developed  capitalism, they narrate 
the  history,  pre-history  or  genealogy  of  today.  Whereas the  narrative  of  emergence 
presents a process of incremental quantitative growth and integration, the narrative of 
the rupture sees only the qualitative leap that distinguishes modes of production.  In 
Marx's analysis these two approaches are inseparable.  Contra the apolitical mythology 
of Adam Smith,  his genealogy of primitive accumulation demonstrates that violence 
was the factor mediating between protocapitalist conditions and capitalism proper. If the 
narrative of pure emergence is incapable of understanding that the Gewalt of primitive 
accumulation  is  a  condition  of  possibility  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production,  a 
narrative of primitive accumulation which only sees  Gewalt would fail to understand 
many of the protocapitalist dynamics leading to primitive accumulation, and the pre-
existence of forces ready to exploit these processes.
It would thus seem that we need to combine the two narratives, of real teleologies and 
Gewalt:  as Marx writes, '[f]orce is the midwife [Geburtshelfer] of every old society 
which is pregnant with a new one.'510 It is possible that Marx is aware that the metaphor 
of birth risks lapsing into a historical rationalisation of violence in terms of stages, and 
natural processes, using the somewhat unusual masculine Geburtshelfer rather than the 
usual feminine Geburtshelferin or Hebamme. Still, in this schema violence is presented 
as a kind of vanishing mediator between two normalities, an event definitively past. 
This  entails,  as  noted  by  Vittorio  Morfino,  a  problematic  teleological  reduction  of 
violence  to  its  result,  which  keeps  us  from thinking the  contingency,  openness  and 
continuity of the history of violence.511 Rather than a 'birth' considered retrospectively, 
violence and force is action in a situation of contingency, even if it is action attempting 
to  reinforce  'necessity.'  Any  revolutionary  orientation  demands  that  we  are  able  to 
consider  violence  prospectively,  in  its  openness,  as  the  moment  of  contingent  force 
necessary to reproduce the necessities and compulsions of life under the capitalist mode 
of production.
But  if  we  don't  consider  teleology  retrospectively,  but  instead  in  terms  of  the 
510 Quoted above.
511 Vittorio Morfino, “The Syntax of Violence. Between Hegel and Marx,” Historical Materialism 17, 
no. 3 (2009), 81–100.
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combination of an emergent system, the passage from combination to organism, we 
understand how Gewalt can be thought in terms of actualisation. Furthermore, because 
this process of combination does not happen on the level of totality, but rather as a 
totalisation,  it  must  be  understood as  always related to  elements  external  and often 
opposed to it, which present resistances to it, i.e. which can only be dealt with through 
an  external,  extra-economic  use  of  violence.  If  the  actualisation  of  capital  must  be 
thought in terms of accumulation, the task here is to think the two sides of  Gewalt  as 
part of the same trajectory of accumulation.512
9. Modes of Accumulation and the Continuity of Gewalt
Often the difference between accumulation and primitive accumulation is taken to mark 
the  difference  between  violent  appropriation  of  wealth  and  normalised  'economic' 
accumulation  of  surplus-value.  For  many  years  the  most  common  position  among 
Marxists was that primitive accumulation refers to the beginning of capitalism only, as a 
form of founding Gewalt. However, in recent years, the contemporary significance of 
primitive accumulation has been stressed, it being argued that it continues to this day 
side  by  side  with  regular  accumulation,  not  merely  as  an  empirical  fact,  but  as  a 
structural feature of capitalism, necessitated by the laws of accumulation as such. In 
order to stress the continuity of primitive accumulation, David Harvey has coined the 
term 'accumulation by dispossession'.513 Hereby he also turns it into another form of 
capitalist  accumulation,  complimentary  to  accumulation  by  exploitation.514 
Terminologically, the continued existence of accumulation by  Gewalt  would only be 
'primitive'  in  the sense of  brutal,  and certainly not  Ursprünglich  or original,  to  use 
Marx's and Smith's terms, rather than the translation of Marx.  But as we have seen, the 
Ursprüngliche accumulation does not just refer to accumulation by brute force,  but to 
accumulation through trade and some commodity production prior to beginning of the 
capitalist mode of production proper. In fact, the exposition above has shown that Marx 
speaks  of  five types  of  'accumulation'  (through  trade,  interest,  tax,  immediate 
expropriation and exploitation) as existing prior to the capitalist mode of production 
proper. We need to understand at once the existence of all five prior to capitalism, and 
the qualitative shift that marks the beginning of the capitalist mode of production. To do 
512 We take the suggestive, but underdeveloped term 'trajectories of accumulation' from Banaji, but we 
use it for our own purposes here. It is thus becomes a different concept.
513 David Harvey, The New Imperialism, new ed. (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2005), chapter 4.
514 See also Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, new ed (London: Routledge, 2003)
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so, we reserve the term primitive or original accumulation for the historical, qualitative 
shift  that  created  the  conditions  of  the  mode of  production.  Further,  we will  try  to 
disentangle the questions of the transition between modes of production – a question on 
the level of reproductive totalities – from the question of different trajectories or modes 
of  accumulation.  While  the  former  problematic  is  orientated  towards  the  issues  of 
systemic structures and historical periodisation (raising the question of economic 'laws' 
or historic modes of necessitation), the latter deals with the analysis of accumulation in 
terms of the relations between heterogeneous social forces, historically, conjuncturally 
(East  Asia  Companies,  slaves  from the  Cross  River  region,  Florentine  weavers,  the 
colonized subjects of Portuguese Goa, etc).
On  the  terms  of  historiography  we  can  speak  of  these  approaches  to  history  as 
systematic-logical and genealogical respectively. But it also relates to the question of 
the orientation of practice: While the former is interested in the question of social form, 
the latter is interested in the question of social forces. Or, the interest of the former is 
revolutionary orientation, while the interest of the latter is strategic and conjunctural, 
i.e. the orientation of struggle and resistance.515 If both deal with a difference between 
accumulation by Gewalt (what we will call accumulation by trade and by dispossession) 
and accumulation through exploitation (capitalist accumulation), they do so differently. 
The  systematic  orientation is  interested  in  the  epochal  break  through  which 
accumulation through exploitation became dominant,  the strategic orientation in the 
different  character  of  struggles,  between  the  oppositional  struggles  of  expropriative 
accumulation  and  the  the  'unity-in-opposition'  (or  contradiction)  of  exploitative 
accumulation, irrespective of historic periodisation.
In this chapter we have seen that the analysis of struggles and strategies explain the 
historical emergence of the system, while the system, once dominant,  becomes self-
explanatory,  by  positing  its  own  presuppositions.  Capitalism,  in  other  words,  is  a 
process of actualisation facing the resistance of other modes of reproduction,  which 
once it  is  dominant,  becomes able  to  produce its  own conditions.  Yet the historical 
continuity of the five modes of accumulation, and of struggles and strategies, should not 
blind us to the epochal shift of the coming together of the capitalist mode of production. 
The question of this qualitative shift is that of the  generalisability  of capitalism, the 
question of the production of labour as an atomised mass seeking to be organised by 
capital in order to survive – all of this we will return to in chapter 6. The period of 
515  See appendix 5.7.
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primitive accumulation thus fundamentally  alters the meaning of the five pre-existing 
forms of accumulation. With capitalism, the accumulation of abstract monetary wealth 
comes to structure all of society. This in turn transforms the meaning of taxes, interest 
and trade, as they now longer extract wealth from a relatively stable productive base, 
but become aspects of a systemic teleology of every expanded accumulation. 
What  created  the  conditions  for  this  enormous  extension  of  accumulation  by 
exploitation was the violent intense period of expropriative accumulation. Massimo De 
Angelis provides a very useful conceptual explication of the relation between what we 
here call  expropriative and exploitative accumulation.516 De Angelis  demonstrates in 
three simple points that  separation is common to both forms of accumulation. Firstly, 
he shows that Marx in Capital Volume III insists that regular accumulation is simply 'the 
divorce  [Scheidung:  separation  or  scission]  of  the  conditions  of  labour  from  the 
producers raised to a higher power'.517 Furthermore, in the Grundrisse, we also find this 
theme: 'Once this separation is given, the production process can only produce it anew, 
reproduce  it,  and  reproduce  it  on  an  expanded  scale.'518 Once  commerce  becomes 
capitalist its corrosive force on communities is multiplied; now as before its effect is 
accumulation. Secondly, De Angelis notes how central the 'category' – or should we say 
problem – of separation is to Marx's critique of political economy. Thus, in continuation 
to the previous quote, Marx writes:
The objective conditions of living labour capacity are presupposed as having an 
existence independent of it, as the objectivity of a subject distinct from living 
labour capacity and standing independently over against  it;  the reproduction 
and realization [Verwertung], i.e. the expansion of these objective conditions, is 
therefore at the same time their own reproduction and new production as the 
wealth of an alien subject indifferently and independently standing over against 
labour  capacity.  What  is  reproduced  and  produced  anew  is  not  only  the 
presence of these objective conditions of living labour, but also their presence  
as independent values, i.e. values belonging to an alien subject, confronting  
this living labour capacity.519
This, as De Angelis points out, is the continuation of the problematic of the alienation of 
516 Massimo De Angelis, “Marx’s Theory of Primitive Accumulation: A Suggested Reinterpretation,” 
University of East London (March 1999); Angelis, The Beginning of History, 136–9.
517 Marx, Capital: Volume III, 354.
518 Marx, Grundrisse, 462.
519 Ibid.
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labour from its  own products and of the reification of social  activity,  present in his 
writings form the  1844 Manuscripts onwards. Thirdly, and finally, having established 
the common feature and centrality of what we call  accumulation through trade,  tax, 
expropriation and exploitation in seperation, we can establish that they are all aspects of 
the same problem, that they are all different modes or conditions of separation. The 
central  epoch-making  distinction,  however,  remains  that  between  expropriation  and 
exploitation:
The latter implies the  ex novo production  of the separation, while the former 
implies the reproduction − on a greater scale − of the same separation … The 
ex novo separation of means of production and producers corresponds to the ex 
novo creation of the opposition between the two, to the ex novo foundation of 
the specific alien character acquired by labour in capitalism.520 
While De Angelis stresses the continuous existence of both forms of separation under 
capitalism, he notes the epochal  shift  involved in the establishment of the capitalist 
mode of production, for which we have reserved the adjective primitive or original. He 
quotes Marx's point that while separation first arises in the interstices of pre-capitalist 
modes of production (trade, colonial plunder) and in the  decomposition  of feudalism 
(enclosures and expropriation), capitalism, 'once developed historically, … itself creates 
the conditions of its  existence (not as conditions for its arising,  but as results  of its 
being).'521 However, De Angelis fails to note that Marx proceeds to insist that these are 
'historic presuppositions...  which are past and gone…; they therefore disappear as real 
capital arises, capital which itself, on the basis of its own reality, posits the conditions 
for its realization.'522 What is past and gone is not expropriative accumulation – of which 
Marx writes much in his texts on colonisation in particular523 – but a situation in which 
capitals can arise and accumulate on their own. After the beginning of the capitalist 
system any new capital arising heterogeneously is born into a capitalist atmosphere.524 
Any new capital immediately finds itself submitted to the imperatives of the capitalist 
system. This must be related to the theme of the dominance of industrial capital over 
commercial capital; while the world market was a condition for the development of the 
capitalist mode of production, 'now it is not trade that revolutionizes industry, but rather 
520 De Angelis, “Marx’s Theory of Primitive Accumulation: A Suggested Reinterpretation.”
521 Marx, Grundrisse, 459.
522 Ibid.
523 To mention but one example, see Marx, Capital: Volume III, 451–2.
524 We here come back to Hegel's arguments against heterogenesis proper, cf. appendix 2.8.
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industry that  constantly  revolutionizes  trade.'525 Accumulation is  no longer  primarily 
based on the exploitation of differentials in trade and the expropriation of wealth, but on 
the production of surpluses; any product looted under developed capitalism will have to 
compete with the an immense collection of mass produced commodities, to paraphrase 
the beginning of Volume I.526 As Marx states in the Grundrisse: 'individual capitals can 
continue to arise e.g. by means of hoarding. But the hoard is [now] transformed into 
capital only by means of the exploitation of labour.'527 
If  the  strategic  conception  of  capitalist  accumulation  stresses  the  exteriority  and 
opposition of social forces and the contingent outcome of their struggles, the systemic 
conception  stresses  the  integration  and interdependence  of  these  forces  even  in  the 
struggle;  capital  and  labour,  for  instance,  as  dialectical  contradictions,  i.e.  as 
systemically mediated. While these perspectives can be taken as irreducible (we might 
say parallactic), their difference is none other than a methodological expression of the 
tension  between  the  orientation  toward  objectivity  and  revolution  and  subjective 
orientation towards practices of resistance and struggle.  To speak of orientation and 
strategy  on  the  level  of  history  is  to  think  these  together,  and  to  realise  that 
revolutionary practice can only proceed through struggle and resistance, but that it can 
only be revolutionary if the implicit or explicit horizon of this practice is orientated by 
the  need  to  overcome  capital.  The  question  then  becomes  whether  to  think  the 
overcoming of capitalism as the revolution of a system or as the abolition of a problem, 
that of separation.  Before we can raise this  question,  we need to elaborate how the 
theorisation  of  the  capitalist  system  is  possible  through  the  materialist  logic  of 
combination and organisation, rather than the always-already of the systematic dialectic, 
as actualisation and totalisation rather than as actuality and totality. 
10. Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen how primitive accumulation must be seen as the Gewalt  
that makes possible the generalisation of commodity production and circulation, and 
thus a passage from the existence of many dispersed capitals to the capitalist mode of 
525 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 918–9; Marx, Capital: Volume III, 451–55. See also footnote 49 for an 
example of the effects of the dominance of capitalist production on the conditions of slave-labour.
526 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 125. See Grundrisse for a more general statement of this issue: 'In all 
forms of society there is once kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations 
thus assign rank and influence to the others. ... Capital is the all-dominating economic power of 
bourgeois society.' Grundrisse, 107.
527 Marx, Grundrisse, 460.
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production proper. Furthermore, we have seen how capitalism as a mode of production 
extends as far as its conditions, the separation between wealth and labour, is in place. 
The chapters  on primitive accumulation cannot  therefore be taken to be exclusively 
about some primordial violence or virtuous trade, about rupture or continuity, or indeed 
about the emergence of capitalist-relations or of this or that individual capitalist. Rather 
it  is  focussed on the precise question  of  the conditions  of  capitalism as  a  mode of  
production, which is nothing but the question of the moment in which the combination 
('the primary equation') which makes possible the generalisation of capitalist production 
and circulation became possible and actual. 
We have seen that Marx gives force (Gewalt) a central place in his theory of history, 
from the remark that history progresses by its 'bad side' in The Poverty of Philosophy to 
the dictum in Capital that 'force is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant 
with a new one.'528 The Hegelian figuration of force here, as the extra-developmental 
means  by  which  historical  development  retrospectively  shows  to  have  happened, 
implicitly makes a distinction between two forms of  Gewalt:  that which helps bring 
about  a  new  society  and  that  which  does  not.  One  is  the  force  serving  a  role  in 
actualisation, the other not.529 The use of force is the moment of  contingency without  
which  actualisation  is  impossible.  The  use  of  force  within  an  ongoing  process  of 
actualisation – i.e. one where political wagers and constructive efforts take the place of 
Minerva's owl – can thus be inscribed into the theory of the tendencies of that process. 
This makes the question of the transition to socialism or communism crucial: only if 
this transition can be thought of as an already initiated process of actualisation can the 
revolutionary  use  of  force  be  given a  historical  meaning,  as  a  constituent  power  – 
otherwise there is only the reactive force against actualisation. Proletarian violence or 
resistance  has  therefore  no  affirmative  sense  to  an  orientation  within  a  process  of 
actualisation unless this orientation also finds itself part of a process of what we can call 
counter-actualisation, the actualisation within-and-against the dominant process. It is in 
this  connection that  a  formula such as that of communism as the actual (wirkliche) 
movement which abolishes the present state of things must be read. This thesis – which 
clearly  is  a  wager  based  on  an  orientation  vis-a-vis  the  unfolding  present  and  its 
problems – means that revolutionary practice is not just resistance against an intolerable 
condition but a constructive force, one aiming to construct a new actuality.
528 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 915–6.
529 Étienne Balibar shows that the same figure is active in Engels' theory of The Role of Force in  
History. Balibar, “Reflections on Gewalt,” 105.
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Chapter 6. The Becoming of Capital
History up to now is nothing other than the  
history of the regulation, the justification, the  
completion and the generalisation of robbery  
with murder and slavery.
- Moses Hess530
1. Introduction
In the last chapter we have seen how the capitalist mode of organisation is conditioned 
upon a separation of the producers from the means and relations of production and 
reproduction. This chapter gave us the elements of the capital-relation, a history of the 
conditions,  but not of the genesis  of the capitalist  mode of production.  The present 
chapter will ask: how did labour and capital combine? Here we cannot presuppose the 
capital-labour contradiction and the teleology of the capitalist mode of production. We 
will  see that  this  combination did not by any means happen by necessity,  but only 
through  an  arduous  process  through  which  force  (Gewalt),  economic  and  extra-
economic, played a major role in breaking down proletarian resistance. The use of force 
in the period of deep social crisis in which the capitalist mode of production took root in 
England in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was a means to abolish the disorder of 
the period. In this chapter we will focus on a reading of material history. However, we 
must note the connection between atomistic political theories and the problems of the 
period of the enclosures, civil war and developing market individualism, theorised in 
chapter 5.531 The imagination of society as an artificial rather than organic, 'body politic' 
promoted by Hobbes at the time, is indicative of his sensitivity to a situation in which 
the collapse of the old order had not yet given way to any new order, a situation in 
which  relations  between  possessive  individuals  were  external  and  mechanic, 
characterised by enmity, chance and fear.532 From the late eighteenth century on, we see 
530 Hess, “The Essence of Money”, section 4.
531 C.B. Macpherson provides an influential analysis of political theory in 17th and 18th Century 
England, which from our perspective fails to consider the importance of primitive accumulation as a 
condition for the intensity with which the questions of individualism and sovereignty were asked, as 
well as the strictly patriarchal nature of early possessive individualism. Macpherson, Political  
Theory of Possessive Individualism.
532 Ibid.
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how discourses on government were adopting the idea of the social organism, with its 
immanent  laws  of  organisation  and  reproduction,  in  Rousseau,  Quesnay,  Kant  and 
Hegel, in close tandem with the increasing integration of labour and capital and the new 
bourgeois philosophy of freedom, reconfiguring and normalising chance, enmity and 
fear.533 All these thinkers reflect on the fundamental problem of bourgeois society: the 
separation between individuals. Marx's early critique of atomism and his writings on the 
social  organism  for  the  Rheinische  Zeitung  analysed  in  chapters  1  and  2,  belong 
squarely to this period. While it is impossible here to account for the intricacies of this 
transformation, these remarks point to the important fact that the shifts in the use of 
natural  analogies  in  political  theory  strongly  mirrored  changes  in  social  relations. 
Nietzsche points our attention to the relation between philosophy and revolution: '[d]id 
Kant not see in the French Revolution the transition from the inorganic form of the state 
to  the  organic?'534 Here,  it  becomes  important  to  distinguish  the  moment  of  the 
formation of a compound social body under the sovereign and law, from the moment of 
the  organisation  proper  of  a  social  organism,  which  concerns  social  production and 
reproduction.  We  must  thus  complicate  and  open  the  narrative  of  the  intimate  co-
production  of  labour  and  capital,  which  closes  history  in  a  retrospective  reading. 
Foucault, perhaps surprisingly, provides a narrative that falls into the trap of intimacy, 
when  he  describes  the  developments  of  this  period  in  terms  of  the  functional 
interdependencies in something like one process of actualisation:
If  the  economic  take-off  of  the  West  began  with  the  techniques  that  made 
possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be said that the methods 
for administering the accumulation of men made possible a political take-off in 
relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power, which soon fell 
into  disuse  and  were  superseded  by  a  subtle,  calculated  technology  of 
subjection.  In  fact,  the  two  processes  -  the  accumulation  of  men  and  the 
accumulation of capital - cannot be separated; it would not have been possible 
to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an 
apparatus  of  production  capable  of  both  sustaining  them  and  using  them; 
conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful 
533 E-W. Böckenförde and G. Dorhn-van Rossum, “Organ, Organismus, Organisation, Politischer 
Körper,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe - Historische Lexikon Zur Politisch-Sozialen Sprache in  
Deutschland, ed. Brunner, O., W. Conze, R. Koselleck, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1978). 
See appendix 1.16.
534 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) §11.
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accelerated  the  accumulation  of  capital.  At  a  less  general  level,  the 
technological mutations of the apparatus disciplinary techniques sustained an 
ensemble of very close relations.535
While  this  passage  beautifully  points  to  the  relationship  between  Gewalt and 
accumulation, its perspective is that of the result of the process, the development of the 
bourgeoisie  and capital;  it  poses the problem of the over-accumulation of 'hands'  in 
primitive accumulation in terms of its solution, the creation of a productive apparatus 
that could absorb them. What goes missing is the time-lag between the problem and the 
solution,  and  the  alternative  solutions  to  the  problem,  those  coming  from  below, 
exerting the counter-force of resistance and aiming at other solutions.536
But  why and in what  sense was atomism and the  contingency of  social  relations  a 
problem, rather than, say, a  condition? In the past 60 years or so, the ethico-political 
affirmation of contingency in existentialist philosophy and certain strands of autonomist 
and  post-structuralist  theory  has  given  rise  to  the  doxa that  contingency  is  only  a 
problem for a subject that nostalgically seeks a stable foundation for meaning and a 
system of habitual regularity. However, thinking contingency as freedom in relation to 
the 'double freedom of labour' requires both a rosy picture of labour under the capitalist 
mode of production and its contrast with slavery.537 Socio-political contingency, which 
is what we are talking about here, is a matter of the reproduction of life at its level of 
habits  and  expectations.  Rather  than  simply  a  condition  of  freedom to  be  ethically 
affirmed, as stated by Marx and Epicurus in chapter 1, atomisation and contingency 
under capitalism is a problem of reproduction of both of individual bodies and existing 
relations of domination.538 In the face of the problem of such non-reproduction,  the 
problematic of organisation imposes itself: How to organise one's own reproduction, or 
how to organise one's subjects in order to control them? And, what force is necessary to 
organise  disorganised  bodies,  who,  like  Epicurus'  says,  have  within  their  'breast 
something that can fight against this force and resist it'?539 We must, however, be careful 
535 Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison (London: Penguin books, 1991), 
220–1. My emphasis.
536 At the beginning of his important historical study of this period, Peter Linebaugh criticises Foucault 
for underestimating resistances to 'the great confinement.' Peter Linebaugh, The London Hanged, 
new ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.
537 On the relation between the contingency of proletarian reproduction and compulsion, see Melinda 
Cooper, “Workfare, Familyfare, Godfare: Transforming Contingency into Necessity,” South Atlantic  
Quarterly 111, no. 4 (Fall 2012), 643–661; Ken C Kawashima, The Proletarian Gamble: Korean 
Workers in Interwar Japan (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).
538 Cf. appendix 3.2.
539 Titus Carus Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans. Martin Ferguson Smith, 2nd Revised edition 
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not to ask this question of force from the point of view of its result. Rather than seeing 
practical processes of organisation and  Gewalt as a process of historical actualisation 
and its midwife respectively, we must orientate ourselves towards the inventiveness and 
contingency of both organisation and Gewalt in the face of the problem of reproduction 
of bodies and/or of relations of domination. 
The  combination  Foucault  describes  did  not  come  about  automatically,  nor  is  this 
history exhausted by reference to its violent imposition. Other solutions to problem of 
the 'accumulation of men' were attempted, by those children, women and men who did 
not consider themselves accumulated, but in a situation of dire need, displaced as they 
were from their lands and commons. We must therefore understand  organisation and 
Gewalt  in the formative period of capitalism as parts of struggles over reproduction,  
which  also  entails  a  reinterpretation  of  political  contingency  as  the  contingency  of 
reproduction. Struggles against proletarianisation were not merely reactive, but posing 
the  organisational  problems of  alternative modes  of  reproduction,  even if  in  mostly 
scattered  and heterogeneous  ways.540 Here  I  will  first  focus  on  the  question  of  the 
contingency of the encounter between capital and what became labour, before I look at 
the conflictual process of their combination. 
2. The Difficult Combination of Labour and Capital
Retrospectively,  any mode of production can be seen as consisting of labourers and 
means of production. However, only under capitalism are they systematically in 'a state 
of mutual separation.' This means that they are 'only potentially factors of production.' 
For  any production  to  take  place  they  must  be  combined  [verbinden].  The 
specific form and mode in which this combination [Verbindung] is effected is 
what distinguishes the various economic epochs of the social structure. In the 
present case, the separation of the free worker from his means of production is 
the given starting-point, and we have seen how and under what conditions the 
two [elements] come to be united in the hands of the capitalist – i.e. as his 
capital  in  its  productive  mode  of  existence.  The  actual  [wirkliche]  process 
which  the  personal  and  material  creators  of  commodity  formation,  brought 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2001). quoted in Marx, The First Writings of Karl Marx, 171 and 
197.
540 Jim Glassman, “Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by ‘extra-
Economic’ Means,” Progress in Human Geography 30, no. 5 (October 1, 2006): 608–625.
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together  in  this  way,  enter  into  with  each other,  the  process  of  production, 
therefore itself becomes a function of capital – the capitalist process .... 541
However, reading Part 8 of Capital, it becomes clear that the combination of capital and 
labour did not happen automatically once the elements were constituted in primitive 
accumulation.  In a letter to the editors of the Russian populist journal  Otecestvenniye 
Zapisky  written  ten  years  after  the  first  publication  of  the  chapters  on  primitive 
accumulation, Marx stresses that the mediation of what becomes labour and capital is in 
no way a necessary or automatic effect of their co-existence: 
the  plebeians  of  ancient  Rome  …  were  originally  free  peasants,  each 
cultivating his own piece of land on his own account.542 In the course of Roman 
history  they  were  expropriated.  The  same  movement  which  divorced  them 
from their  means of  production and subsistence involved the formation not 
only of big landed property but also of big money capital.  And so one fine 
morning  there  were  to  be  found  on  the  one  hand  free  men,  stripped  of 
everything except their labour power, and on the other, in order to exploit this 
labour, those who held all the acquired wealth in possession. What happened? 
The Roman proletarians became, not wage labourers but a mob of do-nothings 
more  abject  than  the  former  “poor  whites”  in  the  southern  country  of  the 
United States, and alongside of them there developed a mode of production 
which was not capitalist but dependent upon slavery.543 Thus events strikingly 
analogous  but  taking  place  in  different  historic  surroundings  led  to  totally 
different results.544
The separation between workers and the means of production is only the condition of 
generalised  commodity  production  and  circulation;  the  two  elements  do  not 
automatically combine. The chapter on the 'Bloody Legislation' against vagrancy shows 
that  it  took  a  massive  effort  by  the  state  to  create  the  conditions  under  which  the 
accumulated land and the masses of surviving proletarians would be combined, rather 
than face each other in a real opposition. This question is of crucial methodological 
541 Marx, Capital: Volume II, 2:120. Translation altered. 
542 Note that Marx follows here the partriarchal Roman property law, and the reduction of women, 
children, slaves and dependents of the person of the pater familias. See also appendix 3.4.
543 On poor whites, slaves and revolution, see appendix 6.1.
544 'By studying each of these forms of evolution … one will never arrive there by the universal passport 
of a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-
historical.' Karl Marx, “Letter from Marx to Editor of the Otecestvenniye Zapisky, 1877,” in Marx 
and Engels Correspondence (International Publishers, 1968).ublishers, 1968). 
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importance as it opens for a theorisation of the historicity of the systematic dialectic 
itself, not in terms of a logical periodisation, but in terms of social struggles, resistances 
and practices of exchange and production. The question is: how did that, which became 
capital and labour, come to relate dialectically, how did they come to be mutually-yet-
antagonistically presupposing? Marx's  systematic dialectical logic is the logic of the 
always-already  of  the  system,  a  synchronic  or  teleological  vision  of  the  dialectical 
whole, as seen in chapter 4.545 The logic of mediation we are interested in here is the 
logic of the becoming of the system, out of hitherto separate elements. This will allow 
us  to  orientate  ourselves  not  just  to  the  systemic  contradiction  inherent  in  this 
totalisation, but to understand the problem which both are articulated in response to. 
While the system is the set of relations between parts (machines, bodies, infrastructure, 
etc.) which reproduces itself even as individual parts are rendered superfluous, die or 
are  scrapped,  it  only  works  as  a  totalising  process  insofar  as  it  is  successful  in 
organising the bodies that reproduce it; the condition for its capacity to organise them is 
the problem, which the system is an answer to and which it reproduces: namely that of 
the separation-combination of proletarian bodies and the means of production. Before 
capital is the 'always-already' of the capital-labour contradiction it is the unsolved open 
problem of reproduction, which reoccurs in crisis, and which the permanent crisis of 
surplus-populations is constantly posing (chapter 7). 
3. Contested Reproduction
Banaji and Balibar, as seen in chapter 5, read the chapters on primitive accumulation as 
a  retrospective account  of the historic  emergence of the elements that  make up the 
capitalist  teleology.  However,  if  we avoid considering the account  in  these chapters 
from the perspective of its result,  we will see that the text, contrary to the common 
reading, deals not only with the 'accumulation' on opposite sides of the two components 
of the capital-relation, but with a struggle over the reproduction of the proletarians. This 
starts  with the repression of alternative forms of reproduction such as vagabondage, 
theft  and  poaching,  and  proceeds  to  extra-economic  regulation  of  wages  and  the 
working day.  Already in the  Grundrisse  Marx notes  that  the 'propertyless  are  more 
inclined to become vagabonds and robbers and beggars than workers.'546 In the chapter 
545 And as argued in Bue Rübner Hansen, “The Value-Form as Real Synthesis” (MA Dissertation, Kings 
College, 2009).
546 Marx, Grundrisse, p.736.
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on the 'Bloody Legislation' in Capital, he shows how it took an extensive use of force to 
drive the poor into the workplaces. In Marx's description, the pauperised peasants only 
become wage workers en masse through the activity of the state. 
Thus were the agricultural folk first forcibly expropriated from the soil, driven 
from  their  homes,  turned  into  vagabonds,  and  then whipped,  branded  and 
tortured by grotesquely terroristic laws into accepting the discipline necessary 
for the system of wage-labour.547 
Marx lists a number of laws, issued in England by Henry VII, Henry VIII, Edward VI, 
Elizabeth I, James I, and in France and the Netherlands, by Louis XVI and Charles V 
respectively. He makes clear that these laws were needed to restore social order, and to 
instil labour discipline into the vagabonds and 'idlers'. Thus, vagabonds were arrested 
and forced to work at a given wage, or to work as slaves for food.548 Mobile 'free labour' 
under these conditions thus had to be coerced through violence and labour discipline. 
Yann Moulier-Boutang describes the response to this spread of free labor as the 'great 
fixation  of  labour.'549 Silvia  Federici,  as  well  as  Papadoupoulos,  Stephenson  and 
Tsianos,  invite  us  to  read  the  history  of  vagabondage  in  this  period  as  a  mode  of 
resistance against feudalism, and the Bloody Legislation as a means of the ruling class 
to  regain  control  in  the  face  of  popular  movements  and  micro-resistances.  Thus 
Papadoupoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos write that '[p]eople do not escape their control. 
People escape. Control is a cultural–political device which comes afterwards to tame 
and eventually to appropriate people’s escape.'550 However,  while escapes from feudal 
bondage were surely an ongoing cause of migration throughout the Middle Ages, in 
Marx's  interpretation  only  the  expropriation  of  the  agricultural  population  and  the 
enclosure of the commons can explain the sudden explosion in vagrancy in England in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Marx stresses here the protocapitalist motives of the 
new nobility551 in this  not-yet-capitalist  society as a reason for the expropriations: a 
changing economic situation – the growth of wool manufacture in Flanders and the rise 
in wool prices – gave the feudal lords of England a means to bypass their dependence 
547 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 899.
548 Ibid., 897.
549 Yann Moulier Boutang, De L’esclavage Au Salariat : Economie Historique Du Salariat Bridé   
(Presses Universitaires de France - PUF, 1998), 291.
550 Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos, Escape Routes: Control and 
Subversion in the Twenty-First Century (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 43.
551 'The old nobility had been devoured by the great feudal wars. The new nobility was the child of its 
time, for which money was the power of all powers.' Marx, Capital: Volume I, 879.
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on the labour of a large section of the bonded peasantry and the struggles that came with 
this dependence. It became more profitable for them to fill the land with sheep than 
feudal serfs growing crops for direct consumption on the manor by themselves and the 
lord.552 But the mobility of the new proletariat was not total and often not sufficient for 
capital. In many cases, former feudal serfs would now pay rents for their dwellings, and 
receive wages for  the work on the lands  of the lord.  'Free labour'  was in  this  case 
indirectly coerced into work, a coercion made possible by their lack of mobility.553 This 
particularly hit  women, whose mobility,  as Silvia Federici  notes, was constricted by 
their greater risk of sexual assault while travelling, and by their caring duties towards 
children and the elderly.554 On the other hand, the excessive number of hands in relation 
to work caused a surge in crime, while hitherto accepted activities became criminalised. 
The  problem was  not,  strictly  speaking,  that  there  was  not  enough  work  for  these 
workers, but that they were not “nomadic” enough; to solve this problem the otherwise 
imprisoned workers were kindly turned into immigrants, that is forcibly deported to the 
colonies as convict and indentured servant labour.
It  may  easily  seem  that  the  Bloody  Legislation,  introduced  over  several  hundred 
years,555 was at first merely a means to deal with the destabilising effects of proletarian 
migration  and  crime,  and only  later  became a  way to  drive  proletarians  into  wage 
capitalist labour. However, the fact that such laws were necessary brings our attention to 
two further aspects of the proletarian condition, at least at this historical conjuncture: 
that proletarians had the will and the capacity to refuse work. While the profoundly 
abject and degrading character of work at the time explains their will to escape work, 
only the existence of  alternative practices of  survival  and reproduction explains  the 
ability to refuse. We are thus not only dealing with resistance in a relation of Gewalt but 
also with alternative attempts to organise reproduction. The central, merely implicit yet 
inescapable argument in Marx's account of the Bloody Legislation, is not the attempt to 
control the escape of labour (as claimed by Moulier-Boutang) or to appropriate its flight 
(Papadoupoulos  et  al.),  but  another  example of  an attempt to  direct  the capacity  of 
proletarians  to  reproduce  themselves.  The  separation  of  labour  from  the  means  of 
(re)production was not  itself  sufficient  to  secure the imposition  and stability  of  the 
552 Ibid., 878–79.
553 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), The 
Pelican Marx Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 736; “Bloody Legislation against the 
Expropriated” Marx, Capital: Volume I, 896–904. 
554 Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 127.
555 Marx's chapter on the Bloody Legislation covers the period from 1530 to 1825.
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capital-relation, i.e. the regularity and sufficiency of the real abstraction or alienation of 
labour. Here we might mention three such forms of proletarian self-reproduction outside 
and inside the wage relation, all of which were addressed by the bloody laws, even if 
not mentioned by Marx. 
Firstly, as noted by Federici, women of the growing proletarian masses regulated inter-
generational  reproduction  through different  forms of  birth-control,  the  repression  of 
which is the subject of her analysis of the early modern obsession with demographics, 
the nascent state and church regulation of reproductive health, and the witch hunts.556 
Secondly, vagabonds as well as the less mobile could refuse wage labour because they 
found  strategies  of  collectively  or  individually  appropriating  means  of  subsistence 
(theft,  poaching,  land occupations,  food riots,  etc.).  Indeed,  England was shaken by 
strong egalitarian and landless movements (the Levellers and the Diggers) and a large 
number of food-riots across the country in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, i.e. 
forms of what we can call re-appropriative and antagonistic reproduction.557 Finally, as 
mentioned by Marx, the anti-combination acts which were effective from the fourteenth 
century to 1825, were introduced very early on to ban workers'  combinations (trade 
unions). In this lies a whole history of forms of solidarity and struggle to improve work 
conditions.558 Furthermore, Marx notes, 
[t]he rising bourgeoisie needs the power of the state, and uses it to 'regulate' 
wages, i.e. to force them into the limits suitable for making a profit, to lengthen 
the  working  day,  and  to  keep  the  worker  himself  at  his  normal  level  of 
dependence. This is an essential aspect of so-called primitive accumulation.559
The issue common to struggles around mobility and wage labour was the struggle for or 
against the alternative or parallel relations of reproduction, as well as the struggles for 
improved  reproduction  waged  by  proletarians.  The  atomisation  and  separation  of 
workers did not automatically lead to their mutual indifference, or to their organisation  
by capital. When separated, these atoms swerved and composed in configurations of  
self-organised reproduction beyond the family. If we see the introduction of these laws 
556 Federici, Caliban and the Witch, particularly 87-91.
557 See Linebaugh and Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra, 15–29. For the Diggers, see Christopher Hill, 
The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution, new ed. (London: 
Penguin, 1991), 110ff.; on riots, see Roger B. Manning, Village Revolts: Social Protest and Popular  
Disturbances in England, 1509-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
558 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 901, 903. For 18th century riots, see E. P. Thompson, “The Moral 
Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present no. 50 (February 1, 
1971): 76–136.
559 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 899–900 .
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and the institutional arrangements necessary to implement them as core moments of the 
development of the modern state, we begin to understand this state as a solution to the 
problem brought  about  by primitive accumulation,  namely the separation of  a  great 
mass  of  people  from the  means  of  their  reproduction.  As  a  solution,  the  laws  are 
crucially premised on not questioning the result of primitive accumulation. Rather they 
are attempts to ameliorate  consequences of primitive accumulation, through organising 
the  dispossessed  into  a  system  of  social  reproduction,  thereby  perpetuating  the 
separation.  Papadopoulos,  Stephenson and Tsianos point  in  this  direction when they 
write that 
national  sovereignty  is  not  primarily  organised  around  the  oppression  of 
singular potentialities. Its main objective is not the suppression of those social 
groups which attempt to escape. Rather, modern national sovereignty attempts 
to absorb unruly potentialities by including them in its social reproduction.560
However, the fact that core functions of the modern state, such as the police, labour law, 
and workhouses (as an example of an institution that pacifies, profitably or not, the 
unemployed) were created to deal with the destabilising impact of a proletarian class 
not fully and organically integrated into social reproduction, must also be related to the 
subversive effects  of  its  self-reproduction.  Thus,  the repressive  depotentialisation of 
labour's self-reproduction, its subordination under the wage, did play a role as a means 
to guide the actualisation of the potentiality of labour into capitalist social reproduction, 
through  the  wage.  Before  the  power  of  the  mass  can  be  exploited,   it  must  be 
disorganised, turned into a mass. The moment of depotentialisation is essential because 
it  allows us  to  recognise a  proletarian  power which could not  be included into  the 
reproduction  of  capitalist  social  relations,  a  collective  negativity  vis-a-vis  capitalist 
relations.  The  proletarian  power  was  antagonised  and  antagonistic,  first  because  it 
demanded reproductive autonomy, and only later political participation. Whereas early 
resistance against expropriations can be seen as a  defensive  struggle, the demands for 
land and access to the commons made by the Diggers at a point where the enclosures 
for many was an established fact,  meant that what had been a  reactive struggle  for 
concrete  communities  (with  all  their  internal  hierarchies),  mutually  separated  by 
distance, could become a generalised affirmative struggle for 'the abstract' – i.e. as yet 
unactualised  –  idea  of  the  commons,  of  egalitarian  communes.561 Furthermore,  such 
560 Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, Escape Routes, 8.
561 On the relation between the memory of the commons and the emergence of a utopian imaginary in 
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demands  were  immediately  radical  insofar  as  they  could  only  succeed  through 
immediate appropriation of wealth.
A similar, but non-antagonistic development is described in the last chapter of Capital,  
titled  'The  Modern  Theory  of  Colonization.'  Here  Marx  sarcastically  shows  how 
colonial  administrators – who at home and in principle were proponents of the free 
market – had to set an artificial price on 'virgin soil' in the colonies in order to force new 
immigrants and colonists into wage labour. The aim was to 'prevent the labourers from 
becoming independent landowners until others had followed to take their place.'562 Marx 
describes this drive to the land as the 'anti-capitalist cancer of the colonies', However, he 
doesn't draw wider theoretical consequences from this example, except to illustrate a 
point about political economists. This chapter is not really about the colonies, but about 
the secret discovered in the New World by the economists of the Old World, namely 
that 'capital  is  not a thing,  but a social  relation between persons which is  mediated 
through things' and that this mediation has as a fundamental condition the 'expropriation 
of the worker', i.e. the destruction of alternative ways of reproduction.563 
4. Proletarian Reproduction Under Capitalism
Primitive accumulation,  as  seen in  chapter  5,  violently  destroyed previous  modes of 
reproduction. It ruptured the old feudal bonds, as well as the peasants' organic tie to the 
land, and left individuals atomised and bereft of the means and relations necessary to 
survive  and  actualise  their  potentials.  It  posed  reproduction  as  a  historical  human 
problem by posing it abstractly.564 Marx's retrospective view focuses on how this process 
lead  to  the  creation  of  a  mass  of  proletarians,  who had to  combine  with  capital  as 
workers  in  order  to  survive.  However,  we also  see  in  his  narrative  the  outline  of  a 
different  set  of  histories  of  struggles  against  the  enclosures,  food  riots,  and  of  the 
criminalised,  and  thus  subversive  strategies  of  survival  and  reproduction.  The 
impotentiality of individuals had to be enforced by the state, their propensity to combine 
autonomously or within and against their workplaces made the process of the integration 
of the proletariat into work-life a protracted process. 
More and Shakespeare, see appendix 6.2.
562 This is quoted from Wakefield's England and America by Marx, Capital: Volume I, 939. From here 
we could develop an interesting analysis of the American settler and frontier mythology as an 
expression of popular desires to escape wage labour.
563 Ibid., 931 and 940.
564 Cf. appendix 3.2.
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In  tandem with  the  repression  of  other  modes  of  survival,  money  developed into  a 
general condition for participation in society: if you don’t have it you are compelled to 
obtain it, be it by working, stealing, selling yourself or by marrying someone who has 
money.  In  other  words,  proletarians  had  and  have  to  reproduce  themselves  through 
exchange. However, this gives us nothing but the abstract social  form through which 
labour is reproduced; indeed the ways in which labour takes this form are innumerable. 
Behind  the  common  problem  of  the  proletarians  (dispossession  of  means  of 
re/production) and their common 'solution' (money) lies a manifold of heterogeneous 
modes of life through which the proletarian condition can and must be lived. Thus, as 
Silvia Federici shows, 
primitive accumulation … was not simply an accumulation and concentration 
of exploitable workers and capital. It was also an accumulation of differences 
and divisions within the working class, whereby hierarchies built upon gender, 
as well as ‘race’ and age, became constitutive of class rule and the formation of 
the modern proletariat.565
What is also implied here is that as the reproduction of the proletariat became mediated 
through the wage, it did not abolish proletarian self-reproduction; the wage has very 
rarely been high enough for workers to obtain all the means of their reproduction (food 
ready for consumption, sex, cleaning, health care) directly on the market.566 Instead, the 
wage became a form through which the unpaid reproductive work of women, but also 
of  children  and  other  dependants,  was  mediated  through  the  mostly  male  wage, 
producing what  Mariarosa  Dalla  Costa  calls  the  patriarchy  of  the  wage.567 Whereas 
Marx's analysis focuses first on the accumulation of 'men', and then on their production 
and  reproduction  of  capital  through  their  exploitation,  authors  such  as  Federici, 
Fortunati,  Dalla Costa and James provide a theory of the condition of possibility of 
Marx's  analysis:  the  production  and  reproduction  of  labour  power  itself.568 To 
understand the history of how struggles over reproduction started to wane, it is therefore 
not  enough  to  analyse  the  integration  of  proletarians  in  wage-labour  and  the 
criminalisation of alternative reproductive practices. We must understand with Federici 
565 Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 64.
566 Ivan Illich, Shadow Work (Boston: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1981).
567 Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of the  
Community (Bristol: Falling Wall Press, 1973).
568 Ibid. See also Mariarosa Dalla Costa, “Capitalism and Reproduction,” The Commoner 8, no. 
Autumn/Winter (2004).
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how one effect of this war on women, whose most violent episode was the witch-hunts, 
was that the proletariat was split.569 This effect of this war was not just the primitive 
accumulation  and  disciplining  of  women's  bodies  by  capital,  but  ultimately  the 
subordination of proletarian women to proletarian men. For these men the struggle for 
reproduction was often – and once alternative routes were exhausted mostly – a struggle 
to find women who could reproduce them. To the macro-Gewalt of the clergy and the 
state,  a  micro-Gewalt  of  the  everyday  was  added,  often  drawing  on  the  discursive 
resources  and  images  produced  by  the  former.  Economic  compulsion  and  extra-
economic violence are inseparable but yet distinguishable under capitalism.
The  destruction  of  the  different  forms  of  reproductive  self-organisation  of  the 
proletarians, did not entail a destruction of proletarian reproduction as such, but the 
creation of the modern nuclear family, within which unpaid reproductive work took care 
of the reproductive needs of children and wage workers, so the workers could remain 
free-floating mutually  competitive productive  atoms.  Hence  we can see the  modern 
family as an essential survival-unity in a condition of insecurity.
5. From the Chemism of Money to the Teleology of Capital
If primitive accumulation is a process that tends to produce an atomised populace, we 
have  seen  why  the  basic  unity  of  bourgeois  society  is  mostly  the  family,  and  why 
'individual' and 'person' could also in the modern period, as it had in Roman law, refer to 
a  man  and  his  dependants.  This  legal  subsumption  is  merely  another  side  of  the 
subsumption of reproductive activities under the dominance of the person standing in an 
exchange relation with society, i.e. the person mediating the reproduction of the family 
with society. Here we shall look at this mediation, the chemism through which the social 
atoms  are  combined,  and  how  these  combinations  are  organised  into  the  social 
'organism'  and  submitted  to  the  teleology  of  capitalism.  This,  following  the  layered 
relational logic of Hegel's  Philosophy of Nature (see chapter 1), gives us the moment 
from the  non-dialectical  exteriority  of  the  separated  parts  to  the  systemic-dialectical 
organisation.
We cannot presume that the first encounters of the new proletarian mass with paid labour 
for  others  was  with  capitalist  wage-labour.  As  day  labourers  or  servants,  nannies, 
569 Federici, Caliban and the Witch; Leopoldina Fortunati, The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework,  
Prostitution, Labor and Capital (New York: Autonomedia, 1995).
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soldiers, cooks, etc., many paupers engaged in wage and wage-like relations with the 
wealthy  without  producing  commodities;  the  class  opposition  became  mediated  by 
money without inscribing itself immediately or without residue in the social teleology of 
capital accumulation. The practical abstraction from use-value that comes with any sale 
– of commodities and labour-power alike – became more and more common. In other 
words,  money  and  wage-labour  become  the  two  primary  mediations  through  which 
masses  of  people  gain  access  to  goods  needed  for  their  reproduction.  Drawing  on 
Hegel's notion of chemistry as the power of division and combination, Marx had already 
in 1844 noted the 'chemical power' of money:
If money is the bond which ties me to human life and society to me, which 
links me to nature and to man, is money not the bond of all bonds? Can it not 
bind  and  loosen  all  bonds?  Is  it  therefore  not  the  universal  means  of 
separation? It is the true agent of separation and the true cementing agent, it is 
the chemical power of society.570
In the Grundrisse, Marx insists that this power of money to mediate between atomised 
individuals  is  not  a  form  of  independence  as  much  as  a  mutual  indifference  and 
separation. While individuals seem
free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom; 
... they appear thus only for someone who abstracts from the conditions, the 
conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into contact...571
Proletarians  only  become wage-labours  because  their  separation  from the  means  of 
production  (partially  violently  maintained,  as  we  have  seen)  compels them  to  be 
reconnected by money. Labour's own power to 'combine and separate', and to give form, 
can  only  be  realised  through  the  mediation  of  money.572 The  chapters  on primitive 
accumulation allow us to historicise the monetarisation of social relations, and relate it 
to the question of reproduction573: only after the separation brought about by primitive 
accumulation  do  we approximate  conditions  under  which  '[t]he  nexus  of  society  is 
established by the network of exchange and by nothing else.'574 The  'abstraction,  or 
idea ...  is  nothing more than the theoretical expression [Ausdruck] of those material 
570 Marx, “1844 Manuscripts,” 377.
571 Marx, Grundrisse, 163–4.
572 See Marx's reference to Pietro Verri, also quoted in Chapter 4. Marx, Capital: Volume I, 133.
573 Matt Hampton, “Money as Social Power: The Economics of Scarcity and Working Class 
Reproduction,” Capital & Class 37, no. 3 (October 1, 2013): 373–395.
574 Sohn-Rethel, “Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology,” 29. 
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relations which are their lord and master.'575 
Here,  the  barriers  to  the  generalisation  of  capitalist  relations  were  removed,  both 
through the destruction of the guild system and the creation of a mass market in workers 
and goods. This marks a shift in social reproduction from straightforwardly organic and 
generally  local  relations  of  reproduction,  where  people  reproduced  themselves 
communally and rarely moved around.  In a  monetary economy,  social  reproduction 
functions through the 'chemical' combination and separation of atomised individuals. 
Money  pure  and  simple  does  not  fundamentally  change  the  elements  which  are 
combined, nor does it abolish their  differences, or the contradiction characteristic of 
their  mediated  separation.  Indeed,  '[m]oney  does  not  create  these  antitheses  and 
contradictions;  it  is,  rather,  the  development  of  these  contradictions  and  anti-theses 
which creates the seemingly transcendental power of money.'576 Here again, we see the 
logic by which a solution to a problem, that  of the opposition between buying and 
selling, does not abolish the problem, but perpetuates it and raises it to a higher level, by 
turning into a contradiction. Marx does not present the development of money, however, 
as simply a development from ordinary commodity exchange; the chemical power of 
money comes to prevail through measures imposed by force, such as the change of taxes 
and rents paid in kind into monetary taxes and rents, a point to 'to be developed further', 
as Marx notes to himself.577
The general separation enforced by primitive accumulation opens the question of the 
recombination of elements in order to make them productive and to guarantee 'public 
safety.' Here we must leave the noisy sphere of monetary exchange and enter into the 
hidden abode of production; not, however, to see how surplus-value is produced, but to 
see how the lost potentialities of the workers are recombined – through capital – into the 
body of social labour. The issue of whether and how to combine separated elements is a 
constant theme in the period of early capitalism, of political theory – in the notions of 
the state of nature and the social contract, for instance, as in Hobbes' artificial model of 
society as the formal subordination of individuals considered as mechanical forces, as in 
575 Marx, Grundrisse, 164.
576 Ibid., 146.
577 Ibid. It is noteworthy that money, taxes and the commodification of land were particularly important 
for the monetisation of the colonies, as a way to force the colonised populations as well as 
proletarian settlers to produce for the market or engage in wage-labour. Marx, Capital: Volume I, 
chapter 33. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard 
University Press, 1982), 165. For an very useful discussion of colonial taxation, partially a corrective 
to Marx, see Mathew Forstater, “Taxation: A Secret Of Colonial Capitalist (So-Called) Primitive 
Accumulation,” University of Missouri – Kansas City Working Paper No. 25 (n.d.).
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state, and in political economy, as in  Mirabeau, a moderate in the French revolution 
quoted by Marx. Mirabeau takes the result of primitive accumulation for granted, when 
he  discusses  the  relative  merits  of  large-scale  factories  and  farms  (manufactures or 
fabriques  réunie)  consisting  of  the combination  of  many small  expropriated  sites  of 
production, and isolated workshops:
The combined workshop (fabrique réunie) will prodigiously enrich one or two 
entrepreneurs, but the workers will only be journeymen, paid more or less, and 
will  not  have  any  share  in  the  success  of  the  undertaking.  In  the  isolated 
workshop (fabrique séparée),  on the contrary no one will  become rich,  but 
many workers will be comfortable.578
Marx clearly is of a different mind, yet he does not dispute Mirabeau's analysis, but 
simply situates it in relation to 'the contemporary [late eighteenth century] position of a 
large part of the Continental manufactures', for whom the development of 'combined 
workshops'  still  seemed  'artificial  and  exotic.'579 However,  Marx  notes,  the  small 
workshops and homesteads, consisting of families, would soon be competing with the 
large-scale industries and farms made possible by the emergence of a 'home market.'580
In  chapter  14,  titled  the  'Division  of  Labour  and  Manufacture',  Marx  presents  the 
development of co-operation based on the division of labour (i.e. manufacture) as an 
initially  'spontaneous  formation'  bringing  together  craftsmen  of  a  certain  trade  or 
combining different trades in one workshop, within the limits of the guild system.581 
Capitalist  production  proper,  as  we  have  seen,  requires  the  combination  of  a  large 
number of dispossessed workers at once, and the destruction of the limitations of the 
guild system. This kind of production introduces the particular kind of proletarianisation 
which  is  the  de-skilling  of  the  worker.582 But  it  also  gives  rise  to  the  specifically 
capitalist form of large-scale co-operation (Vol. 1, chapter 13), which consists at once in 
the dis-empowerment of the individual, as noted, and the creation of a collective organic 
power:
Being independent  of  each  other,  the  workers  are  isolated.  They enter  into 
relations with the  capitalist, but not with each other. Their co-operation only 
578 Quoted by Marx, Capital: Volume I, 910.
579 Ibid.
580 Ibid., chapter 30.
581 Ibid., 485, 457. 
582 On the crippling effects of proletarianisation and the division of labour in Marx and Adam Smith, see 
appendix 6.3.
 194
begins  with the  labour  process,  but  by then  they  have  ceased to  belong to 
themselves. On entering the labour process they are incorporated into capital. 
As  co-operators,  as  members  of  a  working  organism,  they  merely  form  a 
particular mode of existence of capital. Hence the productive power developed 
by the worker socially is the productive power of capital.583
The integration of proletarians into capitalist production requires the destruction of the 
former  communal  relations  and  means  of  (re)production,  i.e.  the  destruction  of  the 
previous  mode  of  production  through which  peasants,  for  instance,  could  reproduce 
themselves.  The  power  of  atomised  individuals  is  merely  potential,  the  path  to  its 
actualisation either goes through criminalised activities or wage labour; they are kept 
from composing in ways other than with capital. The chemical question of combination 
of labour and money through wage-labour is, however, still  a question of  contingent  
encounters.  It  is  only when these encounters  become regularised  in  a  new mode of 
(re)production that we can speak of the development of systemic necessity proper.
Such  only  becomes  possible  because  the  vast  productive  potential  of  capitalist  co-
operation  finds  a  market  for  the  goods thus  produced.  This,  finally,  leads  us  to  the 
establishment  of  an  organic  relation  between  capital  and  labour,  one  dialectically 
contradictory,  relating to  their  mutual  reproduction:  Whereas  previously,  the produce 
brought to the market amounted to a small portion of the overall goods consumed, as 
most peasants produced their means of subsistence themselves, the expropriations have 
created not only the conditions of capital and labour – their existence as naked wealth 
and labour capacity – but also the demand for the goods produced capitalistically: only 
through the separations of primitive accumulation can the home market arise. The issue 
is that the destruction of a large number of the small workshops in the rural domestic 
industry makes the remaining incapable of satisfying the needs of social reproduction, 
and renders them vulnerable in competition with larger combined farms and industries 
precisely  because  these  can  supply  this  market  with  reproductive  goods.  It  is  this 
'organic'  question  of  the  functional-relational  capacity  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  social 
reproduction,  rather  than  the  question  of  the  comparison  and  opposition  between 
productive facilities of different magnitudes, which gives the conditions by which large 
producers can drive out or subsume smaller workshops, i.e. turn them into a network of 
subsidiary and low-paid producers of raw materials for larger industries.584 This opens 
583 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 451.
584 Ibid., 911. Note that such subsidiary producers can produce very cheaply because they depend on 
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the question of the new temporality,  the synchronic,  or  synchronising and expansive  
temporality of capital:
The collective worker, formed from the combination of the many specialized 
workers, draws the wire with one set of tooled-up hands, straightens the wire 
with another set, armed with different tools, cuts it with another set, points it 
with another  set,  and so on.  The different stages  of the process,  previously 
successive in time, have become simultaneous and contiguous in space. ... This 
simultaneity … arises form the general co-operative form of the process of as a 
whole.585
It  proceeds  by  imposing  a  rhythm  on  the  manifold  of  workers  it  organises  like  a 
nineteenth-century conductor,586 but also by increasingly 'subdividing handicraft labour' 
and  'riveting  each  worker  to  a  single  fraction  of  the  work.'587 Subordinated  to  the 
workday, bodily lived duration is not abolished but subordinated: 'constant labour of 
one uniform  kind disturbs the intensity and flow of a man's vital forces, which find 
recreation and delight in the change of activity itself.'588 
6. The Movement of Capital
Before the development of the capitalist mode of production, accumulation was mostly 
a non-reproductive process. Whether through expropriation, interest on debt or trade, 
surpluses  were  generally  merely  transferred  from  A to  B.  At  this  time,  capitalist 
exploitation took place only in few branches of production in certain towns, and rarely 
included  the  whole  commodity  chain.  The  epochal  shift  introduced  with  the  the 
capitalist mode of production is that this process is made reproductive. Capital comes 
back to posit its own beginning: M-C-M'. Whilst the line of regular trade begins and 
ends  with  the  material  consumption  of  wealth,  C-M-C,  two  encounters  between 
individual atoms that eventually compose each with a product, in capitalism this process 
other forms of income or cultivate small plots of lands for the market on the side.
585 Ibid., 464.
586 'All directly social or communal labour on a large scale requires, to a greater or lesser extend, a 
directing authority, in order to secure the harmonious co-operation of the activities of individuals, 
and to perform the general functions that have their origin in the motion of the total productive 
organism, as distinguished from the motion of its separate organs. A single violin player is his own 
conductor: an orchestra requires a separate one.' Ibid., 448.
587 Ibid., 464.
588 Ibid., 460. See also E.P. Thompson's seminal article “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial 
Capitalism,” Past & Present 38, no. 1 (December 1, 1967), 56–97.
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gets a life of its own.  Marx, as we have seen in the previous chapter, often likens the 
capitalist mode of (re)production to an organism.  Life, notes Hegel, is a very precise 
moment designating the articulation of chemical component into a living process: 'life is 
a perenniating chemical process.'589 For him, complex life is distinguished from simple 
life by being an organised whole. The organising function is called the soul: '[e]ach 
member  has  the  entire  soul  within  it,  and  is  only  independent  through  its  being 
connected with the whole.'590 For Marx, capitalism is precisely defined by being a 'self-
valorising-value' or 'value in process', which he speaks of in several places as the soul of 
capital.591 Thus he speaks of capital as a 'social soul' that enters the body of labour and 
products,592 when they are organised as elements in the life process of capital. Whereas 
the  labourers  had  previously  worked  the  land  and  made  products  for  their  own 
reproduction, the sustenance of their bodies is now predicated on helping the soul of 
this new mode of production wander:
While productive labour is changing the means of production into constituent 
elements  of  a  new  product,  their  value  undergoes  a  metempsychosis 
[Seelenwandrung]. It deserts the consumed body to occupy the newly created 
one. But this transmigration [Seelenwandrung] takes place, as it were, behind 
the back of the actual labour in progress.593
Contrary to the common impression that this focus on the 'metaphysical subtleties' of 
capital is merely a satirical play with metaphors, our reading goes some way to show 
that these natural-historical concepts are precise notions of relationality, organisation, 
and reproduction. When money becomes capital, or rather when C-M-C becomes M-C-
M' we have the shift from a chemical to a teleological process, i.e. from encounters that 
might  produce  sequences,  to  a  self-reproducing  and  expansive  system.  This  is  the 
'natural historic' logic of organisation which underlies what Antonio Negri calls Marx's 
'method of the tendency.'594 However, the most precise layers of Marx's discourse are 
obviously those that critically work through the concepts of political economy, precisely 
589 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature II, 219. See also Cinzia Ferrini, “The Transition to Organics: Hegel’s 
Idea of Life,” in A Companion to Hegel, ed. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (Chichester: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2011).
590 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature III, 13, §337.
591 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 253–57. See appendix 6.4. on the 'soul' of capital. David McNally is one of 
the few to give attention to this, even if his reading ultimately stretches the idea of the soul in a 
metaphoric direction. Monsters of the Market (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 125.
592 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 909. My emphasis.
593 Ibid., 314.
594 Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 
1991).
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because the concepts of political economy refer to real abstractions. 
So the epochal beginning of the capitalist mode of production marks the moment in 
which accumulation becomes a self-expanding self-positing process of self-valorisation. 
The extraction of surplus-value which drives this process takes two forms. These two 
modes are the extraction of absolute and relative surplus-value: The former is related to 
strategies for increasing the total number of hours worked by increasing the workday 
and the workforce. The latter seeks to increase the intensity and productivity of work, 
by employing more and more machinery:
The production of absolute surplus-value turns exclusively on the length of the 
[social]  working  day,  whereas  the  production  of  relative  surplus-value 
completely revolutionizes the technical processes of labour and the groupings 
into which society is divided. It therefore requires a specifically capitalist mode 
of production, a mode of production which, along with its methods, means and 
conditions,  arises  and  develops  spontaneously  on  the  basis  of  the  formal 
subsumption of labour under capital. This formal subsumption is then replaced 
by a real subsumption.595
In formal subsumption, capital exploits a given labour process as it finds it by extracting 
the difference between the cost of labour-power (i.e. its means of reproduction) and the 
products of labour. This difference is absolute surplus-value.596 In real subsumption, the 
telos of capital organises the labour process itself in order to extract greater surplus-
value  relative to  other  capitals,  through  the  introduction  of  labour  saving 
technologies.597 Real and formal subsumption, as well as relative and absolute surplus-
value,  are  systemic-logical  concepts,  however,  they  often  also  play  a  periodising 
function  in  Marx.  They  can  thus  help  us  trace  the  narrative  of  the  shift  from the 
dominance  of  trade  and  manufacture  to  industrial  capitalism,  which  we  have  seen 
above, is the historical expression of the development of real subsumption out of formal 
subsumption.  As  Marx  writes,  with  real  subsumption,  'capitalist  production  ... 
establishes itself as a mode of production sui generis and brings into being a new mode 
of  material  production.'  What  this  means  is  that  it  produces  not  only  profits,  but 
capitalist social relations; capital thus begins to produce its own conditions.598 
595 Ibid., 645. My emphasis.
596 Ibid., 1021.
597 Ibid., 1025.
598 Ibid., 1035.
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[O]nly  capitalist  commodity  production  is  an  epoch-making  mode  of 
exploitation, which in the course of its historical development revolutionises 
the entire structure of society by its organisation of the labour-process and its 
gigantic  extension  of  technique,  and towers  incomparably  above all  former 
epochs.599
As long as capital can  extend  this day, or more precisely  extend the time of surplus-
labour absolutely, by employing more workers who were hitherto out of work, or by 
lengthening the working day of the existing workforce, there is little pressure to invest 
in labour-saving machinery.  The extraction of relative surplus-value happens exactly 
where  the  extension  of  the  workday  reaches  the  limit  of  the  number  of  workers 
available within a given capital's field of operation, the limitation of the length of the 
working day whether by custom, struggle or law, and the 'natural'  limitations of the 
working  day,  the  24  hours,  or  the  number  that  a  given  body  can  labour  before  it 
collapses physically or psychically. 
Capital's  two  fundamental  strategies  of  exploitation,  the  production  of  absolute  or 
relative surplus-value, give us two different logics of capitalist expansion (totalisation) 
on the level of social capital (in the process of expanded reproduction). On the one hand 
there is the connective and extensive logic of formal subsumption, and on the other the 
intensive and organisational logic of real subsumption. However, at this point we have 
only understood capital itself an expansive process of self-reproduction – and it cannot 
be understood as an organic process until we understand how it posits not only itself, 
but its presuppositions.
7. Simple and Expanded Reproduction
To reproduce itself, capital must reproduce its starting point, namely the elements of the 
capital-relation,  capital  and  the  proletarians.  Marx  calls  the  process  of  the  constant 
renewal  and  perpetuation  of  the  starting  point  simple  reproduction.600 Capitalist 
reproduction is the reproduction of the problem of the capitalist epoch, the separation of 
proletarians  from  the  means  of  production,  i.e.  a  reproduction  of  a  whole  set  of 
mediations  and  contradictions.  In  this  process,  the  workers  reproduce  capital  by 
reproducing  themselves,  and  capital  reproduces  them  as  workers  through  its  self-
599 Marx, Capital: Volume II, 120. 
600 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 716, 723.
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reproduction:
the worker himself constantly produces objective wealth, in the form of capital, 
an  alien  power  that  dominates  and  exploits  him;  and  the  capitalist  just  as 
constantly produces labour-power, in the form of a subjective source of wealth 
which is  abstract,  exists  merely  in  the physical  body of  the  worker,  and is 
separated from its own means of objectification and realization; in short, the 
capitalist produces the worker as a wage-labourer.601
Note that it is capital – the product of labour – that reproduces the worker as worker. As 
workers consume  capitalistically produced goods, they benefit both the capitalist and 
the  state  since  they  reproduce  the  workforce.  Whereas  simple  reproduction  merely 
requires  that  value  is  realised  as  surplus-values  and  that  any  surplus  is  consumed, 
expanded reproduction requires that surplus-value is transformed back into new capital, 
variable and constant, i.e. that capital expands.602
As simple reproduction constantly reproduces the capital-relation itself, i.e. the 
presence of capitalists on the one side, and wage labourers on the other side, so 
reproduction on an expanded scale, i.e. accumulation, reproduces the capital-
relation on an expanded scale, with more capitalists, or bigger capitalists, at 
one pole, and more wage labourers at the other pole.603
For this reason Marx can say that '[a]ccumulation of capital is therefore multiplication 
of the proletariat.'604 While the relation that hereby comes to include ever more dead and 
living labour (capital and workers respectively), it is not by any means symmetrical. 
While  the telos  of the workers is  to  reproduce themselves,  they can only do so by 
reproducing  capital,  i.e.  by  helping  capitalism  realise  its  goal,  which  is  not  the 
reproduction of the working class itself, but its own expanded reproduction. Capitalism, 
as Marx, notes is not aimed at production for needs, instead its  differentia specifica is 
the valorisation of capital; 'The production of surplus-value, or the making of profits, is 
the  absolute  law  of  this  mode  of  production.'605 This  means  that  the  ever-growing 
proletariat is not secured its reproduction in the process:
601 Ibid., 716. And: 'The capitalist process of production, therefore, seen as a total, connected process, 
i.e. a process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also 
produces and reproduces the capital-relation itself; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the 
wage-labourer.'  Ibid., 724
602 Ibid., 725, 727.
603 Ibid., 763.
604 Ibid., 764
605 Ibid., 769
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'Proletarian' must be understood to mean, economically speaking, nothing other 
than  'wage-labourer',  the  man  who  produces  and  valorizes  'capital',  and  is 
thrown onto  the  street  as  soon  as  he  becomes  superfluous  to  the  need  for 
valorization.606
Again, we note that Marx's analysis is one of the reproductive necessities of capital, and 
of the proletariat insofar as it is under the systemic compulsion of the capitalist mode of 
production.  Proletarian  reproduction  is  secondary  to  the  extent  that  it  is  rendered 
inorganic  as  soon  as  capital  has  no  need  for  it  (in  fact  the  higher  the  organic 
composition, in Marx's terminology, the lower the ratio of living labour to machinery). 
Apart from driving capital's mode of expansion (intensive or extensive) and mode of 
subsumption (connective or organisational) the two forms of surplus-value extraction 
also determine this organic composition: the search for absolute surplus-value increases 
the component of variable capital (labour-power), while the search for relative surplus-
value increases the component of constant capital.
8. The Industrial Reserve Army and Struggles Over Wages
Thus, again, we find that the proletarian condition is that of being in and out of work. 
'This  exchange',  writes  Marx  in  the  Grundrisse, 'is  tied  to  conditions  which  are 
accidental for him [or her], and indifferent to his [or her] organic presence. He [or she] 
is thus a virtual pauper.'607 In an absolute sense, the separation of capital from the means 
of reproduction is what compels proletarians to sell their labour-power. Because of this 
enforced condition of proletarian non-reproduction, its virtual poverty, the contingency 
of the sale of labour-power can work as a systemic disciplining mechanism. This returns 
us to the question of the centrality of the free labourer for capital. Unlike the slave who 
is bought once and for all by the owner, and is thus a fixed cost that can only be sold at  
a loss if its value falls, the wage-labourer is a variable cost to capital, who can be let go 
when there is no need for their labour. The ultimate whip of free capitalist wage-slavery 
is homelessness and starvation.
The  industrial  reserve  army  [of  the  unemployed],  during  the  periods  of 
stagnation and  average prosperity, weighs down the active army of workers; 
during the periods of over-production and feverish activity, it puts a curb on 
606 Ibid., 764
607 Marx, Grundrisse, 604.
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their pretensions. The relative surplus population  is therefore the background 
against which the law of the demand and supply of labour does its work. It 
confines the field of action of this law to the limits absolutely convenient to 
capital's drive to exploit and dominate the workers.608
Here, Marx explicitly states again how capitalism is not the meeting of two opposed 
classes, but the contradiction between two classes  mediated  by capital itself: 'capital 
acts on both sides at once. ... The movement of the law of supply and demand of labour 
on this basis completes the despotism of capital.'609 Marx mentions two situations in 
which the price of labour might rise, apart from 'violent conflicts' between labour and 
capital. Firstly, the price of labour may rise if it does not interfere with accumulation. 
Second, accumulation may slacken because of a rise in the labour cost, given that there 
are less profits to gain. This very slackening of accumulation lessens the demand of 
labour, whereby the price of labour falls again. Thus the rate of accumulation is  an 
independent  variable,  on  which  the  rate  of  wages  is  dependent.610 This  gives  us  a 
seemingly cyclical disciplining concept of capital's domination over labour.611
The  organization  of  the  capitalist  process  of  production,  once  it  is  fully 
developed, breaks down all  resistance.  The constant generation of a relative 
surplus  population  keeps  the law of  the supply and demand of  labour,  and 
therefore  wages,  within  narrow  limits  which  correspond  to  capital's 
valorization requirements. The silent compulsion of economic relations sets the 
seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker.612
Marx is very well aware of the limitations of unionism that is limited to the workers 
already organised by capital. To suspend the action of the law of supply and demand of 
labour,  a  suspension  of  the competition  between the  employed and unemployed is 
needed.  However,  as  soon  as  the  creation  of  a  reserve  army  is  made  impossible, 
capitalist reproduction is threatened. Under these circumstances 'capital ... rebels against 
the “sacred” law of supply and demand, and tries to make up for its inadequacies by 
608 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 792.
609 Ibid., 793
610 Ibid., 770
611 As we will see in the next chapter, Marx points to a secular tendency underlying these periodic 
fluctuations of wages. This secular tendency will itself undermine workers combinations by 
producing an ever greater surplus-populations. See also Geert Reuten, “The Inner Mechanism of the 
Accumulation of Capital: The Acceleration Triple - A Methodological Appraisal of Part Seven of 
Marx’s Capital, Volume I,” in The Constitution of Capital, ed. Riccardo Bellofiore and Nicola Taylor 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
612 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 899.
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forcible means.'613 Thus the problem of capitalist reproduction is not solved through the 
'silent compulsion' of economic laws alone. This is the political side of the laws of the 
capitalist economy. In other words: the laws are only laws insofar as they are lived by 
classes in themselves or for-themselves (unionisation is acceptable)614; the laws are no 
longer laws when faced with the proletariat for-itself.  This means that despite its talk 
about  the  despotism  of  capital  breaking  down  all  resistance,  Capital  orientates  us 
towards  the  openness  of  the  relation  of  forces  at  the  site  where  the  economic  and 
juridical  passes  over  into  Gewalt,  where  the  economic-contractual  regulation  of 
relations between formally equal legal individuals, turns out to be a relation of force 
between  extra-legal  collective  forces  (unified  or  not):  'Between  equal  rights  force 
[Gewalt] decides.'615 Discussing the struggle over the working day, Massimiliano Tomba 
writes:
The  Gewalt that seeks to determine the level of wages does not lead to civil 
war, but can, at most, achieve a provisional compromise; a compromise that, by 
its nature, is marked by violence. The compromise is never desired as such, but 
comes to be accepted, and as such contains within itself a coercive moment: it 
hides the intention to take up again as soon as it becomes possible the goal that 
it was necessary to give up. Compromise politics can be a “peaceful struggle”, 
but does not eliminate violence; on the contrary, it reproduces it.616
When Marx speaks of the struggle over the working day, we have a struggle premised 
on  primitive  accumulation;  it  is  never  fully  managed  nor  legally  stabilised.  The 
exteriority of forces therefore remains in place, and, furthermore, is inscribed into the 
interiority of the capitalist mode of production. 
The genealogy of  the passage  from the  exteriority  of  the 'class'  opposition to  class 
contradiction does not show that the exteriority of forces of capital and labour is totally 
cancelled out, but that the relationship between them is determined by a set of rules and 
compulsions that are set by what Marx calls 'the pre-dominant kind of production.'617 
613 Ibid., 794.
614 Michael Krätke, following Rosa Luxemburg, goes as far as saying that there is no 'socially necessary 
labour time' without workers' combinations. The individual workers cannot gain a wage that allows 
their reproduction in the buyer's-market of capitalism without trade unions. Michael Krätke, “A Very 
Political Political Economist: Rosa Luxemburg’s Theory of Wages,” in Rosa Luxemburg and the 
Critique of Political Economy, ed. Riccardo Bellofiore (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), 139–174.
615 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 344.
616 Massimiliano Tomba, “Another Kind of Gewalt: Beyond Law Re-Reading Walter Benjamin,” 
Historical Materialism 17, no. 1 (2009), 128.
617 Marx, Grundrisse, 106–7.
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But given the analysis we have established in the current and previous chapters, this is 
always  also related  to  force  and hegemony.  No clear  distinction  between economic 
domination and extra-economic power is possible when we consider the system from 
the point of view of processes of combination and organisation. As Negri writes, 
capital is always a relation of power (of force), that whilst it might be able to 
organize  a  solid  and  overbearing  hegemony,  this  hegemony  is  always  the 
function of a particular command inside a power relation.618
The formal overdetermination of the field of struggle by one of its classes (this is what 
gives the dialectical formula: “capital = capital-labour”), does not abolish Gewalt, but 
sets out the rules and stakes of the struggle. Labour thus becomes a player within a 
game whose parameters are set up by capital and the state. E.P. Thompson puts this 
beautifully with respect to the historical process through which the proletariat combined 
with and was organised by capital:
The  first  generation  of  factory  workers  were  taught  by  their  masters  the 
importance of time; the second generation formed their short-time committees 
in the ten-hour movement; the third generation struck for overtime or time-and-
a-half. They had accepted the categories of their employers and learned to fight 
back within them. They had learned their lesson, that time is money, only too 
well.619
Marx already points to the fact that this gradual integration of the working class is not 
just a matter of embodied labour-time but of subjectivity. As commodity production is 
generalised, there is the development of 'a working class which by education, tradition 
and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural 
laws.'620 
9. Conclusion
Endnotes point out that the periodisation of capitalism helps us avoid the 'metaphysics 
of a theory of class struggle in which every historical specificity is ultimately reduced to 
618 Antonio Negri, “Communism: Some Thoughts on the Concept and Practice,” in The Idea of  
Communism (London: Verso, 2010), 155.
619 Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,” 86. On the strongly racialised and 
colonial character of Marx's discussion of the work-ethic, see appendix 6.0.
620 Capital: Volume I, 899. 
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the eternal recurrence of  the same.'621 In this chapter we have aimed to show how the 
struggles for proletarian reproduction went from being a struggle in opposition to the 
state and capital,  to increasingly becoming a struggle integrated with capital  and in 
contradiction with it, rather than in opposition to it. Yet the alternative of periodisation 
and invariable sameness obscures the fact that the proletariat lives the problem of its 
reproduction in many different ways within any given period, as well as the fact that 
proletarianisation and expropriation are ongoing processes (cf. chapter 5). As Federici 
says,  primitive  accumulation  is  also  an  accumulation  of  differences  within  the 
proletariat.622 This means that the struggles of any given period cannot be reduced to 
any simple formula; the issue is not to ask which 'subject would be adequate to real 
subsumption'  in  this  period,  but  how  do  we  compose,  combine  and  organise  the 
struggles of the present.623
In the next chapter we will see how the drive for  absolute  and relative surplus-value 
analysed in  Capital  explains the tendencies which Marx and Engels observed in the 
Manifesto.  In  Capital  it  becomes  possible  both  to  see  this  as  a  real-teleological 
tendency, while also avoiding the unilinear projection that supports the exclusive focus 
on the working class. At the same time, the question emerges of the effects of this real 
totalisation  of  globalising  capital:  does  it  eventually  exhaust  and  undermine 
countervailing measures, such as Hegel's ameliorating solutions, particularly the welfare 
state  and  colonialism?  We  will  see  how  capital's  chase  for  absolute  surplus-value 
subsumes ever new swathes of population into its workforce (especially women, and 
former agricultural workers across the world), and how its quest for relative surplus-
value compels it to replace workers with labour-saving technologies, thus generating 
relative surplus populations. All this, we will argue, results in the continuity of struggles 
over reproduction outside and at the margins of the capital-relation; first where new 
populations are subsumed, and second where proletarians are expelled from work. This 
reintroduces  the question  of  self-organised reproduction  on a  terrain  much different 
from  that  of  seventeenth-century  England;  it  reintroduces  the  questions  of 
criminalisation and militarisation of the surplus-population, (neo-)colonial subsumption, 
land occupations, and much more. 
621 Endnotes, “A History of Subsumption,” Endnotes 2 (2010): 131.
622 Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 63–64.
623 For a brief critique of totalisation in recent theories of real subsumption, see appendix 6.6.
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Chapter 7: Organising the Proletariat in its Differences
But even though we are Lumpen, we are still  
members of the proletariat...In both the Mother  
Country and the Black Colony, the working class is  
the right wing of the proletariat and the  
lumpenproletariat is the left wing... We definitely  
have a major contradiction between the working 
class and the lumpenproletariat … 
- Eldridge Cleaver624
1. Introduction 
In the  Communist  Manifesto,  as seen in  chapter  3,  Marx's  theory of revolution was 
predicated on an expanding socialisation of capital and a deepening immiseration and 
productive exploitation of the proletariat. He predicted how the globalising growth of 
the organised power and misery of the proletariat would prepare it for the revolutionary 
role.  The  revolutionary  opportunity  would  come  with  one  of  the  recurrent  and 
deepening  of  crises  overproduction.  Drawing  what  we  discussed  in  chapter  6,  the 
present chapter will show how the insights of the Communist Manifesto were elaborated 
theoretically in Capital.625 But, as we have seen in chapter 4 where we visited the sketch 
of  revolutionary  transition  that  Marx's  outlines  in  the  chapter  on  'The  historical 
tendency  of  capitalist  accumulation',  the  revolutionary  prophesy  allowed  by  this 
theorisation is premised on the projections of the Symmetry Thesis that capital would 
organise workers as its gravediggers.626 We have argued that deprived of the Symmetry 
Thesis,  this  leaves  us  with  a  purely  accelerationist  or  messianic  orientation  to 
revolution,  and  beyond  the  horizon  of  organisation  or  strategy.  Thus  the  idea  of  a 
revolutionary rupture, one way or the other, becomes premised on capital running up 
against its own limitations or into some absolute ecological or spatial exhaustion. But, 
we  have  to  be  careful,  for  history  shows that  capital  tends  to  overcome its  limits, 
something for which we saw Hegel's keen eye in chapter 3. For instance, Marx greatly 
624 Eldridge Cleaver, “On the Ideology of the Black Panther Party,” 1970.
625 We are inspired by Massimiliano Tomba, “Historical Temporalities of Capital: An Anti-Historicist 
Perspective,” Historical Materialism 17, no. 4 (2009), 44–65.
626 '[T]here also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly increasing in numbers, and 
trained, united and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production'. Marx, 
Capital: Volume I, 929.
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underestimated  how colonialism,  neocolonialism  and  neoliberal  globalisation  would 
enable capital to extend its reach exponentially and diversify rather than homogenise 
struggles against  capital.627 Furthermore, he underestimated the national-social state's 
capacity to ameliorate class antagonism and the worst effects of unemployment. For a 
long time it seemed social democratic and fascist,  Keynesian and Rooseveltian state 
management,  confirmed  Hegel's  conception  that  the  rabble  was  a  manageable  if 
unfortunate problem. 
The years after 2008 have not resulted in a resuscitation of the Symmetry Thesis, but in 
a resurgent interest in the other side of Marx's projection of the end of capital: not in the 
organisation of workers by capital,  but the constant increase in 'the mass of misery, 
oppression, slavery, degradation and exploitation grows', the re-awakening of a negative 
proletariat, as also seen in chapter 3.628 This tendency has particularly been re-actualised 
through a re-reading of the 'generalised law of capitalist accumulation' and the capitalist 
tendency to produce surplus-populations, by currents of communisation theory, Théorie 
Communiste, Sic!, and Endnotes and taken up by Fredric Jameson. This theorisation is 
of interest to our project, because it is one most sophisticated among the (in any case 
few)  contemporary  Marxist  attempts  to  think  the  conditions  of  revolutionary, 
communist practice today. A lot speaks for the orientation to surplus-population today: 
after  the  Great  Financial  Crash and during the  Great  Recession,  the arguments  that 
capitalism is imminently running up against both external and internal limits appears 
intuitively correct, in its contrast between the bubble years (and the Golden post-war-
years)  with  the  current  non-recovery.629 Furthermore,  the  crisis  has  spread  the 
knowledge that debt and cheap East and Southeast Asian commodities have for long 
masked the slow squeeze on European and American working-class households, related 
to a longterm socio-economic downturn. Finally, the discourses of development, which 
saw the former colonies as simply needing to catch up, have been challenged by the fact 
that  capitalist  development  in  the  Global  South  is  mostly  synonymous  with  rural 
expropriation,  environmental  degradation,  and  low-wage  competition  with  Western 
wages, and the production of enormous urban slum-dwelling surplus-populations.630 In 
short, the spatially differentiated, gendered and racialised effects of the 'General Law of 
627 Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital; Hirschman, “On Hegel, Imperialism and Structural 
Stagnation.”
628 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 929.
629 Jameson already takes this spatial exhaustion as a maker of post-modernism. See appendix 7.0.
630 Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (London: Verso, 2007).
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Capitalist  Accumulation'  on  the  proletariat,  are  precarisation  and  unemployment, 
migration, create the temptation of new projection, this time catastrophic, pushing us in 
the  direction  of  what  Eldridge  Cleaver  has  called  the  lumpenisation  of  humanity.631 
From the point of view of orientation, the situation is promising: if in the past, the mode 
of  life  of  large  sections  of  the  proletariat  made  it  conformist  in  the  problems  and 
solutions it posed, now, as the problem is changing, so, in theory, will their political 
orientation. But this still leaves us with the question of organisation.
While  the  emergence  of  the  problem  of  surplus  population  after  the  end  of  the 
Symmetry Thesis points towards the abstract possibility of revolution in the deepening 
separation of proletarians from their  means of reproduction,  it  does not  in any way 
provide us with a new concept of organisation, nor does it answer the question posed by 
the Black Panther Party: how, under the condition of  lumpenisation,  is it possible to 
build  the  capacity  of  resistance,  pending  revolution?632 While  these  are  of  course 
practical  questions  to  be  answered in  practical  ways,  we will  ask  the  more  formal 
question: what forms of organisations and active class composition become possible and 
necessary under conditions here described? 
If Marx saw the concrete possibility of revolution in the organisation of the proletariat 
by capital,  we are today faced with the abstract  possibility  of revolution,  without  a 
strong concept of organisation. Marx always gave a dual definition of the proletariat: in 
terms of the problem of their separation, their existence as 'virtual paupers', and in terms 
of their exploitation as workers.633  Where the symmetry thesis starts with the solution to 
this separation – wage-labour organised by capital – and the attempt to reverse it, today 
we must start with the problem of proletarian separation, the genealogy and persistent 
re-imposition  which  was  analysed  in  chapters  5  and  6.  To  pose  the  question  of 
proletarian organisation starting from here, means to pose it immediately as a question 
of self-organisation, within and beyond the workplace and other forms of capitalist and 
state organisation.634 To pose the question of self-organisation, as defined in chapters 1 
631 Eldridge Cleaver, “On Lumpen Ideology”, in Grass Roots - Black Community Newspaper, 1972, 4. 
We might speak of the years since 1989, and particularly since 2008 as the period of the end of the 
welfare state exception. See appendix 7.1.
632 On the Panthers' distinction between resistance and revolution, summarised in Huey P. Newton's 
statement that 'The vanguard party only teaches the correct methods of resistance', see Howard 
Caygill, “Philosophy and the Black Panthers,” Radical Philosophy 179, no. May/Jun (2013).
633 Michael Denning, “Wageless Life,” New Left Review 66, no. November-December (2010).
634 It should be clear that this definition of self-organisation differs from that of Théorie Communiste, 
who define it in terms of the idea of the autonomy and self-affirmation of the working class; this, we 
agree, is a mode of organisation proper to the period of the Symmetry Thesis. TC can only imagine a 
concept of self-organisation around the identity of the worker, and not as the emergent result of 
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and 2 is to pose the question of 'idealisation' emerging from a process of combination. 
Thus,  we reach the question of theory not  as an external  orientating supplement  to 
practices,  giving them maps and principles,  but as a part  of the material  process of 
organisation, of inventing solutions to the problem of proletarian separation.
2. General Law of Capitalist Accumulation
In  the  previous  chapter,  we  have  seen  how  the  history  of  the  capitalist  mode  of 
production can be understood as the tendential organisation of proletarians according to 
the telos  of  capitalism,  and the elimination of alternative strategies  of  reproduction. 
Class opposition thus tendentially becomes class contradiction even if never absolutely. 
Methodologically, then, the dialectical study of capital is always a study of the results of 
a contested process, and the necessities of its success: the systemic dialectical analysis 
of capital gives us a theory of capital from the point of view of its 'normal' reproduction. 
However, this is a normality that has to be enforced by the constant latent threat of 
force, a threat which is renewed through its occasional exercise. Systematic, dialectical 
understandings of capital are thus strictly limited, and insufficient for thinking practice. 
Here, however, we are interested in such a theory in so far as it gives us a sense of the  
terrain of struggle, and the movement of the class antagonism.
The proletariat  is  defined by its  separation from the means of reproduction,  and its 
compulsion  to  reproduce  itself  by  reproducing  capital.  We  have  seen  how  the 
reproduction  of  proletariat  (the  value  of  its  labour-power)  is  kept  in  line  with  the 
reproduction of capital through the 'normal' working of the law of value. If wages raise 
too  high,  capital  will  hire  less  workers,  thus  creating  a  reserve  army  exerting  a 
downward pressure on wages.635 The point here is that as long as the employed and 
unemployed do not combine, wages will always fall back in line with the requirements 
of capital accumulation. We saw how Marx pointed out that state violence is generally 
unleashed should such a combination force the law of value temporarily out of function. 
However,  there are two other crucial  limitations of such organising,  which are both 
combination around shared problems, which is the line we will pursue here. Théorie Communiste, 
“Self-Organisation Is the First Act of the Revolution; It Then Becomes an Obstacle Which the 
Revolution Has to Overcome,” LibCom (September 5, 2005).
635 Marx here brackets the role of the state, which complicates this picture, without abolishing the 
general dynamic, particularly under conditions of strong inter-state competition for capital 
investments.
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based  on  the  long-term  secular  tendencies  of  capital.  First,  the  production  and 
accentuation of differences within the proletariat along gendered and racialised lines, 
leads  to  competition  between  and  within  national  workforces.  As  Marx  notes  with 
regards to the national and religious conflicts between the English and the Irish, 
this antagonism is the secret of the English working class's impotence, despite 
its  organisation. It is the secret of the maintenance of power by the capitalist 
class. And the latter is fully aware of this.636
This is not merely a strategy of divide and rule, however, but an effect of capital's chase 
for absolute surplus-value, which – as soon as it has extended the existing workday as 
much  as  possible  –  brings  it  to  incorporate  the  labour-forces  of  areas  where  the 
reproductive cost of labour is lower, and where necessary labour is thus less relative to 
surplus-labour time. In Grundrisse, Marx writes:
Surplus time is the excess of the working day above that part of it which we 
call  necessary labour  time;  it  exists  secondly  as  the  multiplication  of 
simultaneous working days, i.e. of the  labouring population. ...  It is a law of 
capital ... to create surplus labour, disposable time; it can do this only by setting 
necessary labour in motion – i.e. entering into exchange with the worker. It is 
therefore equally a tendency of capital to increase the labouring population, as 
well as constantly to posit a part of it as surplus population – population which 
is useless until such time as capital can utilize it. ... It is equally a tendency of 
capital  to  make human labour  (relatively)  superfluous,  so as  to  drive it,  as 
human labour, towards infinity.637
Second, Marx discovers that the chase for relative surplus-value itself replaces workers 
with machinery, leading to an internal secular tendency towards the growth of surplus 
populations.638 Thus, by enrolling new populations as workers and by expelling existing 
workers in favour of machinery, capital produces ever larger working classes along side 
ever greater surplus populations, which makes the challenges of suspending the law of 
value  through organisation  ever  greater.  We see  here  two tendencies  of  capitalism: 
whether in crisis or in periods of growth, existing lines of production will shed labour. 
636 Marx’s letter to Vogt and Mayer, April 1970 in MECW - Marx and Engels: April 1868-July 1870, 
vol. 43 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), 475.
637 Marx, Grundrisse, 398–9.
638 Here we can only present Marx's systematic analysis of this tendency, to which he notes there are 
many modifying circumstances. That this tendency is observable empirically is suggested by 
Endnotes and Aaron Benanav, “Misery and Debt,” Endnotes 2 (2010); Davis, Planet of Slums.
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Despite  periodic crises,  capital  will  accumulate  ever  more capital,  and employ ever 
more proletarians. This gives us 'the general law of capitalist accumulation':
The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of 
its growth, and therefore also the greater the absolute mass of the proletariat 
and the productivity of its labour, the greater is the industrial reserve army. The 
same causes which develop the expansive power of capital, also develop the 
labour-power at its disposal. … But the greater this reserve army in proportion 
to  the active labour-army,  the greater  is  the mass  of  a  consolidated surplus 
population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to the amount of torture it has to 
undergo in  the  form of  labour.  The more  extensive,  finally,  the  pauperized 
sections of the working class and the industrial  reserve army, the greater is 
official pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation. 
Like all other laws, it is  modified in its working by many circumstances, the 
analysis of which does not concern us here.639
If we try to break this down we have three effects of this law: the expansion of the mass 
of  employed  ('active')  proletarians,  of  the  number  of  unemployed  ('reserve') 
proletarians, and of the mass of unemployable ('consolidated') proletarians.640 The effect 
of  the  latter  two  categories  is  to  press  down  wages,  i.e.  the  monetary  part  of  the 
reproduction of the working population. Indeed, capital constantly produces a relatively 
redundant  working population,  i.e.  a  population which  is  superfluous  to  capitals,  to 
fulfil  capital's  drive for valorisation.641 The expanded reproduction of capital  is  thus 
both the expanded reproduction of the employed and unemployed populations, positing 
an ever greater relative surplus, a 'disposable reserve army' bread by the capitalist mode 
of production.642 'Modern industry's  whole form of motion therefore depends on the 
constant transformation of the working population into unemployed or semi-employed 
“hands”.'643 The tendential expansion of capitalist productivity along with the growth of 
639 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 798. Marx does not present what such modifying circumstances might be, 
and leaves this as a simple ceteris paribus clause. Henryk Grossman has a useful list of the economic 
factors from which Marx abstracts in his systematic analysis. “3. Modifying countertendencies” in 
Law of the Accumulation and Breakdown, trans. Jairus Banaji (Marxists.org, 1929).
640 Marx distinguishes between four different modes of existence of surplus populations: 1. floating 
form: urban in and out of work. 2. latent form: the masses that can be called in from rural areas. 3. 
stagnant: extremely irregular employment. 4. Pauperism: lumpenproletariat; consisting of those 
unemployable, either because they refuse work, or because they cannot work. This is what we can 
call absolute surplus-population. Marx, Capital: Volume I, 794–97.
641 Ibid., 782.
642 Ibid., 783-4.
643 Ibid., 786.
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poverty means that the reproductive cycles of capital and labour become increasingly 
decoupled. 'In and through these cyclical crises, a secular crisis emerges, a crisis of the  
reproduction of the capital-labour relation itself', write Endnotes.644
3. Secular Crisis and Revolutionary Hopes
This perspective is that of antagonistic reproduction, i.e. the struggle for reproduction of 
those who can only reproduce themselves by appropriating what they need. Following a 
similar  logic  of  exhaustion  of  frontiers  and  possibilities  of  intensive  capitalist 
development, contemporary Endnotes posit a deepening crisis of the reproduction of the 
class relation itself, whereby the reproduction of capital and of the proletariat will enter 
into a deepening antagonism:
With its own reproduction at stake, the proletariat cannot but struggle, and it is 
this reproduction itself that becomes the content of its struggles. As the wage 
form loses its centrality in mediating social reproduction, capitalist production 
itself appears increasingly superfluous to the proletariat: it is that which makes 
us proletarians, and then abandons us here. In such circumstances the horizon 
appears  as  one  of  communisation;  of  directly  taking  measures  to  halt  the 
movement of the value form and reproduce ourselves without capital.645
This invites us to imagine present struggles that are neither modelled on a desire for a 
return to pre-capitalist conditions or on an escape from history through its dissolution, 
nor on an  Aufhebung of the immensely destructive process of capitalist globalisation. 
This orientation is immanent to the actuality of the capital-relation, an orientation not 
towards something more modern and exciting, or more of the same without the bad 
stuff, but of a real movement beginning with the desires and needs of today as they are 
increasingly unsatisfied under conditions of capitalist  crisis. The orientation of these 
needs  and  desires  is  of  paramount  importance,  and  a  matter  of  organisation. 
Disorganised, their orientation will increase the competitive pressure among the global 
proletariat,  but if  organised,  these needs and desires will  be objectively antagonistic 
insofar as they demand something that capital cannot or refuses to provide.646
However,  we can only see this  as immediately and imminently  revolutionary,  if  we 
644 Endnotes and Benanav, “Misery and Debt,” 32.
645 Endnotes, “Crisis in the Class Relation,” 19.
646 For a remark about the relation between proletarian organisation and the capitalist downturn since 
the 1970s, see appendix 7.1.
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claim that capitalism has reached some absolute limit to expansion, some exhaustion of 
the capitalist teleology itself. Otherwise, capital will have room to manoeuvre and give 
concessions, and we would thus be dealing either with a contingent limit, which poses 
nothing but a window of revolutionary opportunity, or more fluid fields of struggles. 
Staking  everything  on  one  global  totalising  process  of  subsumption  and  abjection, 
communisation theory describes a process that is heading for its limit. Like with Marx 
and Engels in the Manifesto, deepening misery becomes the occasion for a conditional  
belief in progress, a kind of perverse faith that history will progress by its bad side – or 
perhaps the thesis is merely that if it progresses by its bad side, it will do so in a more 
communist  way this  time,  unmediated  by  trade  unions  and parties,  and free  of  the 
labourist productivism of former epochs. Curiously, this hope is premised precisely on 
the absence of the positive tendency on which Marx and Engels hung their hats, namely 
the growing organisation and productive power of the proletariat. However, the debate 
which is of interest here is not one between forms of hope, and the possibility of good 
abstract reversals of good or bad abstract tendencies. Neither from surplus population to 
communisation, nor from the multitude to commonwealth, as it were. This takes us no 
further  than  the  Kantian  concept  of  orientation,  to  a  theoretical  indication  of  hope, 
which  might  keep  practical  reason  from  falling  into  cynicism,  melancholia  or 
opportunism. Even if this concept, unlike Kant's, is founded on a systematic materialist 
and dialectical understanding of the laws of movement of capital, such a theory does 
not,  as  we  have  seen,  provide  us  with  a  strategic,  practical  orientation  of  class 
formation, nor with a concept of state force.
As  Albert  O.  Hirschman  provocatively  notes,  in  the  late  1840s  Marx  thought  that 
capitalism was reaching its final limit, not recognising the capacity of imperialism to 
displace capitalism's contradictions and postpone its crisis. Thus, as we saw in chapter 
3, Marx saw colonialism as a progressive force, the driver of the process that would 
make the proletariat  a global reality,  and thus communism a global possibility.  This 
implication is  premised on an abstract formal  dialectical reversal,  which completely 
effaces how the effects of the global division of labour is divisive and disciplining, and 
hence the necessary difficult task of developing cross-border solidarity. Similarly, Lenin 
and Rosa Luxemburg only really recognised this power of imperialism when they could 
say it was close to having run its course, i.e. when this recognition did not contradict the 
idea that revolution is imminent. The question Hirschman's provocation raises is the 
following: does the orientation of the revolutionary desire of Marxists – insofar as it is 
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sustained by the theory of capital's real teleology running its course – orientate them 
away from the problem that there might still be venues for capitalist expansion as well 
as other modifying circumstances to the general law?647 And furthermore, does capital 
not have the capacity to re-subsume areas and populations it had previously spat out as 
if they were new to it – once they have been sufficiently devalued? The problem with 
the thesis  of exhaustion is  that  in order to  give hope it  needs to  suggest  a uniform 
deepening of the proletarian antagonism with capital. This allows theory to avoid the 
question  of  strategy  and  organisation,  and  allows  it  to  'solve'  the  problem  of  the 
proletarian condition through a simple dialectical schematic à la 'the expropriators are 
expropriated.'  While  we  might  agree  that  that  is  indeed  the  formal  concept  of 
communist  revolution,  it  says  nothing  whatsoever  about  the  real  movement  that 
abolishes the present state of things. 
The  proletariat  is  defined  by  a  negative  commonality,  yet  it  exists  as  a  positive 
heterogeneity of forms of living and surviving. As we saw in chapter 5, the proletariat is 
defined by the common problem of reproduction, by its separation from the means of 
production. In chapter 6 we saw that this is a problem which is necessarily faced and 
tackled in various different ways. This, furthermore, entails that the modes of struggle 
of the proletariat are extremely diverse: from the limit condition of peasants fighting 
against becoming proletarianised, to the classical figure of the wage-labourer on strike, 
lies a whole range of struggles, to which feminists and post-colonial writers are more 
attuned than most Marxists. Once we recognise this constitutive heterogeneity of the 
exploited  and expropriated populations  of  the world,  we recognise  that  any general 
theory  of  'the  proletariat'  as  a  revolutionary  agent  will  have  to  start  from the  self-
organisation  of  differences.  Here  we  can  merely  elaborate  the  appearance  of  this 
challenge in relation to the critique of political economy and the tendencies of global 
capitalism.
What is interesting and challenging about the re-actualisation of the theory of surplus 
populations today, is that unlike the immiseration thesis of the Communist Manifesto, it 
is not predicated on a thesis of the gradual shaping of the world in the image of the 
bourgeoisie  or  the  homogenisation  of  the  proletariat.  As  we  saw in  chapter  3,  the 
privileging of the revolution of the working class over  the many different struggles 
against  capital  (against  proletarianisation,  colonialism,  gendered  oppression,  etc.)  is 
partially  a  result  of  the  strong theoretical  orientation  of  the  Symmetry  Thesis.  The 
647 Hirschman, “On Hegel, Imperialism and Structural Stagnation,” 6–7.
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reality  of  surplus-populations  poses  instead  the  issue  of  a  generalised  crisis  of 
reproduction, and the multitude of survival strategies that arise from it, including modes 
of wealth appropriation far short of revolution proper. Reversing the relation between 
theory and practice, it poses the question: what does it mean to orientate revolutionary  
practice  from  the  standpoint  of  the  problem  of  the  proletarian  condition  and  the  
manifold ways to live it? Here we cannot, of course, raise this question of the actuality 
of the proletariat in all its forms. Rather, we merely try to elaborate the theoretical place 
of this standpoint in Marx, and to ask what resources he provides to think revolutionary 
class formation from this standpoint. 
Firstly, Marx recognised that the proletariat also attempts to survive outside the capital-
relation, as lumpenproletariat, rural or urban. This class lives as an excluded insider to 
'the silent compulsion of economic relations', instead constantly faced with the '[d]irect 
extra-economic force which is still … used, but only in exceptional cases.'648 If we are to 
think the common problem of dispossession as the common problem through which 
those living it differently might be united, then the problem must be thought in its full 
range. 
Secondly, in times of crisis, capitalist actuality is disrupted by contagious contingency. 
Capitalist crises have always been crises of the reproduction not only of capital, but of 
the proletariat, in its many modes. In crises, workers who are thrown unto the streets 
must find other means to survive. When these efforts to solve the reproduction problem 
outside of capital become more urgent and more powerful, they are faced with the force 
(Gewalt) which sustains capitalist actuality when it is faced with its own contingency. It 
is from such moments of crisis and contingency – and the deepening crisis of surplus 
population – that the thinking of proletarian self-organisation must start.
4. Lumpen/Proletariat
In chapter 3 we saw how Marx, from 1843 to 1848, continued to be invested in the 
negative  revolutionary  figure  of  the  proletariat,  as  the  harbinger  of  a  revolution  of 
radical  needs,  also  as  he  increasingly  stressed  the  positive,  productive  side  of  the 
proletariat.  Before  1848,  Marx  affirms  that  universal  communism  is  both  possible  
648 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 899. On the notion of the inclusion of the excluded as excluded, see 
Colectivo Situaciones, 19&20 Notes for a New Social Protagonism, trans. Nate Holdren and 
Sebastián Touza (Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions, 2011), 103–106.
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because  the  proletariat  has  become  a  world-historical  producer,  and  becoming 
necessary because the proletariat will increasingly struggle to survive. This deepening 
necessity was seen as springing from the contradictory development of civil society, its 
dual  production  of  excess  populations  and  surplus  wealth.  Thus  the  prediction  of 
revolution is premised not only on the growing productive powers of the proletariat, but 
on  its  pauperisation.649 In  this  final  part  of  this  chapter  we  return  to  the  period 
immediately after 1848, which bear witness to a profound moment of crisis, that of the 
1848 Revolution in France and its aftermath. This crisis shook and complicated Marx's 
belief in progress (both by the good and the bad side), and complicated the idea of the 
relation between radical needs and revolution. This lead to the composition of the 18th 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx's perhaps most important strategic reading of how, 
in  a  moment  of  crisis,  contingency  breaks  out,  Gewalt  becomes  decisive;  here  the  
problem  of  social  revolution  is  no  longer  one  of  economic  tendencies,  but  about  
organisation, class-alliances and articulations of interests, in a situation where it turns  
out  that  the  issue  of  political  class  composition  is  rather  more  complicated  than  
economic class analysis tends to suggest. Our interest will here be to read these issues 
in relation to the problems of the inner differences of the proletariat, and in relation to 
proletarian needs and reproduction. 
We have already seen in chapters 5 and 6 that Marx conceptualises the problem of the 
proletarian  condition  in  two  ways:  in  terms  of  its  exploitation  and  in  terms  of  its 
expropriation.  If  the former relates to the (waged) working class the latter  refers  to 
anybody separated from the means of re/production,  a  pauper virtual or actual.  The 
lumpenproletariat is the central category for understanding that part of the proletariat 
which falls solely into the second category. Marx first introduced the lumpenproletariat 
in a discussion of Max Stirner's romantic vision of non-productive and work-refusing 
ragamuffins and lazzaroni. After 1848, the problem of the lumpenproletariat becomes a 
problem  of  a  failed  revolution,  of  the  proletarians  who  sold  themselves  to  the 
reactionaries. This approach, which stresses the difference between the working class 
and the lumpen, and contains certain moments of moralisation from the perspective of 
the work-ethic and law and order, has since been at the mainstream of Marxism, with 
the most notable exceptions in Frantz Fanon and the Black Panther Party. In appendices 
3.5 and 3.6 we see how Marx's focus on the productivity of the proletariat produces the 
lumpenproletariat as an incoherent residue which helps constitute the unity and social 
649 Marx did not hold to theory of absolute immiseration. See appendix 3.2.
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productivity of the proletariat in opposition to it. Here, however, we shall consider not 
the opposition between the lumpen and the working class, but rather the possibility of 
their composition, starting from the point of view of their common problem. To think 
the  proletariat  as  differentiated  into  workers  and  lumpenproletarians  means  not 
prioritising the problem of exploitation over domination or vice versa, but rather to see 
these as different ways in which proletarians live their condition: at the extremes some 
suffer only one or the other directly, but mostly, proletarians are faced with some mix of 
both. And through the mediation of competition of jobs and state hand-outs, etc., all 
proletarians are always indirectly submitted to both, but in a differentiated way in which 
some are relatively privileged over others.
……
The 18th Brumaire  is prefaced by a meditation on the time of revolution.650 Here the 
temporal orientation of the potential social actors in history, and their proximity to the 
flow of history becomes central to the analysis. Class here becomes much more than a 
category determined by its place in the social order, the class in-itself, but a question of 
the  class  for-itself  its  internal  composition,  the  relations  between  classes,  the 
articulations  of  common  problems,  and  of  the  spontaneous  and  possible  temporal 
orientations of the class, etc.. If the proletariat was ready to accept the leap into history, 
other classes were not, and as they became functional to the  Gewalt  of the counter-
revolution, the force of the proletariat was defeated. 
If  the  Communist  Manifesto  stressed  a  gradual  polarisation  of  society,  the  18th 
Brumaire considers a number of classes, and sub-categories of classes. The question of 
revolution here is not one of a world-historical clash or transition, but of navigation in a  
crisis, it is not about the consummation of necessity, but of relations between forces in a 
situation of  contingency.  This chapter will  analyse Marx's description of these classes 
and their modes of political composition and representation with a view to asking how 
they might relate to the problem of history, indeed be in closer contact to it than Marx 
thinks. The proletariat was ready to leap, because it was in circumstances calling out for 
a leap, while other classes were treading water or joining the forces of reaction. First,  
the petty bourgeois are, as we saw in the previous chapter, too stuck in the present, too 
realistic  and  philistine,  incapable  of  conceiving  of  an  overcoming,  rather  than  a 
mediation of the problematic relation of capital and wage labour. Second, the small-
650 See appendix 3.7.
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holding peasants  live  a  life  on the  margin  of  history,  exploited  by  it,  yet  living  in 
relative  isolation.  Finally,  and  most  peculiarly,  the  lumpenprolateriat  re-enters  as  a 
problematic  figure  for  Marx's  schema  of  revolution:  as  a  class  the  lumpen  are 
irrefutably a product of bourgeois society and its dynamics, and a class of radical needs, 
yet one organised against the 1848 revolution in France. 
The February Revolution had cast the army out of Paris. The National Guard, 
that is, the bourgeoisie in its different gradations, constituted the sole power. 
Alone, however, it did not feel itself a match for the proletariat. Moreover, it 
was  forced  gradually  and  piecemeal  to  open  its  ranks  and  admit  armed 
proletarians, albeit  after  the most tenacious resistance and after setting up a 
hundred different obstacles. There consequently remained but one way out: to  
play off part of the proletariat against the other.651
Thus enter the lumpenproletariat in the narrative of the failure of the revolution, made 
historically relevant by the 24,000 young men recruited to the Mobile Guard to suppress 
the revolutionary proletariat.  Already in the  Manifesto  Marx and Engels had warned 
against this group:
The "dangerous class," the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off 
by the  lowest  layers  of  old society may,  here  and there,  be swept  into  the 
movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it 
far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.652
Marx's scepticism with regards to the lumpenproletariat is a result of his awareness of 
how the political  allegiances  of a  class  are  shaped by the ways in  which this  class 
reproduces itself. However, this did not lead him to suggest that political recomposition 
can be achieved through recomposition of reproduction. Instead, he conceptualised the 
chaos of the revolutionary crisis solely in terms of its political contingency, rather than 
its reproductive contingency. Thus the question of strategy and force becomes reduced 
to the question of recomposing the political contingencies with a view to establishing 
new class alliances. This nevertheless gives us one of Marx's most interesting reflections 
on the dynamics of political representation in relation to class interest, and the decisive 
role of Gewalt in a situation of crisis. This is, incidentally, most relevant in relation to 
classes such as the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, whose basic needs are satisfied, 
651 Karl Marx, “The Class Struggles in France,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1973), 219.
652 Marx and Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” 118.
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whose problem is  not  immediately that  of their  reproduction.  We will  turn to these 
classes now.
5. Proletarian Difference
With regards to the proletariat, we have seen that wage labour is one of many ways in 
which proletarians try to solve the problem of separation. If the proletarian is a virtual  
pauper, the proletarian condition (to take this word in the sense of the 'human condition', 
but historicised and negative) is the common problem to which different 'classes' live 
different solutions:
Working class (employed, temporarily, under- and un-employed)
Proletariat Lumpenproletariat (the unemployable)
Wage-earner-dependants (particularly women)
Semi-proletarians (e.g. indebted peasants, seasonal workers)
The  proletariat  in  Marx's  analysis  is  not  limited  to  the  actively-working  industrial 
proletariat, which was so central to trade-union, socialist and communist strategy in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If the proletariat consists, as Engels claimed in 1888, 
of 'the class of modern wage labourers, who, having no means of production of their 
own, are reduced to selling their labour-power in order to live', we must note that this 
does not imply that they find willing buyers.653 The proletariat thus consists both of the 
employed  and  the  unemployed.  If  the  proletariat  and  lumpenproletariat  are  not 
agglomerations of concrete individuals, but modes of life which individuals slip in and 
out of according to the need and availability of work or other strategies of survival, the 
distinctions begin to blur. Yet it is clear that frequent conflicts might arise between these 
populations, both for moral reasons – in the context of the protestant work ethic – and 
the negative impact of crime on the everyday of working people.654 What distinguishes 
the lumpenproletariat from the unemployed is its mode of life, its everyday strategies of 
hustling,  theft,  and  sex  work,  a  subjectivity  or  conduct  that  tends  to  make  it 
653 In a note to the English edition of ibid., 108. Denning, “Wageless Life.”
654 Marx's analysis of the interplay between the common sense and day to day common sensibility of 
work and law-abiding behavior among 'working people' has been usefully updated in Hall, S., C. 
Critcher, T. Jefferson, J. Clarke and B. Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and  
Order (London: Macmillan, 1993), 142, 149. 
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unemployable, whereas the unemployed law-abidingly look for work. Similarly, there 
are conflicts between the unemployed and the employed, most obviously the downward 
pressure on wages and conditions exerted by the former, or struggles for job-security by 
the latter. These groups therefore cannot share the same strategies for dealing with their 
class  condition:  the  workers  reject  the  parasitism  and  crime  of  the  lumpen.  The 
unemployed  compete  with  each  other  and  press  the  wages  of  the  employed.  The 
employed struggle against the inclusion in the labour market of new groups of workers 
(women, lumpen, migrants), to maintain their position. Finally, those reproducing the 
labour  force  –  mainly  women – are  under  pressure  from the  labour  force  itself,  to 
reproduce  it.  This  is  what  it  means  that  different  parts  of  the  proletariat  live  the 
proletarian condition differently. Therefore we can define these classes  in-themselves  
not as categories of people, but as different ways of dealing with the problem-condition,  
as it is expressed in the 'laws',  i.e. the inner necessitation of bourgeois society and the 
capitalist economy. 
This  complicates  the  question  of  the  revolutionary  composition  of  the  proletariat, 
because it  can  no longer  consist  in  a  simple  appropriation  and reversal  of  capital's 
organisation of the proletariat. We here have to ask the question of the relation between 
political composition and problems. Is the task of composition that of enlightening all 
proletarians about their common condition through the exposition of the system and 
genealogy of capital? Or is it to homogenise all proletarians – despite their differences – 
around a common ideology? Is it, in other terms, a problem of representation, and more 
precisely of the relation between three forms of representation?
6. Representation, Problems and Solutions
Three quite distinct German words are often translated as 'representation':  Vertretung,  
Darstellung and Vorstellung.  The first belongs, as Spivak notes, to the problematic of 
persuasion and rhetoric, the second to tropology; the third, which she doesn't mention, 
refers to real imaginaries, such as God and money (cf. chapter 1).655 Vetretung  means 
'speaking for' (as in political representation), while Darstellung and Vorstellung refer to 
're-presentation'.  Darstellung is  Marx's  key  term when  it  comes  to  the  problem of 
exposition in Capital.656 In Capital Marx suggests that the method of inquiry should be 
655 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 259.
656 Postface to the Second Edition of Capital: Volume I, 102.
 220
separated from the Darstellung, such that the 'real movement' [wirkliche Bewegung] can 
be appropriately represented, which, if done successfully will make it appear 'as an  a 
priori  construction.'657 In  Capital, a methodological principle is that abstract concepts 
refer  to  real  abstractions.  Theoretical  representation  is  crucial  for  political  practice, 
because  it  orientates  it  towards  the  real  abstractions  ruling  people.  Thus,  while  the 
proletarians described in the systemic analysis of capital are heterogeneous they are the 
same formally and functionally subsumed under the value-form (as labour-power and 
abstract labour).  The individual members are hence 'ruled by abstractions'  and mere 
bearers (Träger) of social relations, they 'can be expressed, of course, only in ideas.'658 
The  'abstraction,  or  idea,  however,  is  nothing  more  than  the  theoretical  expression 
[Ausdruck]  of  those  material  relations  which  are  their  lord  and  master.'659 This 
theoretical description has the advantage over the immediate experience of exploitation 
and domination that it shows how this particular misfortune is in fact one particular 
expression of a “class” condition; furthermore,  Darstellung  explains the causes of the 
imaginary relation to this situation, the Vorstellung.660
The classical reading of the relation between Vorstellung and Darstellung suggests that 
because the real relations are abstract and impersonal they can only be represented in 
the two modes of ideology and science, in the imaginary form of  Vorstellung  and the 
scientific form of Darstellung of the actuality of abstraction. For Althusser, for instance, 
the task of science is to lay bare the 'real conditions',  which necessitates ideological 
representation, and to understand ideology  itself as the imaginary supplement to these 
real relations. In other words the task of class composition becomes one of producing 
the right knowledge of objectivity, and inventing modes of its imaginary representation. 
The  necessity  of  both  Darstellung  and  Vorstellung comes  from the  fact  that  social 
relations are not immediately transparent to the people who live them; they must be 
represented, either in the form of abstraction or as imaginaries. Political struggle then 
becomes  centred  around  the  articulation/representation  of  the  real  relations,  as  a 
manner  of  class  consciousness.  Yet,  such a  correct  representation  does  not  in  itself 
657 'Of course the method of presentation [Darstellungweise] must differ in form from that of inquiry 
[Forschungsweise, mode of research].' Ibid.
658 Ibid., 92. Marx, Grundrisse, 164.
659 Ibid., 164.
660 Which, remembering chapter 1 are real and effective, yet illusory in as much as they hide the real 
powers that generate them; 'illusions are not nothing; they are real, yet only one side of the real. ... 
Errors relate to solutions only, whereas illusions take place primarily in the realm of problems, to 
which they refer back.'  Miguel De Beistegui, Truth and Genesis: Philosophy As Differential  
Ontology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 312.
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destroy what it reveals, in fact it confirms its necessity: 'the knowledge of [ideology's] 
conditions of possibility, of its structure, of its specific logic and of its practical role, 
within a given society, is simultaneously knowledge of the conditions of its necessity.'661 
Althusser's theses on ideology are deeply informed by the question of the reproduction 
of the mode of production, and do little to suggest openings for their non-reproduction. 
From the point of view of class formation these differences are essential. 
To sum up, we have here three distinct issues: First, there is the fact that people living 
the same conditions live these conditions differently. Second, there is the issue of how 
people represent their position to themselves (ideology/science). Third, there is the issue 
of their non-position. This is problem of the proletarian condition, of  virtual poverty. 
The proletarian condition is not a class position, not a role one can carry, but the name 
of the problem, or negativity, the precariousness of proletarian existence.
subjective  relation  to  solution  and  problems,  orientation
Condition/problem
mode of living condition, 'solutions'
The condition/problem is here what gives rise to different modes of life and subjectivity. 
It cannot be represented or lived purely, its practical solutions are always situated, its 
representation  always  orientated:  resigned,  indignant,  brave,  practical,  lazy,  
aspirational, revolutionary, or keeping calm and carrying on,  etc..  With intellectuals, 
clerics and politicians, there emerges a class which is specialised in orientating subjects. 
This  logic  appears  clearly  in  Marx's  analysis  of  the  petty  bourgeoisie,  and  the 
intellectuals and politicians who represent them: 
What makes them representatives [Vertretern] of the petty bourgeoisie is the 
fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not 
get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same 
problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the 
latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the political and 
literary representatives of a class and the class they represent [vertreten].662
We have already seen in chapter 2 how Marx describes the petty bourgeois ('philistines') 
as 'such prudent realists that none of their wishes or wildest fancies ever extend beyond 
661 Althusser, For Marx, 230.
662 Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 424.
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the  bare  actualities  of  life.'  In  1848  an  alliance  between  the  representatives  of  the 
workers and the petty bourgeois formed, the so-called social-democratic party, aiming 
to establish democracy not as a means to bring about the dissolution of the contradiction 
between capital and wage labour, but with the aim 'of weakening their antagonism and 
transforming it into harmony.'663 The issue here is not that the petty bourgeoisie wants to 
enforce its own egotistical class-interest, but that its idea of the conditions of universal 
liberation  are  limited  to  the  conditions  of  its  own  liberation.  In  other  words,  the 
democratic  representatives  and  intellectuals  of  the  petty  bourgeois  believe  that  the 
problem of the times can be solved if the problems of the petty bourgeoisie are solved, 
their solutions implemented; think of Thatcher's tax cuts and the idea of a nation of shop 
owners. 
Through his polemical writings after the demise of the  Rheinische Zeitung,  Marx had 
himself  become a  representative of  the proletariat.  The  standpoint  of  the proletariat 
promised a partisan perspective which went beyond any mere class-perspectivism.664 
The partisan standpoint of the proletariat offers the truth of the whole of social totality, 
because the proletariat is the universal exception, the victim of the universal crime of 
the totality, the class with radical needs pressing it toward a radical revolution. But if 
Marx is then driven to the same solutions, theoretically, that the proletariat is driven to 
practically,  there  can  be  no  revolutionary  theory  except  as  a  part  of  revolutionary 
practice, i.e. a practice that aims to overcome these problems practically. The prospect 
of revolution is premised on the deepening of these needs. Theory is then a Darstellung 
of the problem, and how its deepening will have to produce new and radical solutions. 
The only thing that brings theory out of the loop of actual problems and solutions is a 
projection  of  a  tendency,  and  of  the  supposedly  necessary  revolutionary  response. 
However,  short  of a  revolution,  the 'radical'  needs of the proletariat  simply produce 
strategies of survival and mutual competition; practice seems caught in the loop of the 
reproduction  of  the  present,  just  as  theory  is  simply  a  reflection  on  the  necessary 
relation between problems and solutions, from the point of view of the reproduction of 
actuality.  The revolutionary proletariat is not merely found, but invented,  sub specie  
futurae,  as what Sartre calls a 'prediction of the present', based on the creation made 
possible by the tendency of the present.665 Proletarian paupers must compete, organise 
663 Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” 202.“18th Brumaire,” 423–4.
664 For a discussion of the distinction between partisanship and perspectivism, see Toscano, “Partisan 
Thought.”
665 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason - Volume 2, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith, new ed. 
 223
where  possible,  and  make  up  for  the  rest  by  shadow  work.  In  the  absence  of 
revolutionary practice there is no revolutionary theory, but simply a critique of badly 
posed problems. A posing of a problem, according to Althusser, 
is  ideological  insofar as this problem has been formulated on the basis of its 
'answer', as the exact reflection of that answer, i.e. not as a real problem but as 
the problem that had to be posed if the desired ideological solution was to be 
the solution to.666
The problematic is itself an answer to 'the objective problem posed for ideology by its  
time'.  It  consists in a problematisation of what appears as a condition of a historical 
problem.667 It entails a relation to actuality which is not orientated by a principle (i.e. 
freedom) nor by a promise (i.e. progress), but by a method of orientation in relation to 
'real'  problems. For Althusser one needs to compare the 'objective' or 'real problems' 
posed  for ideology  by  the  times,  with  the  problems  posed  by the  ideologist.668 He 
therefore needs a tertium, a measure of badly and well posed problems; this is the gate 
through which Althusser will introduce his notion of science.669 
Yet, Althusser's formulation precludes the very dimension of invention opened by the 
problem as problem. Furthermore, as we have already seen in chapter 6, what science or 
systematic critique makes appear as an 'a priori construction' must be understood as the 
result of a struggle over reproduction which is only propped up by force. The range of 
attempted solutions is wider than that of the solutions that sustain the status quo. Within 
the  speculative  projection of  a  revolutionary  solution,  but  operating  on the  level  of 
composition rather than totality, we find the principle that poverty requires an invention 
that turns this into a problem, something that can be solved. The old discussion about 
the relation between the 'a priori construction' of the theoretical re-presentation and its 
imaginary  representation  ('ideology')  hides  the  actuality  of  constant  inventions  of 
practical solutions to and problematisations of a shared condition of life. As Bergson 
notes with regards to problems:
stating the problem is  not  simply uncovering,  it  is  inventing.  Discovery,  or 
uncovering,  has to do with what  already exists, actually or virtually; it  was 
(London: Verso, 2006), 407.
666 Althusser, “The Object of Capital,” 52. 
667 Althusser, For Marx, 67.
668 Ibid.
669 Indeed, with Gaston Bachelard, Althusser defines science as the introduction of a new problematic 
through a break with an un-scientific problematic. See Patrice Maniglier, “What Is a Problematic?,” 
Radical Philosophy 173, no. May/June (2012).
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therefore certain to happen sooner or later. Invention gives being to what did 
not exist; it might never have happened.670
A theory orientated in this direction will see that sometimes such inventions become 
contagious, and generalise, and potentially revolutionarily so, even if that is not usually 
the case. Whether revolution is the construction of new solutions to old problems or 
their abolition, there is no revolution that does not build on such experimentations and 
constructions. Revolution also entails practical inventions. This opens the question of a 
method  of  inquiry  (Vorschungsweise)  that  does  not  stop  at  the  Darstellung.  
Revolutionary theory might posit the conditions of possibility of revolution, abstractly, 
but only revolutionary practice can invent new revolutionary possibilities.  This is not 
just a matter of theory letting itself be orientated by struggles, but about taking part in 
the invention of and experimentation with solutions.671
In the 18th Brumaire, to which we limit ourselves here, Marx presents three conditions 
for  revolutionary  class  formation,  which  might  open  the  circle  of  problems  and 
solutions  toward  revolutionary  invention.  We  relate  all  of  these  to  what  we  have 
described as the common problem of the proletariat (separation) as well as the thesis of 
the tendential deepening crisis of proletarian reproduction. These three conditions are: 
1.  Class  formation  in  struggle  rather  than  through  Vertretung. 2.  Practices  that  go 
beyond  problems  and  solutions.  3.  The  existence  of  the  material  ground  for  class 
formation. Finally he poses the issue of the importance of force. 
7. Class Formation Through Struggle
Operaismo's  notion of class composition has both a passive and an active form: the 
composition of the class as workers, and the active effort of composing the elements of 
the class, autonomously. 'The political class composition ... is determined by how the 
'objective'  conditions  of  exploitation are  appropriated 'subjectively'  by the  class  and 
670 Quoted by Elie During in “‘A History of Problems’ : Bergson and the French Epistemological   
Tradition,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 35, no. 1 (January 2004).
671 Contemporary attempts in this direction count militant research practices and workers' inquiries. See 
Colectivo Situaciones, A New Social Protagonism; Asad Haider and Salar Mohandesi, eds., 
“Workers’ Inquiry” no. 3 (2013).What is interesting here, is how the new theoreticians of the 
increasingly precarious and unemployed proletariat in the Argentine rebellion of 2001-2002 brought 
strategies of resistant communities (e.g. the unemployed workers unions like the MDT Solano) and 
tactics for community appropriation of state private wealth (the piquetes) back on the agenda. Liz 
Mason-Deese, “The Neigbourhood Is the New Factory,”Viewpoint Mag, no. 2 (2012).
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directed against those very conditions.'672 Marx, similarly, would distinguish between 
the forms that subsume classes (the value-form, money-form, capital-form, state-form, 
etc.), and the active process of class-formation in struggle.673 It is here useful to recover 
a passage from The German Ideology describing active and passive class formation: 
The separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a 
common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with 
each other as competitors.  On the other hand, the class in its turn achieves an 
independent existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their 
conditions of existence predestined, and hence have their position in life and 
their personal development assigned to them by their class, become subsumed 
under  it.  This  is  the  same  phenomenon  as  the  subjection  of  the  separate 
individuals to the division of labour and can only be removed by the abolition 
of private property and of labour itself.674
Individuals are formed as a class, through their subsumption and limitation in the web 
of  necessities  of  their  social  condition,  but  are  forming  a  class  through  a  common 
struggle. When there is no common struggle, those who could form a class fall back in 
internal competition or mutual indifference, even if they share a common problem to 
which there is a common solution. The nature of a problem, however, means that it 
cannot be solved individually, but it also cannot be ignored: it insists. This creates a 
market for other solutions:  representatives,  religion,  opium.  In order not to compete 
with  God,  drugs  and  Napoleons,  class  composition  must  provide  solutions  to  lived 
problems. In doing so, it supersedes the ways in which a mass lives its problems in the 
everyday. Or more precisely, it changes these modes:
Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to 
one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, 
this  common interest  which  they  have  against  their  boss,  unites  them in  a 
common thought of resistance — combination. Thus combination always has a 
double aim, that of stopping competition among the workers, so that they can 
672 Matteo Mandarini, “Translator's Introduction,” in Time For Revolution, by Antonio Negri (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 265.
673 In terms of the philosophy of nature, the vocabulary of composition suggests exteriority, 
juxtaposition and conjunction, while the concepts of form suggest interiorising organisation, either as 
subsumption or self-organisation. Marx's early concept of the crystallisation and self-organisation of 
the mass gives us a logic of the passage from class composition to class formation.
674 Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1969, 65.
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carry on general competition with the capitalist.675
The class is formed around a shared problem, and it  immediately provides a partial 
solution  to  one  aspect  of  the  problem by partially  suspending  competition  between 
workers. There is no class formation which is not based on solutions to lived problems 
which supersede existing identities, hereunder individual interest.  Organised practical 
thought  goes  beyond  its  own  immediate  pragmatic  aims:  by  projecting  possible 
solutions it poses problems in a concrete manner, and thereby politicises what otherwise 
is merely a condition of misery, exploitation and domination. A common problem is 
only a problem if a solution can be imagined; if not, it is simply a condition, a given if 
troubling fact, which might as well instil cynicism and opportunism into the subject. 
Indeed, the slogan of 'communism' is in itself a merely ideological principle of hope, 
which does little to construct capitalism as a practical problem. 
Thus,  when theory  aims to  show proletarians  that  struggle  is  abstractly  possible  or 
necessary it is merely ideological, and not a part of the practical construction of possible 
solutions which does not respect the institutionalised division of labour between theory 
and practice.  Marx presents his argument against Proudhon's theoreticist rejection of 
workers' combinations as orientated by the practice of the English workers. Proudhon 
argues against workers' combinations, for what will they achieve, even if they win wage 
rises: the capitalist class will push down wages to make up for lost profits, the cost of 
organising will itself be higher than what is won, and at the end of the day the workers 
will still be workers, the masters still masters.676 While questioning the economic side of 
Proudhon's  argument,  Marx also focuses  on the  experiences  of  the  Bolton workers, 
which suggests that something more, and more important than wages, can be gained 
from combinations and struggles:
If  the  first  aim  of  resistance  was  merely  the  maintenance  of  wages, 
combinations,  at  first  isolated,  constitute  themselves  into  groups  as  the 
capitalists  in  their  turn  unite  for  the  purpose  of  repression,  and in  face  of 
always  united  capital,  the  maintenance  of  the  association  becomes  more 
necessary to them than that of wages. This is so true that English economists 
are amazed to see the workers sacrifice a good part of their wages in favour of 
associations, which, in the eyes of these economists, are established solely in 
675 Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy,” 1976, 210.
676 Ibid.
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favour of wages.677
The self-interested combinations of workers thus produces a surprising surplus: not a 
final  telos,  but  an  immanent,  self-organised  telos.  The  suspension of  individualism, 
happens in the production of social bonds of solidarity, self-defence and living. As Marx 
wrote after  his  first  encounters  with the Paris  proletarians,  as we saw in chapter  2, 
conviviality  which  becomes  an  end  in  itself,  gives  content  to  the  struggle  for 
communism, and allows a combination of individual interests to become organisation 
proper.678
However, the problem of the proletarian condition is much wider than any existing or 
even possible organisation of proletarians. The problem of proletarian separation can 
only be tackled in those nodal points where common solutions can be produced. The 
general  problem  gives,  rather  abstractly,  the  field  of  separated  individuals,  but 
crystallisation only happens where some common aim can be produced. We thus face 
the challenge of thinking the conditions of the composition of those that are not part of a 
workplace. The 18th Brumaire only gives us the most scattered and isolated: the small-
holding peasants, a mass of semi-proletarians who are largely being undermined by the 
developing markets in food, taxes and debts.
8. The Material Conditions of Composition
The counter-revolutionary section of the lumpenproletariat was organised by Bonaparte, 
because he offered not merely Vertretung, but a temporary solution to their condition of 
insecurity and poverty: pay, comradeship and a mission.  While the lumpenproletariat 
secured the dominance of Louis Bonaparte in the Parisian streets, it was the peasantry 
that elected him in December 1848.  Marx asks what it is about peasant life that made 
them susceptible to electing a leader so alien to them. Unlike the petty bourgeoisie, the 
peasantry  does  not  easily  produce  or  come into  contact  with  more  or  less  organic 
intellectuals. This gives us the basis of Marx's often criticised statement that the small-
holding peasants are
incapable of asserting their class interest in their own name, whether through a 
parliament or a convention. They cannot represent [vertreten] themselves, they 
must  be represented [vertreten].  Their  representative must  at  the same time 
677 Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy,” 1976, 211.
678 Marx, “1844 Manuscripts,” 365.
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appear as their master, as an authority over them, an unlimited governmental 
power which protects them from the other classes and sends them rain and 
sunshine  from above.  The political  influence  of  the small-holding peasants, 
therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power which subordinates 
society to itself.679
But what is it in their mode of life that makes the peasants susceptible to this mode of 
Vertretung?  Here we must ask how Bonaparte became an answer to the peasantry's 
need for orientation and representation. By understanding this need we understand how 
it  might  instead  by  satisfied  by  a  movement  of  revolutionary  composition. Marx's 
inquiry into this problem starts not with the consciousness of the peasants, but with a 
description  of  the  peasants'  specific  mode  of  life,  their  problems  and  the  possible 
solutions:
The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in 
similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with each other. 
Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing 
them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is furthered by France’ bad means 
of  communication  and  by  the  poverty  of  the  peasants.  … Each  individual 
peasant family is almost self-sufficient... and thus [the peasantry] acquires its 
means of life more through an exchange with nature than in intercourse with 
society. A small holding, the peasant and his family; alongside them another 
small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these make 
up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department. In this way, the 
great  mass  of  the  French  nation  is  formed  by  the  simple  addition  of 
homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes.680
Thus the everyday and the mode of (re)production of the peasants separates them from 
one another,  making it  hard to constitute any political  collectivities.  And unlike the 
isolated urban proletarians who live in close proximity and attend the same workplaces, 
peasant families live stationary lives with few neighbours.681 Where a discourse that 
starts  from the  need  of  science  and  ideology  would  ask:  how can  the  peasants  be 
represented, and how can they be enlightened about the conditions under which they 
live, an inquiry starting with the way the peasants are living their condition comes up 
679 Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 479.
680 Ibid., 478. 
681 On the often misunderstood phrase 'idiocy of rural life', see appendix 7.2.
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with different results:
Insofar as millions of families live under conditions of existence that separate 
their  mode of  life,  their  interests,  and their  culture from those of  the other 
classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so 
far  as  there  is  merely  a  local  interconnection  among  these  small-holding 
peasants, and the identity of their interests forms no community, no national 
bond,  and  no  political  organization  among  them,  they  do  not  constitute  a 
class.682
The peasantry lives this common problem, but the very character of the problem itself, 
as well as the peasants' limited means of communication and its localised mode of life, 
means that it cannot form a class. This shows the strictly  relational and self-relating 
character  of  Marx's  concept  of  class;  the  peasants  share  certain  problems  (market 
fluctuations on their goods, competition, their enslavement to capital through debt),683 
but the ways these are formulated and dealt  with are local.  While this  might create 
strong bonds of local communities, the peasant population as a whole is a mere mass. It 
does not find the collectivity in which these problems could be articulated as common 
interests, where the everyday struggles of each peasant family or village could become a 
common struggle. 
The isolation of the small-holding peasants meant that they were lost for the revolution: 
instead they were homogenised by Bonaparte, a man in whose fame and power these 
individual  peasants found a protector.  Their  trust  in him as their  representative was 
based on the historical memory of their alliance with the old Napoleon. A mass, whether 
heterogeneous  and connected  by locale  (like  the  lumpen)  or  relatively  uniform and 
separated (like the peasantry), is most easily united under a master or master-signifier. 
However,  the isolation also points  to  the  fact  that  a  movement which  develops  the 
technical means and organisational forms through which peasants can communicate and 
link up is one that will  abolish the need for a  Vertreter  and enable the peasantry to 
represent itself.684 
Marx, however, did not think along this route, but instead invested his hopes in the 
revolutionary organisation of the small-holding peasantry on its worsening condition. In 
682 Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 479.
683 '...the feudal obligation was replaced by the mortgage...'. Ibid., 481.
684 For an example of successful political project to mobilise and connect peasants in the Europe of 
Marx's times, see appendix 7.2.
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order  words,  Marx  pointed  to  the  possibility  that  a  change  in  the  character  of  the 
peasants' problem would lead them to seek its Vertreter in the proletariat. In short, Marx 
did suggest that the peasants cannot be revolutionary:
The Bonaparte dynasty represents not the revolutionary, but the conservative 
peasant;  not  the peasant who strikes out  beyond the condition of his  social 
existence,  the  small  holding,  but  rather  one  who  wants  to  consolidate  his 
holding; not the countryfolk who in alliance with the towns want to overthrow 
the old order through their own energies, but on the contrary those who, in 
solid seclusion within this old order, want to see themselves and their small 
holdings saved and favoured by the ghost of the Empire.685
Marx defines revolutionaries as those who aim to abolish the old order,  rather than 
improve their position within it, who opt for a different future rather than a repetition of 
the past in the present. Further, he notes that the ranks of the revolutionary peasants are 
likely to swell  with the growth of the rural  lumpenproletariat,  'the five million who 
hover on the margin of existence and either have their haunts in the countryside itself' or 
move  back  and  forth  between  town  and  countryside  with  'their  rags  and  their 
children.'686 As the small-holding peasant class is drawn further into the bourgeois order, 
the conservative consolidation will become an option for still fewer peasants; in other 
words,  the strategies  and modes of  living the peasant  condition will  change as this 
condition changes. Now, Marx writes (in what is certainly also a political intervention in 
a process of class  composition), the interests of the peasants are close to those of the 
urban proletariat, in which they will find a 'natural ally and leader' – while many young 
lumpen peasants will be lost to the army.687 The terrain of struggle and political class 
composition also changes – the majority of the peasants no longer find their interests 
aligned with the bourgeoisie, as under Napoleon, but as turning against it. Thus, while 
Bonaparte would like to appear as the 'patriarchal benefactor of all classes ... he cannot 
give to one class without taking from another', severely constricting his capacity to unite 
685 Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 479.
686 Ibid., 482. Thus the number of rural paupers in France, according to Marx's numbers, is greater than 
the urban lumpenproletariat, which he sets at 4 million; also Fanon finds the most important group of 
lumpenproletarians in the colonies and post-colonies among the landless peasants. Frantz Fanon, 
The Wretched of the Earth, 1st Evergreen Black Cat Edition (New York: Grove Press, n.d.), 111. The 
total number of paupers, 11 million, would thus have been almost one third (32.7%) of all 
inhabitants in metropolitan France, which in the period in 1848-52 was around 36 million. This, 
incidentally, is the exact same percentage as that living in 'extreme poverty' (less than $1.25 p.d.) in 
India in 2010, as estimated by the World Bank. “Poverty & Equity Data | India,” The World Bank, 
2010.
687 Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 482–3.
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different classes under his representation.688
Curiously,  the  proletarian  leadership  of  the  peasantry  advocated  by  Marx seems  to 
install it in position of  representation  of the isolated peasantry, similar to that of the 
modern Prince Bonaparte.  It would thus seem that our reading brings us to the very 
traditional interpretation that Marx – according to the iron logic of his own argument – 
could only be champion of the industrial proletariat. However, Marx is not hostile to 
peasants per se,  nor does he present the peasants as necessarily counter-revolutionary. 
The arguments around their subordination to proletarian leadership mainly relate to the 
development  of  the  means  of  communication  and  combination,  i.e.  the  means  of 
relating and composing in struggle, and of  representing  themselves.  As we see in the 
case of the petty bourgeoisie, it is the character of their mode of life, its problems and 
solutions, which keeps them conformist: as their problem is changing, then so will their 
political orientation.  In  The Civil War in France,  written in 1871, Marx asks: 'how 
could it [the peasants' earlier loyalty to Bonaparte] have withstood the appeal of the 
Commune to the living interests and urgent wants of the peasantry?' The reactionary 
rural assembly of landowners, officials, rentiers and tradesmen...
knew  that  three  months'  free  communication  of  Communal  Paris  with  the 
provinces would bring about a general rising of the peasants, and hence their 
anxiety to establish a police blockade around Paris, so as to stop the spread of 
the rinderpest.689
In  the 18th Brumaire Marx  was  hostile  to  the  lumpenproletariat,  sceptical  of  the 
peasantry's revolutionary capacities, and hopeful about the urban proletariat. The whole 
issue here is to keep in mind that Marx's reflections, while informed by a structural 
analysis, are first of all conjunctural. They are focussed on the material conditions of 
combining or allying what is separate around common struggles, and on the invention 
and construction of new solutions to the problems of the times and of life. Technologies 
of communication (means of contagion, as it were) and the capacity to overcome or 
bypass the force of the state are here decisive. But first of all, it is a question of aligning 
and shaping the interests of populations.  In his rebuttal of Bakunin's critique that he 
wishes to make the proletariat the master of the peasants, Marx remarks that it is simply 
an issue of composing interests. With owner-peasants it is a matter of the proletariat 
688 Ibid., 486.
689 Karl Marx, “The Civil War in France,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1969), 226.
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doing for them at least what the bourgeoisie is able to, while proletarianised agricultural 
workers can organise with the proletarians immediately,  because of shared interests. 
Finally, with respect to the rural workers, the goal is not a mere class alliance, but to  
effect  a  reorganisation  of  their  reproduction  toward  communal  ownership,  without 
antagonising the peasants, i.e. without forcibly collectivising them or removing their 
rights to the land.690 
In the final part of this chapter we will attempt to investigate how the analysis of the 
developing  proletarian  condition,  with  its  tendencies  towards  proletarianisation, 
surpluspopulation  and  disorganisation  of  the  class  relation,  might  orientate  and  be 
orientated by revolutionary practice.691
9. Starting from Reproduction
We have seen how the proletarian condition is best understood as one of separation 
from the means of reproduction. This is the condition of capital organising proletarians 
as  wage labourers.  New  separations  are  constantly  produced by capital's  expansive 
drive for absolute surplus-value, a tendency through which ever new populations are 
included in the workforce; women and agricultural producers primarily.692 Furthermore, 
we  have  seen  how  the  drive  for  relative  surplus-value  tendentially  spits  out  more 
workers,  rendering  them superfluous  to  capitalist  production.  In  the  course  of  long 
periods of mass-unemployment, and as an effect of the secular decline in employment 
we see a growth of the consolidated surplus-population, i.e. a population unfit, unable, 
unwilling  to  work,  because  of  poor  health,  age;  or,  which  Marx  does  not  mention, 
because it has adopted another mode of reproduction.
Thus, if our reading of Marx's chapters on primitive accumulation are combined with 
his analysis of the general tendencies of capitalist accumulation, we must conclude that 
struggles over reproduction are becoming an increasingly important issue, not merely in 
the form of struggles over the wage and working day, but as defences of welfare (the 
social wage), and struggles to appropriate the means of reproduction. However, even if 
communisation, the reproduction of the proletariat as the non-reproduction of capital, 
690 Karl Marx, “From Comments on Bakunin’s Book, Statehood and Anarchy,” in Selected Works, vol. 2 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), 410–411.
691 See also appendix 7.3. on class formation through radical solutions, i.e. the politics of communist 
appropriation of wealth.
692 This analysis will be based on Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of Marx's theory of expanded 
reproduction. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital.
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here becomes the horizon, it does not necessarily come onto the agenda as an aim. If the 
proletariat is, as Endnotes and Benanav write, 'rather a working class in transition, a 
working  class  tending  to  become  a  class  excluded  from  work',  it  is  also  a  class 
increasingly in need of alternative ways to  secure its  own reproduction.  Before this 
becomes a matter  of revolutionary struggle it  is  a matter  of everyday solutions and 
resistances.  The  question  is  how  the  individualism  of  such  solutions  is  or  can  be 
suspended.  To investigate  this,  it  is  useful  to  look to  the class  whose solutions  has 
traditionally  been  most  vilified  as  selfish,  amoral  and  opportunistic,  those  of  the 
lumpenproletariat.
In  the  18th  Brumaire  it  would  seem  that  Marx  lapses  into  the  organicist  idea  of 
parasitism when, invoking the nation, he writes that the lumpen, like their chief Louis 
Bonaparte,  'felt  the  need  of  benefiting  themselves  at  the  expense  of  the  labouring 
nation.'693 However, Marx's 'nation' as a victim appears ironically, in relation to Louis 
Bonaparte's  own  consistent  self-representation  as  the  saviour  of  the  nation.  What 
Bonaparte  and  the  lumpenproletariat  have  in  common is  their  character  as  floating 
elements  in  the  situation  –  if  Bonaparte  eventually  becomes  the  figure  uniting 
contradictory class interests, it is precisely because of his apparent elevation above the 
classes. On the other hand, the lumpenproletariat was exploited exactly as an element 
who has  no stable  station  or  stake  in  society.  For  Bonaparte  – as  for  the  financial 
aristocracy  –  it  takes  abstractions  and  money  to  exploit  an  unstable  situation.  A 
significant example is the case of the young members of the Mobile Guard, who were 
captivated by their Bonapartist officers' 'rodomontades about death for the fatherland 
and devotion to the republic.'694 On top of this ideological seduction, it took monetary 
corruption (1 franc 50 centimes a day) to bring the malleable young lumpenproletarians 
into the Bonapartist ranks.695 The problem of the lumpenproletariat might not be that 
they are the paradoxical product of bourgeois society standing in the way of the world-
historical revolution, but that their untimely up-rootedness is so contemporary in times 
where 'everything solid melts into air', that its organisation in the revolution requires a 
wholly different mode of political composition, their organisation ex novo.
It  is  clear  that  the  counter-revolutionary  character  of  this  group of  overwhelmingly 
young and male lumpenproletarians does not allow any general points to be made about 
693 Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 442.
694 Marx, “The Class Struggles in France,” 220.
695 Ibid.
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the lumpenproletariat as such. Consider Marx's numbers: 25 000 in the Mobile Guard 
compared  to  4  million  'recognised  paupers,  vagabonds,  criminals  and prostitutes  in 
France.'696 Furthermore,  even  this  particular  section  enrolled  in  the  Mobile  Guard, 
'capable  of  the  most  heroic  deeds  and  the  most  exalted  sacrifices  as  of  the  basest 
banditry and the foulest corruption', cannot be said to be counter-revolutionary per se.697 
Indeed, while Marx does not suggest any tactics by which the lumpenproletarians can 
be  won  for  the  revolutionary  cause,  his  description  of  how  they  became  counter-
revolutionaries, implies that other ideological articulations and other ways of satisfying 
their needs could bring them to another cause. Here we have radical needs that are not 
definable  in  terms  of  stable  class  interests,  but  as  the  wavering  interests  of  a 
heterogeneous group who can compose with whomever can help satisfy their needs and 
desires, with whomever it can share a slogan, an idea and a meal (just like, we should 
add, the working-class itself before it is ideologically and organisationally homogenised 
by the workers movement). From this perspective of needs and the thirst for ideas and 
conviviality, the problem with the lumpenproletarians for the revolution is no longer 
that their modes of life are essentially counter-revolutionary, but that they, unlike the 
workers who are fed by capital, will not be satisfied by slogans, but only by cash pay 
and food (and a  bit  of  moral  licence).  There  therefore is  no  structural  reason  why 
Marx's strategic orientation couldn't heed the urgency of Frantz Fanon's call to organise 
the lumpenproletariat, whose alliances are never given in advance, but who will always 
take part in the conflict: 'If this available reserve of human effort is not immediately 
organised by the forces of rebellion, it will find itself fighting as hired soldiers side by 
side with the colonial troops.'698  
The willingness of young lumpenproletarians to enlist in the Mobile Guard brings up 
the question not just of radical needs and their revolutionary potential, but the question 
of their practical organisation around concrete solutions: the  problem of all those that 
cannot  or  will  not  work  is  of  an  immediate  everyday  character.  The  needs  of  the 
lumpenproletarian  are  more  immediate  than  those  of  the  employed,  and  more  non-
conformist than those of the unemployed; in the absence of exploitation their modes of 
696 Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 482.
697 Even if, as mentioned by Trotsky and Fanon, the danger of a rightist cooption of the 
lumpenproletarians remains. Trotsky:  'Through the fascist agency, capitalism sets in motion the 
masses of the crazed petty bourgeoisie and the bands of declassed and demoralized 
lumpenproletariat – all the countless human beings whom finance capital itself has brought to 
desperation and frenzy'. Leon Trotsky, “Fascism: What It Is and How to Fight It,” Pioneer  
Publishers, August 1944.
698 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 137. 
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life  are  criminalised,  their  neighbourhoods  colonised,  in  the  terms  of  the  Black 
Panthers, by the police.699 Thus the programmatic demand of an abolition of bourgeois 
property will be inefficient if it does not address the immediate needs of those that will  
otherwise sell themselves to the counter-revolution.700
In  order  to  think  the  composition  along  the  whole  range  of  ways  people  live  the 
proletarian condition (through wage-labour, precarity, as semi-proletarianised seasonal 
workers  with  small  plots  of  land,  as  subsistence  peasants  in  the  process  of  being 
expropriated,  as  lumpenproletarians,  etc.)  we  must  think  through  the  problem  of 
reproduction from the point of the heterogeneous need of proletarians for other modes 
of reproduction, and the actuality of attempts to construct such modes and foremost the 
actuality of struggles over reproduction. The history of the proletariat outside the wage-
relation,  of  the  proletarians  rendered  superfluous  to  capitalist  production  (if  not 
necessarily indirectly purposeful as a reserve army) and the proletarians that always 
were  superfluous,  is  a  history  of  constant  attempts  to  create  other  modes  of 
reproduction, their victory, co-optation, or suppression. If proletarian self-reproduction 
against capital – i.e. a reproduction that opens for the self-abolition of the proletariat as 
proletariat – is to come on the agenda, it is not enough to state that such communisation 
is an invariable revolutionary project of the proletariat (Gilles Dauvé and Karl Nesic) or 
a  project  only  possible  today,  a  deepening  radical  need  (Théorie  Communiste, 
Endnotes).701 To open the historical orientation of communisation theory to the practical 
question of organisation, it becomes unavoidable to relate it to ongoing practices of de-
proletarianisation. To go beyond this we need to see not only possibility and growing 
existential need, but potentialities which can be – or are striving to be – actualised. To 
do  this  is  to  open  for  the  question  of  composition,  emulation,  organisation,  and 
contagion, between heterogeneous strategies of reproduction, as they exist or are needed 
to satisfy the practical situated needs of proletarians in relation to the many different 
ways they live this condition-problem. 
While  the  reproduction  of  large  sections  of  the  Western-European  proletariat  was 
mediated by the welfare state (what Balibar calls the 'national-social state')702, another 
699 Cf. Bobby Seale, Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party and Huey P. Newton 
(Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press, 1991).
700 For this demand, see appendix 7.3.
701 For a collection of texts from the debate between Théorie Communiste and Dauvé & Nesic see 
Endnotes, Gilles Dauvé and Karl Nesic, and Théorie Communiste, Endnotes, vol. 1 (London, 2008).
702 Étienne Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy before and after Marx 
(New York: Routledge, 1994), 134.
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range of struggles have taken hold, among migrants in Europe and proletarians in the 
'Global South.' Informal work and illegal activities, squatting and land occupations most 
significantly, but also what Asef Bayat calls quiet encroachments, a popular version of 
what  Italian autonomists  called auto-reduction in poor  Levantine and North African 
neighbourhoods and slums.703 Even where such activities  are carried out on a  small 
group or individual basis, attempts to crack down on those modes of reproduction have 
often resulted in mass popular resistance as Bayat points out; in short, we can speak of 
these as emergent  moral  economies of the proletariat.704 Such strategies,  along with 
existing  organisations  of  resistance  such  as  workers  unions,  informal  communities 
around  mosques,  and  the  football  fan  clubs,  were  all  practical  conditions  for  the 
capacity of the spontaneous uprising to pose the existence of Mubarak's regime as a 
practical problem. 
In  appendices  7.4.  and  7.5.  we  raise  the  question  of  proletarian  struggles  for 
reproduction in  relation to  violence and resistances  to  proletarianisation.  What  such 
struggles point to is that, while the immediate contradiction between the reproduction of 
capital and the reproduction of the proletariat might orientate us to the 'condition of 
possibility of communism' today, it gives us nothing but a practical condition of the 
perpetuation of misery and proletarian competition.705 What matters here are strategies 
that might build the proletarian capacity to resist and thus to project solutions to its 
misery, i.e. see it is a problem rather than a fate. Today, the tactics and strategies for 
dealing with, and abolishing the proletarian condition can thus only be reduced to the 
questions of the welfare state and trade unions through gross neglect. Furthermore, such 
strategies will become increasingly important in a Europe that is provincialising itself 
and  abolishing  welfare  rights  in  bundles.  The  forms  of  organisation  and  class 
composition  possible  and necessary  under  conditions  of  surplus  population  and the 
squeeze  on  proletarian  reproduction  starts  with  'survival'  programmes.706 If  not,  the 
current  violent  and  economic  annihilation  of  the  proletarian  capacity  to  resist  and 
combine will prevent any revolutionary crystallisation.
703 Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, 2013.
704 To speak with Edward P. Thompson “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
Century,” Past & Present no. 50 (February 1, 1971), 76–136.
705 This phrase is from Endnotes, “Spontaneity, Mediation, Rupture,” Endnotes 3 (2013).
706 On the relation between reproduction and self-deference in the survival programmes of the Black 
Panther Party, see appendix 7.4.
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10. Conclusion  
The  final  chapters  of  this  thesis  have  argued  that  the  proletarian  problem must  be 
defined  more  broadly  than  by  exploitation.  The  lumpen,  the  unemployed,  unpaid 
reproductive  workers  and  the  working  class  live  the  same problem-condition  –  the 
separation from the means of (re)production.707 Yet they live it  differently,  in terms of 
daily practices, which are stratified according to gender, ability, race, etc.. 
The systematic dialectical orientation to the conditions of possibility of communism 
poses the question of solution adequate to the radicality of this problem: the proletariat 
becomes the name for the only solution to this problem. Theory is then in a place to 
point out the limitations of existing struggles from the point of view of the theory of the 
whole and/or content by showing what form such a revolution must necessarily take to 
be  adequate.  Theory  proves  to  intellectuals  the  logical  form  and  possibility  of 
revolution, and to proletarians the inadequacy of their efforts.  Merely pointing out the 
limitation of any one struggle by reference to the epochal radicality of the problem, 
however, might as well produce cynicism and indifference. It is not enough to be faced 
with a common problem; this gives nothing but an understanding of the proletariat in-
itself. Unless there is the development of common strategies to (dis)solve the problem,  
the  different  mutually  competing  strategies  for  dealing  with  it  will  prevail.  Any 
revolutionary practice must start with and always proceed by way of solutions that are 
situationally more convincing or desirable than existing ones. Theory, considered as a 
part of such movements – rather than withdrawn to its own niche in the division of 
labour out of habit or fear of violating the purity of struggles – is the active effort to  
disseminate strategies of combination and struggle, and of elaborating commons and 
transversal points of connection between different struggles.
The  problem  of  the  revolutionary  organisation  of  proletarian  difference  is  one  of 
strengthening  and  inventing common  solutions  to  the  common  problem  of  the  
proletariat, whether lumpen, employed or unemployed. This entails recognising that the 
strategies of the struggle will  differ  significantly, according to the different ways the 
problem  is  lived  and  survived...  If  the  struggle  proceeds  successfully  these  class-
differences will be abolished both gradually and in leaps – in other words, the self-
abolishing proletarians will be stuck less and less in the mode of life they had developed 
to  deal  with  a  problem  of  their  separation.  De-separation,  further,  is  not  exactly 
707 Included in which is the relations of reproduction, among those communal structures of care.
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unification, but free composition and association. While these only make sense starting 
from the lived desires and needs of more or less separated proletarians, they produce a 
telos in excess of themselves, a suspension of individuality as seen above, and by Marx, 
when he participated in the Parisian proletarians' conviviality. He noted that the means 
to create communism is communism itself: that is, communism practiced produces itself 
as a need and an aim in itself.708 In this  sense, which does not distinguish between 
macro and micro,  communism is  not an abstract  Kantian 'ideal'  nor  a  plan,  but  the 
emergent telos in a process of combination, when it folds back on itself and becomes 
self-perpetuating  and  self-organised.  This  is  the  abstract  and  'idealising'  yet  fully 
materialist form of the 'real movement' that abolishes the present state of things.
708 Marx, “1844 Manuscripts,” 365.
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Conclusion, and another introduction
1. The Path Travelled
Our introduction started from the premise that the best theorisations of contemporary 
capitalism are based on Marx's Capital. Or rather, we started with an immediate caveat 
to  this  proposal:  Marx's  own  articulation  of  the  critique  of  political  economy  and 
revolutionary practice is in deep crisis, premised as it was on the prediction that capital 
would not only produce its abstractly possible gravediggers, but create the conditions 
for their organisation into an actual unified counter-subject. It has not been our object 
to criticise, reject or resuscitate this idea, which we have referred to as the Symmetry 
Thesis. We have, however, taken its crisis, which is both a crisis of organisation and 
orientation,  as an occasion to raise the question of the limitations of the Symmetry 
Thesis. This, in turn, leads to the question of what room and logics can be found in 
Marx  for  a  concept  of  the  revolutionary  organisation  of  struggles  starting  from 
reproduction in general, rather than the wage-relation in particular. This, we argued, is 
particularly relevant in times of crisis, unemployment and growing surplus-populations. 
The question has then been: what space is there in the critique of political economy for  
thinking the revolutionary potentiality of struggles today, beyond the Symmetry Thesis? 
This is ultimately a question of how the critique of political economy can orientate and 
be orientated by struggles falling outside the classical workers' struggle.
To  narrow  down  this  problematic,  we  have  asked:  what  is  the  orientating  role  of  
concepts of organisation in revolutionary theory and practice, according to Marx?  In 
Part I, the mode in which we elaborated this question was both critical and constructive. 
On the one hand, we saw how the theoretical concepts of organisation central to Marx's 
version of the Symmetry Thesis conceived revolution as an Aufhebung of the process of 
capitalist history. This was premised on the central position of the working class in the 
production  of  capital  and  the  regressive  or  insignificant  role  of  struggles  against 
proletarianisation, colonialism and the gendered division of labour. On the other hand 
we excavated, via a reading of Marx's use of concepts from the Hegelian philosophy of 
nature, an  inherently  constructive  concept  of  organisation,  a  kind  of  materialist 
dialectic, in the words of Alfred Schmidt. This allowed us to find in Marx not just a 
critical,  systematic  logic  of  capital,  but  an  open  logic  of  organisation,  and  one  of 
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struggle, strategy, and violence. 
In chapter 4 we argued that Marx transforms the contemporary analogy between the 
problem of  social  organisation  and  organisation  in  nature  into  a  conception  of  the 
natural history of modes of production, considered retrospectively. This allowed, in Part 
II,  to  rethink  the  relational  concepts  of  the  philosophy  of  nature  –  separation, 
composition, combination, organisation – as historical logics of social organisation. We 
saw how the starting point, separate atomised individuals, can here be thought of as the 
invariable problem of the epoch of capitalism and the modern state. This allowed us to 
think  the  historicity  of  Marx's  systematic  dialectical  method  in  Capital  through  an 
analysis  of the epoch-making period of primitive accumulation which produced this 
general  separation  and  atomisation:  trade  and  expropriation  gave  rise  to  possessive 
individualism and large, pauperised masses, processes of separation that are constantly 
repeated today, and which pose the main challenge to workers' organisations and their 
capacity to organise. Further, we saw how this fundamental exteriority was mediated by 
money in the combination of labour and capital, and how it became the fundamental 
equation  of  capitalist  organisation  as  it  established  itself  as  the  social  teleology  of 
capitalist production, through the use of force against resistances and alternative modes 
of organisation. Marx predicted that capital's search for absolute surplus-value would 
lead to increasing proletarianisation of new populations and that the competitive drive 
towards relative surplus-value would increase surplus-populations on a global scale. We 
argued, that this tendentially increases the importance of struggles over reproduction. 
Under  these  conditions,  the  task  appears  to  be  one  of  proletarian  self-organisation, 
starting from the immediate problem of reproduction, rather than just from exploitation; 
here struggles over labour-rights and the wage are merely one part of the terrain.
Through these arguments we have confirmed the hypothesis that what connects Marx's 
methodology  and  ontology,  his  dialectical  theoretical  method  and  his  historical 
materialism, is found in the logic of organisation and disorganisation. To start from the 
natural history of capital allows us to think the systematic dialectic – modelled on the 
Hegelian  Idea  –  as  a  result,  while  remaining  open  to  questions  of  contingency,  
resistance, strategy and revolutionary organisation. If we do not start from the always-
already of the capitalist  totality,  but from a process of totalisation which modulates 
between contingency and necessity, organisation and disorganisation, we can read the 
critique of political economy in political and strategic terms, without renouncing on the 
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systematic  ambition  of  Capital.  Thus  we  can  affirm  that  the  Marxian  logics  of 
organisation  inspired  by  the  philosophy  of  nature  must  be  understood  as  practical  
concepts. As such they become relevant to the critique of actuality from the point of 
view  of  potentiality,  as  well  as  for  the  organisation  and  disorganisation  of  social 
relations,  and  for  comprehending  violence  and  force  as  intrinsic  aspects  of  these 
processes. This thesis thus draws a set of concepts of orientation and organisation out of 
Marx – in  determinate relation to  his  systematic  critique of capital  –  which neither 
presuppose  the  always-already of  the  totality,  whole  or  organism,  nor  disavows the 
existence of real teleology, of totalisation. 
Thus, we can begin to think the ways in which immediate struggles and resistances, 
even  when  not  directly  related  to  exploitation  and  the  wage-relation,  might  be 
composed as resistances to proletarianisation and struggles for de-proletarianisation, of 
a proletariat which is constantly stratified, divided, and heterogeneous, yet resistant and 
self-organising. The proletariat here is not a sociological category, the unitary subject of 
revolution,  a  radical  negativity  or  the  industrial  working  class.  Rather  it  is  the 
differentially lived condition of atomisation and virtual poverty, and the task of posing 
this condition as a problem, which can only be done through combination. Thus the 
proletariat becomes the name of the possibility of the emergence of collective subjects 
organising  themselves  to  solve  and  abolish  the  problem  of  separation,  and  which 
thereby enter into antagonism against the exploitation and domination that attempts to 
uphold and profit from their separation and alienated co-operation.
2. Three Speculative Trajectories of Orientation and Organisation
Writing this conclusion I realise that this thesis has been orientated in many ways by 
news from Greece, and by the challenge the Greek crisis poses to think the possibility of 
crisis and resistance after the Symmetry Thesis.709 The situation in Greece has posed 
three problems that underlie the orientation of this thesis: What are the possibilities and 
necessities of organising in a situation where extreme levels of unemployment, global 
competition and legal assaults on workers' rights undermine the power of trade unions 
while  global  capital  and  international  governance  (the  Troika)  undermine  the 
709 Apart from media reports, I rely on conversations and updates from Stathis Kouvelakis, Clara Jaya 
Brekke, Dimitra Kotouza, George Caffentzis, Efi Papapavlou, Katerina Anastasiou, Giorgos Kano, 
and interviews I conducted outside the remit of this project with Mohammed Numan, who passed 
through Greece on his way from Pakistan, and with Makis Anagnostou, from the occupied and 
worker-run factory Vio.Me. in Thessaloniki. 
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effectiveness of political solutions on a national level? Secondly, what is the role of riots 
and self-defence in a situation where the capacity of the state and the law to command 
obedience is in deep crisis, and where fear of a social implosion attracts many to the 
brutal  racialist  order promised by fascists, and leads many others,  who have lost  so 
much, to defend the state's desperate use of violence against the social  movements? 
Finally, what is the role of immediate need in the formation of political movements, 
what are the mechanisms by which it becomes individualised as personal tragedies and 
socialised as re-appropriation, mutual aid, solidarity or charity? These questions are not 
by any means answered in this thesis, of course, but merely posed, in relation to Marx 
and the theoretical apparatus we have developed here. The hope is that they may help us 
clarify  the  usefulness  of  this  apparatus,  as  well  as  its  lacunae  and  limits.  Thus, 
speculatively,  we  turn  this  conclusion  into  an  introduction,  orientating  us  to  future 
research and the possible approaches to the problems of our contemporaneity.
a. What is the orientating use of the logics of atomism, chemism and organism  
today?
The current crisis can be seen as a crisis of the organic, national social state, as it was 
developed in the dialectic of the capital-labour symmetry after the Second World War. 
Of course, given the lack of a developed theory of the state in Marx, and his writing 
before the welfare state, leads us to leave many questions open. Marx was writing at a 
time  when  the  modern  state's  capacity  for  organic  integration  was  still  developing. 
While the crisis can be seen as a moment of re-atomisation, many things make this a 
different situation than Marx's,  particularly the existence of an often ossified labour 
movement, the dense integration of global networks of military and police violence, and 
the differentiated patterns of surplus-value production, which modulate between labour-
intensive industries and mechanisation. This invites us to give greater attention to the 
problems  of  finance  and  logistics  as  mechanisms  that  ensure  global  competition 
between workforces  and undermine the  power of  nationally  organised trade  unions. 
Here, localised attacks on supply chains (such as the harbour blockade carried out by 
Occupy Oakland in solidarity with the port workers) and forms of transnational supply 
chain organising (such as the newly-formed Global Garment Workers' Union) become 
increasingly important; such combinations, unheard of in Marx's time, have been made 
possible by new means of communication and travel. Furthermore, the current global 
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system, while deeply integrated, has not developed the kinds of governance typical of 
nation states. Thus, if we speak of a global 'organism' it is a curious amoebic one, which 
increasingly cannot constitute itself in relation to an outside. An organism which has 
swallowed up its environment can only cannibalise itself, and abandon those parts of 
itself it cannot reproduce, only to reabsorb them after their putrefaction. 
Theoretically,  the  above  tendencies  invite  a  clarification  of  the  historical  passage 
mentioned at the beginning of chapter 7 from a mechanistic to an organic state theory. 
Here  we  might  find  the  Foucauldian  analysis  of  the  folding  of  biopower  over 
sovereignty  useful,  while  the  question  of  how  to  theorise  the  new  paradigm  of 
governance (Empire, the camp, neoliberalism?) and how it reconfigures sovereignty and 
biopower, remains open. 
b. How do the concepts of organisation reconfigure our conception of power,  
struggle and violence? 
The question of the natural-historic organisation of state and capital is also a question of 
different  regimes  of  violence,  struggle  and  power.  Starting  with  the  proletarian 
condition rather than with exploitation means to start with the different modes of living 
the same abstract condition of virtual poverty and separation, and the task of turning 
this condition into a common problem. To think proletarian self-organisation as starting 
with any combination that  suspends separation might  allow us to  rethink traditional 
theories of power and struggle. For instance, where Foucault starts with difference and 
resistance, and thinks this in terms of the paradigms of war and ethics of the self, a re-
conception  of  resistance  from  the  point  of  view  of  reproduction  promises  greater 
sensitivity to issues of gender and sociality. At the same time the clarification of the 
logics of relations in Marx's 'natural history' of the period since primitive accumulation, 
taken  from natural  philosophy,  gives  us  the  tool  to  think  the  determinate  relations 
between three classical paradigms of power:
• The logics of separation and contractualism, which theorise the problems of 
law, exchange and latent civil war according to the logic of the atomism of 
individuals,  and  the  need  for  their  mechanic  submission  or  organic 
articulation with sovereignty (present in Hobbes, Kant, and Hegel). 
• Closely  related  hereto  are  the  logics  of  opposition  and  resistance,  which 
interpret the problem of war and enmity in terms of the natural philosophy of 
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the clash between exterior composite bodies, be they mechanic or organic (as 
in Clausewitz and Schmitt).
• Finally,  the  logics  of  contradictory  class  interdependence  and  negotiation, 
which  articulates  the  problems  of  class  struggles  and  parliamentary 
democracy in through the logic of organism (at the heart of social democracy 
and theories of bureaucracy). 
In fact, we might have opened for a general disorientation of the modern vocabulary of 
power, which fully orientated by the organisational solutions (mechanical sovereignty 
and organic integration) to the problem of separation. If this whole vocabulary takes 
separation for granted, the perspective of proletarian combination orientates us toward 
the abolition of separation,  that is  of the problem to which sovereignty and organic 
integration are responses. 
Further, the theorisation of the epochal and strategic primacy of self-organised struggles 
for reproduction disorientates the three classical Marxist notions of power, and gives 
another inflection to traditional leftist  notions of power and antagonism. Firstly,  the 
notion of self-organisation which includes but goes far beyond the classical workers' 
organisation  shows  the  narrowness  of  the  Marxist-Leninist  and  social  democratic 
conceptions  of  class  struggle,  which  are  premised  on  the  Symmetry  Thesis.  This 
reopens the questions of proletarian and communist culture and of 'dual power', but no 
longer from the perspective of the workers' identity. Secondly, while this theorisation 
does not in any way exclude the logics of class war and civil war, as theorised by Mao 
or Guevara, it sees any collision between camps not as the aim of a final battle and 
decision, but as one possible outcome of workers' self-organisation. Antagonism in this 
sense would be the moment which coheres a number of initiatives for self-organised 
reproduction: either as a result of such activity – provoking the state into such attacks – 
or as a way in which self-organised struggles attempt to overcome their own limits, by 
appropriating the wealth needed to do so directly or indirectly. 
c. What does it mean to ask the question of revolution from the point of view of  
struggles for reproduction?
Struggles  for  reproduction  start  as  resistances  to  pauperisation,  precarity  and  as 
collective  strategies  of  survival.  But  such  resistances  do  not  necessarily  pose  the 
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problem  of  revolution.  Thus,  while  different  forms  of  self-organisation  might 
revolutionise sociability, be forms of 'revolutionary becoming' to speak with Deleuze, 
self-organisation easily leads to forms of self-sufficiency, withdrawal and fantasies of 
autarchy. However, this should not lead us to affirm, dogmatically, revolution as the 
only solution, forcing concrete struggle into the interpretive framework of the ultimate 
end  of  capital.  Theoretically,  such  approaches  fail  to  compose  with  the  immanent 
orientation and organisation of struggles, and practically, they threaten to disorientate 
and  disorganise  them.  The  question  is  rather  to  ask  by  which  mechanisms  the 
revolutionary solution can be posed.
Pauperisation and precarity are often lived in individualised and family-based ways, or 
used as pretexts to subsume, represent or organise those suffering from lack, through 
logics of charity or nationalist solidarity. Thus, in Greece, the George Soros-funded and 
NGO-driven  'Solidarity  Houses',  which  offer  rudimentary  replacements  of  previous 
state  services,  a coalition of the Orthodox church,  working with Skai-TV and large 
supermarket  chains  to  encourage  customer-financed  food  distribution,  and  Golden 
Dawn's  'Food for  Greeks'  programme all  compete  with  mutual  aid  initiatives,  time 
banks  and  the  initiative  Solidarity4All,  a  project  of  the  leftist  party  Syriza,  which 
attempts  to  coordinate  and  fund  self-organised  initiatives.  In  this  rather  extreme 
situation the problem of proletarian reproduction outside the wage relation reveals itself 
as the politically decisive issue it always is, in its naked undecided form. The political 
question here is not one of reform or revolution, but of the mechanisms through which 
need and anger can organise themselves, rather than fall back in the logics of hope, 
belief  and  supplication.  The  mechanism,  abstractly  speaking,  is  that  of  organising 
around concrete  problems and their  concrete  and imaginable  solutions.  Here,  grand 
slogans  and  orientating  concepts  such  as  capital,  revolution  and  communism  are 
abstract and ideological answers, until  the limitations of concrete solutions pose the 
question to which these concepts are possible answers. Just  as we strive to position 
ourselves beyond the symmetry/asymmetry binary, the concept of self-organisation here 
tries to place itself beyond the binary of disorganisation and existing organisations: it 
does not pose itself in opposition to the latter, nor necessarily starts from the former.  
The concept of self-organisation does not imply a choice between Black Panther Party, 
Solidarity4All,  Pop-up  unions,  quiet  encroachments,  community  groups,  square 
occupations  and  anarchist  support  networks.  The  decisive  point  is  whether  situated 
 246
actors  develop  a  situated  capacity  to  think  the  singularity  of  the  organisational 
possibilities of a situation, and thus to think struggles in their irreducibility to the wider 
socio-political  conjuncture.  Thus,  while  the  preceding pages  contain  many scattered 
proposals for how to raise these questions in determinate relation to Marx's critique of 
political economy, and hence to situate them within a theory of global capitalism, this 
does not mean that the critique of political economy is the final horizon for struggle and 
strategy.  The  concept  of  orientation  attunes  us  to  the  danger  of  hierarchising  the 
priorities of practice according to a general theory, rather than the emergent possibilities 
of  a  situation.  Living  the  proletarian  condition  means  to  be  determined  by  need; 
combination is  the  name  of  a  collective  subjectivating  operation  which  turns 
determination into a problem for practice rather than a condition. To combine means to 
suspend individuality, as we have seen, or to 'revolutionise sociability' in the words of 
Colectivo Situaciones.710 This entails appropriating and inventing possibilities for action 
in a situation, and combining its elements in ways which allow for the emergence of 
self-organisation,  i.e.  for  association  to  become  an  end  in  itself.  Furthermore,  to 
orientate oneself from the standpoint of self-organisation means that it is not possible to 
formalise and objectify collective interests and strategies according to a theory of the 
global totality. Self-organised resistant and revolutionary practices orientate themselves 
in the singularity of their situations, striving to produce their own irreducibility to the 
global, macropolitical conjuncture. They do not disavow that fact of the articulation of 
the  global  system  with  the  situation,  but  resolutely  situate their  orientation  in  the 
conjuncture.  They  focus  on  the  timing  and  organisation  of  concrete  situations  and 
antagonisms  and  ignore  the  urgencies  and  orientations  projected  by  the  media,  the 
enemy and those militants who let the prose of the past go before the poetry of the 
future. 
So what then, is the use of Marxism? First of all, to readers of Marx, the critique of 
political  economy  is  an  orientating  device  that  helps  us  theorise  the  problems  and 
organisation of our times. However, the question is what function Marx might have for 
those who do not have the interest,  time or training to pick it  up as a theory or an 
ideology. Our contention is that it may only help others orientate themselves if they live 
the problems and pose the question to which Marx has so many answers – including the 
bad ones, some of which we have tried to highlight. We might thus say that Marx can 
only become useful in struggles if it is a part of a self-critical pedagogy of the problems 
710 Colectivo Situaciones, A New Social Protagonism, 109.
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and questions that tend to arise in struggles today – including, at the atomised extreme, 
the  lonesome individual  resistance  of  the  bodies  that  resist  the  overwork the  mind 
imposes  on them. Marx gives  concepts  with  which  we can get  a  handle on all  the 
problems of our epoch as well as the potentialities of co-operation and communism. 
This is no mere matter of an ideal theory, be it a cognitive mapping of the conditions 
and abstractions which are our lord and master, or a utopian or axiomatic supplement. It 
is also, and most importantly perhaps, a form of cognitive mapping that allows for the 
de-individualisation of the imagination and gives an outline of possible combinations 
and alliances. 
Finally, we can argue that revolutionary practice today cannot rely on some irruption of 
proletarian negativity, the spontaneity of a global insurrection nor on a theory of capital. 
What is possible and necessary now is to build the capacity for proletarian resistance, 
pending revolution. This starts with minimal acts of re-appropriation of time, resources 
and space.  The problem of revolution poses itself as the challenge of overcoming the 
limitations  of  self-organised  resistance,  as  well  as  the  limitations  of  the  Symmetry 
Thesis.  The problem here is  not  to  overcome self-organisation,  but  to  generalise  it, 
something that is only possible through generalising the re-appropriation of the wealth 
of this world. 
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Introduction 
0.0. The problem of revolutionary theory
In his famous text 'What Is To Be Done?' Lenin presented the paradigmatic articulation 
of theory and practice in the Marxist tradition.711 For Lenin the answer to the question 
was  relatively  straightforward:  revolutionary  theory  orientates  a  practice  that  is 
otherwise blind, by providing explanations for the dynamics of the present, and thus 
prescriptions for practice. Writing against the 'theoretical disorder' of his times, Lenin 
polemicised against 'opportunism' which saw practice as the one and all of revolution: 
'[w]ithout revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement'.712 As already 
Marx  had stated,  theory  is  necessary  for  practice  because  the  social  totality  which 
governs  people's  live  is  not  immediately  available  to  experience.  In  the  Grundrisse 
Marx makes the following observation about the historical specificity of the epoch of 
the capitalist mode of production, and its relation to theory:  
These  objective  dependency  relations  ...  appear,  in  antithesis  to  those  of 
personal dependence (the objective dependency relation is nothing more than 
social relations which have become independent and now enter into opposition 
to  the  seemingly  independent  individuals;  i.e.  the  reciprocal  relations  of 
production separated from and autonomous of individuals) in such a way that 
individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on 
711 As I have learned from conversations with Amithab Rai and Alexei Penzin from the Russian 
collective Chto Delat, The Hindi translation as “    हमें क्या करना है?” – “what do we do?” – and 
the German “was tun?” – “what to do?” – brings us closer to the literal meaning of the Russian Что 
делать? (Chto Delat), which can also be used as a colloquially exclamation: “what are you gonna 
do?”. While the English suggests not a doing, but something which must be done, the question 
posed in Russian, Hindi and German can express a moment of indecision, perhaps even resignation 
and confusion, but certainly an admittance of a certain indeterminacy of the answer. In short: a 
moment of disorientation.
712 V. I. Lenin, “What Is To Be Done?,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1961), 119 – 271, chapter 1., Section B.
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one  another.  The  abstraction,  or  idea,  however,  is  nothing  more  than  the 
theoretical  expression  of  those  material  relations  which  are  their  lord  and 
master. Relations can be expressed, of course, only in ideas...713
The objective dependency relations of capitalism are  abstract,  thus material relations 
must be comprehended with ideas, i.e. by theory.  It is for this reason Marx can affirm 
the necessity of science, in the manuscripts that Engels' published as Capital volume III: 
'all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided 
with their essence'.714 
For  Lenin,  further,  revolutionary  theory  is  needed  to  orientate  practice  towards  the 
historical potentials for revolution, which are not merely given by practice, but by the 
state of the social totality. Thus 'the role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a  
party that is guided by the most advanced theory'.715 From the standpoint of Lenin's 
Marxism disorientation is only really a problem for a practice that is not orientated by 
Marxism. Marxism becomes synonymous with orientation within and against the reality 
of the capitalist system. This leeds to Lenin's famous dictum: 
the concrete  analysis  of  the  concrete  situation is  not  an opposite  of  “pure” 
theory,  but  –  on the  contrary  –  it  is  the  culmination  of  genuine  theory,  its 
consummation – the point where it breaks into practice.716
Lukács takes this conception to extremes in his presentation of Marxism as the science 
of  the  always-already  of  capitalist  totality.  For  Lukács  struggles  only  receive  their 
revolutionary  significance  by  being  aimed  at  the  concrete  totality,  which  'governs 
reality'.717 The knowledge of this totality is not the knowledge of the proletariat in its 
efforts of organisation, but a knowledge developed from the standpoint of proletarian 
struggle.718 In his pamphlet on Lenin – if we resist the temptation to read it as a vulgar  
eulogy  for  a  Hegelian  'historical  individual'  –  the  revolutionary  implications  of 
proletarian struggles, i.e. the actuality of revolution719, can only be grasped theoretically:
it  is  the  totality  which  correctly  points  the  way  to  the  class-consciousness 
713 Grundrisse, 164. My emphasis.
714 Marx, Capital: Volume III, 956.
715 Lenin, “What Is To Be Done?”, chapter 1., section D.
716 V. I. Lenin, “The Junius Pamphlet, October 1916,” in Collected Works, vol. 22 (Moscow: 
Marxist.org, 2000), 305–319.
717 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. R. 
Livingstone, new ed. (The Merlin Press Ltd, 1971), 22 and 10.
718 Ibid., 21. For the notion of partisan knowledge, see Toscano, “Partisan Thought.”
719 Georg Lukács, Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought, 2nd ed. (Verso, 2009), 11–13.
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directed towards  revolutionary  practice.  Without  orientation  towards  totality 
there can be no historically true practice. But knowledge of the totality is never 
spontaneous, it must always be brought into activity ‘from the outside’, that is, 
theoretically.720
The  implication  of  revolutionary  theory  and  practice  is  here  unbreakable:  the 
revolutionary orientation of Lenin's theory is not premised on theory itself, but on the 
actuality of revolution.  As the moment after the Great Symmetry Thesis reveals, the 
theory of global capitalism easily leads to profound pessimism when not supplemented 
by a revolutionary practice which promises its own globalisation or by a theory which 
predicts  the  eventual  demise  of  capitalism due  to  its  own contradictions.  As  Marx 
argues that theory can become revolutionary only if it relates to two actualities: on the 
one hand the actuality of proletarian class struggle, and on the other the development of 
the  productive  forces  'necessary  for  the  emancipation  of  the  proletariat  and for  the 
formation of a new society'.721 
0.1. Rancière and Foucault against revolutionary theory
In the past decades the classical partisan theory has been challenged by a rejection of 
'totality' in favour of a perspective which insists on the irreducible complexity of the 
world,  and the necessarily  partial  and limited character  of  any theory and practice. 
Foucault and Rancière will stand loosely for the two central breaks in the past half-
century, 1968 and 1989, understood as turning points in the crisis of Leninist conception 
of theory.  In the first  moment struggles rejected the mastery of official  theory over 
practice,  and in  the second, theory itself  became performatively of dis-empowering. 
Rejecting  the  image  of  thought  that  proposes  a  gap  between  knowledge  and 
consciousness on the one side, and practice and social relations on the other, Foucault 
and Rancière are  part  of a  wave of theorists  who since the 1960s have insisted on 
rejecting the objectivist pretensions of classical Marxism, and its implicit gap between 
theory  and  practice,  and  thus  the  division  of  labour  between  theoreticians  and  the 
masses. As Foucault states in conversation with Deleuze: 
the  intellectual  discovered  that  the  masses  no  longer  need  him  to  gain 
knowledge: they  know perfectly  well,  without illusion; they know  far better 
720 Ibid., 95–96. See also appendix 4.0.
721 Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy,” 1976, 177.
 253
than he and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves.722 
According to Foucault, practice does not need theory to guide it circle of struggles after 
1968: 
In such struggles people criticize instances of power which are closest to them, 
those  which  exercise  their  action  on  individuals.  They do not  look  for  the 
“chief  enemy,” but for the immediate  enemy. Nor do they expect  to  find a 
solution to their problem at a future date (that is, liberations, revolutions, end of 
class struggle).723
It is no longer a matter of practice being blind without theory, but of theory blinding 
practice with its totalisations. Against this Foucault suggests a different conception of 
theory which is performative and descriptive, rather than explanatory and prescriptive. 
If the discourse of Foucault was aimed at affirming the autonomy of struggles, against 
the hegemony of Marxist parties and intellectuals, in Rancière's more recent writings 
the problem is not the danger of Leninist domination, now negligible, but rather of the 
dis-empowering effects  of Marxism itself.  The Marxian logic of capitalism must be 
rejected  because  it  dis-empowers  by  demanding  too  much,  a  wholly  new mode  of 
production, the all  or nothing of global revolution or capitalism, and by placing the 
theoreticians of revolution and capitalism in a position of mastery. Against this he writes 
that ‘there is no unity of a global process',724 and that instead emancipatory politics must 
start from the 'assumption is that the disabled are able, that there is no hidden secret of 
the machine. There is no huge beast swallowing all energies and desires in its belly, no 
global  process  of  dissimulation’.725 Both  Rancière  and  Foucault  proceed  through  a 
disavowal of the problem of the totality, a manoeuvre that dismisses the macropolitics 
of Marxism in favour of a micropolitics of situated struggles. Here the division between 
ethics and politics begins to blur. In the tradition of the Enlightenment philosophy of 
autonomy it starts from the ethical premise that subjects are free and capable of their 
722 Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power - a Conversation,” in Language,  
Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 
207.Spivak discusses the implication of this statement at lenght in A Critique of Postcolonial  
Reason.
723 Michel Foucault, “The Body of the Condemned,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982), 211.
724 Jacques Ranciere, “The Mis-Adventures of Critical Theory,” in The Emancipated Spectator, Reprint 
edition (Verso, 2011), 48.
725 Ibid.
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own autonomy as long as they have the courage to be autonomous.726 
Lenin's conception of theory is concerned not with an ethics or micropolitics, but an 
economy of the whole: autonomy is for him not a fact, but something to be won by class 
struggle  guided  by  the  reflexive  knowledge  of  the  social  whole  and one's  position 
within  it.  When  Foucault  and  Rancière  write  against  the  mastery  exercised  by  the 
theoreticians  of  totality,  they  do not  exit  the  realm of  theory,  but  adopt  a  different 
orientating  strategy,  by  introducing  a  principle  of  immediate  struggles  based  on 
experience: the unbearable and the desireable, which despite its empirical referents is 
easily  transmuted  into  a  philosophical  principle  (such  as  that  of  the  primacy  of 
resistance  over  power).  Thus,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Kantian  problem  of 
orientation, Foucault and Rancière can be read as insisting on the need for subjective 
principles in the face of the overwhelming objectivity of global capitalism. For these 
principles to play this role, this overwhelming objectivity must either be downplayed or 
presented as a theoretical fiction, and the revolutionary ambition must correspondingly 
be lessened. Thus Foucault proposes that if ‘we accept that we are not dealing with an 
essential  capitalism  deriving  from  the  logic  of  capital,  but  rather  with  a  singular 
capitalism formed by an economic-institutional ensemble, then we must be able to act 
on this ensemble and intervene in such a way as to invent a different capitalism'.727 
Today the defeat of the closed benevolence of welfare-statist capitalisms, as well as the 
impossibility of not seeing the catastrophes to which such words as  poverty, climate,  
ecology  and  war  refer  as products of the world system, means that  the question of 
revolution constantly imposes itself on a global scale, generally far divorced from the 
levels of any effective and consistent political agency. 
0.2 'Capitalism is crisis' and the limitations of crisis theory
In the year of the square occupations, a large banner was raised and then removed by 
protesters  occupying  the  area  in  front  of  St.  Paul's  Cathedral  in  London.  It  read 
726 Foucault's ethics of the self, and Rancière's ignorant school master, can both be read as 
radicalisations of the Kantian dictum 'sapere aude' (dare to know), rejecting the idea of education as 
submission to mastery in favour of pedagogics self-emancipation and practices of self-care. Michel 
Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Ethics, ed. Paul 
Rabinow, The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York: New Press, 1997); 
Jacques Rancière, The ignorant schoolmaster: five lessons in intellectual emancipation (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991).
727 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France, 1978-1979 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 167.
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'CAPITALISM  IS  CRISIS'.728 The  location  of  the  camp  next  to  the  London  Stock 
Exchange  and  the  removal  of  the  banner  which  was  deemed  to  'anti-capitalist'  to 
represent the whole occupation is symptomatic of the prevailing response to the crisis. 
The cause of the social misery of the crisis is seen to lie in the  abstraction nature of  
financial  capital,  in  speculation,  'greed',  the dominance  of  credit  money,   fractional 
reserve banking, etc. The articulations of antagonism and alliance drawn up around this 
orientation is that of the 99% against the 1% of the modern financial aristocracy. The 
strength of Marxist analyses of the crisis, on the other hand, is to think together the 
'abstract' crisis of finance not only with various crises of production, but with what we 
can speak of as multiple crises of the everyday – contraction of wages, social spending; 
increasing unemployment and disciplining of the workforce, etc.. 
This text is written in the macro-context of the crisis, which has renewed the topicality 
of Marx's analyses of capitalism. However it is not a text on Marx's crisis theories as 
such, but rather an inquiry into the presuppositions of these theories, in a context where 
crisis holds different historical promises than at Marx time. If crisis for Marx signalled 
the painful events necessary for the transition between modes of production, crises in 
the period of decline of the workers movement and international communist movement 
are promises of apocalyptic rather than messianic times. To find hope in crisis today 
must be part of a voluntaristic reversal according to which either consciousness or the 
urgency of the naked need produced by unfolding catastrophe is supposed to produce 
the action required to turn crisis  into opportunity.  Theories of crisis  produce only a 
knowledge  of  the  contradictions,  crises  and  struggles  of  history,  but  not  of  the 
potentialities that might produce the qualitatively new. They point to an irruption of 
contingency but not its articulation to destroy the necessities of actuality,  or replace 
them with a different actuality. As Peter Osborne notes, 
Crisis ‘theory’ is thus in principle inadequate to thinking the historico-political 
meaning of crises   – and this includes Marx’s own account (or ‘theory’) of 
capitalist crises, however central to such a thinking it might be.729
It  is  through a  critique  of  the presuppositions  of  Marx's  crisis  theory – its  implicit 
modelling of society, historical time, and conception of strategy – rather than of this 
theory itself that we can begin to disentangle Marx's theory of capitalist crisis from the 
728 The banner was originally made for Climate Camp in 2009, and was eventually moved from the 
central St. Paul's occupation to the smaller occupation at Finsbury Square.
729 Osborne, “A Sudden Topicality - Marx, Nietzsche and the Politics of Crisis,” 21.
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historico-philosophical context in which Marx's theory of crisis is inscribed in Marx.
0.3. On the concept of crisis
Drawing  out  the  genealogical  roots  of  the  term  in  Hippocratic  medicine,  Reinhart 
Koselleck has show how the concept of crisis is inextricably a concept of period of 
decisive convulsion of a systemic complex, of an organism or an integrated process; the 
necessary positive determinacy correlate to crisis as indeterminacy, is found in notions 
of normality, homeostasis, equillibrium, interiority. The concept of crisis, taken in its 
specificity, refers not generally to chaos or catastrophe or caesura, but more precisely to 
a systemic/organic problem of reproduction. From medicine the concept of crisis retains 
an existential urgency and diagnostic character as it is imported into political thought. 
Thus crisis in its ancient and medieval medical as well as modern economic and socio-
political sense, invokes the need to make a decision, an intervention: that of the doctor, 
the technocrat or the virtuous movement leader. Koselleck defines crisis as ‘that point in 
time in which a decision is due but has not yet been rendered’.  He encapsulates this 
nicely in the idea that crisis implies a ‘knowledge of uncertainty’ and a ‘compulsion 
towards foresight’. Or, as a Danish witticism from the time of the Great Depression 
goes: 'a crisis is when nobody knows what needs to be done – in a rush'. 
The necessity of a decision arises in the moment of the necessities of the system's self-
reproduction  are  undermined by inner  irruption  of  contingency;  this  contingency  is 
always possible (or actual on a micrological level), but only in the crisis does it threaten 
the actuality of the organism as a whole. In his Encyclopedia Logic Hegel theorises the 
organism  in  the  following  terms:  'these  (elementary  powers  of  objectivity)  are … 
continuously ready to jump to begin their process within the organic body, and life is 
the constant fight against such a possibility'.730 Accordingly, '[t]he living body is always 
on the point of passing over into the chemical process … perpetually exposed to danger, 
and always bears something alien within it. ... If life were realistic, it would respect that 
which is external to it, but it is perpetually checking the reality of this other term, and 
transforming it into its own self'.731
Hegel describes the constant possibility of crisis as an effect of the contradiction within 
the  organism  between  its  teleological  self-positing  and  the  latently 
730 (Hegel 1992, p.293, §219 addition, translation ammended),  
731 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature III, 10, 337.
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rebellious/decomposing forces that it organises. By making crisis an essential possibility 
of the organism Hegel also introduces the possibility of thinking aspects of the organism 
as so many attempts to master and control the constant possibility of crisis.732 The inner 
organisation must be thought as a solution to the problem of the possibility and past 
actuality  of  crisis.  It  is  of  some  note,  that  Hegel's  use  of  the  term “crisis”  in  his 
Philosophy of Nature inscribes it into a logic of reproduction, as a self-regulation of the 
organism:
'The crisis is the organism's mastering of itself, reproducing itself, and putting 
this power into effect by excretion. It is not the morbid matter which is secreted 
of course; it is not the case that the body would have been healthy if it had 
never contained this matter, or if it could have been ladled out of it. The crisis, 
like digestion in general, is at the same time a secretion'.733
Thus in a crisis the organism  secretes,  renders superfluous chemical compounds and 
physical elements that had hitherto been part of its life. Marx's concept of crisis carries 
with it and elaborates this set of meanings. It is thus pre-formed by a number of thought 
models which are rarely made explicit in Marxist theory, particularly the conception of 
society in systematic dialectical terms, which stresses the mutual dependency of the 
different parts of the capitalist 'totality' and the internal contradictions of this totality, 
which is the condition of possibility of both crisis and political action.734 Peter Osborne 
notes that the originality of Marx's approach to crisis is that it posits the solution to the 
crisis as immanent in the conditions of the crisis itself, first in the pauperised proletariat 
and then in the collective worker.735 While Osborne points to a shift in Marx's focus 
from the writings of the 1840s to Capital, his concept of the proletariat remains both an 
732 A physical process might be out of equilibrium, but not in crisis; only organic or self-reproducing 
processes enter into crisis. The positing of contingency and chance as problems – the establishment 
of defenses crises – can thus be taken to be the defining moment of the establishment of a properly 
organic process. The aim of self-reproduction combined with the possibility of such contingency 
(non-reproduction) is what establishes the necessity of a range of defensive mechanisms to protect 
and purify the organism.
733  Hegel, Philosophy of Nature III, 201. The logic is the same, yet the interest different, when Marx 
writes about the possibility of crisis in reproductive process of the 'organism' of bourgeois society: 
'These two processes [of sale and purchase] lack internal independence because they complement 
each other. Hence, if the assertion of their external independence [äusserliche Verselbständigung] 
proceeds to a certain critical point, their unity violently makes itself felt by producing a crisis. ... 
these forms therefore imply the possibility of crises, though no more than the possibility'. Marx, 
Capital: Volume I, 209.
734 For instance Simon Clarke's extensive synthesis of Marx's theories of crisis does not discuss the 
semantics and history of the concept of crisis itself. Simon Clarke, Marx’s Theory of Crisis 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1994). 
735 Osborne, “A Sudden Topicality - Marx, Nietzsche and the Politics of Crisis,” 23.
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element  which  is   superfluous waste,  yet  indispensable  to  social  reproduction,  both 
pauper and collective worker. But since the crisis is an aspect of the social organism 
defined by its reproduction – on the level of the mode of production, the crisis, while 
politically meaningful, is  'politically irresolvable (that is, is not amenable to political 
action). The historical concept of crisis thus registers an aporia in the historical concept 
of politics'.736 This opens the question of praxis on the level of the mode of production 
itself,  a 'politics',  if  by this we understand one not of the  polis,  but of the mode of 
production. Such action is only possible through autonomous proletarian organisation 
which overcomes the separation between the necessary and the redundant. 
Marx's theory of crisis functions in two temporal registers: that of periodic crisis (what 
has  later  been theorised  in  terms  of  'the business  cycle')  and that  of  the  long term 
tendencies of capitalist development: the question of a secular crisis,  whether thought 
in terms of the 'tendency of the rate of profit to fall', or necessary continual growth of 
working  and  unemployed  proletariat,  in  the  so-called  'General  Law  of  Capitalist 
Accumulation'.737 At  the  heart  of  both  theories  lies  the  question  of  the  organic 
composition  of  capital  (the  proportion  of  dead  to  living  labour,  constant  capital  to 
variable capital), and how the tendencies given by capital's teleological drive (M-C-M') 
result in a disproportionate growth of capital, resulting in crisis both of the reproduction 
of capital and of the proletariat itself.738 The predictions possible on the grounds of this 
real teleology is that capital's search for absolute surplus-value with force it to subsume 
ever greater numbers of people as workers, and that the competitive drive for relative 
surplus-value  will  force  capitalists  to  invest  in  labour  saving  technologies,  thus 
producing  an  ever  greater  population  of  proletarians  surplus  to  the  requirements  of 
capitalist production. The historical optimism of Marx's theory of crisis relied on the 
idea that a proletariat, working as well as unemployed, whose organised and desperate 
736 Ibid.
737 The former tendency has been much debated recently. Michael Heinrich, “Crisis Theory, the Law of 
the Tendency of the Profit Rate to Fall, and Marx’s Studies in the 1870s,” Monthly Review 64, no. 
11 (2013). Kliman, A., A. Freeman, N. Potts, A. Gusev and B.Cooney, “The Unmaking of Marx’s 
Capital - Heinrich’s Attempt to Eliminate Marx’s Crisis Theory,” Social Science Research Network 
(July 22, 2013). Whereas the sections on the rate of profit were written in 1863-65, and never 
finished, the chapter on the general law of capitalist accumulation was written in 1866-67. Endnotes 
and Benanav, “Misery and Debt.”
738 Note that a rising organic composition of capital means a higher proportion of constant capital; thus 
the 'inorganic' component of capital, living labour, falls. We can only understand this if we related to 
the definition of nature as man's 'inorganic body', in 1844 Manuscripts, and 'inorganic being' in 
Grundrisse. Inorganic in the sense that it is not an organ, but sustenance, an exterior necessary 
condition. Living labour, thus, is capital's inorganic body. “1844 Manuscripts,” 328; Grundrisse, 
489.
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ranks would continue to grow, would be capable of seizing the opening for revolution 
by the secular crisis producing it. 
Along with the constant decrease in the number of  capitalist magnates, who 
usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, the 
mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation and exploitation grows; but 
with this there also grows the revolt of the ·working class, a class constantly 
increasing  in  numbers,  and  trained,  united  and  organized  by  the  very 
mechanism of the capitalist  process of production.  The monopoly of capital 
becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has flourished alongside 
and  under  it.  The  centralization  of  the  means  of  production  and  the 
socialization of labour reach a point at which they become incompatible with 
their  capitalist  integument.  This  integument  is  burst  asunder.  The  knell  of 
capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.739
All this is happens through 'the immanent laws of capitalist production', through what 
Marx in the Preface to Capital calls the 'development of the social antagonisms that 
spring  from the  natural  laws  of  capitalist  production'.740 The  20th  Century  did  not 
confirm  this  prediction,  as  imperialism,  globalisation  and  successful  workers 
movements created a global division of labour in which sections of the growing global 
work-force could achieve the gains of public welfare and collective bargaining, while 
populations in and migrants from the periphery were pauperised and excluded from the 
regime of social rights and collective pay deals.
Today  'we'  no  longer  live  in  the  'post-scarcity  economy'  of  the  1960s  or  with  the 
'confidence' of the consumer-debt economy of the decades that followed – and neither 
did  or  do  the  majority  of  the  world's  population.  Capitalism  has  always  been 
characterised  by  the  production  of  absolute  or  relative  poverty  alongside  wealth. 
Further,  the global competition of a fiercely stratified proletariat,  mobile capital  and 
migratory  or  forcibly  fixed  reserve  armies  of  labour  increasingly  complicates  the 
classical  North/South  divide.741 If  Marxists  projected  that  the conditions  of  socialist 
revolution  would  result  from  the  simultaneous  growth  of  proletarian  need  and 
unification  through  organisation,  and  the  intermediate  period  saw  the  geographical 
739 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 929.
740 Ibid., 929 and 91.
741 As Denning points out the current situation forces us to push beyond the clear core/periphery divide 
implicit in the unemployment/informal sector approach. Denning, “Wageless Life.”
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separation of these two trends, today we see a growth of proletarian need everywhere 
with what looks like a decline in traditional proletarian organisations.742 Furthermore, 
throughout  the  whole  period  activists  and  writers  have  pointed  out  the  internal 
stratifications of the global proletariat along lines of gender, race and citizenship status. 
All this means that the historico-political meaning of crisis has changed. Peter Osborne 
notes that
The  political significance of the concept of crisis motivating Marxist debates 
depends upon some  projected articulation of these two levels [the political and 
the economic], some conjunctural political effectivity at the level of the mode 
of production, in response to ‘periodic’ crisis.743
The thesis of a secular crisis, more strongly, which gives crisis a significance which is 
not  merely  political  but  epochal,  as  the  opening of  the  possibility  of  the  transition 
between modes of production, is derived from the projection of the tendencies given in 
the  movement  of  the  past-and-present  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production  as  an 
unfolding teleology. The epochal opening of crisis signifiers something deeper than the 
political opening of a given conjuncture or general abstract possibility of an event; it 
refers  to  an  organic disintegration  predicted  on  the  basis  of  an  extrapolation  of  a 
Wirklich,  that is to say actual, effective and real  teleology.744 The topicality of Marx's 
theory of crisis and predictions of 'General Law of Capitalist Accumulation' and the 
failure of his historical predictions of the epochal revolutionary implications of these 
tendencies, makes it urgent to reconsider the relation between the politics of crisis and  
the modelling of social relations and systems.  We have seen how the theorisation of 
crisis is based on the modelling of society or mode of production in organic terms, as a 
contradictory whole, organising 'elements', which might be rendered inorganic in the 
crisis. Crisis suggests a certain notion of the conditions of reproduction of a system. 
And we have seen how crisis is a moment of exception – where contingency opens for 
political decision – as well a part of the auto-adjustment of a system. 
742 This is at least the case in the old bastions of labour in Europe.
743 Osborne, “A Sudden Topicality - Marx, Nietzsche and the Politics of Crisis,” 21.
744 The connection of organism and teleology was current in German thought starting with Kant, 
Critique of Judgement. Kant took the organism to be teleological in the sense that it has itself as its 
own end, it is minimally a self-reproducing and self-organised system. See also Jacob Grimm and 
Wilhelm Grimm, “Organismus,” Deutsches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: Verlag von H. Hirzel, 1854)
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0.4. Some notes on method, reading and the return of Marx
In some sense Marx was always a critical  philosopher – perhaps always in  a sense 
heretical to the Kantian project – analyzing the conditions of possibility of the given, of 
his object. However, this given, as a given that is, politically speaking, too given, and 
therefore all more a problem for thought and practice, shifted throughout his journey as 
a writer and activist.  Anticipating the results of this inquiry, we can say that Marx's 
central objects, central in so far as they overdetermined his relation to other objects and 
questions,  was  always  a  problematic  relation between  immanence  and the  abstract, 
something  presenting  itself  as  transcendental  or  transcendent.  Simplifying  in  the 
extreme we might say the early Marx's focus shifted, just in the 1840s from abstract 
atomism↔practical philosophy, to God↔species and philosophy↔sensuousness, over 
religion↔real human beings, to capital↔labour.745 It is important to note that these are 
not binary oppositions, but folded into each other in mutual presupposition and tension 
– the distinctions are thus modal or organic (let's not pick yet). The focus is therefore 
not a relation pure and simple, but the active relation of co-constitution, the activity of  
that co-constitution. In turn I suggest that we approach Marx's own activity as a writer 
through  the  shifting  focus  of  his  critique,  i.e.  in  the  shifts  within  and  between 
problematic 'objects' (e.g. from religion and state to capital) and the conditions given for 
these objects (e.g. from species-being to the mode of production), and of the very way 
of  thinking the relation between the two (e.g.  from alienation to  exploitation).  This 
relates to a changing modelling, which is driven by a need for orientation; this is not an 
abstraction need, but one shifting with Marx's shifting practice: from Bierstube-radical 
and aspiring academic, to editor-journalist, to movement intellectual, etc.
When Marx impressed 'there is no royal road to science' to the communard Lachâtre, 
the  editor  of  the  French translation  of  his  major  Critique,  he was complicating the 
invocation of method as a tool which one 'employs' or 'applies', drawing instead on the 
Greek etymology of method, in speaking of it as an arduous path, a steep climb which 
745 Other pairs are state-democracy, superstructure-basis, forces of production-relations of production. 
Whether these shifts involes breaks, leaps or salto mortales we will have to discuss. Althusser's 
thesis of the break in Marx happening around the German Ideology (1846). Lenin saw Poverty of  
Philosophy and The Communist Manifesto, both 1847, as the first mature works of Marxism. 
Recently, Kojin Karatani and before that Hans-Georg Backhaus, have pointed out that a crucial 
‘shift’ took place in Marx’s thinking between the pre-Capital critiques of political economy 
(Grundrisse and Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) and Capital (1867) itself. Kojin 
Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx (MIT Press, 2005). Hans-Georg Backhaus, “On the 
Dialectics of the Value-Form,” Thesis Eleven 1 (1980).
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the reader would have to follow.746 The way of travelling changes with the path made, 
which changes with the terrain. Method is not simply a tool reflected and stabilized in 
thought as meta-hodos, 'after the way'; before that it is an open activity of constructing a 
path, making (and not necessarily 'clearing') a way: meta odos.747 This understanding of 
method is  one that goes beyond what Lukács affirmatively spoke of as orthodox as 
opposed to doctrinaire Marxism or vulgar materialism: 
...orthodoxy refers exclusively to  method.  It  is  the scientific  conviction that 
dialectical  materialism  is  the  road  to  truth  and  that  its  methods  can  be 
developed,  expanded  and  deepened  only  along  the  lines  laid  down  by  its 
founders.748
Before this stabilization and inscription of the royal revolutionary road to science in the 
genealogical line of forefathers, method arises, as Hegel notes, in the arduous 'labour of 
the concept'; here we can agree with Hegelian Marxists.749 But method is also a singular 
path of becoming, a durational engagement with the problematics of one's time (the 
space of contemporaneity750). Method in this sense is not a truth procedure of a science, 
nor critique, but something more like practice. Stathis Kouvelakis has demonstrated the 
productivity  of  reading  Marx's  intellectual-political  development  in  terms  of  its 
problems,  contradictions,  and  the  displacement  of  these  into  new  problems, 
contradictions and mediations.751 It is perhaps impossible to distinguish between a path 
traced  in  the  text  of  Marx  and  one  constructed;  we  make-and-find  a  reading-and-
writing-path, on which new readers might follow according to the reading's ability to 
engage with contemporary problematics. These problematics, from the point of view of 
the  deadlocks  of  contradictions  and  antagonisms  –  if  not  their  positive  historical 
instantiations – might very well, such is the hypothesis that makes this text more than an 
exercise in intellectual history, be the same  problems through which Marx cleared a 
road of which  Capital  remains the most comprehensive map. To speak of the same 
problems,  is  not  to  speak of  the  'same'  as  such,  but  to  speak of  the  same epochal  
746 French preface to Karl Marx, Marx, Capital: Volume I.
747 If we follow the etymology proposed by Ryan Bishop and John Phillips, “Of Method,” Theory,  
Culture & Society 24, no. 7–8 (December 1, 2007).
748 Georg Lukács, “What Is Orthodox Marxism?,” in History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin 
Press, 1971), p.xx.
749 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 43.
750 The question of the simultaneity or complex differentiality of this space is a discussion we will have 
to pass through. 
751 Stathis Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (Verso 
Books, 2003).
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difference, the same set of insisting challenges.752 This brings us to a level where what is 
at stake is not the topicality of Marx's analyses of actuality, but the contemporaneity of 
the problems to which the actuality of the 19th and 21st century are different, if related, 
replies.  The  continuity  of  a  problem,  antagonism  or  contradiction  as  a  matrix  of 
historical difference is the continuity/discontinuity between Marx. It offers the promise 
of an explanation to the real question which is not 'why return to Marx?', but 'why does 
Marx keep on returning to us?'753 If Marx does not, in some sense, return to us through 
the recurrence of the problems he mapped, any 'return to Marx' will be nothing but a 
voluntaristic, habitual, or nostalgic endeavour. 
But this repetition comes with a difference, or rather with many; we cannot be silent 
about or take for granted everything about which Marx did not speak or took as simple 
presuppositions, we must be sensitive to his symptomatic silences. Any reading of the 
past is of the present, the past is the past of the present. The reverse danger of reading or 
judging the past from the present, is mirrored by the danger of reading the past as if the 
present  and the  years  in  between  did  not  happen.  Perhaps  we can  say,  simplifying 
somewhat,  that  if  the  first  anachronism is  a  mistake  of  historiography,  the  other  is 
political, that of rendering oneself anachronistic in the present. 
Given that our interest does not lie in a reading pure and simple or in the development 
of method as such, but in an “activation” of Marx's writings today as a mode of activity 
in the terrain of capitalism, the question of abstraction seems a good starting point. 
Abstraction, in Marx, and in the philosophers on which he drew, reappears as a problem 
of method in the extended sense given above, both as a problem in and for philosophy  
(what is  abstraction?) and  of  theoretical activity (how does philosophy abstract,  and 
what does it do by doing it?), and as a question of the terrain we have in common with 
Marx, namely the problem of capital(ism),  i.e.  a society in which material  relations 
reproduce an abstract rule over individuals. Ideas for Marx are at once indispensable in 
an age of abstract relations – relations can only be expressed in ideas, he writes – yet to 
be treated with utmost caution against their hypostasisation, reification and legitimising 
use.754 
752 It is to speak of truth in the negative sense of Leonard Cohen's line 'there is a war between the ones  
who say there is a war / And the ones who say there isn't'. 'There is a War', in New Skin for the Old 
Ceremony. 
753 ...this is a reading which does not merely reach into the past to understand the positivity of the 
present, but into the antagonism of the past as the antagonism of the present, thereby a reading which 
reaches into the capitalist part of the future. 
754 Ideas, as opposed to religious beliefs, can play this role exactly because the 'new age' of impersonal 
relations cannot be comprehended without them. Ideology, in this specific sense, thus refers to a 
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In  Post-Kantian  German  philosophy,  as  well  as  in  Marx's  analysis  of  capitalism, 
abstraction presumes a separation or difference between what subsumes and what is 
subsumed.755 Abstraction comes with subsumption, subsumption with abstraction: what 
is  subsumed by the “universal” (the idea,  money, capital,  state,  God...) is subsumed 
through a procedure of abstraction, by which it is separated from (aspects of) itself, as 
well as from it's “environment” or “context” (the scarecrows here mark the hesitation of 
someone who has gotten ahead of himself, even in terms of posing questions). Yet we 
must quickly hint at  the way these questions might set  us out on: speaking of how 
'individuals are now [this extended now that we share with Marx] ruled by abstractions, 
whereas earlier they depended on one another'  is to pose at once the question of the 
prehistory of the present, as well as of a future in which dependency is reorganised or 
abolished. It is to raise the question of autonomy and heteronomy historically, both as a 
conceptual  distinction  within  philosophy  and  as  a  historically  shifting  mode  of 
comprehending and reproducing social relationships.
If we ask the question what is the contemporaneity of Marx? we do not ask the obvious 
question of which aspects of his theories that are still  valid and which are dated (as 
Benedetto Croce's question 'what is living and what is dead in the philosophy of ...?), 
nor suggest that there is some method that is alive despite the dated character of his 
insights (as Žižek's reversal of Croce's question, into what are we in the eyes of...?). The 
limitation of both framings is that they beg the deeper question of contemporaneity 
itself. How can we say we are still living in the historical epoch of Marx, when so much 
seems to have changed? Marx's method and theory might simply be alive in the weak 
sense  that  the  Marxian  problematic  is  constantly  reproduced  and  elaborated  within 
certain  academic  and activist  milieus.  Its  contemporaneity  cannot  be  established by 
comparing facts of the early 21st century with facts the mid 19th century, or by clinging 
onto  orthodoxy.  Method  is  alive  in  so  far  its  object  persist  and  is  problematic  for 
thought; but method is more than an engagement with an object, it is an engagement 
with the problem to which an objectification is  a  crystallisation,  a  problematic  is  a 
particularly modern phenomenon, rather than an invariant feature of societies, as theorised by Louis 
Althusser. Jacques Rancière correctly pointed out the proto-Durkheimian functionalism at play in 
this notion of ideology. Althusser, On Ideology. Jacques Rancière, “On the Theory of Ideology – 
Althusser’s Politics,” in Ideology, ed. Terry Eagleton (London: Longman, 1994), 143–5,Ibid.Jacques 
Rancière, “On the Theory of Ideology – Althusser’s Politics,” in Ideology, ed. Terry Eagleton 
(London: Longman, 1994), 143–5,Ibid. Marx, Grundrisse, 164.
755 For a useful, and usefully simplified, distinction between the Kantian and Hegelian notions of 
subsumption in relation to the distinction between form and content, see I.I. Rubin, Essays on 
Marx’s Theory of Value (Delhi: Aakar, 2008), 117–118.
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problematisation.  Method passes into practice when it  is  not  only a way to study a 
problematic-object  (its  internal  relations  and  movement)  or  to  critique  it  (show  its 
conditions  of  possibility  in  the  problem),  but  a  way  to  rearrange  the  conditions 
themselves, a way, as it were, to dissolve the problem. This is a question is not only of  
the contemporaneity of Marx – or his articulation of the contretemps of capitalism itself 
– but of untimeliness.
Obviously this point cannot be proven except through the road itself, or, the failure to 
prove  the  point  here,  is  exactly  the  proof  itself.  What  we  have  here  is  merely  an 
introductory pointing ahead towards a road that will have to be travelled in the coming 
chapters. 
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chapter 1
1.0. The practical energy of philosophy
Our chronologically first chosen encounter with the young Karl Heinrich is in 1837, in a 
letter. In it he carefully sketched out his intellectual development to his father, who had 
sent him to the Prussian capital to get him away from his hedonist and drunken lifestyle 
in Bonn and Cologne.756 
If Marx's was later to speak of Hegelian philosophy's highest achievement that it at least 
manages to thinks itself as 'alienated science', even if it continues 'doing philosophy',757 
in Marx's earliest texts we have a testimony to the de-habituating and energising force 
of  philosophy.  If  Marx's  eventual  rejection  of  philosophy  follows  the  path  we  are 
accustomed to – and thereby agrees with the philosophical tradition's self-description of 
philosophy as an overcoming of mere passion, embodiment and affect – the letters of 
the young Marx bear witness to the visceral force of ideas.  In his first encounter with 
Hegel's  writings  the  visceral  effect  of  philosophy  was  a  headache,  their  'grotesque 
craggy melody' produced little resonance.758 However, soon the dialectic revealed its 
force in ways recounted by few Hegelians. The attempt to think and write in Hegel's 
style turned into its Dionysian opposite: 
For some days my vexation made me quite incapable of thinking; I ran about 
madly in the garden by the dirty water of the Spree, which “washes souls and 
dilutes the tea”.759 I even joined my landlord in a hunting excursion, rushed off 
to Berlin and wanted to embrace every street-corner loafer.760
756 Francis Wheen, Karl Marx: A Life (New York: Norton, 2001), chapter 1.
757 Marx, “1844 Manuscripts,” 386.
758 As Hegel himself notes, thought requires practice: 'It is through ... habit that I come to realize my 
existence as a thinking being. Even here, in this spontaneity of self-centred thought, there is a 
partnership of soul and body (hence, want of habit and too-long-continued thinking cause headache); 
habit diminishes this feeling, by making the natural function an immediacy of the soul'. The 
Philosophy of Spirit (Marxists.org), §410. 
759 A quote from Heinrich Heine's Heinrich Heine’s Pictures of Travel (Philadelpha: F. Leypoldt, 1863), 
121.
760 Karl Marx, “Letter from Marx to His Father, November 1837,” in The First Writings of Karl Marx 
 267
This young man, enrolled at the university in Berlin to be made a lawyer like his father, 
was becoming something quite different, putting his body on the line in philosophy and 
the heavy-drinking-heavy-philosophizing circles of  young radical  Hegelians:  'During 
my period of poor health I had gotten to know Hegel from beginning to end, including 
most  of  his  students'.761 The  young  Karl's  engagement  with  the  Left  and  Young-
Hegelians was intense, physically and intellectually. In the letter to his father he wrote 
of how the tense engagement with contemporary philosophy brought him into 'a true fit 
of irony ...  as  could easily  happen after so many negations'.  His letter  to his  father 
returns again and again to the lived contradiction between the stuffy reading room and 
the fresh air, the lofty halls of the university and the dirty banks of the river Spree. The 
thrust to establish that 'the nature of the mind is just as necessary, concrete and firmly 
based as the nature of the body',762 took total immersion (the image given: 'I wanted to 
dive into the sea'), but also the cleansing of the soul in shallow waters, and the tracing 
of animals in the Brandenburg countryside. He was, in some maddening sense, carried 
into the rhythm of the living concept,  the 'mediating'  activity between contradictory 
opposites,  as  a  matter  of  life  and  philosophy.  This  tension  (here  with  a  surprising 
affirmation of the mind in the terms usually ascribed to the 'material')  can easily be 
reduced to that between idealism and materialism, yet this is clearly insufficient: if there 
is a tension, it is one both lived and thought, that is, thought in life as well as lived in 
thought:  the  tension  or  negativity  cannot  be  isolated  as  a  theoretical  or  practical 
problem. And so the very work on this tension, the labour of mediation, takes place in 
both 'theory' and 'practice'. Karl's existential effort, in this letter to his father, was to 
conceptualise, begreiffen with all the connotations of 'grappling with, getting a handle 
on, rendering conceptual'.  While the lived (everyday, affective and bodily) stakes of 
these issues is clear in Marx's letters, they are rarely noted upon by commentators keen 
to avoid 'psychologising' Marx (as if the 'psychological' is purely individual, private and 
limited to its singular moment,  and as if  only the strictly conceptual – what can be 
rendered  in  logical,  argumentative  form  –  deserves  to  be  communicated).763 The 
(Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing, 2006), 79.
761 Ibid., 80.
762 'die geistige Natur ebenso notwendig, konkret und festgerundet zu finden wie die körperliche'. 
763 It is curious how Marxists self-limitation to the consideration of the strictly conceptual often 
disappears when we speak of other of the Marx's situated and conjunctural everyday day concerns 
around issues of organisation, and the strategies and internal power games of the International 
Working Mens' Association, for instance. The main difference is, of course, that Marxists have 
developed a language much richer in dealing with questions of organisation and propaganda than 
questions of affect. But in so far as organisation cannot be understood purely in terms of their 
structures and conscious ideas and beliefs, such understanding is impoverished by its lack of a 
 268
personal, affective, and psychological are only 'merely' individual and thus irrelevant 
for the universalising ambitions of social, political and philosophical activities to the 
extent that one accepts a certain number of individualising mechanisms.764 But of course 
our interest in Marx, a marker of the limitations as well as qualities of his work, lies in 
his  critiques of philosophy and political  economy (and the style  of my writing will 
express this). 
1.1. Beyond Kantian subsumption - the idea in reality itself
In  Berlin  the  young  romantic  poet  and  law  student  had  at  first  aligned  himself 
philosophically with Kant and Fichte, developing the draft for a formalist theory of law. 
However, he soon rejected the opposition between the form and matter of law, between 
the  conceptual  and  the  given,  turning  to  Hegel,  and  his  critique  of  transcendental 
idealism. 
From the idealism which ... I had compared and nourished with the idealism of 
Kant  and  Fichte,  I  arrived  at  the  point  of  seeking  the  idea  in  reality  [im 
Wirklichen,  actuality] itself. If previously the gods had dwelt above the earth, 
now they became its center.765
The trope of the worldliness of rather than non-existence of Gods runs through all Marx 
writings – all the way to his remarks on the 'metaphysical subtleties and theological 
niceties' of the commodity in Capital. But more importantly to our concerns here, is that 
Marx opens the possibility for an orientation without a God-postulate. What he refuses 
is the Kant's conception of God as a necessary transcendental postulate grounding the 
validity  of  practical  judgement  and  the  possibility  of  disjunctive  judgement  in 
theoretical reason. While Kant's operation was essentially subversive religions claims to 
intuitive access to God, reducing the God-hypothesis to mere conceptual function of 
reason, Marx rejected this transcendental dualism. If God in Kant is the name of the 
regulative idea that guarantees the unity of practical and theoretical reason in the face of 
language enabling affective analysis – and more importantly perhaps – the collective refinement and 
development of affective sensibilities. For an attempt to do this, see The Nanopolitics group, 
Nanopolitics Handbook, ed. Bue Rübner Hansen, Paolo Plotegher, and Manuela Zechner 
(London/New York: Minor Compositions, 2013).
764 Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley, eds., The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, 1st Ed. 
(Duke University Press Books, 2007).; Franco “Bifo” Berardi, The Soul at Work, trans. Francesca 
Cadel and Guiseppina Mecchia (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009).; the nanopolitics group, 
“Nanopolitics - a First Outline of Our Experiments in Movement,” Lateral 1, no. 1 (2012).
765 Marx, “Letter from Marx to His Father, November 1837,” 78. 
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the chaotic multiplicity of the phenomenal (the content of any judgement), the simple 
rejection of God would only unleash this unconceptual chaos. Rather, the point becomes 
to show how concepts are  not external to the manifold contents of the world, but the 
active part of the process which produces form out of content, that reason is real, not a 
contribution of human cognition:  'The Concept [der Begriff] is ... the mediating link 
between  Form and  Content'.766 This  was  a  move  away  from the  Kantian  notion  of 
subsumption of content under concept, towards a Hegelian conception of the rationality 
of the real.  In Kant subsumption involves a process of abstraction through which the 
truth of the manifold of sensual impression is obtained. The form for Kant is external to 
the content; the  form brings out the truth of the content; but these are not juxtaposed in 
an external relation, they must have something in common for the operation to work. 
This  is  the  transcendental  schema as  the  “third thing”  enabling the comparison (in 
Capital  Marx  will  return  to  this  logic  when  speaking  of  value as  the  tertium 
comparationis of commodities). Hegel's critique of this logic, hugely influential on the 
young  Marx,  aimed  at  subverting  the  binary  between  form  and  content,  and  the 
subjective idealism according to which the mediation of the two sides is the work of the 
transcendental subject, rather than that of the material itself:
Subsumption under the species alters what is immediate. We strip away what is 
sensory, and lift out the universal. [...] It seems absurd, if we what we want is 
knowledge  of  external  objects,  to  alter  these  external  objects  by  our  very 
[abstractive] activity upon them. ... The alteration consists in the fact that we 
separate off what is singular or external, and hold the truth of the thing to lie in 
what is universal rather than in what is singular or external.767
Instead  of  this  abstractive  process  of  subsumption  Hegel  searches  for  he  concrete 
universal present already in particulars, mediating and mediated by the relation to the 
particulars. In Isaak Rubin's pithy summary, 'Kant treated form as something external to 
the content [...]. [In Hegel] through its development, the content itself gives birth to the 
form which was already latent in the content'.768  In his article on Marx's Dissertation 
Martin McIvor relates Marx's philosophy to Hegel's critique of the transcendentalism of 
Kantian philosophy. Drawing on recent anti-foundationalist readings of Hegel (Robert 
Pippin and Terry Pinkard in particular), McIvor suggests that Marx adopted Hegel the 
766 Ibid., 75.
767 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831, trans. Clark Butler (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2008), 12–13, §22, .
768 Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 117–18.
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project of affirming the immanent self-determination of reason against – or rather from 
the inner  contradiction  of -  the Kantian 'reflective'  standpoint  which posited a strict 
distinction between the given “appearance” and underlying “essence”.769 In short, the 
production of the form from the concept  is  taken to  be descriptive of a  process  of 
thought.  However,  Marx's  was  explicitly  not  limiting  this  activity  of  rationality  to 
thought, but understood it as the self-ordering or self-organising activity of the reality, 
or actuality (wirklichkeit). Thus
in the concrete expression of a living world of ideas, as exemplified by law, the 
state, nature, and philosophy as a whole, the object itself must be studied in its 
development; arbitrary divisions must not be introduced, the rational character 
of the object itself must develop as something imbued with contradictions in 
itself and find its unity in itself.770
What McIvor misses, is that Hegel's program of a science extends to nature itself. Hegel 
is not merely interested in the movement of thought, but in the ‘movement in the object 
itself’, and similarly Marx's describes all true and real [wirkliche] science as dealing 
with the nature of things  themselves.771 The question is  whether  real  manifolds  can 
organise  themselves  into  compound bodies  or  if  the  unity  of  natural  phenomena is 
supplied by the understanding. Kant, in his  Inaugural Dissertation,  had insisted that 
wholes and compounds, respectively are only given when a totality or a multiplicity of 
parts  (multitudo)  is  recounted  for,  leading  to  infinite  regress.  Thus  the  concepts  of 
simple parts and a whole can only be supplied by the understanding by subsuming such 
multitudes from without.772 Hegel's suggestion is that nature in organic beings reach 
'concrete totalities'.773  In fact, in the Critique of Judgement Kant had come close to such 
an idea with his concept of organisms as self-organising beings; however, he made clear 
that such 'natural ends' could not be proven, but merely presumed by us, regulatively 
and from the point of view of reflection.774 While Hegel agrees with Kant, contemporary 
physics and the ancient Atomists that mechanical nature is pure exteriority, he insists 
that self-organisation and individuation, and thus rationality (understood as free self-
769 McIvor, “The Young Marx and German Idealism.”
770 Marx, “Letter from Marx to His Father, November 1837,” 74.
771 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 145.
772 Immanuel Kant, “Inaugural Dissertation (On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible 
World),” in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, ed. David Walford (Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 377–8.
773 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Nature, Vol. I, trans. M. J. Petry (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1970), 215
774 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 200–205, §65-66. 
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organisation775), is proper to nature itself. 'Matter involves itself into life, and evolution 
is  therefore  also  involution'.776 Thus  nature  is  capable  of  synthesising  itself  into 
compounds and organisms. Marx was familiar with this position, as we can see from his 
plan  of  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Nature  in  his  preparatory  notebooks777,  but  in  the 
Dissertation  itself  we find only passing references to the logics of (self-)organising, 
typically in oblique passing remarks about what the atomists cannot think. However, as 
noted Marx's was writing after Hegel's system, or in its crisis. Thus what Marx learned 
from Hegel was not a stable method, nor was it, as Marx noted, for Hegel 'something 
received, but something in the process of becoming, to whose uttermost periphery his 
own intellectual heart’s blood was pulsating!'778 We go to Marx's notebooks to see how 
the crisis of Hegelianism was registered by Marx, and thus how he conceptualised the 
need for reorientation.
1.2. The Left-Hegelians and the Young-Hegelians
We find Marx in the middle of a lively discussion in Berlin. Much has been written of 
the Young-Hegelian circle and Marx's relation to it, but here I will make only a few 
remarks: this circle is in fact two overlapping circles, that of the Left-Hegelians (a split 
internal  to  the  Hegelian  school)  and  the  Young-Hegelians  (a  split  from  the  Left-
Hegelians).779 John  Toews  points  out  that  the  distinction  between  Left  and  Right 
Hegelians was originally a quite context-specific and slightly misleading joke of David 
Strauß'. Somewhat complicating Strauß distinction Toews shows that there were in fact 
two sets of Left-Hegelians, the  “Old Left,” “New Left”, with Strauß belonging to the 
latter.  The main difference  between the Old and the New Left  Hegelians  in  Toews 
schema is the relation to Christian theology: While Old-Left Hegelians such as Eduard 
Gans,  a  contemporary  of  Hegel,  stressed  the  modernist  and  republican  elements  of 
Hegel's  thoughts  and  a  Protestant  notion  of  secularisation,  the  New Left  Hegelians 
775 The reality or actuality of reason or 'the idea' can be taken in two senses here, that of order, which 
pertains to law, and organisation, which pertains to a self-referential system. Thus order and 
organisation refer to two modes of universality, one sovereign and transcendent, the other emergent 
and immanent. Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History, 25.
776 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature I, 218–19, §252. 
777 Marx, MECW I, 510–16.
778 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 148.
779 For a useful attempt to untangle of the relationship between the Left and the Young Hegelians, and 
Marx’s relation to both intellectual movements, see Emmanuel Renault, “The Early Marx and Hegel: 
The Young-Hegelian Mediation” (presented at the Marx and Philosophy Society Annual Conference, 
London, June 2, 2012).  
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approached secularization from a strictly atheist immanentist perspective.780
After the death of Hegel in 1831 the Left-Hegelians, among them David Strauß, had 
argued  against  the  Right-Hegelians'  adoption  of  the  Hegelian  dictum  'the  actual  is 
rational, and the rational is actual' and 'freedom is insight into necessity'. They did so by 
adding a simple 'not yet',  effectively turning Hegelian philosophy into a philosophy of 
the future, a future conceived as the extension of an ongoing process of realisation of 
reason,  which  is  nothing  but  a  process  of  actualisation  of  freedom.  The  Young-
Hegelians,  on the other hand, took the Hegelian system itself  as a part  of the past, 
unwilling to commit itself to a radical change of the world. The philosophical system 
itself – with its defence of the Prussian state in the Philosophy of Right – was seen as 
standing in the way of a true realisation of philosophy, i.e. the actualisation of freedom 
in history.  Before Marx's  supposed break with Hegel he was,  as Young-Hegelian,  a 
philosopher of such a break. The positions of these authors converged in these few years 
in the late 30s and early 40s, united not by a shared doctrine,  but in an intellectual 
milieu in which the elaboration of a critique of Hegel as the main priority, but always in 
relation to the Left-Hegelian critique. This critique was strongly political, and taken as 
such  by  the  authorities  who  attempted  to  suppress  it,  yet  by  and  large  limited  to 
intellectual circles.781
In  The German Ideology,  written four years after the  Dissertation, Marx and Engels 
note that 'as we hear from German ideologists ... [t]he decomposition of the Hegelian 
philosophy, which began with Strauß, has developed into a universal ferment into which 
all the “powers of the past” are swept.'782
1.3. After the deluge: Prometheus and Hegel drowned
In a  notebook from 1839 on Epicurean philosophy, preparatory for his  Dissertation 
which was completed two years later,  Marx gauged the state of philosophy and the 
contemporary  pertinence  of  Epicurus,  by  dramatized  the  crisis  of  Hegelianism in a 
myth.783 The  term  dramatization  is  used  advisedly,  for  Marx  is  not  interested  in 
exploring a unified system of thought or a historical sequence, but an event in and of 
thought. On the one side something like a  philosophical event, the 'nodal point which 
780 John Toews, “Transformations of Hegelianism, 1805-1846,” in The Cambridge Companion to  
Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
781 Breckman, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory.
782 “The German Ideology,” 1969, 17. 
783 The text was written in 1839, two years after the letter. Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 198.
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raises  philosophy  …  into  concretion  …  and  breaks  of  the  rectiliniear  process'  of 
philosophical history, on the other the moment where 'philosophy turns its eyes to the 
external world, and no longer apprehends it, but, as a practical person, weaves, as it 
were, intrigues with the world...', what we can speak of as an  event of philosophy.784 
More than a myth, Marx interlaces history and a thought of the contemporary situation 
with  myth,  drawing  on  three  stories:  Prometheus  and  Deucalion  against  Zeus, 
Democritus and Epicurus after Aristotle and Plato, and the exhaustion of systematic 
Hegelian philosophy. Here, in a narrative told retrospectively, according to the dictum 
that one knows a hero's  life  by his death,  Hegelian philosophy, just  as Prometheus' 
project,  itself  was  seen  as  a  force  of  cosmic  unbalancing.785 The  basic  narrative 
connecting  these  layers  by  analogy  is  the  following:  a  great  totalising  project  – 
Prometheus,  Plato-Aristotle,  and  Hegel,  breaks  of  the  linear  path  of  history  and 
becomes a historical force turning against the world. The totalisation is self-defeating, 
impossible to uphold. The attempted creation of a world or a system fails, philosophy 
turns outward and disintegrates into worldly engagement; carnal, sensuous, materialist. 
This period Marx calls 'the carnival of philosophy'; Epicurus and Democritus are two of 
the  characters  of  such  an  ancient  carnival,  which  is  what  makes  them  the 
contemporaries  of  Marx,  contemporaries  of  the  avowed  materialism  of  the  Young-
Hegelians (we imagine Marx and the characters of the time – whom he would later 
dress  up  as  saints  –  disputing  in  the  famous  Café  Hippel).786 If  the  carnival  of 
philosophy  comes  after  the  totalising  philosophy,  how  then  characterise  this 
philosophy? Here enters the mythical narrative of Prometheus who stole the fire from 
the  Gods  and  gave  birth  to  civilization787,  and  his  son  Deucalion.  Marx  compared 
Hegelian philosophy with the Promethean endeavour of building and settling upon the 
earth, expanding 'to be the whole world'.788 But Marx made clear that such an expansion 
must necessary lead to, and proceed through a turn against the world of appearance. A 
total  philosophy  becomes  total  only  through  abstraction,  or,  in  other  words,  the 
heterogeneity, or heteronomy of the world is not abolished, but abstracted from. Such 
784 Ibid., 197–8.
785 Ibid., 201.
786 Marx does not mention Aristotle or Plato, but clearly implies that Epicurus and Democritus are both 
reactions to a a totalising philosophies analogous with Hegel's. The fact that Democritus was 
Socrates' generation makes it clear that this is not a historical/chronological narrative, but a narrative 
that has a mythical function in the present.
787 For a brief sketch of the Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment significance of the figure of 
Prometheus, see appendix 1.9.
788 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 198.
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abstraction is presented as at once philosophical, historical and practical. Philosophy 
sealing  itself  off,  as  totalisation  and  abstraction  is  an  effect  of  it's  own  internal 
development,  yet  this  internal  development  stands  in  a  practical  relationship to  the 
world.789 It becomes possible to make two important points here: while Hegel's drive 
towards  totalisation  in  thought  finally  makes  his  philosophy  also  a  subsumptive 
philosophy – and one less humble than Kant's – such subsumption is not merely an 
event in thought, but in practice, effecting a diremption within the world:
...the totality of the world in general is divided within itself, and this division is 
carried to the extreme... The division of the world is total only when its aspects 
are totalities. The world confronting a philosophy total in itself is therefore  a 
world torn apart.790
The attempted global totalisation as abstraction achieves the opposite of its end, it tears 
the world apart,  through its  own totalisation.  The casting of  Aristotle  and Hegel  as 
Promethean figures  goes  further  than  to  noting  the  world-subduing process  of  their 
activity;  the  failure  of  the  projects  is  written  into  them  from  the  beginning:  '[I]ts 
objective  universality  is  turned  back  into  the  subjective  forms  of  individual 
consciousness in which it has life'.791 This objective universality is not that of substance 
(Gaia in the terms of the myth), but of the totalising Promethean system-subject. 
It is important to take note of that fact that Marx, in the face of Epicurus' hostility to 
myth792, and Hegel's and the later Marxist tradition's talk of the superiority of prosaic 
history over mythical poetry, registered the end of the Hegelian system and the period 
that followed it in the form of myth rather than history.793 As noted, what Marx's is 
interested in is  events in philosophy  and  of philosophy,  not a sequential history. The 
montage,  the superimposition of  myth,  history and the contemporary,  presents three 
historical events as repetitions of the same structure. However, this repetition does not 
suggest  something  like  the  possibility  of  the  repetition  of  a  certain  dialectic,  the 
repetition  of  a  figure  of  sublation,  but  rather  the  repetition  of  a  certain  failures  of  
sublation.  Reversely,  this  means  that  Marx  does  not  present  us  with  a  wholly 
789 Ibid.
790 Ibid.
791 Ibid.
792 Which Marx refers to on several occasions in the dissertation, e.g. Ibid., 90, 141.
793 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Volume I: Manuscripts of the 
Introduction and the Lectures of 1822-1823, ed. Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson (OUP 
Oxford, 2011); For the intimate connection between myth and history respectively poetry and prose 
in Hegel, see Ranajit Guha, History at the Limit of World-History (Columbia University Press, 
2003). 
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indeterminate situation of disorientation – a pure chaos – nor with an indeterminate 
problem of reorientation. Rather, he attempts to outline the precise structure of the crisis 
of  orientation,  and thus to  come to understand the structure of the openness  of the 
situation.  The crisis does not pose the question of orientation  in nuce,  but the more 
precise question of orientation after the failure of a project of totalisation. This is were 
the young Marx is the contemporary of the post-1989 period.
So, Marx describes a situation in which world philosophy turns into it's opposite – 'a 
world  torn  apart',  and  the  succeeding  period  in  which  'mediocrity  is  the  normal 
manifestation of absolute spirit'.794 The post-Hegelian situation is like the night after the 
setting of 'the universal sun', in which the moth of philosophy seeks the dim lights of the 
lamp of the 'private individual'. In these times of disorientation and hopelessness, where 
the 'Absolute  has … fallen into the measureless',  Marx's  text  suggests two possible 
orientations, exodus or waiting, based on a new world-building practice or the promise 
of  a  'new goddess'.  The  practice  suggested  by  Marx's  text  is  that  of  the  figures  of 
Deucalion,  Prometheus  son,  and  of  Themistocles  who  attempted  to  persuade  the 
Athenians to found a new Athens at sea, when Athens was about to fall. Deucalion, like 
Marx after the death of father-Hegel, attempted to create 'a world' following the failure 
of his father's grand global project and after the great flood, by creating a people by 
'throwing  the  bones  of  his  mother'  (Gaia)  behind  him.795  Deucalion,  the  Greek 
equivalent of Noah, is here proposing a very different and materialist notion of post-
apocalyptic times, than the classical Messianic figures.796
The new goddess, on the other hand, is the promise given in the depth of the night 
which, after the flight of the owl of Minerva:
...titanic are the times which follow in the wake of a philosophy total in itself 
and of its subjective developmental forms, for gigantic is the discord that forms 
their unity. Thus Rome followed the Stoic, Sceptic and Epicurean philosophy. 
They  are  unhappy  and  iron  epochs,  for  their  gods  have  died  and  the  new 
794 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 199.
795 Ibid., 198.
796 It would be interesting to reread the young Marx with Walter Benjamin onthis point. Howard Caygill 
suggests that Benjamin's messianic language toward the end of his Theses on the Philosophy of  
History must be read in terms of the task of building a new world after the end of the storm of 
progress: Benjamin's 'work is certainly full of intimations of last things, but not necessarily in the 
sense of a Messianic completeness. A better biblical precedent for his thought is the appearance of 
the rainbow to Noah after the flood, marking the advent of a new covenant between Divinity, Nature 
and Humanity. Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin the Colour of Experience (London: Routledge, 
1998), 149.
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goddess still reveals the dark aspect of fate, of pure light or of pure darkness. 
She still lacks the colours of day.797
The Deucalian and Themistoclean orientations are properly hopeless, it has not hope in 
the current world nor in the one beyond, but aims at the construction of a world in 
exodus or after the deluge. The new goddess, on the other hand is a figure of the coming 
of hope and orientation, the promise of an orientated practice within an actuality that is 
only in the process of formation; Marx only found his new goddess years later, when he 
encountered the practice of communism.
1.4. A Promethean Philosophy
Two years  after  having  pronounced  the  death  of  Hegel's  Promethean  philosophy798, 
Marx strongly declared himself a devotee of Prometheus 'the most eminent saint and 
martyr  in  the  philosophical  calendar'.799 He  denounced  the  gods  of  all  religions, 
heavenly and earthy alike, in an affirmation of 'human self-consciousness as the highest 
divinity'.800 Instead Marx affirms the immanent power of philosophy 'whose sovereign 
authority ought everywhere to be acknowledge'.801 'Philosophy', he continues 'as long as 
a drop of blood shall pulse in its world-subduing and absolutely free heart, will never 
grow tired of answering its adversaries with the cry of Epicurus'.802 Against the today 
consensual dismissal of “Promethean activism” as the 'deiﬁcation of man as a disastrous 
form of hyper-humanism' Alberto Toscano notes:
The Promethean act is first and foremost the emblem of the revolt against the 
infinite “super-power” of authority. Prometheanism is precisely the refusal of 
the articulation between divine (or political) authority and human mortality.803
Did Marx give up his diagnosis of the failure of the Promethean project of Hegel or 
should we read his exclamation as a call to repeat the Promethean gesture under other 
circumstances?  In  a  note  written  between the  preparatory  note  written  close  to  the 
797 Ibid., 199–200.
798 Cf. appendix 1.3. 'After the deluge: Prometheus and Hegel drowned'
799 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 90.
800 Ibid.
801 Ibid., 89. Marx is here quoting the German translation of David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature 
(Digireads.com Publishing, 2010), 104.
802 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 90.. My emphasis. 
803 Alberto Toscano, “A Plea for Prometheus,” Critical Horizons 10, no. 2 (August 2009).
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completion of the thesis,804 we find a hint towards the answer. Here Marx presents his 
new philosophy against the pupils of Hegel. Where they, in Marx's scathing critique, 
turn their moral indignation against their old Master's idiosyncrasies [Einseitigkeiten], 
their critique amounts to nothing more than the complaints of  disappointed acolytes 
who have at last noticed the faults of what they thought was the perfect science of the 
Master. At least for Hegel, Marx exclaims, science 'was not something received, but 
something  in  the  process  of  becoming,  to  whose  uttermost  periphery  his  own 
intellectual heart’s blood was pulsating!' Hegel's relation to his system was substantial 
and living, theirs is only reflective.805 Marx knows that the moment of this father is over, 
and that the any battle against the ruins of Hegel's project happens at the risk of merely 
resurrecting its individual moments. He cannot adopt it, he cannot negate it; he cannot 
but affirm its energies.
In  the  notes  to  the  missing  fourth  chapter  of  the  Dissertation Marx  returns  to  the 
questions raised two years earlier  in his notebooks, but with a crucial  twist.  He has 
found a philosophy that neither points towards a Deucalian construction of a world, nor 
the orientation of new goddess, but a destructive-constructive philosophy. The practical 
energy of abstraction is not just turning against the world, or onto its own individuality. 
It does both, and in so doing it is changing that world:
What  was  inner  light  has  become  consuming  flame  turning  outwards.  The 
result  is  that  as  the world becomes philosophical,  philosophy also becomes 
worldly, that its  realisation is also its loss...  That which opposes it and that 
which it fights is always the same as itself, only with the factors inverted.806
1.5. The labour of Pyrrha
The rejection of patriarchal authority, in the Prometheus myth, is a struggle over the 
world, what is  given  and without agency, namely Gaia and Pyrrha. Importantly these 
two figures are missing in Marx's adoption of the Prometheus myth. Thus, in the myth 
as told by Ovid in the Metamorphoses, it was not Deucalion alone who repopulated the 
earth after the flood. Pyrrha, who had Deucalion as her husband, also worked the earth – 
804 The title of the fragment refers to the title of a chapter of the Dissertation, which is now missing, but 
which occurs in the final dissertation index. We thus gather that this note was not a preperatory note, 
but rather written during the period in which Marx was writing the thesis, in late 1840 or early 1841.
805 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 148.
806 Ibid., 149.
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Gaia their common mother – and from her created a new people (after the advice of the 
goddess Themis each threw a 'bone of their  mother',  a stone,  behind them, creating 
respectively  a  man  and  a  woman).  The  new  world  after  the  destruction  and 
fragmentation  of  the  flood,  was a  product  not  just  of  Promethean synthesis,  but  of 
sexual  reproduction,  and  the  daily  activities  of  reproduction  which  sustained  and 
multiplied the living while they were still fragmented. Where Marx inscribes himself 
and Hegel in the male lineage of the conquering father and his son, we might see the 
forgetting,  or (in so far as mythical characters stay alive as long as the rituals they 
support) the continued exclusion of Pyrrha and Gaia, an exclusion not to an outside, but 
to an invisible inside. Marx, in rejecting the patriarchal authority of the King of Gods, 
Zeus, comes no further than to align himself with the rebel father, Prometheus, while 
forgetting the son's wife and her labours. This, I would argue is not merely an absence 
or an oversight on the part of Marx, rather 'an inner darkness of exclusion' something 
which remained structurally invisible for Marx, the inventor of symptomal readings, as 
well as for the inventor of the invention of symptomal readings, Althusser.807 Behind the 
freedom of the Promethean abstraction lies what we might call the prior abstraction of 
separation from the earth; to sustain an element in abstraction requires a labour, the 
reproductive labour of Pyrrha and the gifts of the soil, of Gaia. 
As Althusser notes, our sighting of the oversights of past writers only becomes possible 
with an 'informed gaze, a new gaze, itself produced by a reflection of the “change of 
terrain” on the exercise of vision'. This can only happen through a transformation of 'the 
production of the visible'.808 Anachronism is not a fallacy, but a given of our vision 
itself,  one that  is  a  condition for  historical  experience.  Here  we might  mention the 
feminist movement and the (re-)entry of women into the waged-labour market as the 
historical condition that made possible this seeing of this oversight. However, it is not 
that such seeing has suddenly become possible through the arrival of the new, but that 
these struggles has forced philosophy and history, fields historically excluding female 
practitioners and testimonies, to begin to recognise what retrospectively will appear to 
having been there all along.809 What I want to note here, as a question to pursue, is a 
certain  silencing that  is  perhaps  necessary in  the  post-Kantian tradition:  even when 
Kantian heteronomy and autonomy (or necessity and freedom) are dialecticized,  the 
'labours' of women and 'typically female or effeminate characteristics' (affectiveness, 
807 Althusser and Balibar, Reading Capital, 24–28.
808 Ibid., 27.
809 Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason.
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care,  passion,  sensuousness,  corporeality,  etc.)  are  either  directly  made  invisible  or 
assigned  a  'natural'  or  pathological  place  (the  effect  of  which  is  silencing  in  a 
philosophy for which speech proper and autonomy become one).810 
The problematic of separation is common to Hobbes and Epicurus, both writing at times 
of  social  disintegration.  But  where  Hobbes  became  a  philosopher  of  absolutism, 
Epicurus became the founder of The Garden. This withdrawal into a world of friendship 
and ataraxy brings him closer to Voltaire's Candide at the end of his journey than to the 
Diggers, Hobbes contemporaries, who in squatting first St. George's hill in 1649, and 
later a great many fields across England, aimed to found elective communities in which 
the self-reproduction of the life of the community and of the individuals coincided. Both 
they and Epicurus arrived at the practical recognition that the human organism is not an 
atom; it cannot exist long outside relations of reproduction, and must invent them where 
they are absent. 
What Epicurus, Hobbes, the young Marx and the late Althusser's materialisms have in 
common is a certain blindness to questions of reproduction; the pure world of atoms, 
clinamen or forces opens no questions of how bodies and societies are reproduced. The 
problem to which combination, the covenant, Hobbes' Leviathan, etc., are answers is the 
problem of fragmentation or separation. Through the introduction of the swerve this 
solution becomes a creative, generative one in which the parts abolish the separation 
through their  own activity,  without  abolishing  the swerve itself,  whereby the  atoms 
remain 'free', while the possibility of disintegration remains; the problem remains, and 
thus  the  process  of  solution  can  perpetuate  itself.  However,  the  above  suggests  a 
different work on the problem, one that  subtends this  solution,  namely the work of 
maintaining  what  is  fragmented.  The  actualisation  of  freedom  in  social  bodies  is 
premised on the 'female' world of heteronomy.811
1.6. Hegel on idealisation and actualisation
Empiricist readings and critiques of Hegel and Marx often rely on a misreading the 
notion  of  Wirklichkeit,  so  that  'reality'  or  what  is  'real'  is  construed  as  a  passive 
810 “The Gender of Enlightenment” in Robin May Schott, Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant 
(Penn State Press, 1997). As we know from fashion advertisements and humanitarian aid campaigns 
alike, silence does not always entail invisibility. Marxism, and our text, will be haunted by this 
silence.
811 Of course talk of Godesses and female powers is still a poor replacement for engaging with female 
'native' informants, and less yet for any the feminist movement.
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collection of elements and relations, and actuality as what is what is simply present, the 
passive  object  of  perception or  theory.  Wirklichkeit,  contrary  to  this,  speaks  to  the 
primacy of Tätigkeit (activity) over Tatsachen (lit. “act-things”, the results or objects of 
an activity). In Wittgenstein's Tractatus, just to measure a distance by way of linguistic 
clarification, Tatsachen are  mere  facts  (the  fact  of  Sachverhalten,  combinations, 
between things, Sachen, Dingen).812
In the  Encyclopedia Logic  Hegel  discusses how nature (the realm of the Epicurean 
analysis) is what is external not just to us, but in-itself; it is multiplicity, not one. On this 
level of externality there is no actuality, only possibility, or rather actuality can only be 
imposed on nature on the outside:
Both in nature and in spirit too, Concept, purpose, and law, so far as they are 
still  only  inner  dispositions,  pure  possibilities,  are  still  only  an  external 
inorganic nature, what is known by a third alien power, etc.813
If merely held in the mind a concept, purpose and law, are only mental abstractions and 
possibilities.  Rather  than  informing  matter  itself  organically  as  its  own  emergent 
powers, they are known from outside, by an observer, 'an alien power'. However, contra 
to Epicurus, Hegel refuses to hypostasise this abstract understanding of nature, and to 
reject  teleology  and  rationality  tout  court  just  because  it  is  not  found  in  nature 
considered in its abstract externality. The point does not become to order chaotic nature, 
but to trace its own self-ordering, self-actualisation. So while the actual is always an 
actualised 'idea', it is not a mere idea (a form of knowledge external to its object), but an 
idea to its immanent, or organic, to its actualisation, something like the 'principle' or 
'goal' (rather than 'structure', which would be too passive) that organises the manifold of 
which  any  one  complex  object  consists.814 Idealisation  is  not  an  goal  governing 
individuation, however, nor certainly an idea subsuming what is different. Idealisation is 
812 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ogden & Ramsey, and Pears & McGuinness, Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus / Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (Boston: University of Massachusetts, 2013), 1 
- 2.011. Fredric Jameson, Hegel Variations: On the Phenomenology of the Spirit, 1st edition (Verso, 
2010), chapter 6, “The Ethics of Activity (die Sache Selbst).”See also Hegel, The Encyclopaedia  
Logic, 213–225, §142-149. particularly §142 and §148.
813 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 210, §140.
814 Just as Hegel is here not an empiricist, neither is he an idealist in the Platonic sense. Hegel explicitly 
agrees with Aristotle in his polemic against Plato, which 'consists in his designation of the Platonic 
Idea as mere dynamis, and in urging, on the contrary, that the Idea, which is recognised by both of 
them equally to be what is alone true, should be regarded essentially as energeia, i.e., ... as the unity 
of inward and outward... actuality in the emphatic sense'. Ibid., 215, §142. For a commentary on the 
relation to Aristotle on this issue, see Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle (Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 139.
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simply the name of the emergent teleology, which emerges when a 'chemical' process 
(which is self-organised in the sense that the combination is given with the properties of 
the elements themselves and no external principle) flips back on itself and becomes 
self-reproductive. In the  Phenomenology of Spirit  Hegel stresses that the organic does 
not come about by necessity, but it is a result, the last thing, which returns into itself, it 
becomes 'the first thing'. The organic emerges from this loop, it does not produce itself, 
'does  not  engender  something,  it  merely  conserves  itself'.815 The  telos  (Zweck)  the 
movement appears in the moment it is actualised [verwirklicht]. That the actual is idea 
means that it is rational in itself and thus that it can be made intelligible. 
In Hegel's  Encyclopedia Logic, the precise determination of  Wirklichkeit,  actuality, is 
that  it  is  the  actualisation  of  a  certain  essence,  an  essence  which  doesn't  just  exist 
contingently, but which exist necessarily, which posits itself. He argues against the error 
of taking essence, or an idea as something 'inner', merely realised in the outer being of a 
thing.816 For  instance,  while  a  child  is  a  'rational  essence',  the  child's  rationality  is 
merely an essential disposition or possibility. It is only through education that a child's 
inner essence (or potentiality) comes into  existence, becomes a true essence, which is 
also outwardly expressed,  appearance. Thus the potential is actualised. We might say 
that for Hegel a real potentiality – capable of actualisation – is more than a mere logical 
or imaginary possibility, however, it can be known only retrospectively, once actualised. 
So what  is  the  relation  between idealisation  and idealism?  The atom,  for  Hegel,  is 
always-already caught up in the demands of philosophy, which are always caught up 
with  figures  of  the  infinite,  of  which  the  finite  is  merely  a  part.  In  a  wonderful 
dialectical  phrase  Hegel  writes:  'The  claim that  the  finite  is  an  idealization  defines 
idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in the recognition 
that the finite is not truly an existent'.817 What truly exists is the infinite of idealism, of 
which the finite – even if an idea – is merely a product. He continues:  
Every  philosophy  is  essentially  idealism  or  at  least  has  idealism  for  its 
principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is carried out. 
This applies to philosophy just as much as to religion, for religion also, no less 
than  philosophy,  will  not  admit  finitude  as  a  true  being,  an  ultimate,  an 
absolute,  or  as  something  non-posited,  uncreated,  eternal.  The  opposition 
815 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §256. 
816 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 209, §140.
817 Hegel, Science of Logic, 2010, 124.
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between  idealistic  and realistic  philosophy is  therefore  without  meaning.  A 
philosophy that attributes to finite existence, as such, true, ultimate, absolute 
being, does not deserve the name of philosophy. The principles of ancient as 
well as more recent philosophies – whether “water,” “matter,” or “atoms” – are 
universals, idealizations, not things as  given immediately, that is, in sensuous 
singularity.818
This  point  draws  on  the  classical  argument  according  to  which  a  manifold  of 
exteriorities or differences (the manifold of sensual impressions, abstract individuals, 
God's heterogeneous creation) is only cognizable through a moment of unification (in 
the transcendental subject, the idea, God).
1.7. The actuality of representation and the need for social critique
In a note written at the time of the composition of the thesis Marx provides us with an 
fragment of a materialist theory of religion. While Marx follows Epicurus in picking 
apart the gods by looking to their component parts, he insists on a certain materiality of 
such existing abstract  beings.  It  is  in  this  incipient  critique of the mystifications  of 
religion that Marx  introduces the notion of the  actuality,  the real effectivity, of social 
ideas. 
The actual,  in Hegelian terms, is not just  active and effective,  but is  so on its own 
accord. It is a causality which cannot be reduced to its preconditions, to a series of 
external causal relationships. Characterised by a causal circularity, it reproduces itself, it 
has itself as an end, it is, in the terminology of German Idealism, teleological. Not all 
teleology is  theological:  To reject  the  power of  God is  to  reject  any final  absolute 
teleology, but not to reject teleologies as such. A finite teleology, such as an organism, 
posits itself and its conditions, i.e. it is not the mere result of what came before, but 
organises it as its own elements. Against Hegel, who in Marx's (mis)understanding had 
attempted to posit the existence of the absolute on the back of finite teleologies ('”Since 
the accidental  does not exist,  God or Absolute  exist”'819),  Marx rejects  this  absolute 
without rejecting the organising power of teleologies. Hegel's argument, according to 
Marx  is  'upside-down';  it  merely  reverses  the  'hollow  tautology'  of  the  classical 
818 Ibid.
819 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 160. Marx here misrepresents Hegel's position as noted by David 
McLellan, Marx Before Marxism, First U.S. Edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). 
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argument for God's existence, which Marx paraphrases as '”what I really imagine is an 
actual representation for me”'.820 That this is a tautology does not make it false, Marx 
notes. The imaginary character of God and money does not make it any less effective: 
'...it works on me (das wirkt auf mich). In this sense all gods, the pagan as well as the 
Christian ones, have possessed a real existence (eine reelle Existenz)'.821
For Marx the existence of God is neither purely symbolic nor empirical.  Indeed Kant 
'might have enforced the ontological proof' by comparing God to something as actual 
yet ideal, as money. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argued against this argument 
that existence does not add anything to a concept;  the actual  is  not 'more'  than the 
merely possible, being is not a predicate that is added to a thing: A hundred taler (or 
dollars, pounds...) in my wallet is not 'more' than a hundred talers in my mind. In the 
latter case, the 'more' is not a mere conceptual determination, but a synthetic, empirical 
external, i.e. contextual addition to the concept. In this sense, considered a posteriori, 
the real talers are of course 'more' than imagined ones, they constitute real wealth. But 
nothing about existence can be proven by pure conceptual argument: existence can only 
be granted a posteriori, empirically. There is a discontinuity between our concepts and 
real relations, and the standards by which we judge either are not the same.822
 Marx picked up on Kant's empirical demand for any proof of existence, but coupled it 
with a very Hegelian insistence that matter and form do not relate externally, but are 
moments of the same process of actualisation. God or money might appear as empty 
imaginary  representations  (Vorstellungen),  yet  they  operate  with  some  force  within 
certain finite settings. 
If somebody imagines [vorstellt] that he has a hundred talers, if this concept is 
not for him an arbitrary, subjective one, if he believes in it, then these hundred 
imagined  talers  have  for  him  the  same  value  as  a  hundred  real  ones.  For 
instance, he will incur debts on the strength of his imagination, his imagination 
will work, in the same way as all humanity has incurred debts on its gods. Real 
talers have the same existence that the imagined gods have.823
Imagined talers, for the imagined possessor with a willing creditor, is worth as much as 
820 '“was ich mir wirklich (realiter) vorstelle, ist eine wirkliche Vorstellung für mich”.'
821 He continues 'Did not the ancient Moloch reign? Was not the Delphic Apollo a real power (wirkliche 
Macht) in the life of the Greeks?' The translation, which renders 'vorstellung' as 'concept', has been 
ammended. Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 160.
822 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A600/B628. 
823 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 160.
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real ones. But this 'real' soon shows itself as relative one, founded – as religious belief – 
in social belief:
Has a real taler any existence except in the imagination, if only in the general 
or  rather  common imagination  of  man? Bring  paper  money  into  a  country 
where this use of paper is unknown, and everyone will laugh at your subjective 
imagination.  Come  with  your  gods  into  a  country  where  other  gods  are 
worshipped, and you will be shown to suffer from fantasies and abstractions. 
And justly so.824
Representations can be real,  a form of common imagination,  which is  effective and 
actual (das wirkt) in so far as it is practised in a definite 'country', through exchange or 
worship.825 Representations can thus construct a world through the embodied practices 
that give it life. Marx here does not conceive of money and God as transcendent forces 
nor as simple illusions, but as fantasies and abstractions, alien to 'the country of reason'. 
Certainly the abstractions 'money' and 'God' represent a certain world, within which 
they structure the very relations of existence. But Marx's argument is not that they are 
irrational  because they are imaginaries  of  the real  relations  of existence.  Rather,  he 
writes,  the  ontological  argument  is  an  argument  that  there  is  an  essentially  self-
grounding autonomous existence; God is no such existence, human self-consciousness 
is.826 The idea of God is thus false and irrational not compared to the material practices 
– of which he is indeed the necessary, real and effective representation – but because 
God is only apparently self-grounding. The 'rational' is what does not merely take the 
actual at face value, but comprehends  actualisation  (Verwiklichung), what truly posits 
itself. Indeed the proof of God – the essence that can only be thought of as existing – is 
a proof of human self-consciousness itself, because the latter can be the causa-sui that 
the former purports to be. The problem with the imaginary is that it understands the 
actual only as a representation, as a given, as semblance rather than appearance. The 
point is not that the semblance is a pure illusion, but that it has the very real effect of  
mystifying the power of actualisation of what has constituted actuality. God and money 
are strictly immanent – ideas born by a collective social and 'conceptual' activity. This 
824 Ibid., 160-61
825 We are here reminded of Althusser's thesis that ideology has a material existence; 'I shall talk of 
actions inserted into practices. And I shall point out that these practices are governed by the rituals  
in which these practices are inscribed, within the material existence of an ideological apparatus...'. 
Althusser, On Ideology, 42.
826 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 161.
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activity is  immanent  in the sense that it  is cause of itself and its products, God and 
money, in the same sense (eo sensu, in Spinoza's terms).827 The rejection of religion is 
not premised on a notion of illusion, but the critique of how religion renders invisible 
the true force that sustains it,  thus blocking the affirmation and actualisation of that 
force.
1.8. Freedom of first and second nature
It deserves mention that for Hegel the freedom of pure indeterminacy or self-reflection, 
is merely natural freedom, a freedom every limitation and content, including drives, 
needs or desires. As such it is singular, or abstract. Such will is particular through the I,  
as an act of differentiation, and determination of form and content. Only the will that is 
not  just  in  itself,  but  for  itself,  which  takes  itself  as  an  object,  is  rational  and 
autonomous, of 'second nature'.828
1.9. A note on the Modern use of Prometheus
There are, of course, several diverging surviving versions of the Prometheus myth, of 
which Marx is likely to have known most, given his solid classical education: Hesoid 
and  Aeschylus;  Sappho,  Aesop,  and  Ovid.  In  the  latter  three  Prometheus  created 
mankind, in the former he merely stole fire from the Gods and gave it to mankind. Here 
we are not concerned with the classical versions of the myth, but with Marx's use of it.  
In  this  context  it  is  important  to  note  the  importance  of  Prometheus  for  the 
Enlightenments self-mythologization; Kant,  for instance,  called Benjamin Franklin a 
'modern Prometheus' after hearing of his experiments with electricity, while Goethe in 
1770. After the French Revolution Prometheus become an important figure of rebellion 
against  authority.  Thus  Percy  Shelley,  in  his  Prometheus  Unbound,  rewrote  the 
827 Evald Ilyenkov, a dissident Soviet philosopher friendly to Spinoza as well as Marx, supports this 
interpretation, when he shows how Marx's in this note theorises ideas as embodied and processual 
immanence. Thus, in Ilyenkov's reading the Vorstellungen, or 'ideal images', even if 'fetishized' (his 
reading of 'abstractions and fantasies'), can only be sustained as long as the activities they sustain 
continue.E.V. Ilyenkov, Dialectical Logic - Essays on Its History and Theory, trans. H. Campbell 
Creighton (Delhi: Aakar, 2008), 279. Ilyenkov's analysis, however, focuses on idealisation as a result 
of the alienation of human intentionality as a causa finalis. Thus his interpretation leads towards an 
image of a 'negative' ruse of reason, rather than a more general theory of real abstraction. For a brief 
introduction to Ilyenkov, see Alex Levant, “E.V. Ilyenkov’s The Ideal in Human Activity,” Marx & 
Philosophy Review of Books (2011).
828 Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §4-11, and the following paragraphs.
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Aeschylus  story  in  such  a  way  that  it  no  longer  ended  with  the  reconcilliation  of 
Prometheus and Zeus (Jove), but with the downfall of the latter ('in truth, I was averse 
from a catastrophe so feeble as that of reconciling the Champion with the Oppressor of 
mankind').829 Mary Shelley's modern Prometheus, Victor Frankenstein, was, as is well-
known, an altogether more ambivalent figure.830
1.10. The time of actualisation
In Marx's reading Epicurus does not provide principle of actualisation; his atom is either 
too  self-reliant and external, or the mere content of a form (of  this animal body,  this 
comet, this stone) which is external or indifferent to it, which subsumes it from without. 
In the absence of  an actualising principle of the atoms, they merely lie side by side 
uninterested  and  unrelated,  they  cannot  become  the  principle  of  the  intelligibility 
(idealisation) of concrete nature. While posing as materialism this atomism is merely 
abstract timeless philosophy. 
In the  Science of Logic  Hegel claims that the atomists  fail  to move beyond passive 
spatial  'composition'  (Zusammensetzung);  the  thought  of  the  atoms  under  the  same 
concept in the same space is one that fails to bring them into active relation; however 
much the atom has a duration, it appears as timeless to thought.831 Composition in this 
sense is purely spatial, whereas time is the active form of concrete nature. However, in 
Marx's  reading only Democritus falls  on Hegel's  critique,  since Epicurus introduces 
time not as a mere imaginary conception of atoms that are otherwise eternal, but as the 
principle of the realm of appearances, indeed as 'the absolute form of appearance'.832 
Time is described as 'the accidens of the accidens', the explanation of change, not pure 
and simple as was 'chance' but substantially, 'reflecting in itself'.833 Appearance becomes 
829 Percy Bysshe Shelley, Prometheus Unbound (London: C and J Ollier, 1820)
830 For an introduction to the cultural history of the Prometheus myth, see Carol Dougherty, Prometheus 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2006).
831 In the Science of Logic Hegel defines composition as 'an external relation of the ones to one another, 
in which the one is maintained in its absolute brittleness and exclusiveness', and ascribes this 
position particularly to atomism. He continues 'But it has been shown that the one essentially and 
spontaneously passes over into attraction, into its ideality...' Quoting Spinoza's Ethics at lenght(I, 
XV, scholium), Hegel makes clear that the mistake of atomism is that sees the pure quantity 
(externality) in the mode of the imagination, abstractly, rather than through intellect, as substance. 
Marx explicitly levies this critique against Democritus ('[t]he imagining intellect ... does not grasp 
the independence of substance...'). It seems clear that Marx's commentary is written with this section 
of Hegel's in mind. Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969, 188.
832 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 132.
833 Substance can be considered as possibility, and as such it passes into accidentality. But it becomes 
necessary as relationship of causality: 'Substance is cause, because – in contrast to its passing over 
into accidentality – it is inwardly reflected'. The inward reflection Marx proposes here is that of 
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objective as sensation, 'human sensuousness is ... embodied time, the existing reflection  
of the sensuous world in itself'.834 Time is sensuous perception reflected in itself, it is the 
'abstract form of sensation'; no appearance without time, no time without appearance. 
This  means  that  time  is  proper  to  appearance,  it  cannot  be  defined  by  analogy  or 
correlation with the atoms; it is simply the criteria of itself. Yet it is not separate form 
the atoms, sensuousness is the natural medium of the reflection of natural processes: 'in 
hearing nature hears itself, in smelling it smells itself, in seeing it sees itself'.835
It is in this way time becomes the explanation of change despite the persistence of the 
atoms in timeless exteriority, the senses the medium of comprehending concrete nature, 
nature in its appearance. But is there not, behind this concept of time, several other 
notions of temporality at play in Marx's discussion of Epicurus? Given the definition of 
time as appearance and appearance as conglomeration of atoms, we can derive three 
additional concepts of temporality from that given above:
Firstly,  under  and  below  appearances,  there  is  also  a  'timeliness'  to  the  immanent 
movement of the atom, 'in time, in place unfixt'. If the singular movement of an atom – 
as the extensive expression of its intensity – is absolute it cannot be in time, nor space, 
yet it must, in its movement, be durational, temporalising itself.
Secondly, there is the Epicurean notions of friendship and the covenant, something like 
a politics of love, an encounter which temporarily suspends exteriority. Given that these 
pre-political conglomerations do not abolish the exteriority of their component parts, yet 
do  move  beyond  mere  spatial  composition,  they  open  the  question  of  temporal  
composition, against Hegel's and Marx's understanding of composition. However this 
cannot be the interior time of an organised being, but that of an assemblage, the relation 
of velocity, let's say, of two or more atoms composed in their movement. 
Thirdly, with regards to the Hegelian criterion of actualisation, i.e. the question of how 
the abstractly universal, the separate atoms, become concretely universal, an integrated 
multiplicity: This criterion demands the introduction of an operator of – to express it in 
extremely  general  terms –  reflexive spontaneity,  a  process-subject  which  is  not  just 
irreducible to a chain of causality (spontaneous), but self-positing (autonomous).836 As a 
accidentality itself; inwardly reflected accidentality, or contingency, becomes considered as 
necessary movement of substance, and therefore not purely accidental. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia  
Logic, 227, §152-3.
834 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 134.
835 Ibid., 135.
836 The problematic to which Marx looks for an answer is not just his, but characteristic of the 18-19 
Century German philosophy; it is that of the Kantian (or Enlightenment) affirmation of the 
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teleology it is not accidental, but an essence that has its reason of existence in itself, and 
appears as such. If time is still of appearance this, however, gives us another concept of 
time which is not merely that of accidents and perpetual change, but that of a teleology 
whose actualisation entails a certain con-temporalisation of a manifold, which organises 
itself, its time, according to its inner finite necessity, its principle of integration-and-
organisation. With this we would have, in Hegelian terms, the basic temporal structure 
of an organism, of the state, and of history (history being conceived minimally as a 
temporal narrative rationality-intelligibility). This is a temporalisation over and beyond 
that of sensuousness and philosophy, a time which is neither the embodied time of the 
perceiving consciousness, nor the abstract time of the philosopher (whether a concept of 
singular duration or a Newtonian container time, the homogeneous-continuous time-
within-which),  but  the   temporalisation  proper  to  a  process  of  actualisation  of  a 
manifold. 
1.11. Hegel's dialectic of time and space837
I here enter into a close reading of first section of the Philosophy of Nature presents as 
the dialectic of time and space under the heading of the mechanics of free motion.
Hegel starts with the category of space given as the 'abstract generality of nature’s self-
externality'.  This is not a Kantian 'form of sensuous intuition',  but a simple form of 
thought,  an  abstraction.  Space  is  pure  quantity,  the  otherness  and  externality  of 
plurality.838 In  other  words,  this  abstract  universal  space is  the  world as  externality, 
abstracted from all the difference that makes something external from something else. 
Or,  in  other  words,  it  is  merely  the  possibility  rather  than  the  positedness  of 
difference.839 With this abstraction externality can be considered as continuous. This is 
'unmediated  indifference'  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  'wholly  ideal   juxtaposition',  which  is 
'entirely abstract'. It is indifferent in the sense that it is abstracted from the difference 
that makes it a plurality, unmediated in the sense that it is does not form a one or a unity. 
Only this procedure of abstraction gives us a notion of homogeneous and continuous 
autonomous and moral will as an end-of-itself, and of romantic art's affirmation that in true art the 
content itself gives rise to its form. It also resonates with the political questions of how the multitude 
constitute itself as state, and how the will of individuals become the general will.
837 From Hansen, “Hegel’s Concept of Time.”
838 See also, Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969, 186–201. Quantity here is characterised as the unity of 
continuity (attraction) and discreteness (repulsion) sublating being-for-self.
839 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature I §254. 
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space, abstract space, indeterminate exteriority. 
However,  this  pure  externality  is  immediately  negated  by  the  point; indifferent 
indeterminate space is negated by the determination of spatial difference: the point as 
determinately different – here from space rather than from other points. The point is the 
negation of space-as-undifferentiated-self-externality.840 Since the point negates space, 
but is itself spatial, its essential characteristic is  self-negation. The point is absolutely 
non-relational, except to itself: it is abstractly singular. 
The point cannot be divided by its negativity, but it forces it to pass beyond itself; in the 
terms of the Science of Logic on quantity, it is an internal difference, an intensity, which 
is the motor of the movement of the different into space, its becoming  extensive,  to 
become line. Only what is extensive becomes the object of perception; intensity is this 
not 'actual', but 'possible' in Hegel's terms, not as something which awaits actualisation, 
or something posited as the ground of the actual, but as always already there, insisting 
in the extensivity it constitutes.  The line  is the  self-sublation of the negativity of the 
point. It is the point existing outside of itself relating itself to space; in the line space 
negates its own self-negation, it negates the point. That the negation of space is negated 
does  not  mean  a  return  to  abstract  homogeneous  space,  but  the  beginning  self-
overflowing of the spatial through its inner negativity. Space, which was first purely 
abstract is now, we might say, singularizing itself. The abstraction from the particular 
differences that make up our spatial environment into a pure externality, discovers in 
that  externality,  a  negativity  traversing  space,  a  motor  of  singularisation,  where  the 
ordinary perspective would only see positive, particular diversity.
The truth of the otherness of the point, that is the truth of the line is  the plane.  As 
opposed to opposed to line and point, the plane is the re-establishment of spatial totality, 
now containing the negative moment within itself as an enclosing surface, separating off 
a distinct part of space. Only here does space become totality, a totality which is not 
total; as Hegel makes clear – in the abstract plurality of space there is no limit; 'No 
matter how far away I place a star, I can always go beyond it, for no one has boarded up 
the universe. […] Space is still at unity with itself as its otherness beyond its limit; and 
it is this unity in extrinsicality which constitutes continuity'.841 Abstract space is infinite, 
uncontainable in any closed totality. 
What we have seen is a certain negativity which 'as point relates itself to space and in 
840 Ibid. §199.
841 p.224
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space develops its determinations as line and plane'. However, Hegel stresses, in the 
sphere of self-externality, this negativity is for itself, whilst it appears indifferent to the 
motionless coexistence of space.842 Negativity thus posited for itself is TIME. 
Time, to repeat, is the  for-itself  of the negativity inherent in space. It arises  because 
space in itself is contradictory: 
Space is in itself the contradiction of indifferent being outside of others [I.e the 
point]  and undifferentiated continuity [abstract  space],  and thereby the pure 
negativity of itself and the transition into time.843 
While this for space is merely an inner negation, the truth of this negation is, Hegel 
writes,  'the  self-transcendence  of  its  moments'.  He  continues:  'It  is  precisely  the 
existence of this perpetual self-transcendence which constitutes time. In time therefore 
the point has actuality'.844 But the point, as we have seen, is pure singular non-relational 
intensity, the line is the extension of that intensity in space. The 'time' we are dealing 
with here is not relational, not measured, except by itself; it is  'absolute'.
Time, in other words, is the negation involved in the point negating space. Therefore 
Hegel can say of time that  ‘since it is, is not, since it is not, is’. Time is a circle of 
emergence-passing away-emergence.845  In the Greater Logic Hegel is clear that time is 
not continuity pure and simple, but the continuity of discontinuity and continuity. It is 
the mediation of self-repulsion,  a 'creative flowing away of itself',  an 'uninterrupted 
continuity' of 'differentiation'.846 Time is not always the same as it self, it differentiates 
itself, and thus temporalises itself. Here comes the line of time, the notion of a 'linear' 
time, but a quite curious one: only universal as the universality of the negativity of 
space; always singular. 
'The truth of space is  time, so that space becomes time; our transition to time is not 
subjective, space itself makes the transition.' The truth of the 'absolute objectivity' of 
space is time as absolute subjectivity, a subjectivity developed out of objectivity as the 
flowing of the inner negativity of that objectivity. It is ‘intuited mere becoming, pure 
842 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature I §257.
843 Ibid. §260.
844 Ibid. §257.
845 'time itself is this becoming, arising, and passing away, it is the abstraction which has being, the 
Cronos which engenders all and destroys that to which it gives birth'. Ibid. §258.
846 Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969, 187–188.
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being itself as sheer coming out of itself’.847  
Moreover, also in the Logic, Hegel states that space – as externality passing into point, 
line and place – as well as time 'are expansions, pluralities which are a coming-out-of-
self, a flowing which, however, does not pass over into its opposite, into quality or the 
one'.848 In  other  words  space  and  time  are  irreducible  to  the  One, they  are 
uncontainable in any dialectic producing a closed totality. 
Time is the for-itself of the externality of space, as such it is universal flowing-out-of 
itself. But why is there ONE HOMOEGENEOUS TIME rather than many, if there is a 
plurality of points negating space? 
A clue as to why time, from one perspective, is uniform and universal, characterised by 
one vanishing  present drawing up  one continuous-discontinuous  time, lies in the fact 
that Hegel, when introducing the negation of space, speaks only of 'the point' not points. 
Why? Because the negation intrinsic to all points is the negation of the abstractness of 
their spatiality; it is uniform with regards to what is negated; time as the inner negation 
of  space can then be considered as universal.  However,  time and space as  quantity 
overflowing itself are determinations of the manifold, not of abstract indifference, this is 
clear both in the section on quantity in the  Logic  and the talk of juxtaposition in the 
Philosophy of Nature. Only because Hegel starts with the abstract unity of space rather 
than the plurality does he arrive at a universal notion of time. So why does he do that? 
In the Science of Logic Hegel makes it clear that he wishes to derive time and space not 
as 'compositions' of external things (mentioning the example of atomism). Rather he is 
trying to demonstrate  time and space as  substance,  of  immanence.  This rejection of 
composition is not a rejection of composition in the Deleuzian sense, because what he 
rejects is the atomism of simple substances on the one hand, or the substrates of sensual 
impressions, on the other, both of which have no principle of difference in themselves. 
In fact, Hegel refers to Spinoza – not Kant! - in defending the decision to prioritize the 
question of substance: he wishes to construct space and time as concepts of the intellect, 
rather than as figures of the imagination. If one starts with compositions, as does Kant 
(time  and space  synthesizing  the  manifold  of  sensual  impression),  the  unity  of  the 
847 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature I §258. And then, we can posit that if abstract time is the pure 
subjectivity of becoming, standardized time is the abstract objectification of time. This remains 
external, never managing to fully dominate the force of the perpetual becoming of time, the 
ceaseless death and birth of moments.
848 Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969, 189.
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composed can only be formal (the composition of sensual impressions according to the 
a priori categories of relation, founded in the synthetic principles of the understanding 
in  permanence  (substance),  succession  (causality)  and co-existence  (community))849. 
Kant made a similar argument in his  Inaugural Dissertation where he argued that a 
totality cannot be constructed on the basis of induction (drawing on Hume).850 Kant's 
logic here is one of subsumption of the indifferent plurality by the universal cognitive 
apperatues,  whereby  the  particular  is  abstracted  out,  as  what  is  essential  about  the 
indifferent. Hegel, on the other hand, is keen to avoid this transcendentalism, which 
relies on a dualism between form and content, composer and the composed, between the 
conditioned and the conditions. He attempts to propose a universal concept of nature as 
not just external indifference, but self-relating difference (in his critique of Observing 
Reason in the Phenomenology he speaks of the importance of tracing the movement in 
the object itself); but by doing so, to arrive at the universality of self-relating difference 
rather than always different regions of difference (different species), he must abstract 
from what makes exteriorities exterior, and from what makes difference differ, he must 
start with substance. In this Hegel is closer to Spinoza than Kant, starting with a, let us 
say 'univocal substance' which is immediately determined as different. For Hegel this is 
not  the  positivity  of  difference,  but  the  negativity  internal  to  the  substance,  the 
immanent  subjectivity  of  substance.  The truth of  space  is  neither  the  abstraction of 
indifferent  coexistence  or  the  manifold  of  external  differences;  rather  the  negative 
relation, or contradiction between the two proves to be immanent to difference, which is 
thus dynamised as differentiation.851 
If, thus, we take our starting point in the manifold of non-coinciding points – and Hegel 
points  to  the  possibility  of  this  perspective  when  he  speaks  of  time  as  intuited 
becoming852 –  we  have  a  manifold  of  lines,  and  hence,  a  manifold  of  singular 
durations.853 As intensive we are not dealing with time as a 'measure of movement', and 
849 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason.
850 'Inaugural Dissertation', Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, ed. David Walford 
(Cambridge University Press, 1992), 377–383.
851 Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969, 188–189. This substance is not immediate: '....nature begins with 
quantity and not with quality, because its determination is not a primary abstract and immediate state 
like logical Being. Essentially, it is already internally mediated externality and otherness'. Hegel, 
Philosophy of Nature I §254.
852 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature I §258. 
853  It is important to note that with the plurality of points we have not at a diversity of individuals, since 
the points are not posited for-self, but rather a pre-individual field of singularities. It is only possible 
to universalise this field of singularities as ontologically fundamental by passing through the 
abstraction which it negates – difference as substance  is only cognized through the abstract notion 
of substance, the abstraction which produces its 'homogeneity' or 'continuity' – some would say 
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hence not with a spatialisation of time, but with a temporalisation of space as realm of 
exterior differences, or a subversion of space as abstract.854 This subversion is a that of a 
manifold subjectivity acting within and against abstract objectivity of space. However, 
the intensive difference of absolute singular durations is still only determined abstractly; 
while space becomes concrete as place, singular time becomes concrete only as motion, 
the 'passing away and self-regeneration of space in time and time in space'. The unity of 
motion and place, is  matter.  Matter, or more precisely dead or inert matter, is motion 
considered as self-identical, i.e. in abstraction from the negativity of time. It is a motion  
which is always in the same place, the place of itself.  Hegel quotes  Zeno's said: 'the 
arrow is always in the same place'. Matter is eternal-and-stable only as being in non-
relative  motion:  it  is  only  in  chemism matter  in  motion  encounters  itself,  creates 
composites and combinations.
But motion can also be harnessed. Against, and exlaining the ordinary conception of 
clock time, Hegel suggests that  only way to contain the negativity of time is to paralyze 
it: He states that time, as the negativity of space '...cannot be expressed spatially, unless 
‘the understanding has paralysed it and reduced its negativity855 to the unit’. The unit of 
external measure, in mathematics, is at once a domination of time and space: think of 
the controlled movement of the spring or the pendulum, or the circular movements of 
the heavenly bodies. For Hegel there can be no immanent science of time. The control 
of time requires first its spatialisation and later its objectification, in externality, external 
measure. Such objectification, we might extrapolate, can only happen by establishing 
one stable or controlled movement as the equivalent of all times, that is instating it as 
the  representative  of  the  universal:  through  this  technology  measure,  relativity  of 
durations is established: singular durations are reduced to particular instantiations of 
standardized time. 
univocity. 
The point is self-negating, but cannot be divided; this gives it an inner instability or vibration (we 
could speak here of intensity, what Hegel calls degree or intensive quantum), the line is the 
movement or self-overcoming, it is extensive, a differential function. Both are measures of 
themselves. The plane, finally, is the attempt to draw a circle: here we can start to speak of 
individuation, an sublation of degree and extension which proceeds towards (good), i.e. circular 
infinity. See quantum, Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969, 202f.
854 Interesting to creating an encounter with Deleuze on this point. ‘We think lines are the basic 
components of things and events’. Deleuze (1995), “On a Thousand Pleateaus” in Gilles Deleuze, 
Negotiations, 1972-90 (Columbia University Press, 1995), 33.
855 A negativity we must affirm is the universal self-relating difference of space points, the universal 
multiplicity-negativity of times in relation to abstract ideal space.
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We saw before that  when universal time becomes represented,  it  does so through a 
particular motion. The immanent quantity of the movement becomes the measure of 
movement in general. The genus of universal standardized time has itself as one of its 
species. We can say that in relation to this time measure singular durations appear as 
particular durations: the singularity of singular durations is effaced to make it a mere 
particular instantiations of measured 'abstract universal time'. Singular times in their 
difference are indifferent to the abstraction of universal space, and hence subversive of 
it.
1.12. Chemism, organism
In the dissertation  Marx reads Epicurus' notion of the atom according to the logic of 
'mechanism' in Hegel's  Philosophy of Nature [PN],  drawing on the notions of space, 
time, exteriority of forces, real opposition, composition. He also focuses on the question 
of the freedom of self-consciousness, the issue of the freedom of Geist.  These are the 
issues of the first and last parts of Hegel's Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences. 
Given Marx's and his readers would have been navigating (whether critically or not) in 
a Hegelian conceptual space, we can say that Marx's text resonates with the sections of 
the  Philosophy of Nature  that follows mechanism, namely chemism and organism, as 
well as those that follow the consideration of the freedom of Geist, namely the state in 
the  Philosophy  of  Right.  In  short,  the  concepts  and  questions  of  the  actuality  (the 
process of actualisation, as well as the effective rationality) of the organism and the 
state resonate in the theoretical space of the Doctoral Dissertation. In this, further, is the 
question of the state as organism (as Marx would discuss in his  Critique of Hegel's  
Philosophy of Right, and the organism as state (self-organised, integrated body ruled by 
a unitary will).856
However,  rather than raise these questions of the abolition of the exteriority or real 
opposition of forces (mechanism), the combination of elements (chemism857) or of self-
856 This issue is important to Foucault's analysis of why sovereignty persists under the regime of 
biopower, and also to the persistent rejection of organicist metaphors in Deleuze, Foucault, 
Agamben, and Derrida. (is a reference to Malabou's lectures ok?)
857 For instance, when sodium and chlorine (Hegel speaks of acid and alkali) combine they form a new 
compound, sodium chroride, which can only be broken by external intervention of electrolysis. In 
short, the swerve of the component parts is suspended, the process of breaking up the compound 
cannot be a sponteneous, immanent result of the compound itself. Hegel himself was familiar with 
Volta and Berzelius, two pironeers of electrolysis, and severely critisiced Berzelius' electrochemism 
for ignoring the difference between electricity and chemism. Hegel, Philosophy of Nature I, 191ff, 
§330. 
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organised, self-reproducing beings (organism), Marx shifts the discussion of Epicurus' 
limitations  to  a  philosophical  register;  he  follows  Hegel's  philosophical  critique  of 
atomism in the History of Philosophy [HP], and relates it, as demonstrated by McIvor, 
to the discussion of the doctrine of essence in the Logic.858 These priorities carry Marx 
in the direction of a consideration of philosophy and the freedom of self-consciousness, 
and autonomy; this is where he shares the presupposition with Epicurus: both propose a 
freedom strictly opposed to heteronomy.859
In short the dissertation can be read as an under-labour on the relation between two 
modes of philosophy. On the one hand the analytical and critical questions – picking 
apart the actual (state, organism) to understand its structure, parts, and conditions of 
possibility. On the other hand, Marx developed the basic concept of a practical active 
philosophy, of the actuality of philosophy as a 'revolutionary', world and history-making 
practice. Philosophy interpreting the world, philosophy changing it, to invoke a phrase 
made famous many years after Marx jotted it down in the spring of 1845. 
1.13. A note on the social context of atomism
It deserves mention that Epicurus was writing during the period the disintegration of the 
Alexandrian empire, a period of political turmoil and political crisis in Athens, yet a 
period of commercial expansion and unprecedented expropriations of peasants and even 
the landed aristocracy by the new Hellenic monarchs. Like Hobbes' England, this was a 
world in which the constant threat or actuality of civil war made convincing – for the 
protagonists of the struggle at least – a mechanistic philosophy of opposed forces, and 
the  concomitant  strategies.  However,  even  if  Epicurus  can  be  read  in  terms  of  the 
Hobbesian problematic, his answer is different, the formation of elective communities 
rather  than  sovereignty.  In  Epicurus  the  fact  of  separation  does  not  entail  the 
establishment of a sovereign to police the peace; the combinations do not give rise to 
social bodies but to social compacts, it do not necessitate the unification of forces in one 
will or reproductive social organism.
As we will argue in chapter 5 and 6, the modern emergence of atomism in political 
theory must be understood in relation to the separations between people introduced by 
858 Martin McIvor, “The Young Marx and German Idealism: Revisiting the Doctoral Dissertation,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 46, no. 3 (2008): 395–419.
859 On the distinction between freedom and autonomy, see appendix 1.8.
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exchange  and  violence.  Richard  Seaford  has  an  interest  argument  for  the  close 
connection between the abstractions of Pre-Socratic philosophy and the emergence of a 
monetary economy, an argument that is in concert with our overall theorisations of the 
relations between social form and thought, as unfolding in chapters 4-6 particularly.860
1.14 Modes of abstraction - philosophy
So where does this take us with regards to abstraction? We saw that the atom for Marx 
was too abstract, because it did not give access to a principle of idealisation. The idea,  
or principle  of the atom does not give us a notion of the atom as  material substance 
which would allow us to derive the idea from this substance. The atoms – as abstract 
decontextualised singularities – only appear to consciousness through the operation of 
an  abstraction  in  thought;  the  abstract  is  a  product  of  an  external  abstraction.  The 
analytical abstraction of the atom and the subsuming synthetic abstraction of the idea 
are symmetrical, a dualism where the former,  the content, is ruled by the latter,  the 
form: The universality of the conceptual abstraction posits the singularity of the atom. 
Marx's  and Hegel's  critique of Epicurus is that he fails to reverse the movement of 
abstraction, posit the production of the abstract on the side of the content, i.e. produce 
the  idea  as  a  movement  immanent  in  matter  itself.861 Epicurus  presupposition  the 
knowledge of the abstract manifold, shows its condition in the idea, but he does not 
demonstrate the genesis of the idea and hence of knowledge. Marx's problem with this 
is not abstraction as such, or the duality abstract/abstraction, but the one-sidedness of its 
transition between the two, which renders it a dualism, and which – for all its posturing 
around  the  immanence  of  the  atomic  swerve,  leaves  transcendence  in  place:  That 
transcendence is that of the idea, subsuming a content which is essentially either alien to 
it  or  merely  a  metaphysical  postulate.  However,  this  problem  is  not  merely 
philosophical, but practical; it does not concern immanence as idea, but as material 
movement, it concerns the activity, the energy and directionality of thought. When 
it  comes  to  the  activity  of  abstraction  –  the  third  notion  of  abstraction,  that  of 
immanent self-positing singularity – Marx has no problem; he does not criticize this 
860 Richard Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Richard Seaford, “Monetisation and the Genesis of the Western 
Subject,” Historical Materialism 20, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 78–102. See also Sohn-Rethel, 
“Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology.”
861  The underlying demand is given by Hegel: 'Form acts on matter and brings it into existence; but 
what “appears as activity of form,  is also no less a movement belonging to matter itself', the 
negativity and ought (Sollen ) of matter. Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969, 453.
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abstraction, but its lacking reflexivity, a practical energy turning against universality, yet 
not aware of itself as such. This practical energy of singularity is exactly a principle of 
abstraction  from  and  against  subsuming  abstractions,  not  an  alien  idea  or  form 
subsuming  a  content,  but  a  form-giving  fire  (to  play  on  Marx's  later  definition  of 
labour), a force free not just to swerve singularly, but to actualise itself in complex self-
organised formations.  in the idea, but he does not demonstrate the genesis of the idea 
and hence of knowledge. Marx's problem with this is  not  abstraction as such, or the 
duality  abstract/abstraction,  but  the  one-sidedness  of  its  transition  between the  two, 
which renders it a dualism, and which – for all its posturing around the immanence of 
the atomic swerve, leaves transcendence in place: That transcendence is that of the idea, 
subsuming a content which is essentially either alien to it  or merely a metaphysical 
postulate. However, this problem is not merely philosophical, but practical; it does not 
concern immanence as idea, but as material movement, it concerns the activity, the 
energy and directionality of thought. When it comes to the  activity  of abstraction – 
the third notion of abstraction, that of immanent self-positing singularity – Marx has 
no problem; he does not criticize this abstraction, but its lacking reflexivity, a practical 
energy turning against universality, yet not aware of itself as such. This practical energy 
of  singularity  is  exactly  a  principle  of  abstraction  from  and  against  subsuming 
abstractions, not an alien idea or form subsuming a content, but a form-giving fire (to 
play on Marx's later definition of labour), a force free not just to swerve singularly, but 
to actualise itself in complex self-organised formations. 
1.15. Party of the concept and the actualisation of philosophy
Marx mapped out the contemporary carnival of philosophy, characterized by a struggle 
between the   of the concept, and the party of the non-concept (the contemporary the 
party of Epicurus, and the party of Democritus, we gather). The activity of the first side 
is that of critique, the turning to the outside of philosophy we have just seen. The other 
deals in  positive philosophy,  and so turns towards  the inside of philosophy,  merely 
applying, developing and entrenching its categories. 'This second side knows that the 
inadequacy is immanent in philosophy, while the first understands it as inadequacy of 
the world which has to be made philosophical'.862 Both parties inhabit an inverted world, 
but while the one that finds contradictions only in thought is forced to live the inversion 
862 Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 151.
 298
[Verkehrtheit]  as  madness  [Verrücktheit], the  party  of  the  concept  achieves  real 
progress,  because  it  knows  this  madness  to  be  real.  While  philosophy's  notion  of 
freedom provides  a  measure  by  which  the  world  can  be  found  wanting,  it  cannot 
actualise it without transforming itself; that its system is 'lowered to an abstract totality', 
means that philosophy is no longer what it was – and that it only becomes a force of 
change by loosing the system, by becoming worldly, by actualising itself as a part of 
worldly struggles.
The realization of philosophy here is thus far away from the left-Hegelian realisation 
which weighs the world against the absolute system and finds it wanting. Its break with 
the system, however, is not one that rejects  philosophy in the name of a materialist 
position  (whether  sensuous  or  atomistic,  Marx  has  found  materialism  itself  to  be 
metaphysical),  but  of  a  philosophy  which  is  itself  a  material  force  in,  against  and 
beyond the inverted world which, for instance, can host at once the Prussian state and 
its  Left-Hegelian  critics.  That  the  world  is  Verrückt is  if  anything a  given in  these 
writings, it is not taken as an object of analysis. If one does not factor in the young-
Hegelians' acute awareness that such analyses would be targeted by state's censorship 
and repression, their lack of real social critique might make it seem as if they only see 
the  world  as  inverted  because  the  system,  which  they  had  taken  for  the  correct 
description of  the world,  had been proven to be  upside-down.  While  mistaking the 
categories and systems of philosophy – as well as their crises – for the systems of the 
socio-political  and economic world is a constant danger as the young Marx and the 
young-Hegelians,  such a  reading  becomes  too  intellectualist,  by  neglecting  that  the 
writings  of  these  men  were  informed  by  their  lived  experiences  of,  and  struggles 
against,  fear  and  unfreedom.   Marx's  intervention  into  the  young-Hegelian  scene 
positions  itself  against  such positions  based on arguments from  morality,  systematic 
coherence, or a transcendental standpoint. Marx is from now on, as Stathis Kouvelakis 
notes, operating on the plane of immanence, affirming that philosophy cannot be but a 
part of a partisan struggle.863 
This struggle is  philosophical;  Marx pursues the concept and practice of a philosophy 
that  turns  against  a  world  split  into  the  atomism of  private  individuals,  rather  than 
863 Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 239;  It should be noted that Kouvelakis' notion of plane of 
immanence is not exactly Deleuzian, but rather working on the register of what I will speak of as 
'systemic immanence' as opposed to 'ontological immanence'. See Alberto Toscano, “Partisan 
Thought,” Historical Materialism 17 (September 2009): 175–191 for a discussion of the notion of 
partisan science in relation to Lenin, Foucault and Schmitt. See also appendix 0.0.
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towards a politics of composition, a politics of new covenants, or of love. In the terms 
imported above, Marx struggle in and against contradictions is a politics of the real, and 
yet  a  constructive  politics  of  truth,  of  fidelity  to  the  event  of  philosophy as  actual 
freedom.. In terms of anachronistic anticipation of concepts, yet of a time quite close to 
Marx of 1841, we notice an absence of the category of the primacy of political practice, 
or  of  the  forces  and relations  of  production,  or  of  a  notion  of  'the  real  communist  
movement'. 
1.16. From the body politic to the social organism
Given that  sovereignty and the state  had long been thought  in  natural-philosophical 
terms as a body politic (Hobbes), or 'corps organisé' (Rousseau) with a will situated in 
the 'head'  of state,  it  required no great  stretch of the imagination from the political 
economists  of  the  late  eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  century  to  think  the  social 
economy in  organic  terms.  The medical  concept  of  crisis  was taken up in  political 
thought, via the bridge established by the resurgence of the ancient metaphor of the 
body politic  in seventeenth century pre-revolutionary England and eighteenth  century 
pre-revolutionary France and America.864 In order to outline this history we will use two 
articles  from  the  GG,  Koselleck's  article  on  crisis  and  Dorhn-van  Rossum  and 
Böckenförde on Organ, Organismus, Organisation, Politischer Körper.865
When Hobbes introduced his notion of the Leviathan as a body politic,  an artificial 
body, we can see him as reaching back to the ancient notion of the  polis as a body 
(σώμα), which for Plato had been a part of a sequence of metaphorical resemblances 
(polis, psyche, human physiology, and for Aristotle a question of the unity of the many 
conceived in terms of the analogical structure between an animal body and the  polis, 
that  is  unmetaphorically.866 More  immediately,  however,  Hobbes  was  reworking the 
medieval  doctrine  of  the  two bodies  of  Christ.867 But  while  this  doctrine  had been 
primarily interested in resemblances, leading to sometimes mad lists of metaphorical 
replacements underlining the overall order of the universe,868 Hobbes started from the 
864 Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crises: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, 
Reprint (MIT Press, 2000), 167. Koselleck, “Crisis,” 362.
865 Böckenförde and Dorhn-van Rossum, “Organ, Organismus, Organisation, Politischer Körper.” 
866 Ibid., 522–3. 
867 Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1997).
868 Jonathan Gil Harris, Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic: Discourses of Social Pathology in Early  
Modern England (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: 
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premise of civil war and the exteriority of humans from one another, and asked the 
question of the construction of order out of chaos. If the creation of human society in 
Hobbes  is  analogous  to  God's  act  of  creation,  this  is  not  merely  a  question  of  a 
secularisation  of  political  theology,  but  a  proposal  for  a  materialist  theory  of  the 
construction of the social, in which the body politic is imagined as a mechanical body 
following Descartes' theory of animal mechanism, and the act of political constitution as 
the construction of a clockwork. Mirroring the atomistic paradigm of natural science at 
the time, Hobbes imagines individuals and society as composed of a multiplicity of 
originally exterior forces,  whose unity and equality is  established in their  difference 
from the sovereign; their self-identity is guaranteed by their recognition as actors and 
authors  of  their  actions,  conceived  in  terms  of  self-ownership  and  representation:  
actors  are  those  that  can  represent  themselves,  and  others.869 Unlike  the  Christian 
corpus  sociale,  Hobbes  is  not  interested  in  the  unio  spiritus  and  solidarity  of  the 
members,  but  in  their  external  determination,  and  the  necessity  of  submission.870 
Because  the  basis  of  this  theory  is  individuals  standing in  an  alien  relation  to  one 
another,  Hobbes  can  construct  the  fiction  of  a  social  contract  that  establishes 
sovereignty through the decision of free individuals.
While Hobbes does not himself speak of crisis in  Leviathan  the context he writes in, 
marred by the English Civil War in particular, but also of the widespread poverty caused 
by the enclosure-movement,  can clearly be described as  one of crisis,  as it  was  by 
Hobbes'  contemporaries  Rudyerd  and  Baillie,  writing  about  the  struggle  between 
parliament and the crown, and the civil war in 1627 and 1643 respectively.871 Then, in 
the period before the Revolution, crisis became a political catch-word in France. Crisis 
itself  did  not  refer  to  the  later  integrated  self-organised  social  organism,  but  to  the 
mechanical, composite body of the sovereign. The problem of crisis was not yet one of 
reproduction and organisation, but of the stability and need for sovereign rule, fending 
of the chaos of civil war. If among French revolutionaries crisis became the occasion for 
the organisation of a constituent power (pouvoir constituant),  it still relied on Hobbes' 
basic  individualist-mechanistic  presuppositions;  it  stayed  within  the  paradigm  of 
sovereignty, law and contract. In the period from Hobbes to Rousseau it is never the 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2002), 19.
869 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: An Authoritative Text : Backgrounds Interpretations   (W W Norton & 
Company Incorporated, 1997), 89. Macpherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.
870 Böckenförde and Dorhn-van Rossum, “Organ, Organismus, Organisation, Politischer Körper,” 555.
871 Koselleck, “Crisis,” 362.
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body politic that is in crisis, rather the body politic is a solution to a threatening crisis 
(whether  based  in  the  experience  of  the  crisis  of  the  divine  creation,  feudalism or 
absolutism). Sovereignty, whether popular or monarchic, posits an opposition between 
crisis and order.
At the end of the 18th century something interesting happens: within the artificial body 
politic,  the notion of  a  natural  and immanently ordered  social  organism arises.  For 
Cartesians there had been no sharp distinction between mechanic and organic bodies as 
technics  were  seen  as  mimetic  of  nature.  However,  the  continual  extension  of  the 
Cartesian  world-view  pushed  it  up  against  its  own  limitations.  What  had  been  a 
productive model became an obstacle. In the early eighteenth century this paradigm 
began  to  disintegrate,  a  process  signalled  by  Christian  Wolff's  distinction  between 
organic bodies and mechanical bodies. Organism detached itself from mechanism to 
become its opposite, physiology gradually emancipated itself from mechanism through 
the  eighteenth  century,  leading  eventually  to  to  the  establishment  of  the  distinction 
between physics and biology, one a science of exteriority and mechanic causality, the 
other of interiority and self-organisation and self-reproduction.872
The central shift from the composite body of the body politic, to the organised body of 
the  social  organism  happened  in  the  late  eighteenth  century.  Nietzsche  points  our 
attention to the relation between philosophy and revolution:  'Did  Kant not see  in the 
French Revolution the transition from the inorganic form of the state to the organic?'.873 
Where  teleology  had  in  previous  Deist  philosophy  been  an  argument  for  the 
purposefulness and harmony of the world (as Leibniz's God who guarantees that we live 
in the best of all worlds) Kant introduced the possibility of a notion of an immanent or  
intrinsic  teleology,  when  he  theorised  organisms  as  self-organised  beings.874 The 
revolution, as suggested above, is the historical event that makes this re-theorisation 
possible.  In  this  period,  the  organised  by  of  society  appears  in  two  guises,  one 
'economic', the other political. The economic conception of the social body appears first 
of all in the writings of the physician and physiocratic  économiste  François Quesnay 
and in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Where Quesnay's Tableau économique (1758) 
represents the social body not through the image of the body of the sovereign, but as a 
complex flows of produce, income and taxes as a model of the necessary conditions for 
872 Böckenförde and Dorhn-van Rossum, “Organ, Organismus, Organisation, Politischer Körper,” 558–
560.
873 The Anti-Christ in Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols §11.
874 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 201, §63. 
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the reproduction of the whole, Kant defined natural organisms as teleologies with their 
own  immanent  ends,  self-reproducing  and  self-organised  beings.875 This  notion  of 
organism  came  into  wide  usage  in  German.876 Kant  also  refers  to  the  state  as  an 
'organism' and 'organised being' albeit this use is explicitly marked as an analogy. Like 
the natural end of an organism the state-body (Staatskörper),  can be described as a 
whole  in  which  the  parts  are  not  merely  means  but  ends,  playing  a  role  in  the 
achievement of the end of the whole.877 This entails a fundamental renunciation of the 
old imaginary of the body politic in that it is no longer focused on the relation between 
the head and the members (the idea of dominance of the head, i.e. the will/sovereignty), 
but the combination of the parts in the unity of the whole in a way in which their forms 
are  the  mutual  cause  and effect  of  each  other.878 The  political  implications  are  far-
reaching: Kant does not raise the question of the creator/first cause, nor of the forces of 
which  the  organism is  composed.  His  perspective  is  that  of  the  immanence  of  the 
actuality  of  the  organism,  ruling  out  at  once  the  need  for  transcendent  sovereign 
mediation  and  the existence of a potentiality that may fundamentally restructure that 
actuality beyond its given organic development. 
Böckenförde  cogently  points  out  how  Kant's  ideas  of  organism,  his  'politische 
Immanenzvorstellungen',  can  be  read  as  an  example  of  political  theology.  Their 
structure could be traced with Agamben to economic theology – however, it falls far 
short  of anything we can call  political  economy.879 Kant's  focus on immanent  order 
pushes in the direction of a conception of government beyond sovereignty; if the task of 
the sovereign is to guarantee the social order – the existence of the body politic against 
the threat of civil war – the task of government is to facilitate the self-organisation of 
the  social  organism  itself.  Böckenförde  keenly  shows  how  Hegel,  following  Kant, 
describes the state as an organism, while no longer taking this as an analogy, but as a 
precise  structural  model.  However,  Böckenförde  misses  how Hegel's  Philosophy  of  
875 Ibid., §63.
876 Grimm and Grimm, “Organismus.”
877 Kant, Critique of Judgement, §65.
878 Böckenförde and Dorhn-van Rossum, “Organ, Organismus, Organisation, Politischer Körper,” 581.
879 Ibid., 582. Giorgio Agamben demonstrates the theological roots of the modern distinction between 
economy and politics, in the distinction between 'political theology, which founds the transcendence 
of sovereign power on the single God' and 'economic theology, which replaces this transcendence 
with the idea of an oikonomia, conceived as an immanent ordering – domestic and not political in a 
strict sense – of both divine and human life' Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: for a 
theological genealogy of economy and government (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2011), 1.. However, while this helps us understand how certain intellectual structures were 
transmitted into the new discourse of political economy, it does little to help us understand why this 
discourse emerges, namely because new problems imposed themselves on thought.
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Right also draws on another tradition, reaching back to Quesnay. This tradition offers 
something beyond Kant's conception of organic self-ordering, namely an aetiological 
and  diagnostic  gaze  on  the  social  body.  This  in  turn  gives  us  the  elements  for  a  
historicisation of the political theology and politicised medicine of the state and the 
economic theology or economic medicine of political economy not merely as forms of 
thought, but as conceptual tools to tackle real social crises. 
To  open  for  a  historical  and  materialist  reading  of  the  distance  separating  the 
mechanical and an organic conceptualisation of the social body it might be useful to 
point to Foucault's analysis of the shift from sovereignty to biopower.880
880 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76: Lectures 
at the College De France, 1975 76, trans. David Macey (Penguin, 2004); Michel Foucault, The Birth 
of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France, 1978-1979 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). I have 
tried to show the connections between these narratives in Hansen, “Crisis and Organism.”
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chapter 2
2.0. Hegel on the imperfection of the state organism
But since it is easier to find defects than to understand the affirmative, we may 
readily fall into the mistake of looking at isolated aspects of the state and so 
forgetting its inward organic life. The state is no ideal work of art; it stands on 
earth and so in the sphere of caprice, chance, and error, and bad behaviour may 
disfigure  it  in  many  respects.  But  the  ugliest  of  men,  or  a  criminal,  or  an 
invalid, or a cripple, is still always a living man. The affirmative, life, subsists 
despite his defects, and it is this affirmative factor which is our theme here.881
2.1 Into Journalism
Philosophy,  according to the Marx of the  Dissertation  and the note on religion and 
money has as its task to work on and against the common imagination, its fantasies and 
abstractions. This task is at once practical and theoretical, critical and pedagogical, it 
aims at the change of social objectivity by means of a subjective change. The young 
Marx saw himself as an intellectual with the mission of effecting such a change; first as 
an academic and then as a journalist. It was as a journalist Marx first began to intervene 
into public debate, and engage in the criticism of existing actuality, of the Prussian state. 
His interventions as well as his analyses were from the beginning shaped by the vision 
of a humanity capable of free self-actualisation yet caught in a reality which did not yet 
live up to this ideal. 
While Marx had the ambition of becoming a university teacher, and planned several 
work on aesthetics, he never got far as a  state licensed educator.882 After finishing his 
881 Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 258, addition.
882 Prawer, Karl Marx and World Literature, 32.
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dissertation in April  1841 he returned to Bonn to seek an academic chair  under his 
friend Bruno Bauer, and waited with some patience as the promises faded. When Bauer 
was dismissed on political grounds in early 1842 Marx had to seek another living. He 
found a job first as a writer and then editor for the  Rheinische Zeitung  in Cologne.883 
Marx's  entry  into  journalism was not  just,  or  did  not  remain,  a  externally  imposed 
condition of making a living; he carried it out as a Promethean project to actualise the 
potential  of freedom. The most obvious example of the grandeur and civilising role 
ascribed  by  Marx  and  his  colleagues  to  the  task  of  the  press  lend  us  the  striking 
illustration which occurred in the Zeitung in 1843, after Marx was suspended from his 
position after pressure from the Russian Tsar via the Prussian magistrate. This cartoon 
depicts Marx as Prometheus, chained to his printing press, his liver picked by the eagle 
of the Prussian censorship, at the industrialised banks of the river Rhine, with young 
damsels  lying  about,  the  free  birds  of  nature  flying  in  formation  above.884 The 
philosopher-critic is so autonomous that the theologically hovering authorities can only 
curb his power with chains and censorship. His freedom of intellect is bound to his 
means of intellectual production and circulation: the printing press. A heroic man, at 
once mythical, historical and modern. Confident in humanity, philosophy, and having 
learned the main lesson of Epicurus – have no fear of Gods or Worldly powers – he 
started his work in journalism communicating the principles of philosophy to German 
humanity, and for the first time found himself engaged in public political controversy. 
As a journalist Marx covered the social tensions and occasional busts of mass politics 
and repression characteristic of what came to be known as the Vormärz period. For this 
reason he came under the scrutiny of the Prussian censorship of the 'Christian' Prussian 
monarchy of Friedrich Wilhelm.885 
2.2. Truth, expression and composition
However, it is important to note that while it might appear to philosophical readers that 
Marx brings philosophical concepts to public polemics from the outside, such ideas as 
'the  freedom  of  man',  the  historico-political  trope  of  the  'stunted  development'  of 
political freedom in the German states, etc., had currency with a audience extending far 
883 Its full name gives a hint as to the liberal-bourgeois composition of its audience: Rheinische Zeitung 
Für Politik, Handel und Gewerbe (Rhine Newspaper of Politics, Trade, and Crafts). 
884 Note how the illustration positions the real of industry on the ground, and while the state hovers in 
the clouds, profaned by its representation by a meagre weasel, the puppet-master of the eagle.
885 Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 246–49.
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beyond specialised philosophical circles. For instance, listen to the 'ill-humoured but 
excellent speech' by a member the peasant estate in the Rhineland Assembly, as reported 
by Marx:
The human spirit must develop freely in accordance with its inherent laws and 
be  allowed  to  communicate  its  achievements,  otherwise  a  clear,  vitalising 
stream will become a pestiferous swamp. If any nation is suitable for freedom 
of the press it is surely the calm, good-natured German nation, which stands 
more  in  need  of  being  roused  from  its  torpor  than  of  the  strait  jacket  of 
censorship.886
This reminds us, conversely, that we must read even Marx's strictly philosophical works 
(which, apart from the Dissertation, all took the shape of notebook) not as ivory-tower 
exercises,  but  as  elaborations,  critiques  and  radicalisations  of  themes  and  political 
concepts  circulating  in  the  broader  liberal  circles  in  the  Rhineland  and  beyond.  If 
philosophical concepts sometimes becomes an aim in itself for philosophers, most of 
their power comes from the ways in which they raise the questions of the day in their 
most  general  or universal  form, whether they attempt to pose common problems or 
invent in the face of them, or to express universal truths. Regarding the latter, Marx 
wrote, echoing Feuerbach's question, ‘[i]s it man that possesses love, or... is it love that 
possesses man?’:887
Truth (...) is common to all – it does not belong to me, it belongs to everybody, 
it possesses me, I do not possess it. What is my property is a form, my mental  
and spiritual individuality.  Le style c'est l'homme.888 Indeed! The law permits 
me to write, but I am to write a style that is not mine! I may show the profile of 
my mind, but I must first imprint on it the prescribed expression!889
If truth, like Hegel wrote, is 'the whole', or as Marx writes 'belongs to everybody', Marx 
makes a crucial addendum: this whole can only be expressed in a living, form-giving 
manner. So, truth is not the Absolute of the system or the state, but a shared force which 
pulls us along, and which can only be expressed singularly. A person's expression of this 
truth is not something given and invariable; all 'objects of a writer's activity' cannot be 
886 Marx, “Freedom of the Press,” 180.
887 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 4.
888 The most famous sentence from Georges-Louis Leclerc, the later Comte de Buffon's 1753 Discours  
sur le style. 
889 Marx, “Freedom of the Press,” 112; Prawer, Karl Marx and World Literature, 34.
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usefully subsumed under some general idea of 'truth'.890 In other words, truth can only 
be practiced, it cannot be proven abstractly, accessed through mythical inspiration, or 
imposed by decree. 
Truth includes not only the result but also the path to it. The investigation of 
truth must itself  be true; true investigation is  developed truth,  the dispersed 
elements  of  which  are  brought  together  in  the  result.  And  should  not  the 
manner of investigation alter according to the object? ... You [the proponents of 
censorship]  conceive  truth  abstractly  and  turn  the  spirit  into  an  examining 
magistrate, who draws up a dry protocol of it.891
Unlike conceptual subsumption892, defined as the violence of imposing an alien form on 
the matter and the mind, or standardizing this relation between the two through a fixed 
procedures  and  style  of  writing,  the  production  of  truth  involves  a  method  of 
composition and organisation of what is dispersed according to its own characteristics. 
The form arising from matter is  not a product of the one-sided work of the writer-
investigator,  but emerges in the conjuncture between the writer  and his matter.  This 
might be critical  and analytic  or poetic  and constructive.  Because writing works on 
common  problems  and  matters,  the  truths  that  are  produced  belong  to  everyone. 
Censorship, we understand, is not just a block on the individual writer's 'freedom of 
expression',  but  an  attempt  to  repress  the  formulation  of  common  problems  and 
common creations.
2.3. The Feuerbachian problematic, and the affirmation of the 
species
Historically  philosophers have deemed that  God is  what is  most  actual,  or the only 
concept  of  true actuality,  the only true final  end. And with God Marx had to  start, 
writing in a Germany that, in Althusser's description was then 
without any possible comparison the world that was worst crushed beneath its  
ideology ... that is, the world farthest away from the actual realities of history, 
the most mystified, the most alienated world that then existed  in a Europe of 
ideologies.893
890 Marx, “Freedom of the Press,” 113.
891 Ibid.
892 See chapter 1.
893 Althusser, For Marx, 74. For a recent analysis of the role of the critique of religion in the young 
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But  was Marx's  initial  attack  on what  he later  called  ideology itself  ideological,  as 
Althusser  suggests? Or rather,  what  can of  answers  does such a  way of posing the 
question propose, and which does it exclude? 
When  Marx  attacked  religion  and  claimed  the  sovereignty  of  philosophy  in  the 
foreword  to  his  dissertation,  he  was  at  the  same  time  affirming  the  movement  of 
counter-actualisation  driven  by  philosophy  and  human  self-consciousness.  Against 
religion,  which  he  claims  suffocates  human  freedom,  Marx  introduces  human self-
consciousness –  and later  the Feuerbachian notion of 'species-essence'  – as  the true 
originator  of  God,  which can  potentially  be freed  of  the image of  God.  Althusser's 
critique of the young Marx through the application of the 'Marxist  science'  is  well-
known: Althusser judges the early Marx by a standard Marx himself later established, 
that of the science of historical materialism. Althusser justifies this not as a reading in 
the future anterior, which would see the in the young Marx the seeds of the old Marx 
which grow forth in a  logic  of  supersession or organic development,  but  through a 
Bachelardian notion of science established in an 'epistemological break' with ideology, 
specifically the 'ideological philosophy' of Marx's earlier formation.894 According to the 
Frenchman,  the  young  Marx,  as  his  mentor  Feuerbach,  were  still  haunted  by  the 
Hegelian problematic, most insidiously when they reversed it.895 
Marx's dissertation was finished in March 1841, at which point he could not yet have 
read Feuerbach's famous The Essence of Christianity, published later in 1841. However, 
minor texts by Feuerbach were circulating at the time and, more importantly, so was – 
in the coffee shops frequented by Marx - his ideas and body. The book had an immense 
influence on Marx in the period after he finished his studies. 
The Essence of Christianity is a stern rejection of the hypostasisation of the concept of 
God. Man, for Feuerbach, is alienated in the figure of God. Thus, when it comes to the 
critique of religion, the proper object of study is humankind itself; not in relation to 
God, but in its species-essence  (Gattungswesen). Feuerbach defines this species-being 
in two ways: in its  differentia specifica, its difference from other species, on the one 
hand,  and as  causa  sui,  as  a  cause  of  itself,  on  the  other.  For  Feuerbach,  what 
Marx, and of Marx's critique of the enlightenment critique of religion, see Alberto Toscano, “Beyond 
Abstraction: Marx and the Critique of the Critique of Religion,” Historical Materialism 18, no. 1 
(2010): 3–29.
894 Gregory Elliott, Althusser - The Detour of Theory (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2009), 75–82. Louis 
Althusser, On Ideology (London: Verso, 2008) with Louis Althusser, Reading Capital (London: 
NLB, 1970), 52.
895 Althusser, For Marx, 73.
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distinguishes humans from ‘the brutes’ (literally the animals,  die Tiere) is the human 
ability to think itself as a species (Gattung), to be conscious of its own essence, to think 
itself simultaneously as identical with others humans and different from other things 
and  species.896 Hence,  the  differentia  specifica of  man  is  its species-consciousness 
(Gattungsbewußtsein),  differentiating  him  from  the  ‘brutes’,  who  have  no  such 
consciousness.897 Here the act of pointing out the  differentia specifica,  what we could 
call the thought-synthesis of humankind’s species-being (Gattungswesen), is in itself an 
enactment of this species-being: humankind's species-consciousness is not just a relative 
differentia, but a self-differentiation, what makes humankind  causa-sui. In this sense 
Gattungswesen is more properly translated referring to its other English cognate, genus, 
as  generic essence. Reflecting on itself humankind finds not  one  being, but its own 
infinite abundance of predicates and individuals (individuen). 'Each new man [Mensch] 
is a new predicate, a new phasis of humanity. As many as there are men, so many are 
the powers, the properties of humanity'.898 Humankind, in its species-being, consists like 
any animal species-being, of individuals relating not individually to their species, but 
always to the species directly through other members of it. In both cases species-being 
is not a generality which predicates or inhabits  its members, but a generic capacity, 
which  is  at  any  point  defined  and  redefined  by  its  members;  these  are  not  mere 
particulars, but singularities.899 The species-essence is the specifically human capacity to 
speak, and be conscious of this infinitude. While the individual animal's (or 'brutes') 
species-being is exterior,  the capacity to reflect and communicate the infinity of the 
species means that the individual can be a part of the species all on his own; the species-
being is internalised, the infinity is no longer merely the extensive infinity of predicates 
and members, but the intensive infinity of consciousness:  'The consciousness of the 
infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of the consciousness'.900 
896 Whereas Eliot translates the German ‘Mensch’ as ‘man’, and uses the pronoun ‘he’, it is possible to 
opt for a more gender-neutral translation, considering Feuerbach’s insistence to think ‘der Mensch’ 
as the unity of man and woman. Nina Power goes as far as calling Feuerbach a feminist. Eliot often 
translates the German Wesen as Nature, whereas – taking into account the general philosophical 
meaning in German, and the Hegelian resonance of the concept in particular – it would more precise 
to translate it essence. 
897 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 1.
898 Ibid., 23.
899 Ibid., 2. Feuerbach is clear that animals can exercise their species functions (Gattungsfunktion) 
through encounters with other members of their species; in this case the species as actual is 
something more like a population. Marx will later call this reproductive function (which is not 
merely sexual) in human bodies, for species-being (Gattungsdasein). Thus, given the alternative 
translation of Gattung as genus, we can also speak of a generic capacity for reproduction, which, 
given the multitude of different individuals, is a capacity generic of singularities. Ibid., 23.
900 Ibid.
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Mankind's  communal  species-being  is,  however,  alienated  in  the  idea  of  God901; 
humankind’s immanent unity in difference is projected onto a transcendent principle of 
unity:
Man [Der Mensch] – this is the mystery of religion – projects his being into 
objectivity  [vergegenständlicht]  and  then  again  makes  himself  an  object 
[Gegenstand] to this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject; 
he thinks of himself as an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of 
another being than himself.902
It  is  important  to  note  that  this  is  not  just  an  issue  the  symbolic  representation 
(Vorstellung) of man in the image of God, itself an inversion of man's self-image. In 
addition this is an inscription or submission of ends, the intrinsic teleology of mankind 
(as causa-sui) transformed into an extrinsic teleology of God: 'Humankind only makes 
itself its own end in and through God'.903
In Christianity the concept of God serves as a transcendent principle of the symbolic 
and teleological unity of humankind, and of humans and nature. However, Feuerbach 
argues, since God is the principle of the unity of the world, i.e. the transcendental unity 
or  universal  tertium  comparationis  of  differences,  he  can  only  be  a  principle  of 
sameness, not of difference. I.e. difference and plurality are only given with the world  
itself  – and subsumed, reduced into abstracted sameness, under the idea of God. God 
becomes  the  negation  of  difference,  the  alienation  of  difference  from  itself.  ‘Real 
difference can be derived only from a being which has a principle  of  difference in 
itself’, something which God does not possess qua principle of unity and identity.904 
Thus the world, and whatever we can correctly describe as species, has its basis in itself. 
The God-function is strictly superfluous since everything the concept can ground, can 
be grounded with the concept of the world as a phenomenal reality. All species have a 
differentia specifica,  which is the ‘peculiar character, that by which a given being is 
what it is, is always in the ordinary sense inexplicable, undeducible, is through itself, 
has  its  cause  in  itself’.905 Each  species  is  thus  a  'causa  sui';  it  is  not  defined 
901 ‘God is the highest subjectivity of humankind abstracted from itself’. Ibid., 31.
902 Ibid., 29–30.
903 Ibid., 30. Translation heavily modifed; the original reads: 'So bezweckt der Mensch nur sich selbst in 
und durch Gott'.
904 Ibid., 85.
905 Ibid., 84. My emphasis. Marx later took this as the starting point of political criticism: ‘The criticism 
of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man, hence with the categorical 
imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved forsaken, despicable 
being’. Marx 1844, Preface, 
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taxonomically  in  its  difference  from other  species,  its  difference to  other  species  is 
defined by its  self-causation,  its  intrinsic teleology (to use Kant's  term906)  as a self-
organised, self-reproducing being.907 Rather than worship the external unity of God, we 
‘must celebrate our distinction, or specific difference’.908 The human species-essence is 
not  something  that  inhabits  every  individual  as  a  natural  essence,  as  Marx charges 
against Feuerbach in his thesis IV written in 1845909, but the awareness of the species 
developed as a product of 'mutuality',  'conversation',  'listening',  as Feuerbach writes, 
'they are products of culture, products of human society'.910 Knowledge, for Feuerbach, 
is a product or rather moment or aspect of a continuous social activity. The species-
essence  is  the  product  of  social  interaction  and cultural  development;911 it  proceeds 
through the  separation of  writing  from speech and the  development  of  a  'power of 
abstraction',  according to  which  the  species-essence  can  finally  be  cognised,  not  as 
something  that  was  already  there,  but  something  that  is  actual,  because  it  is 
developing.912 Feuerbach is here relying on the distinction between species-being and 
species-essence: the being is a mere natural being, the essence is a potentiality that can 
only be cognized once it has been actualised, retrospectively. It is only real, wirklich, in 
the process of actualising itself.  The animal has itself  – its  own reproduction as an 
intrinsic end  –  while  humanity  can  make  itself  its  own  final  end,  by  consciously 
affirming itself as such; humanity's teleological self-relationship can be one of infinite 
self-differentiation  rather  than  mere  reproduction.  The  distinction  of  humans  from 
animals on the level of essence does not run between biological species, but within the 
human species, just as Marx could later, given Aristotle's definition of the human as a 
906 Kant, Critique of Judgement.
907 Feuerbach is here in agreement with Hegel's critique of Observing Reason, which merely describe 
species from without, failing to reach their own inner movement. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 
147–49. See also the discussion of the reproduction of the organism, pp.160-164.
908 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 276. In the context Feuerbach stresses the distinction of 
humankind from nature. Note, however, the insistence that all species are causa sui – differentiating 
themselves from the ground of nature, or God. There's a great levelling implicit in this statement, 
which Marx expressed thus, in an attack on Hegel's: 'In a certain sense, every necessary being is 
“purely self-originating”; in this respect the monarch's louse is as good as the monarch'.Marx, 
“Critique of Hegel,” 85.
909 And Althusser repeats in 1964. Althusser, For Marx, 228.
910 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 83.
911 Feuerbach here writes in the slipstream of Hegel's theorisation of the human as second nature.  
Cathrine Malabou's gloss on Hegel's anthropology is here useful:  ‘the transition from nature to spirit 
occurs not as a sublation [or mediation], but as a reduplication, a process through which spirit 
constitutes itself in and as a second nature. This reflexive reduplication is in a certain sense the 
‘mirror stage’ of spirit, in which the first form of its identity is constituted. Man appears as the 
inverted lining of the animal and not as its opposite. The concept of ‘second nature’, synonymous 
with habit, allows us to bring to light the great originality of the Anthropology.’ Malabou, The 
Future of Hegel, 26.
912 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 83.
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political animal, describe the Germans as animals, referring to the unpolitical 'actuality' 
of the German states.913 George Eliot renders this nicely when she translates  Tiere as 
'brutes'.  The  human  being  is  a  generic  animal,  only  the  human  essence  is  human,  
capable of generic universality. In religious communities – as subjects of God – human 
animals are capable of abstraction and of cognising the infinite, yet do not see that this 
shared  abstraction  is  in  fact  their  common  capacity,  their  common  potentiality  for 
producing a  common knowledge of themselves  as community without  the alienated 
mediation of God.914 The cognition of the infinite potentiality of the human species – as 
a universal characteristic unevenly actualised – this thus based on the prior universal 
abstraction/projection in God, as what Marx called an  actual representation-fantasy-
abstraction.915 Philosophy, as the cognizance of the species, is itself a moment of the 
actualisation  of  the  species.  As  an  activity  of  abstraction,  rupturing  the  form  of 
representation, and as the affirmation of potentiality; the unity of the species is purely 
the  knowledge  of  the  infinity  of  the  species;  the  notion  of  species-essence  is  a 
knowledge of the 'human' potentiality for infinity. All species differentiate themselves; 
only the human produces a knowledge of differentiation, which makes possible a cosmic 
affirmation: ‘we can affirm nothing without affirming ourselves’.916 It is a teleological 
philosophy,  but  politically  so:  the  telos  is  mankind  in  its  infinity  and  unity,  its 
universality  and  manifold  singularity.  Species-essence  is  a  rallying  cry  against  all 
religious institutions, a program to  make visible  the common and singular powers of 
self-actualisation of human beings in the present. This is what is missing in Althusser's 
otherwise  important  critique  –  important  for  posing  the  problem  of  problems,  his 
theorisation of intellectual problematics and solutions as different attempts to deal with 
913 We will encounter this description, taken from a letter to Arnold Ruge, later in this chapter.
914 The human species is infinite in that there is no limit to 1. its accomplishments, 2. the number of 
members, and range of abilities, 3. its species-powers, which transcends limitations of individuals. 
Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 7.
915 Here the discussion opens, if non-Christian or non-monotheistic peoples are capable of cognizing the 
species, a discussion replayed in the discussion whether pre-capitalist people need to pass through 
the stage of capitalism to arrive at communism. The old Marx answered 'no' in the case of Russia. 
The Russians in his analysis could go directly to communism bypassing capitalist development, 
because it could learn from capitalism elsewhere. Thus he still implicitly considered capitalism a 
necessity for global communism ('species'). And indeed there is no one world without the violent 
integration brought about by capitalist colonialism, imperialism and the world market. See the letter 
to Karl Marx, “Letter To Vera Zasulich,” in MECW, Volume 24 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1989), 346.
916 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 6. In this sense, to open for a thought rather than make a 
point, Feuerbach's becoming-human coincides curiously with Deleuze & Guattari's becoming-
animal: ‘A becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short, a 
multiplicity.’ ‘demonic animals, pack or affect animals that form a multiplicity, a becoming, a 
population, a tale’. Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: 
Athlone Press, 1988), 240.
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problems imposed on theory by the times. What is missing, despite this, is a sensitivity 
to the temporal-affirmatory character of the fiery politics of Feuerbach's 'solution', the 
fact  that  it  is  a  'philosophy of  the  future',  to  invoke a  later  title  of  his.  The modal 
categories of possibility and actuality are not substantial, but temporal, in Feuerbach. 
This of course reintroduces the problem of actualisation of an essence on the level of a 
progressivist philosophy of history. 
2.4. The 1840s did criticise humanism
Despite the caveats above, this does not mean that our reading of Marx can simply 
dismiss Marx's early humanism with reference to the classical 20th century critique, as 
is now habitual within certain sectors of academia (a critique which certainly still has its 
important  points  to  make,  as  has  been  amply  demonstrated  by  feminists  and  post-
colonial activists and thinkers). To avoid anachronism – something that is of course not 
a priority when early Marxian humanism is taken up as if it should orientate struggles 
today – it is most useful to look to the critique of humanism emerging as Marx, Engels 
and Stirner exited the Young-Hegelian scene. The basic tenets of this critique is that 
humanism is still structured like religion, and insufficiently capable of historicizing the 
notion  of  mankind  itself  (Marx  and  Engels)  or  of  grasping  the  singularity  of  the 
individual human being, which is neither God nor Human but this ego (Stirner).
2.5. Marx's critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state
Kouvelakis  shows  how  the  very  organicity  of  the  state  for  Marx  is  an  'incessant 
production  of  new  life,  a  movement  that  unifies  social  life  by  acknowledging  the 
constitutive role of its internal differentiation' rather than a formal universal and abstract 
principle enveloping the particular contents.917 This pushes Marx beyond Kant's formal 
liberalism, with Hegel. The problem of freedom of the press is not just one of formal 
rights and their limits, but one of  Sittlichkeit,  the objective morality, the  actuality of 
moral reason in the social body, the rational overcoming of the contradiction between 
autonomy and heteronomy. 
We will  see that  Marx compared the  social  organism with the  truth of  the  species, 
thought initially  along the lines of the Aristotelian notion of the zoon politikon rather 
917 Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 265.
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than the Feuerbachian Species-being. In Marx's use of this notion, political man not as 
subjected to a state or member of a democratic  polis, but as a  potential inherent in a 
situation of subjection, realised in democracy. Marx's critical point was that freedom 
only  appeared  in  perverted  form,  as  state,  as  a  social  yet  apolitical  organism.  The 
dissertation  had  argued  for  the  practical  strength  of  Epicurus'  notion  of  essential 
freedom,  as  an  ethics  of  freedom  capable  of  actualising  itself  in  elective  political 
communities, a covenant. 
In the spring and summer of 1843, after  his forced resignation from the  Rheinische 
Zeitung, Marx wrote a long critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state.918 This commentary 
is helpful in giving some background for the correspondence with Arnold Ruge, which 
was going on in the same period. We have already seen Marx contrast the potential 
freedom and generic capacity of mankind, an ideal at once real and unactualised, with 
the real unfreedom blocking its  realisation.  And from the beginning of the  Critique 
Marx engages in a close immanent critique of the question of concrete freedom and the 
social organism in Hegel's  Philosophy of Right  (PR).  Where Hegel in the  Logic  had 
defined actuality – the realisation of an idea, of reason, as the unity of inner and outer,  
of  essence and appearance,  in  the  PR,  the  work that  celebrates  the  actuality  of  the 
(Prussian) state, he defined the state in the following way:
In contrast with the spheres of private rights and private welfare (the family 
and civil society), the state is  on the one hand an external necessity and their 
higher authority; its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate 
to it and dependent on it. On the other hand, however, it is the end immanent  
within them...919
Marx was quick to point out that the idea of 'external necessity' of the authority of the 
state, is nothing but a defence – against Hegel's own notion of actuality and necessity – 
of the subordination and dependence of family and civil society in relation to the state. 
As external, this subordination and dependence does not describe the actualisation of 
the  immanent  ends  and tendencies  of  society,  but  the  dominance  of  the  state  over 
society.  In fact Hegel does not theorise the potentials in the 'immanence' of the family 
and civil society, but merely posits it as the sphere of contingency of the everyday, in 
which the individual 'is visibly mediated by circumstances, his caprice and his personal 
918 He focussed on paragraphs 261-313 of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.
919 §261 in Hegel, Philosophy of Right; quoted in Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 58.
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choice of his station in life'.920 Thus, in Marx's reading of Hegel, the family and civil 
society appear 'as the dark ground of nature from which the light of the state is born'; 
they are a mere material  for the state,  the passive content subsumed under the state 
form.921 For Marx the real, i.e. the actualising relationship is the opposite: 'The family 
and civil  society  are  the  preconditions  of  the  state;  they  are  its  true  agents;  but  in 
speculative philosophy it is the reverse'; here they are 'not regarded as true, necessary 
and self-justified'.922 But when Hegel fails to show how state grows out of the needs of 
families and civil society, his description is both 'false', undialectical in so far as it does 
not trace the movement from content to form, and 'correct' in so far as it describes the 
Prussian state, its lack of true actuality. The problem is not straightforwardly that Hegel 
does not comprehend the 'real relations', as in Althusser's notion of ideology, but that his 
mode of argument takes the form of 'Vorstellung', which sees contingency instead of 
potentiality; in short it precludes the perspective of affirmation.
Marx's early inversion of Hegel thus takes the perspective of the rationality and freedom 
of  the species:  the real  everyday material  relations  and exchanges of bodies,  in  the 
spheres of reproduction (the family) and production and social exchange (civil society). 
The problem, for Marx, is that Hegel takes these spheres as mere phenomena, realising 
the idea of the state, whereas the state for him has no other content than this. The empty 
idea is taken as subject, rather than as predicate. Thus Marx could critically agreed with 
Hegel that: 'the state is an organism, and... its various powers are no longer to be seen as 
[inorganic/mechanical] but as the product of living rational divisions and functions'.923 
But against Hegel, who in Marx's reading started from the actuality of the state – what 
is rational is actual and vice versa – Marx insisted on the priority of what we here call  
potentiality: Hegel's actuality was in fact a false actuality, an abstract imposition of an 
idea on material external to it, instead of the derivation of the idea from this material. 
Or, in another variation: Hegel does not develop the thought from the object, but the 
object  from  the  system;  the  object  thus  remains  abstract,  a  mystification.924 '[T]he 
various powers are not determined by “their  own nature” but by something alien to 
them'.925 Or,  '[t]he  soul  of  an  object,  in  this  case  of  the  state,  is  established  and 
920 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §262; quoted in Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 61.
921 Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 61.
922 Ibid., 62.
923 Ibid., 66.
924 Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 69–70.
925 Ibid., 70.
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predestined prior to its body which is really just an illusion'.926 Where Hegel says that 
the organism of  the state  is  the subject,  'the differentiation of the Idea into various 
elements  and  their  objective  reality',  Marx  reverses  subject  and  predicate:  the 
differentiation of state or constitution is organic; rather than the noun organism, Marx 
proposes the adjective organic, which comes to work as a concept of the organisation of 
society. The concept of  an organism or a body, does not answer the question of the 
specificity of that body or organism: the noun organism itself does not tell us if it is an 
animal or political organism.927 This specificity is not one of a conceptual distinction, 
but  a  differentia  specifica,  or  Gattungswesen, i.e.  a  generic difference.  If  the  state-
organism is the level of the totality, its component parts are nothing but a determination 
of a passive content, of diversity, or the many subsumed under this one. Against this 
Marx states that the 'real differences or the various aspects of the political constitution  
are  the  presupposition,  the  subject.  (...)  the  Idea  must  be  developed  from the  real 
differences'.928 Thus Marx criticises Hegel for presupposing the universal and deriving 
the particular from it. Instead of developing the state from the immanent contradictions 
of civil society itself Hegel starts with the Idea of the State (of the whole, the One), and 
then goes on to examine its internal differences, or parts. He starts with the state and 
then goes on to the family and civil society. As we see in appendix 2.10., Marx's line of 
argument  here  follows  Hegel's  own  critique  of  'Observing  Reason'  in  the 
Phenomenology of  Spirit.929 The  basic  point  of  this  critique  is  that  if  one  does  not 
understand specific essence, one cannot comprehend actualisation, but only approach it 
through  'mere  names',  through re-presentation.  So  what  is  the  effective,  actualising 
subject of the state, what is the power that constitutes this state? Marx's answer is the 
not individuals, but the people, demos, not as an agglomeration of individuals, but as a  
collective  life.930 For  Hegel  the  people  is  only  sovereign  as  state,  through  its 
representation in the particular body of the sovereign, the monarch. For Marx, on the 
contrary,  the monarch can only be 'representative and symbol of sovereignty of the 
people. The sovereignty of the people is not based on him, but he on it'. Marx continues: 
'The state is an abstraction. Only the people is a concrete reality'; thus Marx can speak 
of the monarchical constitution as a 'form' which 'subsumes' what really has produced it, 
926 Ibid.
927 Ibid., 67.
928 Ibid., 66.
929 Phenomenology of Spirit, 146–148.
930 Chitty, “The State in Marx.”
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namely the people.931 Hegel dismisses democracy as an aberration from the Idea of the 
state, in so far as it fails to provide a concept of the unity of the state or, if you will, the 
monarchical principle of sovereignty (of course this idea of a 'final' arbitrator, i.e. an 
'arbitrary' will, is the reason liberal democracies still have 'heads of state'). Instead of 
positing the subjects of the state as those who produce the state, Hegel suggests that the 
state  produces  its  subjects.  We  are  here  reminded  of  Althusser's  'ideology  hails  or 
interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects', and 'there can only be such a 
multitude of possible ... subjects on the … condition that there is a Unique, Absolute, 
Other Subject', i.e. the king in this case.932 Marx, on the other hand, insists on seeing the 
'Subject'  as  a  result  of democracy,  despite the obvious fact that Prussia is lacking a 
democratic constitution! He can do this because his measure is not the 'real relations', 
but the potentiality inherent in actuality. Against the surprising alliance of Althusser and 
Hegel Marx claims democracy as the truth of monarchy, as democracy in contradiction 
with itself. Why? Because democracy gives a principle of constitution (it is 'the generic 
constitution [Verfassungsgattung]'), whereas monarchy is merely the result, constituted, 
which negates its  process of  constitution:  power can only be centralised in the one 
through the activity of the many. In monarchy the sovereignty of the people – the whole 
– is represented and determined by one part, the monarch, whereas in democracy form 
and content are one. Democracy generic not just in the sense taxonomical sense that it is 
the  genus  of  all  species  of  constitution,  but  more  fundamentally  because  it  is  the 
generative force of all existing constitutions.933 Monarchy can only 'produce' monarchy, 
while the activity of the people can produce democracy as well as tyranny. Democracy 
is  not  some primordial  source  of  political  systems,  but  the  principle  of  the  people 
considered not as one but as many – or rather multitude – in its immanence, i.e. without  
its representation. Democracy is the 'virtual multitude' which is effective in any actual 
particular  constitution,  democratic  or  not.  Democracy is  a  site  a  popular  genericity 
which  can  be  realised  differently,  and  a  political  constitution  of  its  own,  where  it 
becomes its own common 'subjective' principle:
In democracy, man does not exist for the sake of the law, but the law exists for 
the sake of man, it is human existence, whereas in other political systems man 
is  a  legal  existence.  This  is  the  fundamental  distinguishing  feature 
931 Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 85.
932 Althusser, On Ideology, 47 and 52.
933 Kouvelakis argues convincingly against the idea that Marx's notion of democracy is adopted from 
Spinoza. Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution, 304f.
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[Grunddifferenz] of democracy. Every other political formation is a definite, 
determinate, particular form of the state. In democracy the formal principle is 
identical with the substantive [materielle] principle.934
This gives us a sense of what Marx meant by the actualisation of the species essence 
(Gattungswesen)  in  this  period,  namely  the  actualisation  of  democracy  as  the 
actualisation of freedom in society,  the process  by which the contradiction between 
autonomy and heteronomy is overcome. We can call this the problem of freedom, a 
problem which takes the political form of the contradiction between bourgeois private 
freedom and the unfreedom of the state. Kant proposed the practical postulate of God as 
an answer to practical reason's need of a subjective principle, and progress as an answer 
to the need for historical orientation – within an objective situation which is complex 
and  which  does  not  offer  clear  criteria  of  action  itself.  Feuerbach's  anthropological 
gesture was to suggest if religion is an answer to human need (for creation, eternity, 
perfection), then it must be possible to think of another satisfaction of this need, one 
that looks to the generic power of humankind itself, rather than to God. The answer to 
the problem of orientation was not to suggest that there is no problem, but to suggest a 
generative way to deal with it, that does not entail positing a transcendent force over 
and  beyond  humankind.  Likewise  we  can  see  Marx's  notion  of  democracy  as  an 
orientating principle of a generative potentiality in relation to a contemporary problem. 
However, Marx is at this point still a Kantian, in the sense that history is on the side of 
actualisation,  that  if  the species  is  given room to develop itself  and not  stunted by 
regressive  governments,  it  will  tend  to  develop  its  potentials  over  time.  Marx's 
journalistic practice was developed to help along this process, devised under the closely 
connected figures of the social organism and historical development. 
934 Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 88.
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2.6. Spießbürger
In medieval times Spießbürger referred to a citizen who defended his town armed with a 
spike. As bourgeois society began to dominate and replace feudal relations, Spießbürger 
and  the  adjective  spießbürgerlich  came  to  refer  to  the  narrowminded  smug  and 
hypocritical subjectivity produced by membership of the middle-class;  a subjectivity 
which is always per definition apolitical, or political only in the self-interested defence 
of the status quo and the nation. English, perhaps the language most in need for a word 
to convey the meaning of this concept, tries to make up for its lack of the word by 
borrowing 'petty  bourgeois'  from French or  the  biblical  'philistine'  via  German;  the 
inauthentic existential disposition the Spießbürger has a great history as an aversion to 
existentialist  philosophy  from  Kierkegaards  Spidsborger  to  Heidegger's  Das  Man. 
However, unlike Marx, these thinkers do not go far in thinking the social production of 
this subjectivity, either as a more or less spontaneous class disposition or a product of 
what Althusser called 'ideological state apparatuses'.935
2.7. Luther and the inner priest
In the generally forgotten passage following this, Marx seems to distinguish this from a 
purely  theoretical  demonstration.  In  a  passage  reminiscent  of  both  Max Weber  and 
Michel Foucault936, Marx compares the coming German revolution of the 19th Century 
to the Reformation, the German philosopher (himself?) with Luther:
Luther certainly conquered servitude based on devotion, but only by replacing 
it by servitude based on conviction. He destroyed faith in authority, but only by 
restoring the authority of faith.  He transformed the priests into laymen, but 
only  by  transforming  the  laymen  into  priests.  He  freed  man  from external 
religiosity, but only by making religiosity the inner man. He freed the body 
from its chains, but only by putting the heart in chains.937 
Marx here notes that Protestantism posed the problem correctly, namely that of external 
authority, its solution, the 'the struggle of the layman with the priest outside himself, but 
935 Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, “Spieszbürger,” Deutsches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: Verlag von H. 
Hirzel, 1854).
936 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Martino Fine Books, 2010); Foucault, 
Discipline and punish, 38. I will return to Marx's analysis of the importance of (work)discipline for 
the emergence of capitalism in chapter 6.
937 Marx, “Critique of Hegel. Introduction,” 251.
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rather of his struggle with his own inner priest' was not a true solution.938 The problem 
of  Protestantism is  that  is  subjectivating procedure amounts  to  an internalisation  of 
authority and faith rather than the abolition of it. The practice of philosophy here is a 
subjectivating process that sets humans free from inner and outer priests, and not just 
individuals,  but the people,  not just  against  church property,  but against  property in 
general. However, Marx immediately declares, subjectivation processes if necessary are 
not sufficient, they only happen under the right conditions.
2.8. Generatio aequivoca
While  the  concept  of  generatio  aequivoca  or  heterogenesis from  self-replicating 
chemical  processes  that  Hegel  is  drawing  on  has  a  remarkable  similarity  with 
contemporary theories of original abiogenesis from catalysis, from Pasteur onwards the 
theory of continual abiogenesis has been considered disproven in biology. However, the 
contemporary argument for biogenesis still relies on an initial abiogenesis. Alexander 
Oparin's  still  paradigmatic  argument  for  the  impossibility  of  abiogenesis  after  the 
beginning of life is remarkably similar to Hegel's: any pre-biological process happening 
in  an  environment  where  (especially  micro-)organisms  are  omnipresent  will 
immediately be consumed by existing biological process.939
2.9. Ships and stars
The  trope  of  the  Narrenschiff was  first  proposed  by  the  conservative  theologian 
Sebastian Brandt  in  the pre-reformation period,  which as  the Prussian  Vormärz was 
characterised  by  social  unrest  and  instability.  From  this  there  is  a  long  way  to 
messianically charged boat at the end of the Alfonso Cuarón Children of Men (2006) or 
Marx's  youthful poem, pious when fearful, yet secular and secure: 
And I battle with wind and waves, Und ich kämpfe mit Wind und 
Wellen, And pray to the Lord, Und bete zu Gott, dem Herrn, 
And let the sails swell, Und lass die Segel schwellen, 
And navigate by a safe star. Und halt' mich an sich ein Stern.940
938 Ibid., 252. Again a reference springs up, Augusto Boal's theatrical method for getting rid of the 'cop 
in the head'.
939 Alexander Oparin, The Origin of Life, 1924.
940 Marx quoted in Prawer, Karl Marx and World Literature, 9.
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The star as the priviledge means of naval navigation at night before the invention of the 
marine chronometer,  is  an important  classical  metonomy for  orientation.  Thus Kant 
famously speaks of his two compasses 'the starry sky above, and the moral law within'. 
Hegel, on the other hand, is reported by Henrich Heine to dismissed the young poets 
enthusiasm for the night sky. Looking out the window the old man grumbled 'the stars, 
hum hum, the stars are only the gleaming leprosy of the sky'. 'So there is no reward 
beyond', Heine asks. Hegel replies: 'so you want a reward because you have cared for 
your  sick  mother,  and  not  poisoned  your  brother?'  Hegel's  metaphor  suggests  that 
spiritual orientation to the beyond is like a bodily orientation to the decomposition of 
the body: both fail to take into consideration the immanence of morality and health.941
2.10. Hegel on differentia specifica and essence
Hegel's critique of 'Observing Reason' in the Phenomenology of Spirit is lodged within a 
critique of Kantian idealism. In this section Hegel first agrees that the differentia allow 
cognition  to  distinguish  one  thing  from  another,  and  that  ‘existence  is  defined  as 
Species’.942 The  need for  the  search for  differentiae appears  to  Hegel  when  Reason 
desires to learn about things qua things, to apprehend them as sensuous things opposed 
to  the ‘I’ of  Consciousness.  Reason is  demanding ‘that difference,  that being,  in its 
manifold variety,  becomes its  very own...’.943 Reason is  thus  caught  in  a possessive 
desire, trying to conquer the multiplicity of being which to it appears both as manifold 
sensuous particulars and as One (as the Other of Reason itself as I – the universal of 
Being identical with itself'). However, in describing things in their particularity Reason 
only superficially raises them out of singularity (their pure multiplicity) in relation to an 
equally superficial form of universality. In its activity of description, or representation, 
Reason does not yet grasp ‘a movement in the object itself’.944 Marx argument against 
Hegel's  definition of the state as organism highlights the importance for him of the 
concept differentia specifica:
An explanation which does not give the differentia specifica is no explanation. 
The sole interest here is that of recovering “the Idea” simply, the “logical Idea” 
941 Heine’s Confessions quoted in Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, 119.
942 Other names by which Hegel designates being include Eidos, Idea, and determinate Universality.  
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 34.
943 Ibid., 146.
944 Ibid., 148.
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in  each  element,  be  it  that  of  the  state  or  of  nature;  and  the  real  subjects 
[wirklichen Subjekte], as in this case the “political constitution”, become their 
mere  names  –  consequently,  there  is  only  the  semblance  of  a  real 
understanding.  They  [the  real  subjects]  are  and  remain  uncomprehended 
because they are not understood in the determinations [Bestimmungen] of their 
specific essence [spezifischen Wesen].945
In deriving the many from the one you only arrive at the many in so far as they are part 
of the one; you fail to grasp their specificity, their ‘specific essence’. Essence, in Hegel's 
terminology, is not immediate or something like an 'inner kernel' of a thing, indeed it is 
relational  and  mediated,  it is a set of  determinations.946  'Essence', to approach it one 
way, is the abstract concept that holds the place of the answer to the real and often 
experienced problem that things are not what they immediately seem to be. What then 
are  they?  But  the  problematic,  the question  developed from this  problem of  course 
differ widely: what is x? How does x work? What is the power of x? What makes x x 
and not y, etc. 
For  Hegel  essence  is  a  rather  abstract  determination,  it  does  not  speak  of  a  total 
determination of something existent by its contexts or relations – not because these are 
not important, but because essence is an attempt to isolate the specificity or difference 
of something. But it is not a concept that looks for a comparison, like the question 'in 
what way does x differ from y?' Nor does it look for an absolute essence of the thing 
'what  is  x  in  itself?'  Rather  it  positions  itself  between the two questions,  neither  of 
which really answer the question: 'what is it'?: a thing considered relatively does not get 
to the question of its inner difference, and a thing considered absolutely is indeterminate 
(and this is precisely the point of the atom considered absolutely: the swerve is another 
way to say indeterminate). Essence is neither absolute, nor relative, but neither, or both. 
Essence is  not absolute,  but relative in the sense that it  is  the reflection of what is 
outside it. But it is absolute rather than relative in the sense that what is reflected in it is 
subtracted, abstracted from, when one considers the essence. Essence, in other words, is 
945 ‚Eine Erklärung, die aber nicht die differentia specifica |besondere Unterscheidung| gibt, 
ist keine Erklärung. Das  einzige Interesse ist, »die Idee« schlechthin, die »logische Idee« in jedem 
Element, sei es des Staates, sei es der Natur, wiederzufinden, und die wirklichen Subjekte, wie hier 
die »politische Verfassung«, werden zu ihren bloßen Namen, so daß nur der Schein eines wirklichen 
Erkennens vorhanden ist. Sie sind und bleiben unbegriffene, weil nicht in ihrem spezifischen Wesen 
begriffene Bestimmungen.‘ Marx, “Critique of Hegel,” 67.
946 'Bestimmung' here and generally in Marx as well as Hegel does not refer to causal determinations, 
but to what gives the determinacy of a thing or concept.
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the specificity of reflection itself. Or, to put it in different terms: essence is how a thing 
resonates, bracketing what it resonates with. There is more to this metaphor: sound and 
light are cast back. Hegel speaks of essence not just as the quality of the reflection in 
itself, but as its re-reflection into exteriority. This is the basis of the famous: 'Essence 
must appear'.947 Essence is always also appearance (unless it is purely thought, abstract 
possibility),  it  has  its  own 'shine',  a  singular  expression.948 Essence  in  this  sense  is 
concrete singularity (as opposed to the abstract singularity of the intensity of the atom). 
Essence, to put it in terms of a discourse that has recently won much popularity, is it at 
once affected and affects. But we need to pass beyond the abstract analytics of essence 
to understand actuality, i.e. the network of relations in which any thing exists.  
947 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 199, §131.
948 Ibid., 175–6.
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chapter 3
3.0. Capitalism and its gravediggers
It is significant to discuss these three tendencies, because they remain influential in the 
Marxian  and  Marxist  orientations  to  revolution.  Marx's  Capital does  not  so  much 
question them, as elaborate the economic 'laws' governing their movement. Thus we 
find these three tendencies at the basis of Marx's conception of revolution at the end of 
Volume 1 of Capital.  According to this brief dialectical sketch, capital will eventually 
generalise its rule to envelop the global and previously uncommodified activities, and 
centralise itself to create an ever greater mass of proletarians. This growing mass of 
workers will be employed as co-operative socialized labour on means of production that 
can only be used in common. Finally centralised and socialised production grows to 
become 'incompatible with [its] capitalist integument. The integument is burst asunder. 
The expropriators are expropriated'.949 1. The dynamism of capitalism will produce 2. 
the gravediggers, the gravediggers qua socialised will 3. bury capital. We might simply 
say: “1 => 2 => 3”.
There  are  two  dialectically  related  versions  of  the  argument  that  the  dynamism of 
capital  will  produce  its  gravediggers:  “A.  capitalist  dynamism  =>  pauperisation,  
radical  need  =>  revolutionary  break”  and  “B.  capitalist  dynamism  =>  proto-
communist productivism => sublation into communism”.  In fact the argument at the 
end of Capital I in chapter 25 ('General Law of Capitalist Accumulation') suggests that 
the tendency to pauperisation and to socialisation of production are at work at once: the 
working proletariat must constantly grow as capital searches for absolute surplus-value. 
Meanwhile, and more and more, the surplus-population must grow as capital searches 
for relative surplus-value and replaces workers with labour saving machinery, rendering 
them unemployed. The relation between these two tendencies depend on the mobility of 
capital: the more the ablity of capital move to low labour cost areas in the search for 
949 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 929. 
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more absolute surplus value is limited by national and other borders, the more intense 
the tendency to replace workers with machinery in the search for relative surplus value.
What  lies  at  the root  of this  projection is  a notion of  the incessant  and unbounded 
expansion of civil society, its tendencies to subsume other modes of production and to 
spread on a global scale. In other words, the orientation is here shaped not only idea of 
the real teleology of capital, but of the belief in the symmetry of the development of 
capital with the development of the forces of revolution. 
3.1. The Ends of Man
In his talk 'The Ends of Man' Derrida suggests that this secular teleology of the cunning 
of reason refers to 'the ends of man'. History and the species considered and judged 
from the superior vantage point of a retrospection. The species, the globe and history all 
come together  in  this  totalising  teleology.  To  his  audience  of  philosophers  Derrida 
proposes strategies of dispersal  in  the face of this  unification,  the interweaving and 
interlacing of the strategies of deconstruction with a change of terrain, the invention of a 
different,  plural  style  of  writing.  Against  the  teleology  of  man,  he  proposes  two 
Nietzschean figures of the end man, here understood as the ending rather than telos: that 
of  superior  man  (hörere  Mensch),  distressed  and  pitiful,  and  the  superman 
(Übermensch), actively forgetting and erasing his traces.950 Avant la lettre,  it suggests 
only two replies to Fukuyama: live as the last man, or affirm the end of 'the End of 
History'. But clearly this cannot simply be a question of a new style or an affirmation, if  
history and its ends is Wirklich rather than a narrative and evaluative figure. But what if 
the 'ends of man' refer to the daily sacrifice of individuals to the cunning of reason. In 
this case we might follow a different line of inquiry than the one suggested by Derrida 
in  his  critique  of  humanism  in  philosophy.951 The  actuality  of  sacrifice  raises  the 
question of the material conditions of this sacrifice to the teleology of humankind. What 
does this tell us about the concepts of mankind and history itself, as they arise in this 
process? Beyond the discursive deconstructionist solutions, Marx invites us to consider 
the problems of mankind and history as historical problems and terrains of struggle – 
such cannot  be overcome through forgetting,  nor salvaged merely by new styles  or 
subjectivities. The problem is not the philosophy of history with its teleological figures 
950 Jacques Derrida, “The Ends of Man,” in Margins of Philosophy (Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester 
Press, 1982), 135–6.
951 “The Ends of Man.”
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in itself, but the historical conditions and dynamics which give rise to this philosophy of 
history as an orientation within an otherwise overwhelming historical process. 
3.2. On the concept of need and the problem of reproduction 
The  concept  of  need  in  Marx  is  curiously  underdeveloped.  While  recognising  the 
availability  of  new  products  introduces  new  needs952,  he  generally  bracketed  the 
'historical  and  moral'  element  of  the  value  of  labour-power,  and  treated  it  ceteris  
paribus:  'in a given country at  a given period,  the average amount of the means of 
subsistence  necessary  for  the  worker  is  a  known  datum'.953 Partly  this  is  useful  in 
simplifying the analysis of value (even if this abstracts from struggles over need), partly 
Marx is following capital's own abstraction from the reproductive needs of workers:
The maintenance and reproduction of the working class remains a necessary 
condition for the reproduction of capital.  But the capitalist may safely leave 
this to the worker's drives for self-preservation and propagation.954
Despite the centrality, and underdevelopment of the concept of the concept of need in 
Marx, there has been very very few studies of it. One exception is Agnes Heller's The 
Theory  of  Need in  Marx,  posits  an  opposition  between  radical  needs and  material  
needs.  The  former  are  qualitative  human  needs  for  self-realisation  and conviviality, 
while the latter are the quantitative and merely reproductive needs that keeps workers 
chained to capital. It should be clear, however, that the context where Marx introduces 
the concept of 'radical needs' does not allow for such a distinction, which is more proper 
to a polemic against consumerism: radical needs refer both to deepening poverty and to 
the deprivation of political rights, and the freedom to actualise the highest potentials of 
mankind, the promises of philosophy.955 
Michael Lebowitz, further, has developed the Marxist concept of need. He distinguishes 
952 'The need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. ... Production 
thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object'. Marx, Grundrisse, 
92.
953 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 275. Michael Lebowitz writes: 'given that the subject of study is capital, to 
understand the nature of capital, it is necessary to treat the level of workers' needs as given and 
determinate'. Keeping wages constant allows Marx to focus on link between productivity increases 
and relative surplus-value.  Lebowitz, Beyond Capital, 48.
954 Marx, Capital: Volume I, 718.
955 Ágnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx (London: Allison & Busby, 1976). For two contemporary 
critiques see Michael A. Lebowitz, “Review: Heller on Marx’s Concept of Needs,” Science and 
Society 43, no. 3 (1979): 349–355, and Hans-Jørgen Schanz, Træk Af Behovsproblematikkens  
Idéhistorie Med Særligt Henblik På Marx Og Engels (Århus: Modtryk, 1981).
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between a physiological, a minimum, lower limit (PN), a necessary need, set by habit 
and custom ( NN),  and  social  need,  which  is  the  upper  limit  of  need  (SN).956 He 
suggests that the growth of capital necessarily entails the growth of the working classes'  
unfulfilled needs.957 This is not because of tendency to absolute pauperisation (a decline 
towards PN), but because of a growing divergence between NN and PN. The denial of 
social needs is denial of self, it brings man in conflict with himself, causes misery. This 
allows Lebowitz to define 'the degree of immiseration' as the relation  (SN-NN)/NN.958 
Thus growing wages and growing immiseration can exist side by side, according to 
Lebowitz.959 While  Marx's  early  theory  of  absolute  immiseration  of  the  proletariat, 
which is most strongly expressed in  The Holy Family, has been much derided in the 
period  of  social  democracy,  Marx  himself  nuanced  it  in  the  early  1850s,  moving 
towards the theory of relative immiseration, that we see in chapter 25 of Capital.960
An important, but relatively unknown contribution to the intellectual history of Marxist 
concept of need is Hans-Jørgen Schanz'. Schanz proposes a materialist theory of the 
emergence of the theoretical question of need:
The problematic of need only arises in the history of theory after lack primarily 
becomes a historical product – i.e. after it becomes a consequence of the mode 
of production more than a consequence of the stinginess of nature or pestering 
of catastrophies – and its universal ... negation as an existential threat or means 
of force becomes a historical possibility.961
Schanz, however,  only marginally relates it  to the problem of reproduction,  through 
which the problem of need is posed on a social level, which brings it into relation with 
Marx's theorisation theorisation of the relationship between proletarian separation and 
capitalist reproduction. In chapter 4 we suggest that to approach capitalism solely as a 
contradictory system is to approach the problem of capitalism one-sidedly; chapter 5 
argues that we need to pose the problem of proletarian reproduction before we ask the 
question of the capitalist system. To broach the question of proletarian reproduction is 
to raise the problem of the reproduction of life under capitalism. 
956 Lebowitz, Beyond Capital, 39–40.
957 Ibid., 35.
958 Ibid., 41.
959 Ibid., 43.
960 Roman Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx’s “Capital,” trans. Peter Burgess, vol. 1 (London: Pluto, 
1977), 300–307. 
961 Schanz, Træk Af Behovsproblematikkens Idéhistorie Med Særligt Henblik På Marx Og Engels, 34. 
My translation.
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The problem of human reproduction is perhaps  the human problem, the  differentia of 
the species-history, defined by the existence of modes of (re)production of social human 
life. Carolyn Merchant speaks of the four dimensions of human reproduction, inscribing 
them into a natural history of ecological revolutions:
(1) the inter-generational reproduction of the species (both human and non-
human),  (2)  the  intragenerational  reproduction  of  daily  life,  (3)  the 
reproduction of social  norms within the family and community,  and (4) the 
reproduction of the legal-political structures that maintain social order within 
the community and the state.962
Species-history is minimally the history of 1 as modified by 2, while the history of 
modes of (re)production is the histories of 1 and 2 as modified by 3 and 4. However, the 
concept of 'mode of (re)production in general' is a theoretical abstraction, which only 
becomes  possible  under  capitalism.  In  previous  epochs  reproduction  is  lived  as  a 
concrete problem by towns, villages and families:
...human beings become individuals only through the process of history. He 
appears originally as a species-being [Gattungswesen], clan being, herd animal  
– although in no way whatever as a ζωον piολιτιχον [political animal] in the 
political  sense.  Exchange  itself  is  the  chief  means  in  this  individuation 
[Vereinzelung]. It makes herd-like existence superflous and dissolves it.963
This superfluousness resides in the fact that individuals can reproduces themselves as 
individuals only though a market in the necessities of life (food, housing, care, etc.); in 
the  absence  of  a  market  individual  human beings  rarely  attempt  to  survive  outside 
communal bonds.  Under capitalism reproduction it appears as an abstract problem for 
individuals, and a problem of workforces and populations for capital and the state. To 
understand  while  this  abstraction,  which  is  valid  for  previous  epochs,  has  become 
historically  possible  under  capitalism,  we  only  need  to  understand  that  only  under 
capitalism does reproduction become a real abstract problem mediated by money. In this 
sense we can say that it is only with capitalism that social reproduction has become a 
problem  of  governance,  theory,  and  politics,  rather  than  a  question  of  'natural'  or 
arbitrary factors such as climate and the custom of a people. Thus, from the perspective 
962 Carolyn Merchant, “The Theoretical Structure of Ecological Revolutions,” Environmental Review:  
ER 11, no. 4 (1987): 265.
963 Marx, Grundrisse, 496. 
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of capitalism, human history can appear as a series of different attempts to solve the 
question  of  social  reproduction.  Only  in  capitalism  is  the  reproduction  of  life 
subordinated to production; perhaps this is the main reason that reproduction here, for 
the first time, appears as a truly historical problem.964 Only under capitalism does the 
solution to the general human challenge of reproduction become possible. Reproduction 
thus becomes a social and political problem for the first time, irresolvable as long as the 
proletariat exists as proletariat. Beyond the schema of the Symmetry Thesis, we have 
here a definition of capitalism, which allows us to see the historical, and potentially 
revolutionary epoch-making meaning of struggles for proletarian reproduction.
3.3. Sismondi versus Malthus
It is clear that already in 1815 Sismondi criticized Malthus for making poverty into a 
natural-historic effect of demographic growth:
Mr Malthus established as a principle that the population of every country is 
limited  by the quantity  of  subsistence  which that  country  can furnish.  This 
proposition is true only when applied to the whole terrestrial globe,  or to a 
country  which  has  no  possibility  of  trade;  in  all  other  cases,  foreign  trade 
modifies  it;  and,  farther,  which  is  more  important,  this  proposition  is  but 
abstractly true, - true in a manner inapplicable to political economy. Population 
has never reached the limit of subsistence, and probably it never will.  Long 
before the population can be arrested by the inability of the country to produce 
more food, it is arrested by the inability of the population to purchase that food, 
or to labour in producing it. … It is those variations in the demand for labour,  
this sort of revolution so frequent in the lives of poor artisans, that gives to the 
state a superabundant population.965
Hegel could thus have had Sismondi's critique of Malthus in his mind. 
3.4. Proletarian, proletariat
The root of the term proletarian in  Roman Law – with which Marx was intimately 
964 Marx, Grundrisse, 495; Marx, Capital: Volume I, 176. 
965 J. C. Simonde De Sismondi, New Principles of Political Economy: Of Wealth in Its Relation to  
Population (Transaction Publishers, 1991), 528-29. For Marx's later assessment of Sismondi, see 
Marx, “Theories of Surplus-Value,” 248.
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familiar – is interesting. It refers to citizens whose property was too low for them to 
qualify for military service; men who were registered as heads of families (capite sensi) 
and  nothing  more.  The  word  comes  from  proli,  'offspring',  referring  to  the  sole 
contribution of the proletarii to Rome: not only the reproduction of the population, but 
the  production  of  a  surplus-population  useful  in  colonising  conquered  territories.966 
Hegel  made  propertylessness  central  to  his  notion  of  the  Pöbel,  whereas  the 
contemporary definition in the  Deutsches Wörterbuch  did not. In this latter definition 
Pöbel comes closer the Latin vulgus or Gustave Le Bon's later concept of the crowd: a 
crowd or multitude [Volksmenge], a mass of lowly, raw or rude common people.967 
Étienne Balibar has pointed out how there is an underlying dialectic at play between the 
idea of the proletariat as mass and the proletariat as class. To grasp this helps us avoid 
two symmetrical pitfalls. While a reading of the proletariat merely as  mass creates a 
vision of a negativity in no need of political mediation (what Spivak calls the 'necessity 
of  the  difficult  task  of  counterhegemonic  ideological  production'),  a  reading  of  the 
proletariat  only  as  class  tends  to  privilege  the  class'  self-identity  through  its 
representation in trade unions and particularly 'the party'.  While the former sees the 
abyss  of  the  problem and  produces  a  fantasy  of  spontaneity,  the  latter  proposes  a 
solution that fails to grasp the radicality of the problem, the problem not as a common 
identity, but as shared problem which is necessarily lived differently.968
It is here a more positive vision of the proletariat as the representative of the best of the 
species  emerges,  one  which  grapples  with  the  problematic  of  representation  and 
species-alienation, which is what renders homologous the problems of God, money and 
the state.969 In his discussion of James Mill’s  Elements of Political Economy (1844), 
Marx described money as a ‘veritable God’.970 For Marx this analogy went beyond mere 
descriptive  comparison  or  the  extension  of  an  anti-theological  argument  beyond  its 
initial field. For Marx money, God and the state function are all alien mediators between 
human  beings;  they  all  present  the  essential  powers  of  social  men  and  women  to 
individuals as an external power ruling them: ‘the divine power of money – lies in its 
966 Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1953), 657. 
“On Commonwealth,” in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, trans. C. D. Yonge (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1877), 411.
967 Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, “Pöbel,” Deutsches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: Verlag von H. Hirzel, 
1854).
968 Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, 94–5; Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 255.
969 As Lucio Colletti remarks ‘…there is an evident parallelism between the hypostasis of the state, of 
God, and of money'. Coletti, “introduction” in Marx, Early Writings, 54.
970 Karl Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy,” in Early Writings, 1st ed. 
(London: Penguin, 1992), 259–278.
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character as men’s estranged, alienating and self-disposing species-nature. Money is 
the  alienated ability  of  mankind’.971 Thus  they  are  also  signs  of  the  potentiality  of 
mankind, the harbingers of a different future. 
Conceptually Marx’s account for the socio-genesis of religion, money and state in the 
1844 Manuscripts – their practical hypostatisation or, in other words, the establishment 
of  their  quasi-transcendence – follows a  Feuerbachian logic according to  which the 
species-being  of  humankind  (Gattungswesen  des  Menschen)  –  or  the  essence of 
humankind (Wesen des  Menschen)  –  takes  the shape  of  an alien  power ruling  over 
humankind  itself.  Through  its  alienation  of  itself  humankind  is  faced  with  the 
objectification of its  own species-being.In his  1844 Manuscripts,  written in  exile  in 
Paris, Marx recognised the importance of Hegel’s development of these concepts:
The importance of Hegel's Phenomenology and its final result – the dialectic of 
negativity as the moving and producing principle – lies in the fact that Hegel 
conceives  the  self-creation  of  man  as  a  process,  objectification 
[Vergegenständlichung] as loss of object [Entgegenständlichung] as alienation 
[Entäusserung] and as sublation of this alienation; that he therefore grasps the 
nature of labour and conceives objective man as the result of his own labour.  
The real, active relation of man to himself as a species-being, or the realisation 
[or actualisation] of himself as a species-being ... is only really possible if he 
really employs all his  species-powers –  which again is only possible through 
the cooperation of mankind and as a result  of history – and treats  them as 
objects, which is at first only possible in the form of self-estrangement.972
Humanity must loose itself in order to develop itself, to, eventually, regain itself fully. 
The human is not merely a human animal, but  becomes human through its alienation, 
including  in  itself  not  just  the  human,  but  its  alienation.973 But  where  Hegel's 
commensuration is written in the present tense, Marx's affirmation follows Feuerbach's 
concept of species-essence as consisting in the cognisance of the species' potentiality for 
open  ('infinite')  self-actualisation,  as  a  fiery  philosophy  of  the  future  based  on  the 
971 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” in Early Writings, 1st ed. (Penguin, 1992), 
377. As Marx would write with Engels in The German Ideology a year later, money is a third party 
holding together individuals whose ‘natural’ communal bonds had been severed.
972 Ibid., 386. For a conceptual clarification of the relation between the terms alienation, estrangement 
and objectification and their relation to Hegel's terminology, see chapter 5, of Christopher J Arthur, 
Dialectics of Labour: Marx and His Relation to Hegel (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
973 But this is not in fact the case in say the coevolution between a wasp and an orchid, or freedom and 
technology. 
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present.  It  is  of some importance to note that  Marx's  first  adoption of an explicitly 
Feuerbachian humanism arises at the precise point at which he begins his engagement 
with  political  economy  in  1844.  Marx's  appropriation  of  Feuerbach's  atheistic 
appropriation of the Hegelian theme of alienation is from the beginning filtered through 
an economic understanding of the activity of alienation. Alienation is not merely seen as 
species-activity, but as  labour,  the channelled and exploited activity of human beings 
under the rule of private property.974 
In the 1843-44 introduction to his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of  
Right Marx had stated that ‘To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But for 
humankind the root is humankind itself’.975 However Feuerbachian these formulations 
might seem, a statement such as this was already – prior to Marx's  adoption of the 
alienation concept – related to a rejection of the idea of Man in general.  The basic 
insight  of  Feuerbach,  that  ‘Humankind  makes  religion,  religion  does  not  make 
humankind’, was for Marx too abstract:
....humankind is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Humankind is 
the  world  of  humans –  state,  society.  This  state  and  this  society  produce 
religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an 
inverted world.976 
Hence Marx's ‘humankind’ was not an Abstraktum, but a concept of the concrete living 
human beings in determinate socio-political relations. In  The German Ideology,  Marx 
was to clarify this idea with the introduction of the concept of a  mode of production 
leaving behind the horizon of Feuerbachian anthropology.977 However, the introduction 
of the concept of mode of production does not leave behind anthropology as such, but 
insists on the historical determinacy of any actual human being. Man must be 'seen in 
his real historical activity and existence’.978 In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels 
say of the species-being of humankind:
974 See chapter 1 of Arthur, Dialectics of Labour: Marx and His Relation to Hegel.
975 The sexist and colonial implications of this term (der Mensch) should be clear – even if it less 
blatantly sexists than the common English translation ‘man’ – to 19th century as well as 
contemporary feminists and liberation fighters. Marx, “Critique of Hegel. Introduction,” 251.
976 Ibid., 244., translation altered. However, as we see in chapter 4 the concept of species history 
remains operative in Marx. 
977 As Nina Power writes: 'It is therefore incumbent upon Marx to cease using ‘Man’ at all in this text, 
which he duly does, preferring instead ‘real, active, men’ as ‘individuals’ wrested away from their 
creative, productive capacities, which, in any case, are always more specific than Feuerbach’s 
generic universalism’. Nina Power, “Marx, Feuerbach and Non-Philosophy” (presented at the Marx 
and Philosophy, Royal Holloway, London, 2007).
978 Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1976, 512.
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Men  can  be  distinguished  from  animals  by  consciousness,  by  religion  or 
anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from 
animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step 
which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means 
of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.979
Far  from  the  philosophical  perspective  of  the  species  as  the  indeterminate,  pure 
possibility of any (mode of) production,  Marx begins to think the species in terms of 
labour, the activity that creates the current actuality. His concept of potentiality is now 
much more specific than the Feuerbachian generic human potentiality; any potentiality 
of radical change is now always  this  potentiality within a given mode of production. 
Like in some sense Feuerbach's species-essence is itself developed through Christianity, 
Marx's  situated  potentiality  is  developed  by  the  mode  of  production  itself,  as  the 
possibility  of  the  abolition  of  alienation.  Thus  the  proletariat  is  its  own developing 
power and knowledge, still less in need of philosophers to impregnate it. The initial 
formulation of the problem of the proletariat in terms of the negativity of an inorganic 
dispossessed mass  is  now specified in  terms of  a  contradiction  between proletarian 
productivity (positivity) and its alienation (negation), as it is developed historically. The 
question of actualisation is no longer that of a meeting between philosophy and the 
proletariat, but rather the question of an sublation  (Aufhebung)  of the aforementioned 
contradiction,  the  proletarian  negation  of  its  negation.  However,  the  problem  of the 
proletarian condition, and of developing proletarianisation, is suffered by others than 
those who make up this  contradiction – as we have already seen in the case of the 
Moselle forest dwellers. In other words, the problem is not by any means exhausted by 
its formulation in terms of either negativity (as we saw above) nor contradiction (as we 
see here).
3.5 The problem with the lumpen
Already in the Manifesto Marx and Engels had warned against the lumpenproletariat:
The "dangerous class," the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off 
by the  lowest  layers  of  old society may,  here  and there,  be swept  into  the 
movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it 
979 Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1969, 20.
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far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.980
So what about their 'conditions of life' makes the 'social scum' dangerous? Before we 
come back to the question of the role of the lumpenproletariat in the 1848 Revolution 
and the reasons it can be bribed, it is useful to look at the conceptual workings of Marx's 
introduction of the concept of the lumpenproletariat.
Where Marx's initial concept of the proletariat, following Hegel's rabble, is an abject 
product, the unemployed and negative element left over from social production, the new 
concept  of  proletariat  Marx  and  Engels  became interested  is  that  of  the  employed,  
exploited  producer  of society,  whose activity  itself  is  what  gradually expels  it  from 
society.981 This move is a significant trans-valuation of poverty in history and political 
economy  itself;  where  the  rabble  were  shiftless,  Marx's  proletariat  are  heroes  and 
paragons  of  virtue.  As  Nicholas  Thoburn  remarks,  the  introduction  of  the 
lumpenproletariat played the role of 'freeing up his concept of the proletariat from the 
bourgeois image of the seething rabble'.982 While this makes sense as a discursive move 
to  rid  the  proletariat  of  its  negative  connotations,  it  also  results  in  a  fundamental 
redefinition  of  the  problematic  of  the  proletariat,  and  thus  of  the  problem  of 
actualisation of freedom, towards the priority of a class perspective, and the deepening 
valorisation of productive labour, at the exclusion of 'unproductive' populations. 
The distinction between the two proletariats is first made in  The German Ideology  in 
1845, where Marx and Engels' criticize Max Stirner's notion of the 'unique' proletariat:
The  latter  consists  of  “rogues,  prostitutes,  thieves,  robbers  and  murderers, 
gamblers, propertyless people with no occupation and frivolous individuals”. 
They  form  the  “dangerous  proletariat”  and  for  a  moment  are  reduced  by 
“Stirner” to “individual shouters”, and then, finally, to vagabonds”, who find 
their perfect expression in the “spiritual vagabonds” who do not “keep within 
the bounds of a moderate way of thinking...983
Lumpen in colloquial German means rags, suggesting a poor person, but, as Hal Draper 
notes,  the world also refers  to  Lump,  the  plural  of  which is  Lumpen,  which means 
980 Marx and Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” 118.
981 As it said in Engels 1888 note to the English edition of the Manifesto: 'By proletariat, the class of 
modern wage labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling 
their labour power in order to live'. Ibid., 108.
982 Nicholas Thoburn, “Difference in Marx: The Lumpenproletariat and the Proletarian Unnamable,” 
Economy and Society 31, no. 3 (2002): 439.
983 Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1976, 202.
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'knave'  or  'rogue'.984 The  equivocation  of  the  term  lumpen  itself,  suggests  both  the 
difference and the commonality of the lumpenproletariat and the proletariat.  For Marx 
proletarians are not paupers per se, only 'ruined proletarians' are; but this does not mean 
that 'ruined proletarians' are necessarily lumpen; the lumpen maybe be ruined, but they 
also find criminal or illicit ways to survive; in short they become  knaves, lumpen.985 
While both proletarians and lumpenproletarians are  virtual paupers – people without  
property  –  the  difference  is  in  the  mode  of  living  this  condition.  In  short,  the  two 
proletariats share a problem, but they live it differently. Despite their shared proletarian 
condition, their conditions are different, one class proud the other ruined and incapable 
of resisting the pressure from the bourgeoisie.
Marx and Engels reserves the term 'lumpen-proletariat' for the supremely heterogeneous 
mass, which is defined negatively by its non-engagement with wage-labour on the one 
hand, and the antagonism between its mode of life (rather than its consciousness) and 
public  law  and  morality.  While  the  proletariat  can  form  itself  as  a  class,  the 
lumpenproletariat  is  marked  by  its  unassimilable  heterogeneity,  its  inertial  mass 
character. The lumpenproletariat
forms a mass sharply differentiated from the industrial proletariat, a recruiting 
ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the crumbs of society, 
people without  any definite  trade,  vagabonds,  gens sans feu et  sans aveu,*  
varying to the degree of civilisation of the nation to which they belong, but 
never renouncing their lazzaroni character.986
It might seem that the lumpenproletariat is more radically negative than the proletariat, 
or that the negativity and inorganicity of Marx's first proletariat (the one modelled on 
Hegel's rabble) is excised from Marx's final definition of the proletariat. The difference 
between the negativity  of  the proletariat  and the negativity  of the lumpenproletariat 
reveals an interesting logical problem with the latter category. Whereas the proletariat 
was initially defined not as a given population, but as an expanding social negativity, its 
inner  heterogeneity  was  not  a  problem:  it  was  defined  in  terms  of  its  radical  and 
deepening antagonism with society, as the name of the subject of the coming revolution, 
a figure in a historical orientation and affirmation. The function of the lumpenproletariat 
is different, it is objective stumbling block of that revolution. Here the difficulty arises: 
984 Hal Draper in Thoburn, “Difference in Marx,” 440.
985 “The German Ideology,” 1976, 202.
986 Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 219. *folk without hearth or home.
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For  Marx  to  say  anything  coherent  about  the  lumpen  he  has  to  assume  at  some 
conceptual level that the term corresponds to a given population. Yet, he has defined 
them in such a way as to preclude its identitarian closure. 
The lumpenproletariat and the proletariat both have in common what they do not have: 
control over the means of re/production. But where the proletariat is defined through its 
common exploitation by capital, the lumpen have nothing in common, except what they 
are not; productive, and in a direct relation to capital. The difficultly with the concept of 
the lumpenproletariat is that it is at once a strongly objectifying category, yet one that 
cannot name anything but a heterogeneous residue, the mere abstract name for a number 
of different ways to live the problem of being dispossessed.
3.6. Lumpen parasites?
Thus inorganicity  of  the  rabble,  and  their  apparent  parasitism,  rather  than  their 
poverty, is crucial.  For Stirner the lumpenproletariat is promising in so much as it 
provides a model for life against wage-labour, a kind of proto-communism. While 
Marx  and  Engels  agree  that  communism entails  the  abolition  of  work,  Stirner's 
attempt to derive communism from the opposition of the bourgeoisie and proletariat 
as the proletarian withdrawal of labour, is too immediate and falsely concrete. The 
two comrades quote Stirner:
“The workers have the most tremendous power in their hands ... they have only 
to cease work and to regard what they have produced by their labour as their 
property  and to  enjoy it.  This  is  the  meaning of  the  workers’ disturbances 
which flare up here and there.”
To this Marx and Engels somewhat sarcastically point out the issue is not a 'here and 
there', but a long history of worker's disturbances since Medieval time, indicative of a 
continuous  problem  which  is  not  addressed  by  occasional  struggles.  Furthermore, 
Stirner's incapacity to understand the proletarians as workers makes him think workers 
could simply cease working and enjoy what they have produced, as if their products 
would continue to exist and be reproduced automatically. 
If  Stirner’s  “ragamuffins”  ever  set  up  a  vagabond  kingdom,  as  the  Paris 
beggars did in the fifteenth century, then Saint Sancho will be the vagabond 
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king, for he is the “perfect” ragamuffin, a man possessing not even ideal wealth 
and therefore living on the interest from the capital of his opinion.
What Stirner misses, according to Marx and Engels, is the the centrality of the labouring 
proletariat  in  the  reproduction  of  the  means  of  subsistence.  And,  as  in  the  implicit 
critique of Hegel's rabble, the mistake is to claim that the proletariat is the product and 
refuser of civil society, rather than that civil society and the proletariat is the product of 
the  proletariat  itself.  This  makes  the  difference  between  a  revolution  in  which  the 
proletariat  ceases  its  activity  and one  it  which  it  seizes,  between negating  work  or 
sublating it. 
Already Hegel mentions two forms of rabble-mentality: the poor and the rich rabble, are 
both a-social, shamelessly idle.987 This curious and apparently contradictory doubling of 
the term, in my interpretation, is possible because of the strength of what Max Weber 
has  called  the  protestant  work  ethic988,  but  more  importantly  because  the  term  is 
developed in relation to a theoretical field structured by the organic metaphors (e.g. the 
body politic and state as organism), which, as mentioned, subtend the introduction of 
the concept of crisis into social analysis: both the rich and the poor are non-reproductive 
of the social organism.989 
Also for Marx the apparently unproductive character of the lumpen allows the semantic 
shift of the term to the 'finance aristocracy': 'in its mode of acquisition as well as in its 
pleasures,  is  nothing  but  the  rebirth  of  the  lumpenproletariat  on  the  heights  of  
bourgeois society'.990 While dual rejection of the 'parasites' of productive society might 
appear as a repetition of the classical paradox of anti-Semitism, we must note that both 
these sentences appear in the context of Marx ironising over bourgeois anxieties. Thus 
he compares the 'moral indignation' of bourgeois pamphlets against “The Rothschild 
Dynasty” with the moral crazes that frequently drive the lumpen to the workhouses, 
987 Hegel's lectures of 1819-20 quoted in Ibid., 454. 
988 Ruda remarks the following: 'That the rabble is lazy and evil at the same time due to the standpoint 
which he takes on the negative as such refers particularly to Kant. Adorno once remarked of Kant 
that he has “taken the work ethic of bourgeois society . . . as his own supreme philosophical 
standard” and therefore for him “radical evil is nothing other then laziness ...”.' Ruda, Hegel’s 
Rabble, 191.Theodor W Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 131.
989 Hegel's sole usage of the term “crisis” in his Philosophy of Nature refers to excretion: 'The crisis is 
the organism's mastering of itself, reproducing itself, and putting this power into effect by excretion. 
It is not the morbid matter which is secreted of course; it is not the case that the body would have 
been healthy if it had never contained this matter, or if it could have been ladled out of it. The crisis, 
like digestion in general, is at the same time a secretion'. Hegel, Philosophy of Nature III, 201.
990 Karl Marx, “The Class Struggles in France,” in Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1973), 208.
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brothels  and mental  asylums.991 Furthermore,  in  both Marx and Hegel  the rich/poor 
lumpen/rabble distinguishes itself in two very important respect from that of the Nazi 
fantasy of the banker/proletarian-communist Jew: while in the latter these are intruders 
or deceases of an otherwise healthy body politic both the knaves of the criminal bottom 
and of the financial  top of society are products of the normal running of bourgeois 
society,  i.e.  forms of life not only made possible but necessary by the principles of 
bourgeois society itself. Secondly, neither Marx and Hegel suggest that the rich and the 
poor lumpen/rabble are 'really one';  the similarity  of their  knave-character  and non-
productive  relation  to  society  merely  displays  the  profound  polarising  dynamics  of 
bourgeois society itself. The Jew as the abstract figure implied in their alleged identity 
is exactly a product of this tendency towards polarisation of capitalist society, as is the 
fantasy  of  an  alliance  between  migrants  and  the  'multiculturalist  elites'  against  the 
'working people'.992 Indeed,  if  the lumpen-proletarian is  a  quintessentially  racialised 
figure, the financier appears as the apotheosis of cosmopolitanism. If we consider these 
under the thematic of endo- and exo-colonisation, the deep antagonism of these two 
orientations of life becomes clear: we might say that the lumpen are colonised subjects 
who refuse assimilation or are refused integration,  while the financial aristocracy are 
colonisers  profiting  from  the  very  differentials  of  separation,  integration  and 
assimilation. 
However,  for  Marx  as  for  liberals  and  fascists,  the  lumpenproletariat  remains  a 
residue, an useless excess; the difference is that he blames this on the dynamics of 
bourgeois  society  itself.  The  lumpen itself  does  not  become an  actor  as  long as 
history and revolution is defined along the matrix of progress and its down-trodden 
producers, the dynamics of the organism of bourgeois society itself. Further, as long 
as the focus is production, the lumpenproletariat can only be thought of as parasitic,  
a problem for the police. However, if we change the perspective from the producers 
of  capitalist  history,  to  the  problem  of  the  reproduction,  the  status  of  the 
lumpenproletariat shifts radically.
991 Ibid. Indeed, the only two occurances of the word 'parasitism' in the text refer to the executive power, 
its integration with the bourgeoisie and its role in keeping order, even at the expense of the stated 
bourgeois interest in democracy. Ibid., 432, 477.
992 We can here follow Werner Bonefeld: 'Marx ... approached the ‘Jewish Question’ through the lens of 
the critique of the fetishism of bourgeois relations of production. Expanding on Marx’s critical 
question, ‘why does this content [human social relations] assume that form [the form of capital]' it 
asks why does the bourgeois critique of capitalism assume the form of antisemitism?' “Antisemitism 
and the (modern) Critique of Capitalism,” LibCom (2009).
 339
3.7. Post-script: The 1848 failure of history
Where  chapter  3  has  attempted  to  characterise  the  effects  of  the  general  temporal 
orientation  of  Marx's  theorisation  of  bourgeois  development  on  his  field  of 
intelligibility/visibility and his historical judgement, chapter 4 will attempt to uncover 
some resources in Marx capable of opening the perspective to these other actualities and 
potentialities.  We find  this  opening  after  the  failure  of  the  1848  revolutions,  when 
historical developments again threw the singular body-mind Marx into a crisis. What is 
of specific interest to this project in the writings of this period – particularly the 1852 
'18th  Brumaire'  –  is  the  paradoxical  way in which  the  proletariat  failed  to  play  its 
expected  revolutionary  role.  Against  the  hopes  pitched  on  the  negative  energy  and 
courage  of  the  proletariat  as  mass,  the  bravest  and  most  negative  proletarians,  the 
lumpen, turned out to be a mass so negative that it was turned against the revolution. 
And contrary to the hopes attached to the working proletariat, the working class of Paris 
turned  out  to  be  too  'positive'  on  the  eve  of  the  revolution,  to  lack  the  sufficient 
negativity.
The revolution predicted in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, written in late 1847, 
took off in the week the text was published, in early 1848. However, as is well-known 
the revolutions failed. Balibar notes that maybe Marx's own theory was challenged by 
'the bad side of history', here not understood in Marx's sense as the side of struggle, but 
as the side of that which remains unforeseen by theory, challenging the representation of 
necessity, indeed the idea that history advances at all.993  
Something went wrong in the making of history in 1848 and the revolution had played 
out as a farcical repetition of past tragedies, Marx noted in his famous introduction to 
the 18th Brumaire. However, the problem was not so much that the circumstances had 
not been in place,  but the fact that 'the tradition of dead generations' had weighed the 
'brains of the living' 'like a nightmare':
...just as [the living] seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and 
things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of 
revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to 
993 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 97.
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present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed 
language.994
Contrary  to  this,  the  revolutionary  proletarians  had  sought  the  creation  of  a  social 
republic, a project which 'was in the most singular contradiction with [what] could be 
immediately  realised  in  practice'.995 While  this  seems  like  an  invocation  of  'unripe' 
circumstances, no circumstances no matter how ripe will bring about the revolution by 
themselves. Marx thus describes the proletarian revolution as a process of self-critique, 
interruptions,  new  beginnings,  until  a  situation  has  been  created  in  which  the 
circumstances themselves cry out for a  leap: 'Hic Rhodus, hic salta!'996 The cry was 
sounded,  but  the  revolutionaries  fell  short  of  the  leap  precisely  because  they  were 
weighed down by the past. Against this Marx affirmed the need for a new poetry to 
express the truth of the revolution:
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot take its poetry from the 
past but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped 
away  all  superstition  about  the  past.  The  former  revolutions  required 
recollections of past world history in order to smother their own content. The 
revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead in order 
to arrive at its own content. There the phrase went beyond the content – here 
the content goes beyond the phrase.997
Poetry  is  here  a  means  not  to  express,  but  to  discover the  social  content  of  the 
revolution. The content is not there, but arrived at via the philosophy of the future. The 
social content is what is there – the circumstances – sub specie futurae. Marx raised the 
question of the leap, in the context of his analysis of the approaching world historical 
revolution.  Thus the leap into the future is  a leap  with  the movement of history,  it 
consists in accepting the challenge of the circumstances themselves from the viewpoint  
of what could be, a timely untimeliness. 
We have seen that  Marx's  rejected  the abstract  ideal  of  communism in favour  of  a 
communist politics of radical needs, and their deepening in the face of the contradictory 
development of bourgeois society. While this in the Manifesto took the form of a theory 
of  absolute needs,  i.e. an immiseration thesis, his later developments, as we will see, 
994 Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 398.
995 Ibid., 403.
996 Ibid., 401.
997 Ibid., 400.
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carried him away from this path, towards one of relative pauperisation, not attached to 
theory of basic bodily needs.998 To encompass both, we can say that Marx's critique is 
based on question of the radical problems of the bourgeois mode of production, which 
tend to become more intensive and extensive, i.e. world-historical, extending over the 
globe and enrolling our souls, calling for radical solutions. Marx's communist politics, 
are  not  politics  of  abstractions,  but  of  'the real  movements',  i.e.  of  solutions  which  
abolish the problem itself, on the level of world history. 
However, this chapter has fundamentally questioned Marx's uni-linear understanding of 
history, and the classical privileging of the industrial proletariat as the subject of history. 
It  has  opened  the  problem  of  other  histories  and  politics,  like  those  of  not  fully 
proletarianised peasants, who hover between capitalist debt and subsistence production, 
those  of  the  lumpenproletarians  surviving  through informal  economies,  criminalised 
activities  and  scavenging,  and  perhaps  even  of  the  petty  bourgeois  mode  of 
entrepreneurship which, as we will see, is under constant threat in Marx's analysis of the 
centralising tendencies of capitalism.
3.8. 'Crisis' in 19C German Economics
First and foremost the focus is on the extreme severity of crises of overproduction in the 
early 19th Century, as an effect of the productivity gains of industrialisation. Koselleck 
mentions the German economist Wilhelm Roscher, writing in 1849, for whom 'financial' 
or  'commercial  crisis'  are  inappropriate  terms,  given  'the  nature  of  the  disease'.  He 
suggests  instead  'production  crisis',  a  crisis  of  overproduction,  during  which 
consumption is stagnant, due to prior over-anticipation of demand which has lead to the 
excessive production of goods for which there not enough are customers, leading to a 
general  glut.  The  task  is  described  in  aetiological  terms  by  Roscher:  to  study  the 
'pathology of the disease' and to suggest 'appropriate therapy'.999
Already in 1844 Friedrich Engels explained the worsening crises with 'there is so much 
superfluous productive power that the great mass of the nation has nothing to live on, 
that the people starve from sheer abundance. For some considerable time England has 
found herself in this crazy position, in this living absurdity.'1000 Why? Because general 
998 Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx’s “Capital,” 1:300–307.
999 Ibid., 390.
1000Friedrich Engels, “Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy,” in MECW, vol. 3 (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1975), 435, http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/df-
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competition pushed firms into a mad race towards productivity gains, which lead to 
overproduction, unsold commodities, or commodities that if sold would have to be sold 
below current price, and which then lower the general level of profits. Thus firms expel 
labour into unemployed starvation  en masse.  Thus the price of wage labour falls, and 
expensive  machinery  can  operated  (or  even  replaced)  by  cheaper  workers.  As  the 
German  economist  Julius  Wolf  wrote  in  1892:  'Economic  crises  fulfil  a  mission  ... 
Because of their invigorating economic effects, one could almost say about crisis what 
Voltaire said about God, that one would have to invent them if they did not already 
exist...'.1001 Crisis, is thus a central means of regulation under capitalism.
jahrbucher/outlines.htm.
1001Quoted by Koselleck, “Crisis,” 393. Joseph Schumpeter would later echo this sentiment with his 
concept of 'creative destruction', even if he refused the usefulness of the concept of crisis to 
economics.
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chapter 4
4.0. Why think totality?
In The Politics of Time Peter Osborne lists three possible answers to the question 'why 
totalize history?' First, the transcendental response, which stresses the idea of a unified 
singular  conception  of  history  as  a  regulative  idea  implicit  in  historiography  and 
Enlightenment thought, providing history with an ultimate horizon of intelligibility and 
meaning. Then, the immanent, and classically Marxian response, that history itself is the 
'historically  emergent  product  of  deep-seated  social  processes  on  a  global  scale'. 
Thirdly,  Osborne  presents  the  answer  of  a  phenomenological  ontology  of  temporal  
existence,  according to which history can be conceived as the existential structure of 
human social in the world.1002 The concept of orientation introduced in chapter 2 has 
suggested  that  the  Marxian  understanding  of  immanent  totalisation  must  itself  be 
understood as a part of an orientating effort, as a reply to the problem explicitly posed 
by what  Osborne calls  the  phenomenological  approach.  But  the  obverse connection 
must also be made: the immanent totalisation of history provides a key to understand 
the  historicity  of  the  phenomenological  approach,  and  a  measure  of  its  potential 
untimeliness. 
Classically  Marxist  have  privileged  dialectics  as  a  method  capable  theorising  the 
systemic whole of capital, while recognizing that this method itself serves an orientating 
purpose.  Thus  Lukács  writes  that  the  dialectical  conception  of  totality 
[Totalitätsbetrachtung] is necessary for understanding and reproducing in thought the 
'[c]oncrete  totality  [which]  is  ...  the  category  that  governs  reality'  –  we  cannot 
understand 'history  as a unified process'  without dialectics.1003 Chris Arthur, recently, 
has  argued  that  dialectical  reason  is  needed  to  comprehend  the  interiority  of  fully 
1002Osborne, The Politics of Time, 30.
1003'Die konkrete Totalität ist also die eigentliche Wirklichkeitskategorie'. Lukács, History and Class 
Consciousness, 10. 12. See also appendix 0.0.
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developed capitalism. Like Lukács' Arthur's perspective is always that of the structure 
of a teleology striving for its full expression. In both cases the possibility of revolution 
is located within this self-reproducing dialectical totality, as the actual (Lukács1004) or 
potential  (Arthur1005)  capacity  of  the  proletariat  to  overcome  its  contradiction  with 
capital through a negation of capital itself. For Lukács and Arthur, the resource to think 
the making of history is not drawn from a Kantian subjective principle, but from within 
the logic of the whole. This is possible because the whole is thought of as contradictory,  
non-coinciding with itself, and a revolution is made possible through the positing of a 
tendency towards an exacerbation of these contradictions (as we saw in chapter 3). In 
other words, the 'revolutionary dialectic', as Lukács calls this materialist dialectic,1006 is 
predicated not just upon the totality, the internal articulation and interdependence of its 
parts, and its structural contradictions, but on the notion of the 'real tendencies of social 
evolution' expressed in the class consciousness of the proletariat, pressing within the 
whole towards the intensification of these internal contractions to the point of open 
antagonism.1007 If  the  condition  of  possibility  of  the  making  of  history  is  the  gap 
between subject and the historical process, the condition of a fundamental change in 
history is given by an analysis of the tendency of the historical process itself, i.e. by a 
certain teleological figure. 
4.1. Dialectical and historical materialism 
To return to Hegel's philosophy of nature in order to throw light on Marx's conception 
of history is of course to court controversy. Even to hold onto a notion of the use of 
dialectics in history is today, with a correct though unproductive and limiting caution, 
considered a dangerous flirt with historical teleology. I do indeed propose that we apply 
the  categories  of  natural  philosophy  to  the  philosophy  of  history.  Dialectics  as 
1004Lukács, Lenin, 11.
1005Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 244–5.
1006Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 2.
1007Ibid., 10. A important theme in the Chinese philosophical discussion preceding the cultural 
revolution is the critique of the Stalinist and early Maoist doctrine that communist societies are 
characterised by non-antagonistic contradiction. Against Mao's idea in On Contradiction that the 
relation between the proletariat and the peasantry is non-antagonistic and solvable through the 
mechanisation of collectivisation of agriculture, Shan Hong, for instance, saw the occassional 
external fights between the classes as signs that this supposedly non-antagonistic contradiction could 
'take on an antagonistic form in the period of its final resolution'. Hong Shan [山虹], “An Attempt to 
Discuss ‘Antagonism’ and ‘Antagonistic Contradictions,’” Philosophical Research [  哲学研究 ] 2 
(1957): 128–132.
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formulated in Engels' Dialectics of Nature was once the cornerstone of a 'Marxist world 
outlook' (Weltanschauung), based on the 'two sciences of Marxism', which purported to 
grasp the laws of both nature and history.1008 Thus Boguslavsky's  ACB of Dialectical  
Materialism,  following  Stalin's  brief  text  on  the  matter1009,  defined  dialectical 
materialism as 'the science of more general laws governing the development of nature,  
society and thought'. Historical materialism, in this definition, is a sub-set of dialectical 
materialism,  'a  philosophical  science  concerned  with  the  specific  laws  of  social  
development as distinct from the universal laws of being'.1010 Both these standard Soviet 
definitions of the two classical 'Marxist sciences' have been rejected over and again. 
Already Lukács, before his years of loyalty to the Soviet leadership, had refused that 
dialectics can be applied to nature, and asserted that it is a method limited 'to the realms 
of  history  and society'.1011 The  main  reason given by Lukács  is  that  dialectics  is  a 
method for dealing with the interaction of subject and object, theory and practice, and 
the historical determination of concepts in thought by changes in the reality underlying 
them,  whereas  science  is  strictly  objective,  theoretical  and  ahistorical  in  its 
epistemology. Lukács' dialectic will thus be able to historize science, but not do what 
science does: study the eternal laws of nature in its objectivity.1012 Furthermore, it has 
recently  been  argued   by  the  proponents  of  the  so-called  'Systematic  Dialectics'-
approach1013 that  Marx  and  Hegel's  dialectics  are  in  the  main  'concerned  with  the 
articulation of categories designed to conceptualise an existent concrete whole' rather 
than a 'historical dialectic'.1014 The former is concerned with the structures of a whole in 
its 'synchronic', or rather synchronizing, organisation. The temporality of the systematic 
1008'It is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are 
abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical 
development, as well as of thought itself'. Friedrich Engels, “Dialectics of Nature,” in MECW, vol. 
25 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), 356.
1009Josef Stalin, “2. Dialectical and Historical Materialism,” in History of The Communist Party of the  
Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (New York: International Publishers, 1939).
1010Boguslavsky's ABC of Dialectical Materialism, quoted by Elliott, Althusser - The Detour of Theory, 
87.
Althusser: historical materialism: science fo social formations. Dialectical materialism: science of 
theoretical practice.
1011Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 24. 
1012Ibid., 10.
1013Alternative names given to this set of new – i.e. post 1989 – dialectical reinterpretations of Marx, 
include 'the New Dialectic' and 'New Hegelian Marxism'. These draw a great deal on the dominant 
Marx's interpreation in the 1970s, the so-called Neue Marx Lektüre. See Arthur, New Dialectic and 
Marx’s Capital, 1. Roberto Fineschi, “Dialectic of the Commodity and Its Exposition: The German 
Debate in the 70s: a Personal Survey,” in Re-reading Marx - New Perspectives After the Critical 
Edition, ed. Riccardo Bellofiore and Roberto Fineschi (New York: Macmillan, 2009).Other 
contemporary authors writing in this tradition count Moishe Postone, Patrick Murrey and Geert 
Reuten.
1014Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 4.
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dialectic  is  that  of  the  stretched  present  of  the  interiority  of  a  process,  while  the 
historical (or historicist) dialectic is the retrospective ordering of diverse historical data 
according  to  a  dialectical  schema.  Chris  Arthur's  arguments  against  Engels' 
understanding of  Capital as a historical work, the idea that its first part deals with a 
stage of simple commodity production, is here a case in point which we shall return to 
in  chapter  6.1015 The  Marxisms  which  today  take  Marx's  Hegelian  moments  as 
productive rather than idealisms in need of purging, do so by refusing the application of 
dialectical thought to history and nature, i.e. by distancing themselves from Diamat and 
the grand philosophy of history of classical historical materialism. So what is dialectics, 
and how can we understand it as more than an aid of thought? Let me provide a list of 
three  definitions  of  the  Marxian  dialectic,  which  all  refuse  to  reduce  it  to  a  mere 
heuristic instrument, i.e. which ascribe to dialectical logics a certain actuality (i.e both 
'rational' and 'real', i.e. intelligible, ordered and effective).
Engels' 'laws of the dialectic'.1016
1. change of quantity into quality and vice versa. Hegel's logic of being
2. interpenetration of opposites. Hegel's logic of essence 
3. the law of the negation of the negation The whole system
Lukács' 'crucial determinants of dialectics'.1017
4. interaction of subject and object (social ontology)
5.  unity of theory and practice (method)
6. determination of thought determined by history (epistemology)
Arthur's 'characteristics of systematic dialectics':1018
7. the reflexivity of subject and object - epistemology
8. existent totalities - ontology
9. the interconnected categories of these totalities - method
1015Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, chapter 2.
1016Engels, “Dialectics of Nature”, chapter 2.
1017Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 24.
1018Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 5.
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We here see the range of applicability of dialectics gradually reduced. While for Engels 
the general laws of the dialectic apply to nature, history and thought, Lukács does not 
refuse the dialectic in the study of nature, per se, but insists that it cannot do justice to 
scientific practice, or account for the social determination of the latter.1019 Arthur, finally, 
limits the use of the dialectic to capitalism in its systematic nature: it is not  actual in 
history  nor  nature,  but  only  in  the  history  of  capitalism as  a  developed  system.1020 
Implicit in most of these points is the positing of a contradiction which does not entail  
logical or ontological  exclusivity, opposition, but some form of unity, in other worlds 
contradictions which are 'dialectical' rather than ruled by the law of non-contradiction. 
The two terms of each of these contradictions are not identical, they mutually negate 
each other, yet each is defined its its negative relation to the other. Some are mutually  
interdependent or inter-penetrating  (2, 4, 5, 7), and others are  mediated, part of the  
same whole (3, 6, 8, 9). But as the example of the transition of quality into quantity (1) 
shows, they are not symmetrical.1021
Both  these  characteristics  are  negated  by  the  Epicurean  notion  of  atoms  as  pre-
individual multiplicities. Atoms merely compose, their relations remain exterior, do not 
determine  or  redetermine  the  atoms  in  their  essence.  Each  atom  is  what  it  is; 
compositions give rise to qualities, existences and appearances, but they do not change 
or  abolish  the  intensity  or  swerve  of  the  atom.  This  is  a  world  without  mediation, 
without  interiority,  without  wholes,  without  dialectical  contradictions.  While  Marx 
considers atoms  insufficient and too abstract  for the purpose of explaining manifolds 
organised 'ideally' i.e. as organisms (chapter 2), he takes the  practical energy of such  
'abstraction' as the starting point for his political affirmation of generic potentiality. So 
what are we to do with this apparent contradiction in Marx, or, from the point of view of 
the atom, this singular swerve away from its organisation into an organism? Are we 
faced  with  a  choice  between  giving  up  the  dialectical  mapping  and  critique  of 
1019Georg Lukács, A Defence of History and Class Consciousness: Tailism and the Dialectic (London: 
Verso, 2002). In all fairness to Engels, it must be mentioned that his project is not to apply dialectics 
directly in the scientific study of nature, but rather to develop a systematic encyclopedic ordering of 
the results of science, for the sake of creating an overview sensitive to the 'internal logic of each 
individual area of [empirical] investigation'. Anti-Düring (1877), quoted by Schmidt, The Concept of  
Nature in Marx, 54.
1020Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, chapter 4.
1021While a thing has both a quantity and quality these can be indifferent to one another: Change in the 
quality of something (i.e. the temperature of water) does not measurably change its quantity or vice-
versa (i.e the addition of water to a puddle does not make it a pond until a certain point is reached). 
However, at a certain point – the boiling point or the point where the sun can no longer evaporate the 
water – there is a shift by which the new quantity causes shift in the former quality or the new 
quantity entails a qualitative change. Water has become steam, the puddle a pond. 
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systematic complexes or giving up the affirmation of multiplicity against any form of 
unity and subsumption? It  would seem that we must either accept the exteriority of 
nature  and  give  up  dialectics,  or  dialecticize  nature  with  history,  and  reject  the 
exteriority of nature. The debate about the relation between the exteriority of atoms, or 
forces in nature, and interiority of dialectical wholes, was long ago posed by Eugen 
Düring's in terms of the critique of dialectical contradiction, from the point of view of 
real opposition.1022 
This is not merely a matter of the correct method of science, or the metaphysics of 
nature, but a question of the construction of problems. Any problem is a relation or a 
complex of relations; to construct a problem as a contradiction is to read this relation as 
an essential relation, or to focus a relational complex around one central problematic 
relation. Here the parts cannot be severed without changing their essence, i.e. without 
loosing  their  existence.  Contradiction  always presupposes  the  existence  of  a  whole, 
characterised by mediation; in other words it positions the problematic relation squarely 
within its solution, a solution which is, however, unstable or dynamic given that the 
contradiction persists. To construct a problematic relation as an opposition means to 
posit the positivity of each element, and to understand their relation as inessential: in 
short the parts do not need one another to stay what they are; even if they influence one 
another in all manner of ways, the parts are perfectly capable of reproducing themselves 
outside  the  relation.  Any  solution  of  an  opposition  does  not  consider  a  whole  or 
mediation, but rather equilibrium, contract, agreement. Where the mode of struggle of 
contradictions is  mediated through interdependence (as class struggle or the master-
slave dialectic), the struggle of oppositions is unmediated and relentless (that of class 
war, open revolutionary struggle, or Carl Schmitt's enmity). 
For  Chris  Arthur,  amongst  others  following  the  idea  that  capital  is  objectively 
dialectical,  this  is  not  a  problem:  Marxism  becomes  a  critical,  negative  theory  of 
objective  falsity.1023 The  truth  which  provides  a  measure  for  this  critique  is  the 
affirmation that social labour is what produces the totality. But the question of nature 
1022Düring had written: 'The first and most important principle of the basic logical properties of being 
refers to the exclusion of contradiction. Contradiction is a category which can only appertain to a 
combination of thoughts, but not to reality. There are no contradictions in things, or, to put it another 
way, contradiction accepted as reality is itself the apex of absurdity... The antagonism of forces 
measured against each other and moving in opposite directions is in fact the basic form of all actions 
m the life of the world and its creatures. But this opposition of the directions taken by the forces of 
elements and individuals does not in the slightest degree coincide with the idea of absurd 
contradictions'. Quoted in Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring. Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in  
Science (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947) Part I, chapter XII.
1023Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 165.
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and natural science still remains unresolved, and its relation to the study of history and 
capital remains problematic.  
The result of the purging of idea of the dialectics of nature in Lukács, Colletti,  and 
Arthur, is that it  reproduces the separation between nature and history central to the 
division of labour between historical materialism and dialectical materialism, and either 
leaves the latter sphere to a very classical objectivist notion of science, science as the 
ahistorical and non-social description of nature, or engages in a humanist or historicist 
rejection  of  the  realist  attempts  by  natural  science  to  bracket  everything  human  or 
historical in the study of nature. Lukács more usefully argues that '[w]hen the ideal of 
scientific knowledge is applied to nature it simply furthers the progress of science',1024 
while maintaining that:  
Nature is a societal category. That is to say, whatever is held to be natural at 
any given stage of social development, however this nature is related to man 
and whatever form his involvement with it takes, i.e. nature's form, its content, 
its range and its objectivity are all socially conditioned.1025
The former argument for the the ideal of scientific knowledge orientates science to its 
object, nature, while the latter approach inscribes this ideal in history.
4.2. The non-dialectics of nature
Let us look at  two critiques aiming to purge Marxism of the idea of a dialectics of 
nature.  In  his  influential  1975  article  in  the  New  Left  Review,  'Marxism  and  the 
Dialectic', Lucio Colletti framed this question as a deep aporia of the relation between 
Marxism and science. Where for Colletti science is based on the Aristotelian principle 
of non-contradiction,  Marxism, as we have seen,  seems fundamentally based on the 
notion  of  dialectical contradiction.  Unlike  logical  contradictions  this  real,  material 
contradiction  entails  an  unity  where  the  opposite  terms  co-exist  even  in  their 
contradiction:  they  are  different  conflicting  or  incompatible  moments  of  the  same 
actuality, the contradiction is essential. Colletti quotes Kant's 1763 article The Attempt  
to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy:
1024Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 10.
1025Ibid., 234.
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In a real opposition [...] one of the opposed determinations can never be the 
contradictory contrary of the other [...], since in such a case the contrast would 
be of a logical character.... In every real opposition the predicates both have to 
be positive.... In this way the things of which one is considered as the negative 
of the other are both, considered in themselves, positive.1026
Following Kant Colletti insists that there can be no contradictions in reality; what is 
classically  taken  as  examples  of  real  contradictions  in  Marxism  following  Engels 
Dialectic of Nature (+ and -, differential and integral, action and reaction, positive and 
negative electricity, combination and dissociation of atoms1027) are really 'examples of 
non-contradictory contrariety'.1028 In  these cases,  there is  no need for  mediation,  the 
question  is  the  analysis  of  the  attraction,  repulsion  or  equilibrium  of  positives.1029 
Science,  based  on  mathematics  and  the  logical  principle  of  non-contradiction  is 
applicable to nature precisely because it is discrete, exterior to itself in time and space: 
no two entities can occupy the same space and time. Thus, Colletti writes, 
what 'dialectical materialists' describe as  contradictions  in nature are, in fact, 
contraries, oppositions that are ohne Widerspruch; and [...] therefore Marxism 
can certainly on on speaking of conflicts and of objective oppositions, without 
thereby being forced to declare war on the principle of (non-)contradiction and 
so break with science.1030
However,  Colletti  goes  on  to  show  that  the  notion  of  dialectical  contradiction  is 
absolutely central  and indispensable to Marx's theory of capitalism and its crises.1031 
1026Kant quoted by Lucio Colletti, “Marxism and the Dialectic,” New Left Review I, no. 93 (October 
1975): 7.
1027Coletti takes this list from Lenin, but shows how it is also active in Mao (p.10). Lenin speaks of 
dialectical contradiction, in the following terms: 'The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, 
perhaps, to say their “unity,”—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not 
particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the 
contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature 
(including mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 
“self-movement,” in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a 
unity of opposites. Development is the “struggle” of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or 
two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease 
and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into 
mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).' V. I. Lenin, Lenin Collected Works  
Volume 38: Philosophical Notebooks, 1st ed. (Lawrence & Wishart, 1961).
1028Colletti, “Marxism and the Dialectic,” 10.
1029As an aside, we can note that the ontology of market exchange has a similar logical distribution: 
individual market actors, represented by the price tags of their commodities, attract or repel one 
another, resulting in brief encounters, which overall create an equilibrium of supply and demand.
1030Colletti, “Marxism and the Dialectic,” 14. 
1031He does so  in a loyal and enlightening reading of passages of Capital and Theories of Surplus-Value  
to which I will return in chapter 7.
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Against  Diamat  capitalism is  not contradictory 'because it  is  real and any reality  is 
contradictory',  but  it  is  contradictory  because  it  is  an  upside-down,  inverted  reality, 
following Marx's critique of the Hegelian dialectic. This is exactly the line the line taken 
by the systematic dialectics approach: 'the very fact that capital is homologous with the 
[Hegelian] Idea is a reason for criticising it as an inverted reality in which self-moving 
abstractions have the upper hand over human beings'.1032 For Colletti the fact that Marx's 
theory of capital cannot do without the notion of dialectical contradiction and the idea 
that science is itself based on the very exclusion of the possibility of such contradiction, 
means that Marxism cannot be a science, but something else: at worst religion, perhaps 
philosophy, at best social science in search for its 'true foundation'.1033
In Capital Marx has a very clear reference to a dialectical contradiction in nature:
We  saw  in  a  former  chapter  that  the  exchange  of  commodities  implies 
contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The further development of 
the commodity does not abolish these contradictions, but rather provides the 
form within which they have room to move. This is, in general, the way in 
which real contradictions  are  resolved.  For instance,  it  is  a contradiction to 
depict  one body as constantly falling towards another and at  the same time 
constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion within which 
this contradiction is both realized and resolved.1034
In a recent article Thomas Weston has recently done much to illuminate Marx's use of 
this analogy.1035 To properly investigate the concept of dialectical contradiction in the 
study of nature it would be necessary to discuss not only the difference between Kant's 
and Hegel's theory of attraction and repulsion, but also the theorisation in both of the 
differential calculus, a central use of which is the calculation of orbital paths. The idea 
of classical mechanics, which Kant supports, is that there are two forces in the moving 
object:  attraction  and  repulsion,  or  rather,  the  tangential  vector  and  the  inward 
acceleration.  This is for Hegel a contradiction; in his interpretation Kant makes this 
mistake  of  hypostacising  these  two  forces,  when  there  is  in  fact  only  one  actual  
movement, that of the ellipsis. But, Hegel knows, this positing of two forces is a useful 
1032Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 8, see also 165..
1033Simlilarly Alfred Schmidt, drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, against Engels: 'If matter is 
presented as being, within itself, dialectically structured, it ceases to be matter in the sense required 
by the exact sciences'. Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, 59.
1034Marx, Capital: Volume I, 198.
1035Thomas Weston, “Marx on the Dialectics of Elliptical Motion,” Historical Materialism 20, no. 4 
(January 1, 2012): 3–38.
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maneuvre, allows the differential calculus:  dx/dy. Thus the tangential velocity and the 
inward  accelation  of  heavenly  body can  calculated  as  functions  of  one  another  (in 
approximation towards 0). However,  for Hegel, the truth of this  contradiction is the 
movement itself; we are thus dealing with a contradiction which is not strictly speaking 
real,  unless one ontologises mathematics – a maneuvre which Hegel  is  very hostile 
to.1036
4.3. Natural, intrinsic ends in Kant and Hegel
Kant speaks of 'natural ends' in relation the intrinsic purposefulness of a natural object. 
The parts of the thing combine of themselves into the unity of a whole by being 
reciprocally cause and effect of their form’. Here we are dealing with the idea 
of a whole which reciprocally determines the parts and the form not in a way 
which  allows  us  to  judge  it as  a  cause,  but  in  a  way  which  grounds  the 
cognition  of  it  as  a  systematic  unity,  a  composition  of  a  manifold,  a  'self-
organized being.1037
The difference from Kant being that for Hegel the 'intrinsic' teleologies of nature are not 
just useful postulates, but ontologically real.1038 
To see  purpose  as  inherent  within  natural  objects,  is  to  grasp  nature  in  its 
simple  determinateness.  e.g.  the  seed  of  a  plant,  which  contains  the  real 
potential of everything pertaining to the tree, and which as purposeful activity 
is therefore orientated solely towards self-preservation.  Aristotle  had already 
noticed this notion of purpose in nature. and he called the activity the nature of 
a thing. This is the true teleological view [as opposed to the externality Kantian 
perspective],  for  it  regards  nature  in  its  proper  animation  as  free.  and  is 
therefore the highest view of nature.1039
1036See Hegel, Science of Logic, 1969, 174–84, and 342–43.
1037Kant, Critique of Judgement, 201, §63.
1038Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel Freedom, Truth and History, 162.
1039Hegel, Philosophy of Nature I, 196, §245.
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4.4. Alientated thought knowing itself
To understand the non-affirmative character of the writings in systematic dialectics, one 
would  have  understand why thought  is  presented  in  purely  negative  terms.  For  the 
systematic dialectic abstraction in thought is the effect of the alienating real abstractions 
of  capital  or  religion.  Since  all  abstraction  is  seen  to  be  alienating,  separating  and 
subsumptive,  no affirmation is possible in thought,  only negation,  produced through 
immanent  critique.  The  idea  is  that  within  our  abstract  mental  labour  our  self-
knowledge and critiques can only be knowledge of our alienation. In philosophy, the 
suggestion seems to be, we can only get as far as what Marx in his critique of Hegel 
called  ’the essence of  philosophy  –  the alienation  of  man  who  knows  himself,  or 
alienated [entäußerte]  science thinking itself‘.1040 What we can hope to grasp within 
what we (with a view to keep alive a spectre of another practice of philosophy) can call 
alienated philosophy -  beyond the questions, the concepts, and the ideas per se (i.e. 
beyond our specialisation and expertise) - is this process of their becoming, as activity, 
and not merely as activity, but as social activity. The immediate task of philosophy – in 
the  service  of  history  establishing  the  truth  of  this  world  –  is  to  ‘unmask  self-
estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-estrangement has 
been unmasked’.1041 
For  Marx,  however,  this  essentially  critical  project  was  not  sufficient.  Under  the 
division of labour  all  labours including philosophy are not immediately social,  they 
exist  in  relative  separation.  They  produce  and  are  produced  in  estrangement  and 
alienation, which no speculative synthesis can abolish. The abolition of philosophy does 
not go through critique, but through a construction:  ‘[y]ou cannot transcend [aufheben] 
philosophy without realising [verwirklichen] it.’1042 Marx was adamant that criticism is 
not enough; material force must be overthrown with material force, that of weapons or 
of  the  masses  gripped  by  theory:  ‘Philosophy  cannot  realise  itself  without  the 
transcendence [Aufhebung] of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself 
without the realisation of philosophy’.1043 The promise of philosophy is here nothing but 
the  promise  contained  in  the  process  of  social  labour,  namely  the  overcoming  of 
1040Marx, “1844 Manuscripts,” 386, Translation amended.
1041Marx, “Critique of Hegel. Introduction,” 250.
1042Ibid. Note that the German verb verwirklichen, just as the equivalent noun Wirklichkeit (‘reality’) 
comes from the verb Wirken which simultaneously means ‘to work’, ‘to be active’, ‘to effect’, 
whereas in English ‘reality’ (from Latin res, ‘thing’, ‘fact’, ‘matter’) is a stable state of being or 
matter.
1043Ibid., 257.
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alienation, and the realisation of communism, through as ‘the positive supersession of 
private property  as  human self-estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the 
human essence through and for humankind’.1044 As estrangement is a function of social 
labour as a whole, emancipation must be thought as a total overcoming.
However, it soon became obvious to Marx himself that philosophy itself considered as a 
specialised  activity  could  not  be  the  driving  force  or  igniting  spark  of  any  real 
communist movement, but merely a moment within such a movement. In other words, 
the  alienation  of  philosophy  consists  first  of  all  in  its  social  form (its  institutions, 
pedagogies, public dissemination, etc.) rather than its content. No amount of humanist, 
materialist, communist watchwords can guarantee more than an imaginary overcoming 
of alienation, unless part of a practice, a movement. Apart from communist movements 
(in  the precise sense Marx and Engels gave it  as the real movement abolishing the 
present  –  alienated  –  state  of  things)  these  words  remain  mere  semblances  or 
placeholders of radicality, and most valuably and less feebly, symbolic representations 
of the real antagonisms of society. If the content of radical philosophy ’unmasks’ self-
estrangement, as abstract form and activity it performs and produces what it unmasks. 
To the question why there is still Marxist philosophy after Marx, Adorno provides the 
following answer:  ‘[p]hilosophy,  which  once  seemed obsolete,  lives  on because  the 
moment to realize it was missed’.1045 In many ways the philosophical moment of post-
modernism  (arising  as  a  collective  mood  of  disillusioned  radical  soixante-huitard 
intellectuals) seemed to follow Adorno’s injunction: ‘Having broken its pledge to be as 
one  with  reality  or  at  the  point  of  realization,  philosophy  is  obliged  ruthlessly  to 
criticize itself’.1046 However, if the deconstruction of philosophy, and the demonstrations 
of  its  contingency and the  groundlessness  of  its  ‘play’ undid  some of  philosophy’s 
internal  determinations  (including  its  status  as  science)  it  did  not  undo  the  social 
determination of philosophy as an alienated  activity.1047 Philosophy is only overcome 
when it is actualised, the negation of philosophy perpetuates it. No longer living, not yet 
dead,  critical  philosophy haunts us.  The point,  further,  is  that  philosophy cannot  be 
overcome, by giving up philosophising –  except by individuals who might move into 
the sociology of knowledge, political economy, gardening or sex work. Is it not exactly 
1044Marx, “1844 Manuscripts,” 348
1045Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 3.
1046Ibid.
1047But perhaps the success of the project of dethronement, or rather the utility and appropriability of the 
narrative and argumentative ammunition it provided for project of the devolution of philosophy 
departments, reinforced this project, spurred it along and blunted the resistance to it.
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what is at stake in William James suggestion that the best way to deal with Hegel, since 
one cannot beat him, is simply to ignore him? And in Foucault’s question: ‘We have to 
determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed 
against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us.'1048 Here, if we 
want to avoid fetishising Hegel or his system, the proper materialist question is:  what 
are  the  (persistent)  social  conditions  -  beyond  the  traditionalism  of  philosophical  
education (itself not a convincing answer) – for the constant reappearance of Hegel,  
not simply at the end of the flight, but in the very flight itself? The short answer, if we 
might attempt one, is capitalism.  If philosophy can no longer hold claim to be at one 
with reality, nor to be at the point of its realization it haunts us not only because in its  
being  abolished  without  being  realized  its  promise  persists,  but  because  its  social 
conditions insists. This conditions, once more, can only be abolished in practice, part of 
which is affirmative, organising thought. 
4.5. On the method of Capital 
If,  however,  we  read  the  theoretical  construction  of  the  concept  of  the  mode  of 
production  in  The  German  Ideology  and  A  Contribution as  the  hypothesis,  that 
bourgeois society functions as a systematic totality, we have a sketch for a research 
programme rather  than interesting speculation or valuable cognitive mapping.  If  we 
assume a systematic totality as a hypothesis the starting point of our inquiry cannot be 
the system itself, but must be a moment immanent to the system. As such the moment 
with  which  we  begin  is  abstracted  from  its  postulated  context,  which  must  be 
‘reconstructable’ in practice from this point, if the assumption of the system is correct. 
Thus we must rise from the abstract to the concrete (the system in its concrete reality),  
from one system-determined part to the system which is then reached as a complex 
concentration of many determinations.1049
In Capital the premise that the investigation must begin with the categories of political 
economy  itself  is  preserved  from  Grundrisse  and  A Contribution.  Thus  Capital  is 
subtitled ‘A Critique of Political Economy’, and as such it is a critique in the Kantian 
sense, namely an inquiry into the conditions of possibility of something given, namely 
classical political economy. But where Marx presupposes economics as a discipline, he 
1048Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2002), 235.
1049It is thus not a sequence of more and more complex models (as in neoclassical economics, 
econometrics), but a progressive development of the same object, capitalism. Arthur, New Dialectic  
and Marx’s Capital, 18.
 356
does  not  take  for  granted  the  reality  of  its  object,  that  is,  bourgeois  economy as  a 
systematic  whole.  In  this  sceptical  attitude  the  method  of  abstraction  comes  to  its 
correct application,  not as the construction of a unity through the abstraction of the 
similar  from the different (Feuerbach),  or as a thought-synthesis  bracketing a  social 
whole,  but  as  an  abstraction  of  the  ‘elementary  cell’ from its  organism in  order  to 
establish the logico-sytematic relations of the assumed social ‘organism’ itself.1050 Thus 
the starting point, the commodity, is double: It is a category of bourgeois economics 
and a really existing entity, namely an object exchanged for another. 
The wealth of societies in  which the capitalist  mode of production prevails 
appears as an “immense collection of commodities”; the individual commodity 
appears  as  its  elementary form.  Our investigation therefore begins  with the 
analysis of the commodity.1051
However,  we  cannot  thereby  take  the  mode  of  production  to  be  given  and  the 
commodity to be a mere appearance. Put polemically we need to reverse the terms: the 
commodity  is  what  is  given,  and  the  mode  of  production  remains  merely  the 
hypothetical system in which the commodity is a part. Indeed, this whole can only be 
reached through the laborious construction of the system starting with the microscopic 
procedure of investigating its presumed elementary cell.
What  we  will  be  looking  at  in  our  critical  exposition  is  the  analysis  and systems-
construction starting with the object as such. The method involved can be described as 
the  move  from  a  thought-synthesis  (the  hypothetical  mode  of  production)  over  an 
analytic abstraction (the elementary form, the commodity) to a systematic construction 
(the analysis of the form of value). In so far as this construction is correct we have 
moved from a thought-synthesis to a real synthesis. Our main instrument has been what 
Marx  calls  ‘the  power  of  abstraction’.1052 Thus  we  are  no  longer  dealing  with  the 
always-already of a social totality, but with a systematic whole which can be developed 
from  one  part.  This  leaves  aspects  of  the  social  to  be  left  uncounted  for,  in  an 
empirically  determinate ‘relative autonomy’  vis-à-vis  a whole with an internal  logic 
based on necessities. This is the reason that Marx, in the Preface to the first edition of 
Capital, can say that the object of study is not the degree of development of 'the social 
antagonisms that spring from the natural laws of capitalist production’, but rather is 
1050Marx, Capital: Volume I, 90.
1051Ibid., 125.
1052Marx, Grundrisse, 101. Marx, Capital: Volume I, 90.
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‘these laws themselves, of these tendencies winning their  way through and working 
themselves out with iron necessity.’1053 
A very emphatic note of point must be made here: because Capital focuses on analysing 
the  logic of  capital  from the perspective  of  capital  the  openness  of  the  problem of 
proletarian reproduction and of class antagonism is glossed over. That Marx's abstracts 
from a very urgent and open problem in order to study the organic of capital,  is of 
course clear to him: 
Labour  capacity  appears  ...  as  absolute  poverty  ..  it  is  itself  merely  the 
possibility  of  labour,  available  and  confined  within  the  living  body  of  the 
worker, a possibility which is, however, utterly separated from all the objective 
conditions of its realisation, ... Since actual labour is the appropriation of nature 
for the satisfaction of human needs, the activity through which the metabolism 
between man and nature is mediated, to denude labour capacity of the means of 
labour, the objective conditions for the appropriation of nature through labour, 
is to denude it, also, of the means of life ... life is therefore absolute poverty as 
such, ... has his needs in actuality, whereas the activity of satisfying them is 
only  possessed  by  him  as  a  nonobjective  capacity  (a  possibility)  confined 
within his own subjectivity. As such, conceptually speaking, he is a PAUPER, 
he is the personification and repository of this capacity which exists for itself, 
in isolation from its objectivity.1054
       
1053Marx, Capital: Volume I, 91.
1054Marx, MECW 30, 30:40–41.
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chapter 5
5.0. On simple commodity production
The  classical  argument  that  Marx  was  proposing  an  abstract  analysis  of  historical 
simple commodity production is found in Engels' classical logico-historical reading of 
Capital.  According to Engels the logical categories of the presentation, represent, in 
idealised form, the actual process of history. Engels' famously read the first chapters of 
Capital  as chapters describing 'simple commodity production', a non-capitalist market 
production out of which developed, eventually, the capitalist market. This interpretation 
has been thoroughly criticised by the combined efforts of the proponents of the 'New' or 
'Systematic Dialectic'.1055 Thus Chris Arthur has shown that this concept is foreign to 
Marx, who 'never used the term ... in his life' –  and that  Capital  does not deal with a 
historical  sequence  of  more  and  more  complex  social  formations,  but  with  the 
development  of  the  same  object,  capitalism,  from  its  most  abstract  concept  (the 
commodity) to the more concrete, complex articulation of concepts in Volume III.1056 
Indeed, the commodity as the general form of appearance of wealth of a society, is only 
possible, as Arthur points out, with the generalisation of commodity circulation, which 
in  turn depends  on  generalised  commodity  production.1057 Ironically  Ernest  Mandel, 
whom Arthur  strongly criticizes  for  having an Engelian position,  makes  exactly  the 
point that only capitalism is characterised by generalised commodity production and the 
law of value. He does so precisely to defend the focus on the emergence of capitalism 
from commodity exchange.1058 However, this apparent disagreement is perhaps not a 
necessary theoretical disagreement, as much a divergence of theoretical interests: while 
Mandel  is  attempting  to  describe  the  historical  emergence  of  capitalism,  Arthur  is 
1055Fred Moseley, ed., Marx’s Method in Capital: A Re-Examination (Prometheus Books, 1993), 1. See 
also Jim Kinkaid's 'The New Dialectic' in Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis, eds., Critical  
Companion to Contemporary Marxism (Haymarket Books, 2009), 385–6.
1056Arthur, New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 18–19.
1057Ibid., 45. 
1058Mandel, “Introduction,” 14–15.
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interested in the reading of chapter 1 of Marx's Capital. In making this argument with 
compelling evidence,  he is raising an important point about the  qualitative  difference 
introduced by the emergence of the capitalist mode of production. 
However,  Arthur's polemical headline 'Dialectical Development versus Linear Logic' 
fails  to recognize the question of emergence as a legitimate one,  and pre-empts the 
whole discussion by posing it in terms of logic and philology. He thus misses that the 
question of emergence, while informed by capital logic, is not a question of logic, but of 
complex historical time: 'a whole series of social and political developments influences 
this birth process of modern capitalism, hastening it, slowing it down, or combining it 
with  trends  going  in  different  directions'.1059 Further,  as  Ian  Hunt  points  out  in  his 
critique of Arthur's book, 'the growth of not-yet-capitalist market relations could have 
played  a  part  in  the  rise  of  capitalism  from  the  dissolution  of  feudalism'.1060 To 
understand the process of emergence creates an orientation within totalisation rather 
than totality. 
5.1. The categories of Capital are systematic, not historical
The danger, to be precise, of the projection of  systematic  concepts onto pre-capitalist 
contexts is the loss of conceptual specificity. To avoid this the concepts developed in the 
critique of the capitalist mode of production would have to be re-developed in the new 
systematic context of non-capital modes of production in the way Capital does for the 
capitalist mode of production. Marx does not begin Capital with the system/totality of 
the  capitalist  mode  of  production,  but  with  the  appearance  of  such  a  system (the 
commodity);  he  then  develops  the  system  systematically,  starting  with  its  defining, 
dominant  practices,  commodity  production and  exchange.  However,  economic 
historians and historical sociologists often seem to simply presuppose the systematicity 
of non-capitalist modes of production, or, in other terms, to apply the concept of totality 
or system  ahistorically and immediately,  hypostisising it,  or taking it as a regulative 
ideal for the ordering of historical data. An example is Perry Anderson's writing about 
'general  crisis'  of  the economic  'system'  in  Medieval  Europe,  in  terms of  'structural 
1059Ibid., 15
1060Ian Hunt, “The Economic Cell-Form,” Historical Materialism 13, no. 2 (2005): Jacques Bidet puts 
this non-identity of market and capitalism in stronger, if theoretical rather than historical term. 
Jacques Bidet, “The Dialectician’s Interpretation of Capital,” Historical Materialism 13, no. 2 
(2005): 129.
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contradictions',  'monetary  crisis'.  One  great  difference,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
reproduction, between such a crisis and modern capitalist crises is that trade – especially 
long distance trade – and money was only marginal to the daily reproduction of the vast 
majority of the populations of the Occidental peninsula of Eurasia.1061 As Jairus Banaji 
notes: 
Unless ‘relations of production’ are constructed and defined to have the sort of 
reach and conceptual power that can ‘integrate’ all the fundamental phenomena 
or  movements  that  social  and economic historians  deal  with as  their  staple 
(conquests, demography, monetary expansion, historical ruptures like the great 
transition from T’ang to Sung, crises within regimes such as the state of Russia 
at  the  death  of  Ivan  the  Terrible  in  1585,  major  ecological  changes,  etc.), 
Marxist  historians  who work on anything other  than capitalism will  simply 
continue  to  pay  lip  service  to  historical  materialism,  as  Anderson  does  in 
Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism in some striking demonstrations of bad 
theory.  By  ‘bad  theory’  I  mean  the  substitution  of  purely  theoretical 
explanations for historical research and/or recourse to a theory that is  itself 
simply a string of abstractions.1062
5.2. On the unevenness of the emergence of capitalism
Indeed, Marx notes, this experiment in capitalist manufacture was reversible as Italy's 
commercial supremacy was annihilated by the development of the world market in the 
late 15th Century. 'The urban workers were driven en messe  into the countryside, and 
gave a previously unheard-of impulse to small-scale cultivation, carried on in the form 
of market gardening'.1063 The unevenness of this process might be read as an important 
corrective to the unilinear comment on the destructive power of trade, made 20 years 
earlier in the  Manifesto:  'The bourgeoisie ... draws all ... nations into civilisation. The 
cheap prices  of  commodities  are  the  heavy artillery  with  which  it  batters  down all 
Chinese walls.... It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois 
mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their 
midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves'.1064
1061Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to feudalism (London: Verso Editions, 1978), 199–209.
1062Banaji, Theory as History, 7–8.
1063Marx, Capital: Volume I, 900. 
1064Marx and Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” 112.
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5.3. Slavery and surplus-value
The reproduction of the slave – even his or her life time – becomes a business decision 
of the slave-owner, which under the capitalist system means an extreme intensification 
of slave labour to keep up with the demands of the capitalist mode of production on the 
world market.
Hence the Negro labour in the southern states of the American Union preserved 
a moderately patriarchal character as long as production was chiefly directed to 
the  satisfaction  of  immediate  local  requirements.  But  in  proportion  as  the 
export of cotton became of vital interest to those states, the over-working of the 
Negro, and sometimes the consumption of his life in seven years of labour, 
became a factor  in  a calculated and calculating system. It  was no longer  a 
question of obtaining from him a certain quantity of useful products, but rather 
of the production of surplus-value itself.1065
5.4. The role of national debt in primitive accumulation
In a passage of particular contemporary relevance Marx writes:
The  only  part  of  so-called  national  wealth  that  actually  enters  into  the 
possession of a modern nation is – the national debt'. 'The public debt becomes 
one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As with the stroke 
of  an  enchanter's  wand,  it  endows  unproductive  money  with  the  power  of 
creation and thus turns it into capital, without forcing it to expose itself to the 
troubles  and  risks  inseparable  from its  employment  in  industry  or  even  in 
usury.  The state's  creditors  actually  give  nothing  away,  for  the  sum lent  is 
transformed into public bonds, easily negotiable, which go on functioning in 
their hands just as so much hard cash would. But furthermore, and quite apart 
from  the  class  of  idle  rentiers  thus  created,  the  improvised  wealth  of  the 
financiers who play the role of middlemen between the government and the 
nation, and the tax-farmers, merchants and private manufacturers, for whom a 
good part of every national loan performs the service of a capital fallen from 
1065Marx, Capital: Volume I, 345.
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heaven, apart from all these  people, the national debt has given rise to joint-
stock  companies,  to  dealings  in  negotiable  effects  of  all  kinds,  and  to 
speculation : in a word, it has given rise to stock-exchange gambling and the 
modern bankocracy.1066
5.5. Some notes on history and the time of revolution
The working assumption of economics reproduce an anthropology or a myth of origins 
and betray a certain desire,  and forgetting,  an eagerness to legitimate.  However, the 
question remains in what sense Marx's own conception is historical, and what desires 
his historical narrative betray and might produce. The textbook understanding is that 
Marx knows that bourgeois society has a past, that its categories are not eternal, and 
also that the methodological bracketing of history misses that history is not only the 
past,  but  the  future,  a  future  that  is  bound  to  be  not  merely  quantitatively  but 
qualitatively different: capitalism did not always and will not always exist. The valences 
of such narratives are well known, and might variously produce a longing for the pre-
capitalist commons, a celebration of bourgeois society for its overcoming of feudalism, 
or a notion of a future in which the powers held back by capitalism are finally set 
free1067, or a future which is really no future but rather a break with capitalism's constant 
projection  of  futurity  as  growth  of  the  ever-selfsame.1068 Beyond  nostalgia, 
progressivism, catastrophism, utopia and hope, this chapter will ask the question of the 
historicity of capitalism from the point of view of a strategic orientation in relation to 
the problems of our and Marx's time. Perhaps the point is not to discuss the temporality 
of the subjective orientation to transition, but to consider the struggles and compositions 
that can be made possible in a given conjuncture in relation to capital's problems, and 
then to see in what specific sense their emergent temporality would be untimely.
Marx's  engagement  with  history  as  actuality  is  divided  between  the  synchronic 
engagement  with  the  temporalisations  of  the  present,  the  time  of  the  mode  of 
production,  first  of  all,  on the  one hand,  and the  diachronic  analysis  of  transitions  
between modes of production, on the other. Furthermore (apart from the logical time of 
the transitions outlined in the chapter  on 'The Historical Tendency'  in  Capital -  see 
1066Ibid., 919.
1067See the recent Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek, “# Accelerate - Manifesto for an Accelerationist 
Politics,” 2013.
1068Berardi, After the Future.
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chapter 4, above), there might be a third time in Marx, that of revolution. Both present 
and transition it does not merely oscillate between the two but expresses an organised 
practical energy, which is perhaps not best described as against or with the history - as 
we know history is a constantly attempted synchronisation of contradicting times (both 
a general direction and against itself).  Revolutionary time might be characterised as 
with  or against the times  (the time of the proletariat  against  the globalising time of 
capital,  the  time  of  the  proletariat  with  the  time  of  capital  as  it  goes  into  crisis). 
However,  my  thesis  is  that  there  is  no  revolution  without  what  we  could  call 
untimeliness, an organised practical energy which is its own time – perhaps within the 
movement  that  negates  or  affirms the  unfolding time of  the  historical  process.  The 
problematic of this chapter is not to discover the right form of historical projection, or 
the facts about the genesis of capitalism, but of understanding the pre-history of the 
present in terms of the inauguration of a certain problem we are still  living,  and to 
understand  this  as  much  as  it  opens  for  a  conceptualisation  of  the  untimeliness of 
revolutionary time.
5.6. The factors blocking capitalist development
Capitals already existed in larger towns in Italy and Flanders before the capitalist mode 
of production developed. However, they were 'prevented'  by their environment from 
growing  and  creating  the  conditions  for  their  own  expansion.  Certain  conditions 
blocked the generalisation of capitalist  production and circulation.  For instance, there 
was no centralised state capable of enforcing labour and commercial contracts.1069 Marx 
also notes the following:  '
The rules of the guilds ... deliberately hindered the transformation of the single 
master  into  a  capitalist,  by  placing  very  strict  limits  on  the  number  of 
apprentices and journeymen he could employ. ... The guilds zealously repelled 
every encroachment by merchants' capital .... A merchant could buy every kind 
of commodity, but he could not buy labour as a commodity.1070 
Jameson  notes  the  similarity  of  this  logic  to  Pierre  Clastres'  work  on  the  defences 
against state-formation in pre-state societies.1071
1069Marx, Capital: Volume I, 902, 935.
1070Ibid., 479.
1071Jameson, Representing Capital, 82.
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5.7. The conjunctural, strategic approach
I have characterised the historical politics of the systematic dialectics approach in the 
previous  chapter.  To illustrate  the  strategic  and conjunctural  approach by picking a 
rather strict expression of it – Althusser's writings on Machiavalli could be another – we 
read this passage from Mario Tronti: 
To wish to systematise everything within the rational order of a programmed 
development is the short path to being left behind. One does not control time; 
one uses it. ... change, the rapidity of change is not only in the social structures 
but also, and even more so, in the social subjects. It is not only the terrain of 
the political struggle that changes, but we ourselves, the bearers of political 
action.1072
1072Mario Tronti, Il Tempo Della Politica, trans. Matteo Mandarini (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1980), 50–
51. - I would like to thank Matteo Mandarini for bringing this passage to my attention. 
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chapter 6
6.0. Marx and the work-ethic
In the Grundrisse Marx writes:
The Times of November 1857 contains an utterly delightful cry of outrage on 
the part of a West-Indian plantation owner. This advocate analyses with great 
moral indignation—as a plea for the re-introduction of Negro slavery—how the 
Quashees1073 (the free blacks of Jamaica) content themselves with producing 
only what is strictly necessary for their own consumption, and, alongside this 
'use value', regard loafing (indulgence and idleness) as the  real luxury good; 
how they do not care a damn for the sugar and the fixed capital invested in the 
plantations,  but  rather  observe  the  planters'  impending  bankruptcy  with  an 
ironic grin of malicious pleasure, and even exploit their acquired Christianity 
as an embellishment for this mood of malicious glee and indolence. They have 
ceased to be slaves, but not in order to become wage labourers, but, instead, 
self-sustaining peasants working for their own consumption. As far as they are 
concerned, capital does not exist as capital, because autonomous wealth as such 
can exist only either on the basis of  direct  forced labour, slavery, or  indirect  
forced labour, wage labour. Wealth confronts direct forced labour not as capital, 
but rather as  relation of domination [Herrschaftsverhältnis]; thus, the relation 
of domination is the only thing which is reproduced on this basis, for which 
wealth itself has value only as gratification, not as wealth itself, and which can 
therefore never create general industriousness. (We shall return to this relation 
of slavery and wage labour.)
Marx discussion must be referred back to Thomas Carlyle, whose text on the matter of 
1073
Thomas Carlyle, “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question,” Fraser’s Magazine for Town and 
Country XL, no. February (1849): 534–5.
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the 'quashees' show the very close connection between the protestant work-ethic and 
racism:
And  now  observe,  my  friends,  it  was  not  Black  Quashee,  or  those  he 
represents, that made those West India islands what they are, or can, by any 
hypothesis, be considered to have the right of growing pumpkins there. ... If 
Quashee will not honestly aid in bringing out those sugars, cinnamons, and 
nobler products of the West India islands, for the benefit of all mankind, then, I 
say,  neither  will  the powers permit  Quashee to continue growing pumpkins 
there for his own lazy benefit, but will sheer him out, by and by, like a lazy 
gourd  overshadowing rich  ground --  him,  and  all  that  partake  with  him -- 
perhaps in a very terrible manner. ... The gods are long-suffering; but the law, 
from the beginning, was, He that will not work shall perish from the earth -- 
and the patience of the gods has limits!'
E.P. Thompson's, on the other hand, provides a nice corrective to this narrative, and one 
that  will  still  have  resonance  for  anyone  familiar  with  regions  only  marginally 
subsumed by capitalist production: 
If the theorists of growth wish us to say so, then we may agree that the older 
popular  culture  was  in  many  ways  otiose,  intellectually  vacant,  devoid  of 
quickening, and plain bloody poor. Without time-discipline we could not have 
the insistent energies of industrial man; and whether this discipline comes in 
the forms of Methodism, or of Stalinism, or of nationalism, it will come to the 
developing world. What needs to be said, is not that one way of life is better 
than the other, but that this is a place of the most far-reaching conflict; that the 
historical record is not a simple one of neutral  and inevitable  technological 
change, but is also one of exploitation and of resistance to exploitation; and 
that values stand to be lost as well as gained.1074 
My familiarity with such regions comes from lifelong friendships in Ifakara, a rural 
town  in  central  Tanzania,  in  which  is  presently  undergoing  processes  of  primitive 
accumulation,  trade expansion and dawning agricultural  capitalism. The challenge is 
here  to  avoid  inscribing  the  struggle  between  capitalism  and  other  modes  of 
reproduction  in  terms  of  a  historically  linear  progression.  See  appendix  7.5.  on 
resistances to proletarianisation.
1074Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,” 93–4.
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6.1. Poor whites, slaves and revolution
The example of the “poor whites” is not randomly chosen among surplus-populations 
under the capitalist mode of production, but by virtue of the fact that they,  like the 
Roman proletarians, were in direct local 'competition' with slave labour. And European 
proletarians would have likely become wage labourers sooner had mass scale utilisation 
of  slave-labour  in  the  colonies  not  made  mass  migration  of  European  labour 
superfluous.1075 Slavery thus, in some sense, retarded the development of wage-labour, 
while also limiting the power of workers-organisations to negotiate wages. As Northern 
trade  unions  were  painfully  aware  during  the  American  Civil  War  the  fight  against 
slavery was a fight for labour in general. However, as W.E.B. Du Bois argues in Black 
Reconstruction, the revolutionary importance of the abolition of slavery was not just, as 
many American socialists believed, that it created the conditions for a revolution by the 
working  class.  Rather,  the  civil  war  itself  was  immediately  revolutionary.  While 
Northern labour could not seize the war as a chance for revolution, the  rebellion and 
desertation of slaves and poor whites turned the civil war into a revolutionary struggle 
for liberation.1076
6.2. The commons and utopia
Writing  about  More's  Utopia  and  Shakespeare's  The Tempest,  I  have  attempted  the 
following characterisation of this moment: 
In  the  simultaneous  politicisation  and  enclosure  of  the  commons  arises  a 
defiant poetry of defeat, which becomes more than that: The more it becomes a 
defence of something irretrievably lost, the more the hierarchical character of 
the lost communities is forgotten. ...the lost continued to exist in its absence, 
the loss itself became a common possession, a common desire. ... Thus we can 
say that communism constitutes itself around a loss, or a lack. For this reason 
communism  as  a  no-where  (outopia)  is  from  its  beginnings  never  purely 
messianic,  but also an idea shaped like a memory or a mourning. The first 
properly communist movements arose in the meeting between the struggle for 
1075Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 105. 
1076Du Bois quoted in Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism - The Making of the Black Radical Tradition 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 235. 
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the commons and the literary  utopia  (eutopia), in exactly the moment where 
the real  loss  became irredeemably lost,  became lack,  became a progressive 
demand,  became desire.  In  this  moment,  where the  turning back of  history 
became impossible, or reversely, where history became thought as progressing, 
communism became modern.1077
At this moment, however, communism also increasingly becomes stuck in the extreme 
con-temporaneity of the capital-relation.
6.3. The crippling of the proletarian body
 'The uniformity of his [the worker's] stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his 
mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous 
life of a soldier. It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of 
exerting his strength with vigour and perseverance in any other employment than that to 
which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, 
to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every 
improved and civilized society this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the 
great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to 
prevent it.1078
About the same problem, Marx writes that the 
crippling of body and mind is inseparable even from the division of labour in 
society as a whole. ... [T]his social separation of branches of labour .... attacks 
the individual at the very roots of his life, it is the first system to provide the 
materials and the impetus for industrial pathology.1079
For a new development  of the concept  of proletarianisation focussed on the loss of 
savoir  faire  and  savoir  vivre,  which,  however,  forgets  dispossession,  see  Bernard 
Stiegler's For a new Critique of Political Economy.1080
1077Bue Rübner Hansen, “Spøgelse Uden Krop,” Trappe Tusind 2 (April 2009): 9.
1078Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 178 Book V, .
1079Marx, Capital: Volume I, 484. 
1080For a New Critique of Political Economy (Polity Press, 2010). Bue Rübner Hansen and Manuela 
Zechner, “Review of Stiegler’s For a New Critique of Political Economy,” Journal of Labour  
History Forthcoming 2014).
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6.4. The soul of capital 
Marx's,  as we have seen in the previous chapter,  often likens  the capitalist  mode of 
(re)production to an organism. But as Hegel defined a living organism, it needs a 'soul'. 
And  so  does  Marx,  a  moment  which,  according  to  David  McNally  'has  received 
remarkably little attention in the critical literature'.1081 It is of course tempting to reduce 
this to a serious if ironically phrased indictment of capital for its demonic mystifications, 
as is the tendency of McNally's exposition: 'As in religion, so in capitalist society, the 
material world  is subordinated to non-material powers, bodies subordinated to spirits, 
the body of value colonised by the soul of value'.1082
However,  while we certainly find these valances in Marx's argument,  there is also a 
rational content to Marx's argument, which will help us to speak of souls not in terms of 
mystifications,  but as structural determinants of reproductive system-processes ('living 
organisms' broadly speaking). Life, in Hegel, is a very precise moment designating the 
articulation of chemical component into a living process: 'life is a perenniating chemical 
process'.1083 Chemical processes – in Marx's terms labour and money are also chemical, 
i.e.  combining  and  separating  –  do  not  of  their  own  accord  give  rise  to  life,  such 
relations can only be elements in an organism, which is characterised by the mutual 
implication of the reproduction of the elements and the whole. 
Reproduction is the initiation of the whole, the immediate unity-with-self in 
which the whole has at the same time entered into relationship.  The animal 
organism is essentially reproductive, reproduction constitutes its actuality.1084
Logically, the reproduction of the conditions of capital is present only with the second 
circuit1085;  chemism  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  organism,  it  does  so  only  in  the 
contingent event of it looping back on itself. The elements of an organism are replaced 
over time through its relations to its outside, while the process and form of the whole 
stays the same. The structure of this self-relation 'or articulation of into members and 
explansion'  is  the  soul: 'Each  member  has  the  entire  soul  within  it,  and  is  only 
independent  through  its  being  connected  with  the  whole'.1086 The  soul  is  the  self-
relation, or self-feeling of a living whole, in its structure and explansion. As Houlgate 
1081McNally, Monsters of the Market, 125.
1082Ibid., 129
1083Hegel, Philosophy of Nature II, 219.
1084Hegel, Philosophy of Nature III, 110, §353.
1085Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx’s “Capital,” 1:266.
1086Hegel, Philosophy of Nature III, 13, §337.
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notes, the soul 'is not some thing separate from the body, nor is it inserted into the body 
from  the  outside',  but  the  'immateriality  of  nature',  it  is  relational,  recursive  and 
structural rather than material.1087 
In Part Eight of Capital the notion of a capitalist soul appears at the exact point at which 
expropriated peasants have become wage-labourers, mere 'material elements of variable 
capital':
Suppose, for example, that one part of the Westphalian peasantry, who, at the 
time of Frederick II, all span flax, are forcibly expropriated and driven from the 
soil; and suppose that the other part, who remain behind, are turned into the 
day-labourers of large-scale farmers. At the same time, large establishments for 
flax-spinning and weaving arise, and in these the men who have been 'set free' 
now work for wages. The flax looks exactly as it did before. Not a fibre of it is  
changed, but a new social soul has entered into its body.1088
The chemical  element  stays the same,  but it  is  now organised as an element  in the 
process  of  capital.  Likewise  the  labourers  producing  it.  Where  the  labourers  had 
previously  worked  the  land  and  spun  flax  for  their  own reproduction,  their  labour 
mediating themselves with the land, the sustenance of their own bodies (including their 
souls) is now predicated on helping the soul of this new mode of production wander, 
soul-crushing as it may be:
While productive labour is changing the means of production into constituent 
elements  of  a  new  product,  their  value  undergoes  a  metempsychosis 
[Seelenwandrung]. It deserts the consumed body to occupy the newly created 
one. behind the back of the actual labour in progress But this transmigration 
[Seelenwandrung] takes place, as it were, behind the back of the actual labour 
in progress.1089
By producing new value, the labourerer is also part of reproducing or transferring the 
old value embodied in the means of production; the worker is part of reproducing the 
articulation and expansion of the organism, to stave off crises, keep themselves and the 
elements  of  capital  invested  with  its  soul.  So  what  is  this  capitalist  soul?  Against 
Wakefield, Marx insists that it is not a thing, but a relation, or rather the movement of 
1087Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History, 168.
1088Marx, Capital: Volume I, 909. My emphasis.
1089Ibid., 314.
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value through many different relations:
We know that the means of production and subsistence, while they remain the 
property of the immediate producer, are not capital. They only become capital 
under  circumstances  in  which  they  serve  at  the  same  time  as  means  of 
exploitation of, and domination over, the worker.1090
The 'capitalist soul' of the means of production has nothing to do with their material 
substance, it refers to the mode of organisation and expansion of the whole, which Marx 
can speak of as 'dominance' because the members (the workers) are irreducible to their 
function; exploitation, the extraction of surplus-value is the expansive moment.  When 
Marx  famously  let's  the  fetishistic  commodities  'speak  through  the  mouth  of  the 
economists'  in  the  English  translation,  he  is  indeed  referring  to  the  soul  of  the 
commodities (der Warenseele), suggesting that the economists are spiritual mediums. 
These mediums do not distort the message, but perpetuate the fetishism: value is the 
soul of commodities, enacted through their 'intercourse as commodities', i.e. through the 
form of their exchange. This, however, is not merely an empty form hiding the true 
content of the world of commodities, i.e. real labour, but an real, effective form, the 
value-form proper to a society of generalized exchange. Thus, in the chapter on the 
fetish-character of the commodity, Marx writes that when the social relations between 
producers do not appear directly as social  relations, ‘but rather as material  relations 
between persons and social relations between things’, they ‘appear as what they are’.1091 
In chapter 1 of Capital is festishism described is the real relation between things, which 
mediates and at  the same time hides the relationship between producers.  A  relation 
hides a relationship. In the example of flax, in chapter 30 it is the material sameness of 
the commodity that hides the character, the soul of the productive process itself. An 
apparent identity hides  a change of  production of that identity.  Where the differential 
relation used to be producer/land now the relation is that of labour/capital. The “same” 
product  is  the product  not  just  of two different  combinations but  a  moment in two 
different processes of reproduction. The telos of the former is the reproduction of the 
life of the Westphalian peasants, and perhaps of the rulers who extort them, while the 
telos is of the second is capitalist profits. Hereby exploitation also changes from a part 
of  the  product  or  extra  labour  extorted  violently  from  the  peasants  process  of 
reproduction,  whose  consumtion  is  only  reproductive  of  domination  not  of  the 
1090Marx, Capital: Volume I, 933.
1091Ibid., 166.
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producers, where in the second exploitation is directly a part of the reproductive process 
of  both  the  worker  and  of  capital.  Likewise  the  capitalist  merely  becomes  an 
embodiment of the soul of capital:
As a capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital. But 
capital has one sole driving force [Lebenstrieb, life drive], the drive to valorize 
itself,  to  create  surplus-value,  to  make  its  constant  part,  the  means  of 
production, absorb the greatest possible amount of surplus labour. Capital is 
dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives 
the more; the more labour it sucks. The time during which the worker works is 
the time during which the capitalist consumes the labour-power he has bought 
from him. If the worker consumes his disposable time for himself, he robs the 
capitalist.1092
The soul of capital is embodied in the capitalist; the expansive drive of this soul is for 
valorisation. This  soul  is  the  reproductive  bond,  that  which  keeps  the  body  from 
decomposing into its constituent parts. But what is value, from the perspective of the 
class relation? Value is the mediating soul,  the soul that inhabits capital and labour, 
wandering through the production and circulation process. The one soul of capital (as 
mediation of labour and capital) is value. Labour and capital constantly reengages with 
one  another  because  they,  in  their  different  ways,  cannot  reproduce  themselves 
otherwise.  Their  relation  is  essential  to  their  beings,  yet  contradictory.  It  is  a  unity 
because  of  mutual  interdependence  of  the  moments,  and  a  contradiction  because  a 
power-relation, whereby one force dominates the other.
6.5. Mediations stabilise the contradictory responses to problems
Mediations  stabilise  the  contradictory  responses  to  the  problem,  keep  them  from 
becoming explosive, yet they perpetuate them at the very same time. The perpetuation 
of  the contradictions  means old mediations are  continually called forth to  solve the 
problem,  but  always  do  so  insufficiently.  Thus  new,  additional  mediations  are 
continually called for. To take two of the most general examples: the state mediates and 
perpetuates class struggle, class struggle makes the mediation of the state necessary. 
Money mediates buyer and seller, keeps at bay the market-fragmenting difficulties of 
1092Ibid., 342.
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barter, the acts of buying and selling constantly call for the mediation of money.
6.6. On theories of real subsumption
In  recent  years,  the  concept  of  real  subsumption  has  played  an  important  role  in 
periodising  contemporary  capitalism as  the  time in  which  capitalist  domination  and 
exploitation is  extended to all  spheres  of life,  to the social  production of  language, 
affects, and desires.1093 These theorisations can be interpreted as attempts to come to 
terms with the crisis of the Symmetry Thesis, the idea that working-class autonomy 
would grow through its official organisations, mirroring the organisation of capital. In 
his book The Micropolitics of Capital, Jason Read argues that real subsumption today 
means  that  the  production  of  subjectivity  is  not  merely  supplementary  to  capitalist 
production, but the centre of this production itself.  In other terms, that capital is no 
longer subsuming singular bodies and social commons such as language to labour-time 
and  the  wage,  but  instead  it  attempts  to  directly  appropriate  singularity  and  the 
commons.1094 In the same period, Hardt and Negri theorised the real subsumption of the 
whole social  bios, particularly communicative, affective and symbolic labour. 'In the 
biopolitical sphere', they claim, 'life is made to work for production and production is 
made to work for life.'1095  In the face of the total subsumption of living labour, Hardt 
and Negri discovered the total  resistance of life  in  the  multitude,  while  Jason Read 
somewhat more carefully noted that 'it is not possible to produce an antagonistic logic 
of  real  subsumption',  to  draw  a  clear  line  of  antagonism.1096 For  Negri,  the  total 
subsumption of life coincides with the absolute clarity of antagonism. Today '[c]apital 
has conquered and enveloped the entire life-world, its hegemony is global ... there is no 
longer any “outside” in this context ... and ... struggle is now totally “inside”.'1097 
In  either  case,  real  subsumption  is  used  in  order  to  produce  a  periodisation  of 
capitalism,  which  poses  the  question  of  the  difference  of  today  with  respect  to 
yesterday. As a concept of a definite change in the mode of organisation of capitalism, 
real subsumption seems to avoid the typical dangers of periodisation, particularly the 
imposition of a schema external to the matter, or one based on superficial experiential 
1093We can trace this tendency back to the 1960s at least, to Tronti's “social factory” thesis and Guy 
Debord's Society of the spectacle.
1094Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital, 150–51.
1095Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 32.
1096Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital, 151.
1097Antonio Negri, “Communism: Some Thoughts on the Concept and Practice,” in The Idea of  
Communism (London: Verso, 2010), 156.
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changes.1098 However, while  Empire  and  The Micropolitics of Capital were written in 
the  early  millennium,  at  the  highpoint  of  capitalist  triumphalism  and  of  leftist 
exaltations of the productive power of capital, the recent crisis has made it clear that the 
existence of surplus-populations and other proletarians not subsumed by the capitalist 
labour process is not just a Third World relic of the past destined to be erased by the  
teleology of  capital.  The necessity  of  the capital-labour  relation never  abolishes  the 
contingency  of  their  encounter:  in  the  next  chapters  we  will  see  this  when  capital 
produces populations absolutely redundant to its needs, and when lumpenproletarians 
refuse  wage-labour.  Capital  is  dependent  on  this  contingency in  order  to  discipline 
proletarians through competition and other means measured out by the state (workfare, 
benefit sanctions, etc.). We will argue that the freedom of proletarians does not lie in the 
freedom of labour, but only in their organisation in such a way that would abolish this 
contingency in favour of forms of free association.
The critique of real subsumption is indispensable insofar as it theorises the conditions 
under which proletarians come to see the requirements of the mode of production as 
self-evident laws. Yet it is insufficient insofar as its approach to capitalism is limited to 
the critique of actuality.  The limitation of most  such critiques is  that  they focus on 
capitalism's most advanced forms of integration and organisation, its most recent and 
most shiny solutions to the problems of the class antagonism and reproduction. In other 
words, these problems are only understood in the light of its 'solutions' (by which one 
should  not  read  resolutions  or  dissolutions),  and  not  truly  as  problems.1099 As  any 
periodisation, the discourse on real abstractions totalises the present, actuality. It does so 
by theorising capital's latest, most sophisticated modes of closure. Even such theories 
proceed to introduce discourses of a new revolutionary subject or a “new” possibility of 
communism,  etc.,  the  hyperbolic  yet  vague  optimism of  these  attempts  make them 
appear like compensatory gestures. 
1098For a critique of the use of the concept of real subsumption in periodisation see Endnotes, “A 
History of Subsumption.”
1099On mediations, contradictions and problems, see appendix 6.5.
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chapter 7
7.0. Jameson and spatial exhaustion
Fredric Jameson ends his chapter on primitive accumulation in his book Representing 
Capital, with the enumeration of two alternative visions of a post-capitalist future. On 
the one hand a future liberating the forces of capitalism, a socialism more 'modern than 
capitalism and more productive'. The affirmation of such futurism and excitement, he 
asserts, 'is the fundamental task of any left “discursive struggle” today'.1100 On the other 
hand he enlists the anarchist vision of an almost pre-capitalist future, on the model of 
the people growing the land freely,  which he describes as a 'mesmerising image of 
liberation' of independent farmers at the American frontier of old.1101 Such an image, he 
insists, can only result from some sense of utter dissolution of the social order, and work 
on the level of the global totality.1102 
However, Jameson's binary is perhaps a false one. For one thing it hides that between 
the  non-capitalist  reproduction  at  the  frontier  and  the  socialist  Aufhebung of  the 
centralising, modernising and socialising tendencies of capitalism lies the question of 
the  needs  of  surplus-populations,  that  cannot  be  satisfied  under  capitalism.  When 
Jameson asserts that it is 'difficult to imagine any further enlargement of the system', 
while the 'entire world is suddenly sewn into a total system from which no one can 
secede',1103 he  misses  how  the  question  of  capital's  secession  from  a  part  of  the 
proletariat poses the issue of their reproduction outside the capital-relation capital in all 
its  immediacy, yet under conditions of capitalist  domination.  And if  all  the globe is 
commodified this outside is inside, and will immediately be antagonistic to capital. 
1100Jameson, Representing Capital, 90.
1101Jameson has previously argued that the inexistence of such spatial frontier is exactly what gives 
purchase to  Fukuyama's thesis of the End of History. Fredric Jameson, The Cultural Turn: Selected  
Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London: Verso, 2009), 90–92.
1102Ibid., 91.
1103Ibid., 90–1.
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7.1. End of the welfare state exception?
We  might  say  that  the  debates  about  precarity  mark  a  return  to  the  problem  that 
appeared to have been solved when the dream of 'full employment' seemed realistic. In 
other terms, far from being a product of recent capitalist restructuring the condition of 
precarity (insecure employment, the passing between un-, under- and overemployment) 
is capitalism's modus operandi. That a certain euro-centrism or belief in progress (two 
sides of the same coin we might  say),  has turned the 30 to 50 years in which this 
tendency was suspended for a relatively small part of the global proletarian population 
into  the  norm,  must  be  noted.  Indeed  the  majority  of  the  most  advanced 'Western 
Marxist' of the 20th century turn this anomaly into the norm, helped along by focus on 
the dominant  nexus on the West and Japan, and a certain belief that the South would 
eventually catch up – de te fabula narratur - shared by many leaders of the liberation 
struggles  there.  This  anomaly  must,  of  course,  be  explained  in  terms  of  successful 
labour struggles, helped along by the threat from the socialist block and revolutionary 
movements. However, if this was a matter of conditions in which productivity increases 
did not impinge on capital accumulation, the question to be answered is why they didn't, 
and whether this was a regional exception.1104 In any case, the belief in a benevolent 
capitalist dynamic which has been shattered in the Global North, should also entail a 
recognition that this dynamic had its less benevolent effects and conditions elsewhere.
While  the  current  tendencies  to  pauperisation  and precarisation  certainly  have  their 
proximate cause in the weakness of proletarian organisation, this weakness in turn must 
be explained by reference to broader economic tendencies which began undermining 
proletarian organisation at the highpoint of its militancy in the early to mid 1970s, and 
made possible the neoliberal offensive against organised labour in the 1980s. While we 
cannot account for the current debates over the character of the long-downturn since the 
late  1970s,  we  resist  the  political  reading  of  the  past  decades,  which  stress  the 
reversibility of the process and the agency of neoliberal policy makers.1105
1104Answers as to why, which are affirmative of the second question, would count: the fresh ground for 
accumulation after the destruction of value and labour in the Second World War, the cheap raw 
materials brought in from the colonies, the availability of outlets for excess commodities as new 
markets opened up, etc.
1105Cf. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Our 
reference points are here Robert Brenner, “What Is Good for Goldman Sachs Is Good for America - 
the Origins of the Current Crisis,” April 18, 2009,  David McNally, “From Financial Crisis to World-
Slump: Accumulation, Financialisation, and the Global Slowdown,” Historical Materialism 17 (June 
 377
7.2. On peasant communication and organising
Marx and Engels have often been taken to carry a real grudge against the peasantry, an 
idea which is particularly based on the phrase  the 'idiocy [Idiotismus] of rural life', in 
the  Communist   Manifesto.  However,  as  Hal  Draper  remarks  the idea  that  “idiocy” 
equals stupidity is based on a mistranslation. 'In the ninetheenth century German still 
retained  the  orginal  Greek  meaning  of  forms  based  on  the  word  idiotes:  a  private 
person, withdawn from public (communal) concerns, apolitical in the original sense of 
isolation from the wider community'.1106 The backwardness of the peasantry has nothing 
to do with a rejection of rural life, but with the fact that they – in the absence of means 
of communication and transportation – cannot easily participate in organised social life 
and its struggles, except by proxy, exemplified by the long representation of the French 
peasantry by the Bonaparte family.
The solution Marx gives in the 18th Brumaire to the political problem of the peasantry, 
is not to enlighten the peasants as to their true interests, but the creation of channels of 
communication and spaces of community formation, which which the peasantry could 
start  to  articulate  its  own interests.  An example  of  a  movement  which  successfully 
achieved this in the mid 19th century is the Danish Folk High School and Co-operative 
Movement (Folkehøjskole- og Andelsbevægelse), even if this was developed through 
the  organic  participation  of  clergy;  their  leading ideologist  was N.S.F.  Grundtvig,  a 
liberal and nationalist priest.  In the 20th century Maoists and Liberation Theologists 
succeeded with more revolutionary attempts.
7.3. Class formation through radical solutions
Why insist on the construction of new solutions to the problems of live? In The German 
Ideology class is not seen as a sociological category or a determinate relation to capital; 
rather it is a separated and isolated life, that becomes exploited by being organised by 
capital and which is dominated also when not exploited. Marx himself writes that to 
compose a class around a radical problem, a radical solution is needed, 'the abolition of 
2009): 35–83. A '45 year decline in companies’ profitability' is also noted in a report by the 
accountancy firm Deloitte Challenging Times and Opportunities: Unemployment, Volatility, and  
Worker Passion in an Era of Constant Change, Shift Index (Deloitte, 2011).
1106Draper quoted in “Notes from the Editors,” Monthly Review 55, no. 5 (October 2003). Marx and 
Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” 112.
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private property and of labour'. However, this is not merely a matter for the class of 
becoming conscious of its class being, with the help of theory. Private property and 
labour are simply to names of the misfortune of proletarians: being separated from the 
former, they need to engage in the latter. Communism is not simply non-capital. Rather, 
it is a matter of a new mode of combination between the 'isolated individuals, who live 
in relationships daily reproducing this isolation', whereby they form a 'real community' 
in which they 'obtain their freedom in and through their association'.1107 
Remember  how  in  the  Critique  of  Hegel's  Doctrine  of  the  State  the  task  is  the 
disorganisation  of  a  heterogeneous  mass,  and  then  to  pass  through  combination, 
crystallisation,  and the essentially  political  self-organisation of  the mass  against  the 
state. In  the  German  Ideology,  the  pivotal  condiration  of  reproduction  and  the 
'primordial' repression of reproductive labour is added for the first time. The isolated 
individuals are thus to be understood as reproductive units, primarily the families.1108 
The question of dis- and reorganisation is here not a matter of a subjective or political 
distance or withdrawal from the state, but also a problem of increasing the capacity to 
refuse being organised by capital, i.e. to find ways to reproduce oneself beyond capital. 
In revolutionary terms, the question is
...how is it  possible for the proletariat, acting as a class in contradiction with 
capital, within the capitalist mode of production, to abolish itself as a class and 
thereby produce  communism? [Or]... how is it possible for the proletariat to 
reproduce itself  without reproducing itself  as a class? That is:  to reproduce 
itself without reproducing the conditions through which it both reproduces and 
is reproduced by capital?1109
This is not a mere matter of immiseration until the final revolutionary leap, but of what 
Silvia Federici calls 'self-reproducing movements'.1110 The common problem is not lived 
1107Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 1969, 63 and 66 respectively.
1108'That the abolition of individual economy is inseparable from the abolition of the family is self-
evident'. Ibid., 64.
1109Nathan Brown, “The Proletariat,” Trans-Scripts 3 (2013): 71.
1110'We conceptualize this as a movement that would not continuously surge and collapse, surge and 
collapse but would actually have a continuity through all its transformations. This continuity would 
be precisely the ability to also place the needs of people and the relationship of people at the center 
of the organizing. This is also what you are referring to by affectivity as a sharing of space, the 
sharing of reproductivity, like the preparing of food, the conversations in the nights or the sleeping 
together under the tents, of making a sign together, of bringing together this creativity as being an 
extremely important aspect of this movement. For many people it has been really a transformative 
experience inseparable from the specific demands...' Silvia Federici, George Caffentzis, and 
Christian Marazzi, “Debt, Affect and Self-Reproducing Movements,” Eipcp Journal (May 25, 2012).
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as common until it is constructed as such, as a problem that can be solved collectively. 
We  can  thus  paraphrase  Marx's  classical  historico-philosophical  remark  from  A 
Contribution, bringing into a practical register:
Human beings set themselves only such tasks as they are able to solve, since 
closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when 
the material  conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the 
course of formation.1111
This common problem of the proletariat is not just the existence of capital – the relation 
of enmity – but problem of proletarian reproduction. Thus, revolutionary practice is not 
defined  by  antagonism  only,  but  necessarily  also  involves  experiments  with  self-
organised  self-reproduction.  Without  this  it  is  hard  to  imagine  a  movement  that 
abolishes mutual competition and separation more generally. Without this we have only 
common  enmity  and  abstract  theoretical  figures  of  revolutionary  reversal.  But 
communism is not a historically invariable possibility. On the one hand, this means that 
different ages make possible different forms of communism theoretically possible, and 
others impossible or unsustainable.1112 On the other hand, the question of revolutionary 
practice is not one of theoretical conditions of possibility, but rather of the practical 
conditions of construction. 
7.4. The question of violence revisited
If proletarian withdrawal becomes too much of a problem for capital and the state, the 
brute violence of the police or the subtle co-optive violence of the law and money will 
be activated, to try to crush or put proletarians to work. However, within the bounds of 
the current text and a reading of Marx, we cannot analyse the question of violence and 
proletarian self-reproduction at any great length. What we can do is briefly outline some 
of the stakes in the discussion, and what seems to need consideration. First, non-violent 
deconstituent violence. Second, self-defence of self-reproduction, and self-reproduction 
as self-defence. Third, the question of order.
In  her  1970  text  'Let's  Spit  on  Hegel',  Carla  Lonzi  insists  on  overcoming  the 
antagonistic model of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, which posits a violent unification 
1111Compare with Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” 263.
1112Primitive communism under the capitalist mode of production is marginally possible, but 
unsustainable. Global communism in precapitalist times is impossible. 
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of  the  side  of  the  slave.  WhatMao  called  the  'contradiction  with  in  the  people'  is 
repressively subordinated to the contradiction with the enemy. 
Women now affirm that the proletariat  [in the hegemonic definition of the communist 
parties of the period] is revolutionary vis-à-vis capitalism, but reformist vis-à-vis the  
patriarchal system.1113
Against  the  patriarchal  difference-obliterating  model  of  enmity,  she  points  to  the 
actuality  of  strategies  of  withdrawal,  which  break  out  of  the  military  analogy  of 
opposing armies: 'the woman who rejects the family, and the young man who rejects 
war'.1114 The  suggestion here is  that  proletarian  struggle  against  the enemy must  be 
subordinated  to  the  construction  of  proletarian  solutions.  However,  overcoming  the 
relation  with  the  capitalist  master  is  obviously  not  achieved  through  only  through 
withdrawal.
The gains of quiet encroachments and other strategies of proletarian reproduction must 
be  defended  by  the  state's  and  private  security  firms  re-imposition  of  proletarian 
separation.  Self-reproduction  can  become  a  question  of  self-defence,  but  also  an 
offensive weapon, and as such a threat to the state. Think of the violent repression of the 
Black Panthers' survival programs.1115 The question to the survival strategies of surplus-
population could be framed: survival pending revolution or pending employment? Huey 
P.  Newton's  assessment  in  his  doctoral  dissertation  is  helpful  in  mapping  out  the 
question, but also in measuring a historical and theoretical distance, and the need to 
undertake different experiments under different circumstances: 
While  the  FBI  rationalized  that  it  took  these  neutralizing  steps  against  the 
Black Panther Party in order to curb its violent propensities, the truth is that 
what the bureau felt most threatening were survival programs providing free 
breakfasts to school children and other constructive services. No single feature 
of the Panthers  made them so feared or  disliked by the government;  many 
organizations possessed either a revolutionary ideology, community service, or 
a  willingness  to  engage in  legal  struggle  to  achieve their  goals.  It  was  the 
combination  of  all  of  these  features,  pitched  to  a  group  that  had  been 
1113Carla Lonzi, “Let’s Spit on Hegel,” in Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel, ed. Patricia 
Jagentowicz Mills (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1996), 282.
1114Ibid., 281.
1115JoNina M. Abron, “‘Serving the People’: The Survival Programs of the Black Panther Party,” in 
Black Panther Party Reconsidered: Reflections and Scholarship, ed. Charles Earl Jones (Baltimore: 
Black Classic Press, 1998), 177–192.
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historically and systematically excluded from full participation in democratic 
capitalist America, that made the Party different, and dangerously so.1116
It seems clear that the traction of the Black Panther Party has to do with its ability to 
organise  concrete  solutions  to  the  problems  of  the  surplus-populations  and 
lumpenproletarians in the North American ghettos: community patrolling of the police, 
free health clinics, liberation schools, free legal aid, etc.1117 
However,  the  Panthers  were finally  repressed,  and what  they  had spoken of  as  the 
colonial  occupation  of  their  neighbourhoods  was  re-established  by  the  police. 
Bonaparte, also, managed to unite the bourgeoisie under his rule, as the leader of the 
army.  They  united  under  his  force,  not  because  he  could  bring  order  as  such,  but 
because  he  could  make  sure  that  no  radical  solutions  were  invented  which  would 
threaten the bourgeois mode of exploiting the proletariat.1118 The bourgeoisie wanted 
reproduction of the class relation, at any cost, even at its own submission to the Gewalt  
of the Bonapartist state:
Thus by now stigmatizing as "socialistic" what it had previously extolled as 
"liberal," the bourgeoisie confesses that its own interests dictate that it should 
be delivered from the danger of its own rule; that to restore tranquillity in the 
country its bourgeois parliament must, first of all, be given its quietus; that to 
preserve its  social  power intact its  political  power must be broken; that the 
individual  bourgeois  can  continue  to  exploit  the  other  classes  and to  enjoy 
undisturbed property, family, religion, and order only on condition that their 
class be condemned along with the other classes to like political nullity....1119
The liberals, write Marx, will accept both ordered disorder and dictatorship to avoid 
loosing their privilege. 
1116Huey P. Newton, War Against The Panthers: A Study Of Repression In America - Doctoral 
Dissertation (Santa Cruz, CA: UC Santa Cruz, 1980), 
1117For a list of 65 of their community programmes see “Black Panther Community Programs 1966-
1982,” The Black Panther Party Research Project (Stanford, California: Stanford University, 2013). 
What do we do today with the fact that the Panthers did not draw a clear distinction between the 
pedagogics of the breakfast programmes and the politics of community self-reproduction on the one 
hand, and the idea of revolutionary 'consciousness' on the other? For instance, Bobby Seale writes: 
'A revolutionary program is one set forth by revolutionaries, by those who want to change the 
existing system to a better system. A reform program is set up by the existing exploitative system as 
an appeasing handout to fool the people and keep them quiet … The revolutionary struggle becomes 
bloody when the pig power structure attacks organizations and groups of people who go forward 
with these programs'. Seale, Seize the Time, 141.
1118Marx, “18th Brumaire,” 484.
1119Ibid., 436.
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after the coup d’état the French bourgeoisie cried out: Only the Chief of the 
Society of December 10 [Bonaparte]  can still  save bourgeois  society!  Only 
theft  can  still  save  property;  only  perjury,  religion;  bastardy,  the  family; 
disorder, order!1120
What  is  crucial  to  note  here  is  that  the  relation  between  revolution  and  counter-
revolution is not one  between order and disorder, but between different forms of order 
and disorder. To establish a new mode of social organisation requires disorganisation of 
what the opposing side has organised, and organisation of what is disorganised on one's 
side. The real danger of fascism seems to occur under in crises where the revolutionary 
forces  cannot  solve the problem of  organisation of  what  has been disorganised,  but 
where the problem of disorganisation calls out for a solution. Thus, in Marx's reading, in 
the crisis of 1848-52 the father figure of Louis Bonaparte could step in to bring order 
with force from outside, because no social force managed to organise the contingencies 
of the situation.
7.5. The proletariat and the resistance to proletarianisation
As shown by Rediker and Linebaugh, the labour of primitive accumulation was carried 
out by proletarians. Yet, as they also stress, many proletarians ran away to to set up their 
own commons in the new world, or to live among Native Americans and marooned 
slaves. In producing capital,  the working class produces the weapons and the cheap 
commodities,  the  colonists  and  soldiers  of  expropriation.  This  poses  the  difficult 
question  of  the  relation  between  the  proletariat  and  those  that  are  resisting 
proletarianisation. It poses the the task of thinking the problem of capital not from the 
point of view of the problem of the proletariat, but from the point of view the problem 
of  subsistence  producers,  nomads  and hunters.1121 In  a  similar  argument  to  the  one 
quoted from Jameson in chapter 7,  Žižek recently said,  'this  is the ABC of being a 
communist. You have to go to the end, through capitalist modernisation. There is no 
way  back'.1122 Clearly  the  choice  between  an  impossible  return  to  the  past  and  a 
1120Ibid., 484.
1121A significant, if decreasing population of the worlds population are still peasants. To see in this 
decrease merely the end of the past, and not struggles against proletarianisation and for a different 
future, is positively genocidal. Samir Amin, “World Poverty, Pauperization, & Capital 
Accumulation,” Monthly Review no. October (2003).
1122Slavoj Žižek, “Freedom in the Clouds” (presented at the Communism, A New Beginning, Cooper 
Union, New York: Verso, 2011), 8mins, 00sec.
 383
wonderful modernised present and future is a false choice, even if it is understandable 
that  contemporary  tendencies  to  capitalist  decadence  makes  it  tempting  to  reaffirm 
modernity  against  the  bourgeoisie.  Even  bracketing  the  ecological  costs  of 
modernisation,  the  question  is  if  it  is  even  possible  to  continue  technological 
modernisation without colonial and neo-colonial looting and access to oil  ad libitum. 
However,  the  point  here  is  not  to  get  into  a  discussion  of  modernism,  or  counter-
modernities, but to ask simply the question of revolutionary practice: in what ways is it 
possible to combine potentialities for communism against capitalist dominance? This is 
the question Marx grappled with in his letter to Vera Zasulich. 
in  Russia,  thanks  to  a  unique  combination  of  circumstances,  the  rural 
commune, still  established on a nationwide scale, may gradually detach itself 
from its  primitive features  and develop directly  as an element  of collective 
production on a nationwide scale. It is precisely thanks to its contemporaneity 
with  capitalist  production  that  it  may  appropriate  the  latter's  positive 
acquisitions without experiencing all its frightful misfortunes.1123
From the  point  of  view of  an  orientation  toward  the  possibility  of  communism,  the 
decisive point is that the peasants of the rural commune can compose with the communist 
goals of the proletariat. And indeed, in terms of non-proletarian ways of life, there is an 
important sense in which these populations might hold some of the answer to how to 
live  non-capitalistically,  using  their  land  in  common,  yet  working  it  as  singular 
individuals.  The challenge is here to avoid inscribing the struggle between capitalism 
and other modes of reproduction in terms of a historically linear progression. Further, 
the   forms  of  indirect  capitalist  exploitation,  which  happen  through  the  ultimate 
connection of of most petty market producers with the world and the increasing role of 
debt  in  the  form of  micro-credit  in  rural  communities,  must  not  be  thought  of  as 
'underdeveloped', but in their contradictory integration with the current world system. 
As Massimiliano Tomba writes:
Assuming  ...  the  reciprocal  co-penetration  between  absolute  and  relative 
surplus-value ... the distinction between “advanced” and “backward” capitalism 
loses  a  part  of  its  significance'  thus  'we  must  consider  the  possibilities  of 
liberation resulting from different temporalities of different social forms.1124
1123First draft of Marx’s “Letter To Vera Zasulich,” 349.
1124Massimiliano Tomba, “Accumulation and Time: Marx’s Historiography from the Grundrisse to 
Capital,” Capital & Class 37, no. 3 (October 1, 2013): 367–68.
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